Tibetan
་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ། མཉམ་གཞག་གིས་སེམས་ཏེ་ཡེ་ཤེས་ལ་དམིགས་པ་ཅི་ཡང་འཛིན་པ་མེད་པའི་ཚུལ་གྱིས་གནས་པ་ནི་ནམ་མཁའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། དཔེར་ན་ནམ་མཁའ་ལ་གནས་ཞེས་པ། ཅི་ལ་ཡང་མི་གནས་པ་ལ་དེར་ཐ་སྙད་བཏགས་པ་བཞིན་ནོ། །གཉིས་པ་ནི། རྣལ་འབྱོར་སྤྱོད་པ་པ་དག སྟོང་པ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ངོ་བོ་རིག་པ་ཡིན་པ་དང་། དེ་ཡང་གཞན་སྟོང་ཁོ་ནར་ཡིན་གྱི། རང་གི་ངོ་བོས་མི་སྟོང་པ་དེ་ཉིད་ཡེ་ཤེས་ཀྱི་བསྒོམ་བྱ་དང་། རྣལ་འབྱོར་མངོན་སུམ་གྱི་རིག་བྱ་ཡིན། དེ་ལས་གཞན་དུ་མེད་པ་གཞན་སེལ་རྟོག་པའི་བློ་ལ་ནི། མངོན་སུམ་གྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཞུགས་པ་མེད་དོ་ཞེས་ཟེར་རོ། །དེ་དགག་པ་ལ་གཉིས་ཏེ། རང་སྟོང་ཁོ་ན་སྟོང་ཉིད་ཀྱི་དོན་དུ་འཆད་དགོས་པ་དང་། ཡེ་ཤེས་ཀྱི་ངོ་བོ་སྐད་ཅིག་མ་ཡིན་པ་དང་། རང་སྟོང་དུ་ཁས་ལེན་དགོས་པ་དང་། རང་སྟོང་ཁོ་ན་ཆོས་རྣམས་ཀྱི་རང་བཞིན་དུ་བསྟན་པའོ། །དང་པོ་ནི། སྟོང་ཉིད་སེང་གེའི་སྒྲ་ཡིས་ནི། དངོས་པོར་སྨྲ་བར་ཐམས་ཅད་སྐྲག་པར་མཛད་པ་དེ་དག་གང་དང་གང་དུ་བཞུགས་པ་དེ་དང་དེར་ནི། སྟོང་པ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ཆོས་སྟོན་པ་ཡོད་པར་འགྱུར་གྱིས། གཞན་སྟོང་ཙམ་ཞིག་སྨྲ་བ་དག་ལ་ནི་དེ་ཡོད་པ་མིན་ནོ། །གཉིས་པ་ནི། རྣལ་འབྱོར་སྤྱོད་པ་བས་སེམས་སྐད་ཅིག་མར་ཁས་ལེན་པ་དང་ 7-5-15a རང་སྟོང་དུ་མི་འདོད་པ་འགལ་ཏེ། གྲུབ་པའི་མཐའ་གང་གི་ལུགས་ལ་རྣམ་ཤེས་སྐད་ཅིག་མ་ཉིད་དུ་སྨྲ་བ་དེའི་ལུགས་ཀྱི་སེམས་དེ་ནི་རྟག་པ་མིན་དགོས་ལ། སེམས་མི་རྟག་པ་ཉིད་དེ། སྐད་ཅིག་ཀྱང་རང་གི་ངོ་བོས་གནས་པའི་སྐབས་མེད་པ་ཡིན་ན། རང་གི་ངོ་བོས་སྟོང་པ་ཉིད་དུ་ཇི་ལྟར་འགལ་ཏེ། དེས་སྟོང་དགོས་པའི་ཕྱིར། མདོར་ན་རྫོགས་པའི་སངས་རྒྱས་དེ་དག སེམས་ནི་རང་སྟོང་དུ་ཅི་ཕྱིར་ན་མི་བཞེད་པར་འགྱུར་ཏེ། སངས་རྒྱས་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་ནི་སེམས་ནི་མི་རྟག་པ་ཉིད་དུ་བཞེད་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཁྱབ་འགྲེལ་ནི། ཇི་སྐད་དུ། མི་རྟག་དོན་ནི་མེད་དོན་དང་། །ཞེས་འབྱུང་བ་ལྟར། སྐྱེ་ཡང་གནས་པའི་གོ་སྐབས་མེད་པ་ཞིག་འཆད་པའི་ཕྱིར། གསུམ་པ་ནི། སེམས་ངོ་བོས་སྟོང་པར་ཁས་བླངས་ན། རྒྱང་འཕན་ལྟར་ཆད་པར་འགྱུར་རོ་ཞེ་ན། རྒྱང་འཕན་གྱིས་ནི་ཀུན་རྫོབ་ལ་ལྟོས་པའི་ཆད་ལྟ་ཁས་བླངས་པ་ཡིན་ལ། འདིར་ནི་གནས་ལུགས་ལ་སེམས་པའི་དབང་དུ་བྱས་པས་མི་མཚུངས་སོ། །ཞེས་འཆད་པ་ནི། དངོས་པོ་རང་བཞིན་གྱིས་གྲུབ་པ་ཞིག་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པ་ཉིད་དུ་བརྗོད་ན་ཆད་པར་འགྱུར་ཡང་། དེ་ལྟར་བརྗོད་པ་མིན་ཏེ། ཐོག་མ་མེད་པ་ནས་སེམས་ཀྱི་རང་བཞིན་རྟག་ཏུ་མེད་པར་གྲུབ་པས་སོ། །དེའི་ཤེས་བྱེད་ཀྱང་སེམས་ཐོག་མ་ནས་མི་རྟག་པ་ཡིན་པ་དེ་སྐད་དུ་བརྗོད་ན། སེམས་ཀྱིས་ནི་བདག་གིས་ངོ་བོ་སྐད་ཅིག་ཀྱང་གནས་པ་སྤངས་པ་ཡིན་ལ། དེ་སྤངས་ན་རང་གིས་རང་བཞིན་ལས་འདས་པ་སྟེ་མེ
Chinese
因为等持（Samahita）以心专注于智慧，不执著任何事物的方式安住，这是虚空的体性。例如，如同说安住于虚空，实际上是不安住于任何事物，只是在那里安立了名称。第二种观点是，瑜伽行者认为空性的自性是觉知，而且仅仅是'他空'（gzhan stong），并非以自己的自性不空，那才是智慧的所观和瑜伽现量所觉知的对象。除了那之外，对于排除其他的分别念来说，没有现量的体性涉入。他们这样说。为了驳斥这些观点，有两点：必须解释唯有'自空'（rang stong）才是空性的意义；智慧的自性不是刹那性的；必须承认'自空'；唯有'自空'才被揭示为诸法的自性。第一点是，空性如狮子吼，能使所有执著实有的人都感到恐惧，无论他们住在哪里，在那里就会有空性的教法被宣说，而仅仅宣说'他空'的人则不会有这种情况。第二点是，瑜伽行者承认心是刹那性的，但不希望'自空'，这是矛盾的。在任何宗义中，如果说识是刹那性的，那么按照那个宗义，心必然不是常恒的。心不是常恒的，因为即使是一刹那，心也没有以自己的自性安住的时候，那么怎么能不以自己的自性空呢？因为它必须是空的。总之，圆满的佛陀们为什么不认为心是'自空'呢？因为佛陀们认为心不是常恒的。注释中说：'无常的意义是没有。'正如所说，解释为生起后没有安住的机会。第三点是，如果承认心以自性空，那么会像断灭论一样吗？断灭论是承认依赖于世俗的断见，而这里是就安住实相的角度而言，所以不相同。这样解释说：如果说一个以自性成立的事物没有自性，那就会变成断灭论，但并非如此说，因为从无始以来，心的自性就一直被认为是空性的。这方面的证据是，如果说心从一开始就是无常的，那么心就放弃了以'我'的自性安住哪怕一刹那，如果放弃了那一点，那就是超越了自己的自性，也就是没有了。 因为等持（Samahita）以心专注于智慧，不执著任何事物的方式安住，这是虚空的体性。