Chinese
如果通过例证来论证没有过失，那么，任何作为可成立等的理由的事物，都是有法。在此，将老年人的感官无分别智作为理由来论证，这也被认为是理由。有什么理由可以用来论证儿童的意识是无分别的呢？因为在老年人和儿童的感官意识中，都同样需要论证为无分别。通过展示感官产生的理由不是正确的理由，也说明了以体验的方式进入和非由意念产生等也不是正确的理由。通过这些，顺便驳斥了认为现量是分别的观点，以及主张其他无分别的论证方式的观点。现在，为了驳斥胜论派等认为感官意识是将理性和物质等结合起来而执着的分别，进一步展示了论证现量是无分别的理路。能区分的法和所区分的基，这两者的关系以及基等世俗的规则或术语，首先是分别把握，然后将这些组合起来，从而认识到以特性来区分基，否则就不是这样，例如像执着于持有棍棒的人一样。通过确立周遍，并将之应用于具体事例：执着于牛的现量，不是将牛的种类等与具有该种类的牛的物质结合起来而执着的分别，因为没有分别地认识到特性牛的种类等和基牛的物质以及这两者的关系和这些世俗的规则等。例如，对于这样的现量，也没有将种类等与物质结合起来而执着的分别。理由成立，即凡是具有普遍事物牛的能立，都是随顺于牛的显现的牛的普遍执着，这也是有法。牛的普遍事物牛不是被把握的意义，因为它是牛的声音，即名称，以及其显现的颜色形状等形象。周遍成立，因为空无颜色形状和文字即名称等形象的事物，就被称为和认为是牛本身的普遍性。如果……
English
If it is argued that there is no fault by giving examples, then whatever is the reason such as being provable is the subject. Here, taking the sensory non-conceptual wisdom of the elderly as a reason to prove, this is also considered a reason. What reason is there to prove that the consciousness of children is non-conceptual? Because in the sensory consciousness of both the elderly and children, it is equally necessary to prove it as non-conceptual. By showing that the reason arising from the senses is not a correct reason, it is also explained that entering in the manner of experience and not arising from thought, etc., are also not correct reasons. Through these, incidentally, the view that direct perception is conceptual and the view that advocates other proofs of non-conceptuality are refuted. Now, in order to refute the Vaisheshika school and others who believe that sensory consciousness is a conceptualization that grasps by combining reason and matter, etc., another line of reasoning is shown to prove that direct perception is non-conceptual. The relationship between the distinguishing characteristic and the distinguished basis, and the worldly rules or terms of the basis, etc., are first grasped separately, and then these are combined to realize that the basis is distinguished by the characteristic, otherwise it is not so, just like grasping a person with a stick. By establishing pervasion and applying it to the specific case: the direct perception of grasping a cow is not a conceptualization that grasps by combining the species of the cow, etc., with the substance of the cow that possesses that species, because there is no separate realization of the characteristic, the species of the cow, etc., and the basis, the substance of the cow, and the relationship between the two, and these worldly rules, etc. For example, for such a direct perception, there is also no conceptualization that grasps by combining the species, etc., with the substance. The reason is established, that is, whatever is the establisher of the universal thing, the cow, is also the universal grasping of the cow that follows the appearance of the cow, which is also the subject. The universal thing, the cow, is not the meaning that is grasped, because it is the sound of the cow, that is, the name, and the appearance of its color, shape, etc. The pervasion is established, because something that is empty of color, shape, and letters, that is, the appearance of the name, etc., is called and considered the universality of the cow itself. If...
