English
Therefore, the attribution of names like "chief" and "self" to individuals capable of achieving goals is also seen as something done by worldly beings. Furthermore, through this reasoning, the non-substantiality of universals is also established. The mind that cognizes the present pot, which has not disappeared from the sound of the pot, is the subject. It does not have an object of apprehension as it appears, because the mind that cognizes the past pot, which has disappeared from the sound of the pot, has the same appearance. This is because they appear the same. This is pervasion, i.e., for sense consciousnesses such as the ear, those with an object of apprehension and those without, their apprehension and appearance are the same, because they do not exist. If it is said that the two minds that apprehend the past and present pot have the same appearance because they apprehend only the universal of the pot, then it is unreasonable for the mind of the universal to apprehend the universal, because it has already been refuted in "not similar to that" and so on. Furthermore, through this reasoning, the non-substantiality of universals is also established. If the Samkhya school believes that the universal is a single manifestation, then the variations of sound, etc., which are mutually different, are the subject. How can they be the same as the undifferentiated universal essence? They cannot be the same, because it contradicts it. If it is said that things have two natures, differentiated and undifferentiated, then these two are also the subject. How can they become one thing? They cannot become one thing, because they are two. If the Vaisheshika school believes that the universal entity that exists in common in these manifestations is a different entity from these manifestations, then the universal of the pot is the subject. Being called the universal of these pot manifestations, it will become unrelated to them, because they are different entities that are not cause and effect. If someone says that, then it is the same for the debater who eliminates faults, then the pot manifestation that is eliminated from non-pot is the subject. The universal that you believe in cannot be refuted by analyzing the manifestations as one and different, because it is non-substantial. Therefore, the universal that exists in common in the manifestations has the characteristic of being non-substantial. This is inclusion and exclusion. Furthermore, through this reasoning, the non-substantiality of universals is also established. If it is not established, then is the universal a result or not a result? If it is said to be a result
Chinese
那么，具有共相的事物，成为众多和坏灭是必然的，因为每一个刹那都在产生不同于其他的（事物）。然而，这并非所愿，因为你们认为它是一体和常恒的。此外，由于已经说过坏灭仅仅与事物的成立相关联，所以，具有共相的事物，不是常恒的，因为它是事物。如果说，由于类不是果，所以没有过失，那么，它必然与显现无关，因为它与那个不是因果关系的异体，并且，它必然成为非事物，因为它不是从因产生的。此外，通过这个理证，也能成立表诠忆念意识的显现境是非事物，即，凡是无错乱的根识，它在执持自境时，不依赖于表诠忆念等，因为它是凭借所取义的事物力量而产生的。共相的意识，不是凭借所取义的事物力量而产生的，因为根识那样不依赖于表诠忆念而显现自境，而它却依赖于表诠忆念来执持自境。如果说，不了解牛的表诠的人，会将杂色牛与黄牛执为一类，而不与马执为一类，那么，这是从什么执持而产生的呢？即使某人先前不了解牛的表诠，但在看到两头牛的事物时，凡是随后生起的不认为种类不同而执为一体的意识，它不是从牛的共相事物牛产生的，而是仅仅从挤奶等作用的相近和相关联而产生的。例如，就像在没有类事物的眼识的果的情况下，眼、色和显现、作意等，在类事物中没有，但作为眼识的近取因存在，因此你们承认在那里产生（眼识）。因此，杂色牛和黄牛等，即使没有牛的类事物随之存在，但随之存在的是执为一类的意识，因为凭借挤奶等作用，它们与非牛的事物区分开来。此外，通过这个理证，也能成立共相是非事物，即，共相，没有不依赖于显现的独立自主，因为无论如何它都依赖于自执的识的显现。
English
Then, it follows that things with universals become numerous and perish, because each moment produces something different from the others. However, this is not what is desired, because you consider it to be one and permanent. Furthermore, since it has already been said that destruction is only related to the establishment of things, therefore, things with universals are not permanent, because they are things. If you say that since classes are not fruits, there is no fault, then it must be unrelated to appearance, because it is a different entity that is not a cause and effect with that, and it must become a non-thing, because it is not produced from a cause. Furthermore, through this reasoning, it can also be established that the appearing object of the signifying memory consciousness is a non-thing, that is, whatever is an unerring sense consciousness, it does not depend on signifying memories etc. when holding its own object, because it is produced by the power of the object of what is grasped. The consciousness of the universal is not produced by the power of the object of what is grasped, because the sense consciousness appears its own object without depending on signifying memories in that way, but it depends on signifying memories to hold its own object. If you say that a person who does not understand the signification of a cow will consider a speckled cow to be of the same kind as a yellow cow, but not of the same kind as a horse, then from what holding does that arise? Even if someone did not previously understand the signification of a cow, but when seeing two cow things, whatever consciousness subsequently arises that does not consider the kinds to be different but holds them as one, it is not produced from the universal thing cow, but only from the proximity and association of milking and other functions. For example, just as in the case of the fruit of eye consciousness without a class thing, the eye, form, and appearance, attention, etc., are not in the class thing, but exist as the proximate cause of eye consciousness, therefore you admit that it arises there. Therefore, speckled cows and yellow cows, etc., even if there is no cow class thing following them, what follows is the consciousness of holding them as one kind, because by means of milking and other functions, they are distinguished from non-cow things. Furthermore, through this reasoning, it can also be established that the universal is a non-thing, that is, the universal does not have independence that does not depend on appearance, because in any case it depends on the appearance of the self-grasping consciousness.
