Chinese
一和异 任何地方都不应说，因为那有陷入两种过失的缘故。那又是哪些呢？要么有蕴是我的过失，要么有我实有存在的过失。如果我和蕴是一个实体，那么我是和蕴相同吗？蕴和我是相同的吗？如果按照第一种情况，如同蕴是众多无常的事物一样，我也将成为具有众多无常自性的事物。如果按照第二种情况，如同我是常恒、唯一、自主的一样，蕴也将成为常恒、唯一、自主的过失。如果我和蕴二者是其他实体，那样是不行的，因为人我是实体之故。这样写道，仅仅这些也不能损害先前的观点，因为也承认我是实体，但如果是其他实体，就必须存在于清净识的境中，必须那样提出理性的技巧。所谓清净识，是指未被暂时的错乱因所染污的根识上清晰显现，以及未被意识错乱的显现上明显生起。因为清净识的境中安立，如果我存在于实体中，就必须存在于那些境中。比如由于暂时的错乱因，眼花缭乱而看到毛发掉落，错乱因存在于根识上。所谓快速旋转，是说火花快速 旋转，显现为圆形，错乱因存在于境上。还有，坐在船中的人，船向下行驶，看到左右的山等向上奔跑，错乱因存在于处所上。还有，黄疸病人看到海螺是黄色的，错乱因存在于内部。还有，梦中的显现出现各种各样的形象，错乱因存在于意识上等等。未被那些暂时的错乱因所染污，称为清净识。第三个要点是驳斥不可言说的补特伽罗我，如上文所示，从承认我和蕴是一和异，看到那些损害性的理性能造成损害后，住子部的宗派们，通常人我是以实体存在，但既不说是和蕴相同，也不说是和蕴相异，因此那本身是其他不可言说的，世尊
English
One and different It should not be said anywhere, because there are two faults involved in that. What are they? Either there is the fault that the aggregates are me, or there is the fault that I exist as a substance. If I and the aggregates are one entity, then am I the same as the aggregates? Are the aggregates and I the same? According to the first case, just as the aggregates are many impermanent things, I will also become something with many impermanent natures. According to the second case, just as I am permanent, unique, and independent, the aggregates will also become the fault of being permanent, unique, and independent. If I and the aggregates are other entities, that is not possible, because the person I is a substance. It is written that just these cannot harm the previous view, because it is also admitted that I am a substance, but if it is another substance, it must exist in the realm of pure consciousness, and the rational technique must be presented in that way. The so-called pure consciousness refers to the clear appearance on the root consciousness that has not been contaminated by temporary causes of confusion, and the manifest arising on the appearance that has not been confused by consciousness. Because it is established in the realm of pure consciousness, if I exist in substance, it must exist in those realms. For example, due to temporary causes of confusion, such as dizziness, seeing hair falling out, the cause of confusion exists on the root consciousness. The so-called rapid rotation is the rapid rotation of sparks, appearing as a circle, the cause of confusion exists on the object. Also, a person sitting in a boat, the boat going down, seeing the mountains on the left and right running upwards, the cause of confusion exists on the place. Also, a jaundiced person seeing a conch shell as yellow, the cause of confusion exists internally. Also, dream appearances appearing in various forms, the cause of confusion exists on the consciousness, and so on. That which is not contaminated by those temporary causes of confusion is called pure consciousness. The third point is to refute the inexpressible person I. As shown above, from admitting that I and the aggregates are one and different, seeing that those harmful reasons can cause harm, the Sthavira schools generally believe that the person I exists as a substance, but neither say that it is the same as the aggregates, nor say that it is different from the aggregates, therefore that itself is something else that cannot be expressed, the Blessed One