Chinese
如果认为，对于总相的执著，不明显显现的颜色形状等，与那本身明显显现的相同，即是总相自性。那么，执持牛的眼识，其所执持的牛的总相识的显现境，不应成为通过区分牛的实体差别而执持，因为那对自己的境没有可见性。理由成立，因为那样的心识，从牛的颜色形状等与实体不同的牛的总相识的显现境，也很难在那本身上显现，因为总相识的显现境，显现为明显和不明显两种显现方式是不存在的，而是只显现为不明显，因为你（总相识的显现境）是只显现为显现境明显。另外，根识，不应成为将种类等与实体结合而执持的分别念，因为那二者的联系是不可见的，因为你没有执持那二者的结合。如果说，认为“这线中有氆氇”的心识，是有因的，因为是心识的缘故。那个因也不是线，也不是氆氇，而是那二者的结合。那么，这些说“这线中有氆氇”的理智者的声音，也不应成为由于事物力量或名声的力量，在理智者的心中，从你那里产生认为“这线中有氆氇”的心识，因为在那心中，事物力量或名声任何一个都没有成立，而是理智者自己随意设定的名称。理由成立，因为世间上说“牛有角，氆氇有线”，但没有说“角有牛，线有氆氇”。如果即使那样，认为“牛有角”的心识的所取义是牛和角的结合，那么，认为“牛有角”的心识，不应仅仅因为有牛和角的结合的理由而产生，因为以没有分别执著牛这个名称的肢体如鼻等，以及剩余肢体上方的角的所有方式的理由而产生。另外，说“线中有氆氇”在世间上也没有名声，因为那些线的“这是氆氇”的声音，无论如何都应……
English
If it is thought that, for the apprehension of universals, the color, shape, etc., which appear unclearly, are the same as that which appears clearly itself, that is, the nature of universals. Then, the eye consciousness that apprehends a cow, the appearing object of the consciousness that apprehends the universal of a cow, should not become apprehending by distinguishing the substantial difference of the cow, because that has no visibility to its own object. The reason is established, because such a mind, from the color, shape, etc. of a cow, which are different in substance from the appearing object of the consciousness that apprehends the universal of a cow, is also difficult to find appearing on that itself, because the appearing object of the consciousness that apprehends the universal, the two ways of appearing, appearing as clear and unclear, do not exist, but only appear as unclear, because you (the appearing object of the consciousness that apprehends the universal) only appear as the appearing object is clear. Furthermore, sense consciousness should not be a conceptual thought that apprehends by combining types, etc., with substances, because the connection between those two is invisible, because you do not apprehend the combination of those two. If it is said that the mind that thinks "there is woolen cloth in this thread" has a cause, because it is a mind. That cause is neither thread nor woolen cloth, but the combination of those two. Then, these sounds of the logician saying "there is woolen cloth in this thread" should also not become, due to the power of things or the power of fame, in the mind of the logician, the mind that thinks "there is woolen cloth in this thread" arises from you, because in that mind, neither the power of things nor fame is established, but the logician himself arbitrarily sets the name. The reason is established, because in the world it is said "a cow has horns, woolen cloth has thread," but it is not said "horns have cows, thread has woolen cloth." If even so, the apprehended meaning of the mind that thinks "a cow has horns" is the combination of a cow and horns, then, the mind that thinks "a cow has horns" should not arise merely because of the reason that there is a combination of a cow and horns, because it arises for the reason that there is no specific focus on all the ways of the limbs of the name called cow, such as the nose, and the horns above the remaining limbs. Furthermore, saying "there is woolen cloth in thread" is also not famous in the world, because the sound of those threads, "this is woolen cloth," should in any way...