例如，如同说安住于虚空，实际上是不安住于任何事物，只是在那里安立了名称。第二种观点是，瑜伽行者认为空性的自性是觉知，而且仅仅是'他空'（他空），并非以自己的自性不空，那才是智慧的所观和瑜伽现量所觉知的对象。除了那之外，对于排除其他的分别念来说，没有现量的体性涉入。他们这样说。为了驳斥这些观点，有两点：必须解释唯有'自空'（自空）才是空性的意义；智慧的自性不是刹那性的；必须承认'自空'；唯有'自空'才被揭示为诸法的自性。第一点是，空性如狮子吼，能使所有执著实有的人都感到恐惧，无论他们住在哪里，在那里就会有空性的教法被宣说，而仅仅宣说'他空'的人则不会有这种情况。第二点是，瑜伽行者承认心是刹那性的，但不希望'自空'，这是矛盾的。在任何宗义中，如果说识是刹那性的，那么按照那个宗义，心必然不是常恒的。心不是常恒的，因为即使是一刹那，心也没有以自己的自性安住的时候，那么怎么能不以自己的自性空呢？因为它必须是空的。总之，圆满的佛陀们为什么不认为心是'自空'呢？因为佛陀们认为心不是常恒的。注释中说：'无常的意义是没有。'正如所说，解释为生起后没有安住的机会。第三点是，如果承认心以自性空，那么会像断灭论一样吗？断灭论是承认依赖于世俗的断见，而这里是就安住实相的角度而言，所以不相同。这样解释说：如果说一个以自性成立的事物没有自性，那就会变成断灭论，但并非如此说，因为从无始以来，心的自性就一直被认为是空性的。这方面的证据是，如果说心从一开始就是无常的，那么心就放弃了以'我'的自性安住哪怕一刹那，如果放弃了那一点，那就是超越了自己的自性，也就是没有了。 因为等持（Samahita）以心专注于智慧，不执著任何事物的方式安住，这是虚空的体性。例如，如同说安住于虚空，实际上是不安住于任何事物，只是在那里安立了名称。第二种观点是，瑜伽行者认为空性的自性是觉知，而且仅仅是'他空'（他空），并非以自己的自性不空，那才是智慧的所观和瑜伽现量所觉知的对象。除了那之外，对于排除其他的分别念来说，没有现量的体性涉入。他们这样说。为了驳斥这些观点，有两点：必须解释唯有'自空'（自空）才是空性的意义；智慧的自性不是刹那性的；必须承认'自空'；唯有'自空'才被揭示为诸法的自性。第一点是，空性如狮子吼，能使所有执著实有的人都感到恐惧，无论他们住在哪里，在那里就会有空性的教法被宣说，而仅仅宣说'他空'的人则不会有这种情况。第二点是，瑜伽行者承认心是刹那性的，但不希望'自空'，这是矛盾的。在任何宗义中，如果说识是刹那性的，那么按照那个宗义，心必然不是常恒的。心不是常恒的，因为即使是一刹那，心也没有以自己的自性安住的时候，那么怎么能不以自己的自性空呢？因为它必须是空的。总之，圆满的佛陀们为什么不认为心是'自空'呢？因为佛陀们认为心不是常恒的。注释中说：'无常的意义是没有。'正如所说，解释为生起后没有安住的机会。第三点是，如果承认心以自性空，那么会像断灭论一样吗？断灭论是承认依赖于世俗的断见，而这里是就安住实相的角度而言，所以不相同。这样解释说：如果说一个以自性成立的事物没有自性，那就会变成断灭论，但并非如此说，因为从无始以来，心的自性就一直被认为是空性的。这方面的证据是，如果说心从一开始就是无常的，那么心就放弃了以'我'的自性安住哪怕一刹那，如果放弃了那一点，那就是超越了自己的自性，也就是没有了。
English
Because Samahita (equal settling) abides with the mind focused on wisdom, without clinging to anything, that is the nature of space. For example, like saying abiding in space, it actually does not abide in anything, but a name is given there. The second view is that Yogacharas (practitioners of yoga) consider the essence of emptiness to be awareness, and that is only 'other-empty' (gzhan stong), not empty of its own essence, that is the object of meditation of wisdom and the object of direct perception of yoga. Other than that, for the discriminating mind that eliminates others, the characteristic of direct perception does not enter. They say that. To refute these views, there are two points: it must be explained that only 'self-empty' (rang stong) is the meaning of emptiness; the nature of wisdom is not momentary; 'self-empty' must be admitted; only 'self-empty' is revealed as the nature of all phenomena. The first point is that emptiness, like a lion's roar, frightens all those who speak of entities, wherever they reside, there will be the teaching of emptiness, but those who only speak of 'other-empty' do not have that. The second point is that it is contradictory for Yogacharas to admit that the mind is momentary but not want 'self-empty'. In whatever tenet system it is said that consciousness is momentary, according to that system, the mind must not be permanent. The mind is not permanent, because even for a moment, the mind does not have the opportunity to abide by its own essence, so how can it not be empty of its own essence? Because it must be empty. In short, why do the perfect Buddhas not consider the mind to be 'self-empty'? Because the Buddhas consider the mind to be impermanent. The commentary says: 'The meaning