Chinese
佛陀也曾在经中说，比丘们，有作为作者的补特伽罗，也有承担责任的补特伽罗，我既不说常，也不说无常。因此，他们说，经中已表明承担责任的补特伽罗是实有的，并且说了常与无常都不可说。但那部经的本意并非如此，承担责任的补特伽罗，只是表明了依赖五蕴状态的假有而已，而并非实有，所以才说常与无常都不可说。如果实有，就必须是常或无常中的一种，但因为对它常与无常都不可说，所以表明它并非实有，只是假立而已。因此，那个论证是不成立的，而且也有理证的妨害。说补特伽罗是实有，又说它与蕴既非一也非异，这二者是相违的。如果实有，就必须是一或异中的一种，如果既非一也非异，那就与实有相违了。对此，前派辩解说没有过失，因为这是由譬喻比量所成立的。例如，木柴燃烧时，在木柴尚未化为灰烬之前，火与木柴不可分离，就像在那样的时刻，火与木柴既非一也非异一样，我和蕴二者也是如此。一般而言，因为譬喻比量并非清净的比量，所以那个譬喻不能成立。然而，火与木柴二者，是显而易见可以观察到是各异的。因为木柴是地界的自性，而火是火界的自性。从自性的角度来说也是各异的。而且世间也显而易见地看到火从木柴蔓延到很远的地方。而且经典中也从未说过火与木柴二者不可说是同一或他异。从这些方面来说，可以成立它们二者是可以说为各异的。第四个要点是驳斥认为“我”是作者的观点，其中有驳斥认为能生起识，驳斥认为能自在，以及依彼而驳斥三种。这里先讲第一个。
English
The Buddha also said in the sutras, "Monks, there are persons who are doers, and there are persons who bear responsibility. I do not say permanent, nor do I say impermanent." Therefore, they say that the sutra has shown that the person who bears responsibility is substantially existent, and it has been said that neither permanence nor impermanence can be spoken of. But the intention of that sutra is not like that. The person who bears responsibility is only showing the imputed existence that depends on the state of the five aggregates, and because it is not substantially existent, it is said that neither permanence nor impermanence can be spoken of. If it were substantially existent, it would have to be either permanent or impermanent, but because neither permanence nor impermanence can be spoken of about it, it is shown that it is not substantially existent, but merely imputed. Therefore, that argument is not established, and there is also a logical contradiction. Saying that the person is substantially existent, and also saying that it is neither one with nor different from the aggregates, these two are contradictory. If it were substantially existent, it would have to be either one or different, but if it is neither one nor different, then it contradicts being substantially existent. To this, the former party argues that there is no fault, because it is established by the analogy of comparison. For example, when firewood is burning, at the moment when the firewood has not yet turned to ashes, the fire and the firewood are inseparable, just as at that moment, the fire and the firewood are neither one nor different, so too are the self and the aggregates. In general, because the analogy of comparison is not a pure measure, that analogy cannot be established. However, the fire and the firewood are clearly seen to be different. Because firewood is characterized by the earth element, and fire is characterized by the fire element. They are also different from the point of view of characteristics. And in the world, it is also clearly seen that fire spreads far from firewood. And the scriptures have never said that fire and firewood cannot be said to be the same or different. From these aspects, it can be established that they can be said to be different. The fourth point is to refute the view that the self is an agent, which includes refuting the view that it can generate consciousness, refuting the view that it can control, and refuting based on that itself, these three. Here, we will first discuss the first.