Chinese
不是真实地适用于与果实的线同时存在的具有分支的毛织品物质，因为只是说后来从作为原因的线（thags ga ba）等显现出来的果实是毛织品。此外，当毛织品的声音所适用的基础或原因被指出时，有法，具有分支的毛织品物质本身不是线这个声音所适用的基础，因为当被问及之前的线是什么时，有些人会将果实毛织品虚构为原因的线，并说这就是之前的线，或者当这样被问及时，从毛织品中艰难地取出一根线，并说这就是线，这仅仅是线的声音适用的情况。此外，认为牛有角的想法，有法，不仅仅是因为牛和角之间存在一致性的原因而适用，因为牛和角之间是相互帮助的对象和帮助者之间的关系，或者除了角等剩余部分和上方的角之间没有区别地显现之外，仅仅是适用而已。如果说毛织品本身这个声音，有法，不适用于任何事物的真实名称，因为没有具有分支的毛织品物质。如果承认，那么也应该不适用于任何事物的假名，如果这样说，那么，那些作为原因的线被织布机等做成一个整体的东西，有法，你被毛织品这个声音以非真实的方式适用，因为从那之中，头脑以无误的方式知道其他事物，并且你是最初将那个约定俗成结合起来的符号的使用对象。通过那些，显示了种姓等没有通过现量成立，现在也显示了没有通过比量成立，通过那个。通过特殊性，事物，有法，为了证明与自己不同的物质的种姓等作为自己的属性而存在，没有标志和比量，因为没有证明那个的比喻。如果说有棍棒的人是那个比喻，因此标志没有成立，如果这样说，那么有棍棒的人等等的所有术语，有法，对于有棍棒的人，仅仅因为棍棒的原因而适用也不是，因为人和棍棒相互视为帮助的对象和帮助者，因此两者作为差别基础和差别属性被普遍认为
English
It is not actually applied to the substance of woolen fabric with branches that exists simultaneously with the yarn of the fruit, because it is only said that the fruit, woolen fabric, later appears from the yarn (thags ga ba), etc., which is the cause. Furthermore, when the basis or cause to which the sound of woolen fabric applies is pointed out, the subject is that the substance of woolen fabric with branches itself is not the basis to which the sound of yarn applies, because when asked what the previous yarn was, some people would fabricate the fruit woolen fabric as the yarn of the cause and say that this is the previous yarn, or when asked in that way, one yarn is taken out of the woolen fabric with difficulty, and it is said that this is the yarn, which is merely the case where the sound of yarn applies. Furthermore, the thought that a cow has horns, the subject, is not applied merely because there is a reason for the consistency between the cow and the horns, because the relationship between the cow and the horns is that of mutual objects of help and helpers, or it is merely applied because there is no distinction between the remaining parts such as the horns and the horns above. If it is said that the sound of woolen fabric itself, the subject, is not applied to the real name of anything, because there is no substance of woolen fabric with branches. If you admit, then it should also not be applied to the nominal name of anything, if you say so, then, those yarns of cause that are made into a whole by weaving machines, etc., the subject, you are applied by the sound of woolen fabric in a non-real way, because from that, the mind knows other things in an unmistakable way, and you are the object of the use of symbols that initially combine that convention. Through those, it was shown that the genus, etc., were not established by direct perception, and now it is also shown that it was not established by inference, through that. Through particularity, things, the subject, in order to prove that the genus, etc., of a substance different from oneself exists as one's own attribute, there is no sign and inference, because there is no metaphor to prove that. If it is said that the person with a stick is that metaphor, therefore the sign is not established, if you say so, then all the terms such as the person with a stick, the subject, for the person with a stick, it is also not applied merely because of the reason of the stick, because people and sticks are mutually regarded as objects of help and helpers, so the two are generally regarded as the basis of difference and the attribute of difference.
Chinese
因为虚假而安立假名。此外，词的六义之事物和楼阁的连串等等的声音也是有法。不应理，词的六义和楼阁等不是作为实名而存在。因为不依赖于具有其他意义的词的六义和楼阁作为理由。因为不相同种类不造就事物，所以楼阁不是事物。如果楼阁是由不相同种类所造就的具有“具有”之功德，那么，楼阁的连串是什么词的六义呢？应成什么也不是。那也不是事物和功德，因为依赖于功德。不是各别的集合，因为不产生结果。如果那是种类，那么即使一个房屋也是有法。你应该被称为楼阁的连串，因为楼阁的连串具有你的种类。例如，即使一棵树也具有树的种类，所以被称为树一样。此外，对于许多楼阁的连串是有法。不应理，楼阁的连串不适用于被称为楼阁的连串的声音。因为楼阁的连串不具有你的种类，因为当楼阁的连串被认为是种类时，种类没有其他种类。还有，对于大的楼阁的连串和大的楼阁等等是有法。不应理，不适用于大和小等的声音。因为大小等不是你的法。如果认为那些声音是通过近似安立而适用的。那么，无论什么是大的楼阁的连串等等，都是有法。不应理，大等的声音不是通过近似安立而适用的。因为与作为实名而适用的山等的大实物没有区别，并且被意识认为是真正的大实物。此外，你所说的具有其他意义作为理由的差别，作为实名和除此之外的假名的定义，也与世间不符，因为明显地，声音“具有棍棒的人”似乎是真实适用的，但对于那个人来说，仅仅是因为棍棒这个原因而适用，这是相同的，因为那是从世俗上安立名称的缘故。