Chinese
由于不是实体的缘故，没有对境和形象，从异熟分的角度来说，不能说它既是实体本身，也不是其他的。它是作为一切烦恼法之因的条件而存在的自性。因此，虽然这两者的实体各自没有可指定的，但其体性却截然不同。因此，那些古代人说这两者本体相同而差别相异的说法，应当理解为不是正确的解释。其中，第一个（指阿赖耶识）是孩童们执著为自我的基础，因此也是阿赖耶，由于执持对境和形象，所以也是识，由于是业的习气完全成熟的体性，所以也是异熟。因此，它也被称为阿赖耶，也被称为阿赖耶识和异熟识。后者（指异熟）在此，一切烦恼法是果的实体，或者说，这个（异熟）也作为那些（烦恼法）的因的实体而结合和聚集，因此是阿赖耶本身，但不是知识，所以不是阿赖耶识和异熟识。如果有人问：什么是阿赖耶识，它也是异熟识吗？与前面的话语结合起来，只有凡夫、小乘有学以及七地以下的异熟识才是阿赖耶识。有的是异熟识，但不是阿赖耶识，即有余依位（指有余涅槃的状态）和八地到金刚喻定之间的异熟识不是阿赖耶，因为已经断除了所有的烦恼种子，所以它们不作为那些（烦恼）的因，并且由于舍弃了烦恼意，所以不作为执著自我的基础。在那些（状态）中，也只有异熟识存在，因为声闻和独觉在没有获得无余依涅槃之前，相续不会断绝，并且菩萨们在没有舍弃所有的所知障种子之前，也不会获得如镜智的转依。异熟自性的阿赖耶。
English
Since it is not established as a substance, it has no object or image, and from the aspect of the Vipāka, it cannot be said to be either the substance itself or something else. It is the nature of being the cause and condition of all defiled dharmas. Therefore, although the substance of these two is not individually specifiable, their characteristics are completely different. Therefore, those ancient people who said that these two are the same in essence but different in aspects should be understood as not being well explained. Among them, the first (referring to the Ālayavijñāna) is the basis for children's attachment to self, so it is also the Ālaya, and because it holds objects and images, it is also consciousness, and because it is the nature of the complete maturation of karmic imprints, it is also Vipāka. Therefore, it is also called Ālaya, and it is also called Ālayavijñāna and Vipākavijñāna. The latter (referring to Vipāka) here, all defiled dharmas are the substance of the fruit, or rather, this (Vipāka) also combines and gathers as the substance of the cause for those (defiled dharmas), so it is the Ālaya itself, but it is not knowledge, so it is not the Ālayavijñāna and Vipākavijñāna. Furthermore, if someone asks: What is the Ālayavijñāna, is it also the Vipākavijñāna? Combining it with the previous words, only the Vipākavijñānas of ordinary beings, Hinayana learners, and those below the seventh bhūmi are the Ālayavijñāna. There are Vipākavijñānas that are not Ālayavijñāna, namely, the state of Sa-upādisesa-nirvāṇa (referring to the state of Nirvana with remainder) and the Vipākavijñānas from the eighth bhūmi to the Vajropama-samādhi are not Ālaya, because they have destroyed all the seeds of defilements, so they do not act as the cause of those (defilements), and because they have abandoned the afflicted mind, they do not act as the basis for attachment to self. In those (states), there is only Vipākavijñāna, because the stream of Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas will not cease until they have attained Anupādisesa-nirvāṇa, and the Bodhisattvas will not attain the transformation of the mirror-like wisdom until they have abandoned all the seeds of the jñeyāvarana. The Ālaya of the nature of Vipāka.
Chinese
又，阿赖耶识的所缘，在色界中则有两种。即能取之识与外器之识。初者又有遍计所执之习气与有处之有色根两种。其中，初者以此能取有根之色，故名能取。二者乃所取之事物，故为能取。器之识者，乃山、房、宅等外境，不为根所摄而显现者。何以故，此三者为阿赖耶识之所缘耶？如是，以于遍计自性显现执著之习气为因缘，能生出异熟识，显现为自他相续之眼等根，以及山、房、宅等外器之显现故。是故，执著于遍计之戏论习气，乃能生起与显现为事物与有情之所缘相应的异熟识之生因，故立为彼之所缘。譬如，经部师等，虽不认为色、声等事物直接显现于根识之前，然彼等能生起识所取之相，故立为彼之所缘。有处之有色根与外境之器，乃异熟识所取之事物，故为所缘。其余名身之蕴等非阿赖耶识之所取分，故不立为彼之所缘。于无色界中，唯遍计所执之习气为所缘。如是，以遍计之习气为因缘，以及由空无边处等之等持所成办之不动业之作者为缘，能生起于无色四处所生之异熟识。初二者，乃生起以所取无量为所缘者，后二者，乃生起以所取微细与极微细为所缘者。何以故，于此等之中，亦不显现内之诸根与外之诸器耶？若
English
Furthermore, the object of consciousness of the ālaya-vijñāna is twofold in the realm of form. These are the consciousness of taking and the consciousness of the external vessel. The first also has two aspects: the habit of clinging to what is imputed and the material sense faculties with their locations. The first is called "taking" because it takes the form together with the sense faculties. The second is what is to be taken, so it is the taker. The consciousness of the vessel is whatever appears externally, such as mountains, houses, and homes, which are not collected by the senses. Why are these three the objects of the ālaya? Because from the cause and condition of the habit of manifest clinging to the nature of imputation, the ripening consciousness arises, appearing as the sense faculties such as the eyes belonging to one's own and others' continuums, and as the external vessel appearances such as mountains, houses, and homes. Therefore, the habit of elaboration clinging to imputation is the cause of the ripening consciousness arising with an object that appears as things and beings, so it is established as its object. For example, the Sutra school does not consider things such as forms and sounds to appear directly to the sense consciousness, but they cause the consciousness to arise with an aspect of being apprehended, so they are established as its object. The material sense faculties with their bases and the external vessels are to be apprehended by the ripening consciousness, so they are the object. The other aggregates of name and form are not the apprehended part of the ālaya, so they are not established as its object. In the formless realm, only the habit of imputation is the object. Thus, from the cause and condition of the habit of imputation and the condition of the agent of immutable karma accomplished by the samādhi of the sphere of infinite space and so on, the ripening consciousnesses born in the four formless realms arise. The first two arise with an object that is an immeasurable object to be taken, and the latter two arise with an object that is a subtle and extremely subtle object to be taken. Why do the internal sense faculties and the external vessels not appear in these either? If