of impermanence is non-existence.' As it is said, it is explained as there being no opportunity to abide after arising. The third point is, if it is admitted that the mind is empty of its own nature, will it become like annihilationism? Annihilationism admits a view of cessation dependent on the conventional, but here it is considered from the perspective of abiding in reality, so it is not the same. It is explained that if it is said that something established by its own nature has no nature, it would become annihilationism, but it is not said that way, because from beginningless time, the nature of the mind has always been established as empty. The evidence for that is that if it is said that the mind is impermanent from the beginning, then the mind has abandoned abiding even for a moment with the nature of 'I', and if that is abandoned, it is transcending its own nature, that is, it is gone. Because Samahita (equal settling) abides with the mind focused on wisdom, without clinging to anything, that is the nature of space. For example, like saying abiding in space, it actually does not abide in anything, but a name is given there. The second view is that Yogacharas (practitioners of yoga) consider the essence of emptiness to be awareness, and that is only 'other-empty' (other empty), not empty of its own essence, that is the object of meditation of wisdom and the object of direct perception of yoga. Other than that, for the discriminating mind that eliminates others, the characteristic of direct perception does not enter. They say that. To refute these views, there are two points: it must be explained that only 'self-empty' (self empty) is the meaning of emptiness; the nature of wisdom is not momentary; 'self-empty' must be admitted; only 'self-empty' is revealed as the nature of all phenomena. The first point is that emptiness, like a lion's roar, frightens all those who speak of entities, wherever they reside, there will be the teaching of emptiness, but those who only speak of 'other-empty' do not have that. The second point is that it is contradictory for Yogacharas to admit that the mind is momentary but not want 'self-empty'. In whatever tenet system it is said that consciousness is momentary, according to that system, the mind must not be permanent. The mind is not permanent, because even for a moment, the mind does not have the opportunity to abide by its own essence, so how can it not be empty of its own essence? Because it must be empty. In short, why do the perfect Buddhas not consider the mind to be 'self-empty'? Because the Buddhas consider the mind to be impermanent. The commentary says: 'The meaning of impermanence is non-existence.' As it is said, it is explained as there being no opportunity to abide after arising. The third point is, if it is admitted that the mind is empty of its own nature, will it become like annihilationism? Annihilationism admits a view of cessation dependent on the conventional, but here it is considered from the perspective of abiding in reality, so it is not the same. It is explained that if it is said that something established by its own nature