English
Therefore, this would become a fault. Furthermore, if the minds of others lack self-awareness, there are other faults as well: The consciousness that apprehends white, subject. How does your consciousness apprehend white and so on? Because you consider white and so on to be its characteristics, this should be remembered, or not remembered? Because you and white do not have the knowledge of being related as object and subject. The reason is established. Because, when one of the two, white and so on and the consciousness that apprehends white and so on, realizes the object, the second will not be the consciousness that sees the object as the subject. The pervasion is established. Because, when the two are seen as related as object and subject, the consciousness that apprehends white and so on will definitely say that it has seen white and so on, otherwise it is not like that. If it is said that any consciousness that sees white and so on, if it is similar to white and so on, it is only because other consciousnesses arising after experiencing white and so on can see and remember it, so it is said that the consciousness that apprehends white and so on has seen white and so on, then this consciousness that apprehends white and so on, subject. It should be established as self-aware. Because it remembers later that it is similar to white and so on. If such a consciousness does not recognize its own object, that is, its own nature, then how can it recognize the nature of other objects, that is, white and so on? It should not be able to recognize it. If it is said that even without self-awareness, it can be established as experiencing the object because it is similar to the object, then it is also unreasonable to establish it as experiencing white and so on because it is similar to white and so on without self-awareness. Because such a view has already been completely refuted by correct reasoning. Furthermore, this (consciousness), subject. How can the subsequent definitive consciousness determine that the consciousness that sees is similar to white and so on? It should not be able to determine it. Because the object white and so on was not seen by a valid cognition in its own time. The pervasion is established. Because, things that are seen in the same way by valid cognition are considered to be similar to each other. For the Vaibhashika who does not admit that consciousness and things themselves are similar, subject. Both object and consciousness should not be seen by valid cognition. Because consciousness is not similar to things, and there is no self-awareness either. If you admit it, then how can there be the statement that this is the object and this is the consciousness? It should not exist. If it is said that what appears as oneself and white and so on is the object of consciousness itself, that is, its own nature, then,
Chinese
因此，那个法，应该成为完全显现的。如果知识没有自证，那么那个法，应该成为事物或对境不显现的。如果有人说，因为自己不显现所以有错误。那些是为了消除心没有自证，从而显示出认为自己的心不是显现的过失而说的。对于那些认为心不是自知的人来说，这个推理“知识不会看到所有事物”也回答了那些说自己的心不是通过现量成立的显现的论敌。还有其他可以成立自己的心是显现的论证：乐、苦、欲求和不欲求等法，在自己的相续中通过现量成立是显现的，因为从所依的根、所缘的境、串习的作意和先前的差别，而对喜悦、悲伤和中间状态等的差别进行体验。因此，那些法，如果没有自证，就不是通过与自己不同体的知识来体验的。因为你们所知的、所体验的，与心自身不同体的其他知识，是无法通过量成立的。如果乐等是由与自己不同的知识来知和体验的，那么天授的乐等法，也应该被其他供施者的知识所享受和体验，因为没有自证，必须由与自己不同体的知识来体验。如果说，由天授的乐等所生起和显现的心识，知道天授的乐等，而不是由其他心识知道，所以没有过失。那么，缘于天授的乐等的其他供施者的意念，也应该毫无疑问地具有由天授的乐等所生起和显现的二者，如果不是由天授的乐等所生起，也不是显现的，那么会有心本身成为无所缘的过失。如果说，天授的乐等的总相是所缘，所以没有过失。那么，那个法，是天授的乐等的总相
English
Therefore, that dharma should become fully manifest. If knowledge does not have self-awareness, then that dharma should become non-manifest in terms of things or objects. If someone says that there is a fault because it does not manifest itself, those words are spoken to eliminate the mind's lack of self-awareness, thereby showing the fault of assuming that one's own mind is not manifest. For those who think that the mind is not self-knowing, this reasoning that "knowledge does not see all things" also answers those opponents who say that their own mind is not manifestly established through direct perception. There are other arguments to establish that one's own mind is manifest: happiness, suffering, desire, and aversion, etc., are manifestly established as manifest in one's own continuum through direct perception, because one experiences the differences of joy, sorrow, and intermediate states, etc., from the differences of the supporting faculty, the object of focus, the habituated attention, and the preceding. Therefore, those dharmas are not experienced by a knowledge that is a different entity from oneself without self-awareness, because that other knowledge, which is different in entity from the mind itself, which you know and experience, cannot be established by valid cognition at all. If happiness, etc., are known and experienced by a knowledge that is different from oneself, then the happiness, etc., of Devadatta should also be enjoyed and experienced by the knowledge of other offering-givers, because without self-awareness, it must be experienced by a knowledge that is different in entity from oneself. If it is said that the mind that arises from and appears as Devadatta's happiness, etc., knows Devadatta's happiness, etc., but not by other minds, so there is no fault, then the mental conception of other offering-givers that focuses on Devadatta's happiness, etc., should undoubtedly have both arising from and appearing as Devadatta's happiness, etc. If it does not arise from Devadatta's happiness, etc., and is not appearing, then there would be the fault of the mind itself becoming without an object of focus. If it is said that the general characteristic of Devadatta's happiness, etc., is the object of focus, so there is no fault, then that dharma is the general characteristic of Devadatta's happiness, etc.