Chinese
哦，是这样的。从眼睛的色所见者到意识的法所知者之间的六者，以及作者、领受异熟者、知取舍者、以道修习而解脱者等，宣说了人我的十种作用等。例如，经中说“眼睛是色的见者”，自宗小乘部派和外道都承认，有能见色之作用的人我实有。对此，如果人我的我进行观看色的生起眼识的作用，那么，是进行新产生眼识的作用呢？还是对由其他因缘先前已产生的识进行作用呢？如果按照第一种情况，眼识是近取因和俱生缘，因为见到从这两种因缘存在而产生识。人我的我对于产生识的因缘的作用，因为没有必要，所以认为它是生起之因是没有意义的。所谓“有二”的这种情况，其他的解释说是因为从境和根二者产生识，这样解释不太好，自己的宗派就是上面所说的那样。因为这个原因，人我的我不能成为从色之见者到解脱者之间的作用之因。如果按照第二种情况，对于因缘已经产生的眼识等，再次产生的作用是不合理的，因为对于从其他因缘已经产生的，再次产生是没有必要的。第二，驳斥认为是自在的观点。如果人我的我以主宰的方式进行自在，如果是一个，那么，不应该有不想要的发生，也不应该阻止不想要的发生。例如，如果眼识见到一个悦意的色境，人我的我以主宰的方式进行自在，那么，应该使悦意的色境永远不坏，恒常存在，但是，不是那样，悦意的境完全坏灭，产生不悦意的形象。
English
Oh, it is like this. From the eye's form-seer to the mind's dharma-knower, the six, as well as the agent, the one who experiences the ripening, the one who knows what to accept and reject, and the one who is liberated by meditating on the path, etc., explain the ten kinds of actions of the person. For example, when it is said that "the eye is the seer of form," the self-sectarian Hearers and other outsiders acknowledge that there is a person who performs the action of seeing form as a substance. In this regard, if the self of the person performs the action of generating eye consciousness that sees form, then, is it performing the action of newly generating eye consciousness? Or is it acting on a consciousness that has already been generated by other causes and conditions? According to the first case, eye consciousness is the immediate cause and the accompanying condition, because it is seen that consciousness arises from the existence of these two causes and conditions. The self of the person, for the action of the causes and conditions that generate consciousness, because it is not necessary, it is meaningless to consider it as the cause of arising. The so-called "having two" situation, other explanations say that consciousness arises from the two, object and sense faculty, this explanation is not very good, and one's own doctrine is the same as the one mentioned above. For that reason, the self of the person cannot be the cause of action from the seer of form to the liberator. According to the second case, it is unreasonable to perform the action of re-generating on the eye consciousness, etc., that has already been generated by causes and conditions, because it is not necessary to re-generate what has already been generated from other causes and conditions. Second, refuting the view that it is independent. If the self of the person is independent in the manner of a master, if it is one, then it should not be that what is not desired occurs, nor should it prevent what is not desired from occurring. For example, if eye consciousness sees a pleasant object, and the self of the person is independent in the manner of a master, then it should make the pleasant object never perish and always exist, but it is not like that, the pleasant object is completely destroyed, and an unpleasant image arises.
Chinese
因为要看见的缘故。再说，有补特伽罗的我想要可意的境，不想要不可意的境， 从可意境的刹那间，也产生不可意境的刹那，由此也成立了不是自在者。此外，没有说补特伽罗我的作用和体性是这样，就说补特伽罗我是实有，是不合理的，如果它是实有，就必须成立它的作用是这样，体性是这样。因为必须成立作用和体性。对于自宗说补特伽罗我是实有的人，就要施设那个太极，但是对于外道，由于他们各自承认补特伽罗我的体性，所以即使施设太极也没有意义。其中，数论派和胜论派等认为补特伽罗我是能知的，并且认为它具有颜色和形状，有些如理作意者等认为补特伽罗我是物质，裸形外道们认为补特伽罗我与身体的尺寸相等，身体大，我也大，身体小，我也小，以这种方式存在，有些人认为补特伽罗我是男根林伽的形状，有些人认为补特伽罗我只有微尘的大小， 所有这些人都共同认为我是常恒、唯一、自在的。然而，裸形外道们则承认我是自性常恒，变化无常。因为各自承认我的体性。此外，对于声闻部你们，如果承认补特伽罗我是实有，那么就会被三种圆满菩提所损害，也就是甚深菩提、不共菩提和出世间菩提。其中，第一种是，由于在远离一切戏论中证得菩提，所以安立为甚深菩提，如果补特伽罗我是实有、真实成立的，那么薄伽梵也必须证悟它，如果这样证悟，那么它就是有戏论的，因此与甚深菩提相违。第二种是，补特伽罗我是实有、真实的