has no nature, it would become annihilationism, but it is not said that way, because from beginningless time, the nature of the mind has always been established as empty. The evidence for that is that if it is said that the mind is impermanent from the beginning, then the mind has abandoned abiding even for a moment with the nature of 'I', and if that is abandoned, it is transcending its own nature, that is, it is gone. Because Samahita (equal settling) abides with the mind focused on wisdom, without clinging to anything, that is the nature of space. For example, like saying abiding in space, it actually does not abide in anything, but a name is given there. The second view is that Yogacharas (practitioners of yoga) consider the essence of emptiness to be awareness, and that is only 'other-empty' (other empty), not empty of its own essence, that is the object of meditation of wisdom and the object of direct perception of yoga. Other than that, for the discriminating mind that eliminates others, the characteristic of direct perception does not enter. They say that. To refute these views, there are two points: it must be explained that only 'self-empty' (self empty) is the meaning of emptiness; the nature of wisdom is not momentary; 'self-empty' must be admitted; only 'self-empty' is revealed as the nature of all phenomena. The first point is that emptiness, like a lion's roar, frightens all those who speak of entities, wherever they reside, there will be the teaching of emptiness, but those who only speak of 'other-empty' do not have that. The second point is that it is contradictory for Yogacharas to admit that the mind is momentary but not want 'self-empty'. In whatever tenet system it is said that consciousness is momentary, according to that system, the mind must not be permanent. The mind is not permanent, because even for a moment, the mind does not have the opportunity to abide by its own essence, so how can it not be empty of its own essence? Because it must be empty. In short, why do the perfect Buddhas not consider the mind to be 'self-empty'? Because the Buddhas consider the mind to be impermanent. The commentary says: 'The meaning of impermanence is non-existence.' As it is said, it is explained as there being no opportunity to abide after arising. The third point is, if it is admitted that the mind is empty of its own nature, will it become like annihilationism? Annihilationism admits a view of cessation dependent on the conventional, but here it is considered from the perspective of abiding in reality, so it is not the same. It is explained that if it is said that something established by its own nature has no nature, it would become annihilationism, but it is not said that way, because from beginningless time, the nature of the mind has always been established as empty. The evidence for that is that if it is said that the mind is impermanent from the beginning, then the mind has abandoned abiding even for a moment with the nature of 'I', and if that is abandoned, it is transcending its own nature, that is, it is gone. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------