Chinese
因为对于你来说，那个独立自主的东西，在事物中是没有显现的。如果那样的话，感官也与形等没有差别，因为与它们没有显现。如果这样说，那么有形的感官，作为有法，对于自识来说，根本不会显现。如果存在能够看到自己的，超越感官的意义，那么自己的身体就会显现，因为是有形的。各种类别，作为有法，不是通过自识的显现，就能看到不依赖于它的独立自主的东西，因为对于那样的独立自主的东西来说，是不可能被看到的。在把握由意识所显现的事物时，你也不会作为独立自主的东西显现，因为在意识中显现的，只是它的声音，也就是名称、形状和颜色等特征，除此之外，没有其他显现。此外，它，作为有法，甚至连产生自识的作用都不能做到，因为自识没有将你作为独立自主的东西来观察。因此，你没有自性，因为你不能起到作用。这是周遍的，因为不能起到作用是无事物的特征。这样一来，声音的实际表达对象，以及它本身和不能表达为其他等等，与之前所说的八种理由相反的，凡不是声音的实际表达对象等等，都被认为是自己的特征。具有无事物特征的排除他者的总相，作为有法，有三种，即依赖于事物的生有性，依赖于无事物的无生有性，以及依赖于两者的所知有性等等。如果依赖于事物的总相执，作为有法，会通过事物自相作为所取境的方式被认识，因为与事物自相的有无相关联。如果这样说，那么它，作为有法，不是以事物自相作为所取境而存在的，因为之前已经回答过，对于自己来说，显现为无事物的，就是之前所说的表达对象等等。并且，与事物自相的有无相关联也是不成立的，因为可以看到它也适用于过去和未来等，与事物存在不同的情况。
English
Because for you, that independent thing does not appear in things. If that is the case, then the senses are also no different from forms, etc., because they do not appear with them. If you say so, then the tangible senses, as the subject, do not appear at all to self-consciousness. If there exists a meaning that can see itself, transcending the senses, then one's own body would appear, because it is tangible. The various categories, as the subject, are not seen as independent without relying on the clarity of self-consciousness, because it is impossible to see such an independent thing. Even when grasping what is revealed by consciousness, you do not appear as independent, because what appears in consciousness is only its sound, that is, the characteristics of name, shape, and color, etc., and nothing else appears other than that. Furthermore, it, as the subject, cannot even perform the function of merely generating self-consciousness, because self-consciousness does not perceive you as independent. Therefore, you have no self-nature, because you cannot function. This is pervasive, because being unable to function is the characteristic of non-things. In this way, the actual object of expression of sound, and that which cannot be expressed as itself or other, etc., whatever is not the actual object of expression of sound, etc., which is the opposite of the eight reasons mentioned earlier, is considered to be its own characteristic. The general characteristic of excluding others, which has the characteristic of non-things, as the subject, exists in three forms, namely, the nature of being born dependent on things, the nature of being unborn dependent on non-things, and the nature of being knowable dependent on both, and so on. If the general apprehension dependent on things, as the subject, becomes known through the way that the self-characteristic of things exists as the object of apprehension, because it is related to the presence or absence of the self-characteristic of things. If you say so, then it, as the subject, does not exist with the self-characteristic of things as the object of apprehension, because it has already been answered before that what appears to oneself as non-thing is the object of expression mentioned earlier, etc. And, it is also not established that it is related to the presence or absence of the self-characteristic of things, because it can be seen that it also applies to the past and the future, etc., which are different from the existence of things.