Chinese
因此，也不应执着于它们。因为没有执着于天施的乐等。天施的乐等的总相，是所立宗。不应成为祭祀施主的意念生起之因。因为你稍微也不是实有之物，这也早已说过。因为如是所说的理由，因此缘于天施的乐等的祭祀施主的意念分别，是所立宗。成立为从自续中现量成立的现行和自证，因为显现为自己是乐等，那识不是与自己异体的法，因此。如果祭祀施主的意念分别执着于天施的乐等，但不是以现量执着，因此没有他人也享用它的过失。天施自己的意念分别以现量执着于自己的乐等，因此没有没有体验者的过失，如果这样说。执着于天施的乐等的天施的意念分别和祭祀施主的意念分别二者，是所立宗。天施的乐等现量执着和不执着的差别是从哪里来的，不合理。因为你们二者都作为所取义而执着是相同的。如果天施的分别体验自己的乐等，因为体验的因是不可见的法与非法之业存在，并且它与自我的一个意义相符，即具有集合，以及自在天喜悦等的原因。祭祀施主的分别则不是，因为没有那些原因。因此，乐等依次被自己和他人体验与不体验是各自确定的，如果这样说。缘于天施的乐等的祭祀施主的分别，是所立宗。他人天施的乐等在一切情况下都作为所取义而执着，并且不会变成体验。因为没有体验的理由不可见等那些。又，缘于天施的乐等的天施和夜叉的分别二者，是所立宗。天施的乐等体验与不体验的差别不应理。因为那在自己的所取义上是相同的，这以前也被什么道理驳斥了。
English
Therefore, one should not be attached to them either. Because there is no attachment to the pleasure of the god-given, etc. The general characteristic of the pleasure of the god-given, etc., is the subject. It should not become the cause of the arising of the mind of the sacrificial donor. Because you are not a real thing even slightly, this has already been said. Because of the reason stated as such, therefore, the conceptual thought of the sacrificial donor that focuses on the pleasure of the god-given, etc., is the subject. It is established as manifest and self-aware, established manifestly from its own continuum, because the appearance of oneself as pleasure, etc., is not a substance other than knowledge itself, therefore. If the conceptual thought of the sacrificial donor clings to the pleasure of the god-given, etc., but does not cling to it manifestly, therefore there is no fault that others also enjoy it. The god-given's own conceptual thought clings to his own pleasure, etc., manifestly, therefore there is no fault of not having an experiencer, if you say so. The god-given's conceptual thought that clings to the pleasure of the god-given, etc., and the sacrificial donor's conceptual thought, both are the subject. The difference between the god-given's pleasure, etc., being clung to manifestly and not being clung to, where does that come from, it is unreasonable. Because you two are the same in clinging to it as the object to be grasped. If the god-given's thought experiences his own pleasure, etc., because the cause of experience is the existence of unseen Dharma and non-Dharma karma, and it corresponds to one meaning of the self, that is, it has a collection, and the cause of the joy of the powerful one, etc. The sacrificial donor's thought is not, because there are no those reasons. Therefore, it is certain that pleasure, etc., are experienced and not experienced by oneself and others respectively, if you say so. The sacrificial donor's thought that thinks about the pleasure of the god-given, etc., is the subject. The pleasure of the other god-given, etc., is clung to as the object to be grasped in all cases, and it will not become an experience. Because there are no those reasons such as the unseen reason for experience. Also, the god-given's and the yaksha's thoughts that think about the pleasure of the god-given, etc., both are the subject. The difference between the god-given's pleasure, etc., being experienced and not being experienced is unreasonable. Because that is the same in its own object to be grasped, this has already been refuted by what reason.