Chinese
如果从一开始就不产生执著于一的念头，但如果显现是多个，那么考虑到其上的一个共同点，就会产生一个非他异的念头，这是什么呢？是所有具有共性的显现都显现，从而产生将它们都执著为一的念头吗？还是显现任何一个而产生的呢？如果是前者，那么认识的念头是不可能的，因为如果所有显现不能同时显现，那么它就不会产生，所以即使承认也不接受。如果是显现任何一个而产生执著于一的念头，那么即使这些显现没有各自聚集在一起，从这些显现中的任何一个所要产生的念头来说，其余的显现也会变得没有作用。因此，这样的总执念头也不会执著其余的显现。即使没有任何理由，如果有什么产生，那么它就不是它的原因，例如，即使没有稻子的种子，也有大麦的幼苗。总念头也是，即使没有其余的显现也会产生，所以不是其余的原因。如果是这样，从看到铜瓶产生的总念头，也不会将剩余的瓶子执著为同一种瓶子，因为它是没有从所取境产生的意识，例如，执瓶者不会执著柱子一样。如果其余的显现没有被执著，那么也不会成为对一个法称为总的念头，因为没有随顺多个。有人说，这个过失是没有的，因为五片花瓣聚集的蓝色花朵也会产生执蓝的眼识，并且在每一片花瓣被移除的最后，一片花瓣也会产生执蓝的眼识，所以每一片花瓣产生时，其他花瓣不会变得无用。即使一片一片地移除显现，一片显现也能产生总念头，但这并不会使其余的显现无论在何时何地都变得无用。这是不一样的，因为像蓝色、黄色等，对于执著自己的眼的识来说，也能看到各自产生它的能力。在那里，聚集的集合也成立了产生眼识的能力，但是对于显现来说，无论是每一个还是集合，都没有像蓝色那样成立通过自己的显现而产生总念头的能力，因为所有显现不
English
If, from the beginning, the thought of clinging to one does not arise, but if the appearances are many, then considering the one commonality upon them, a thought of non-otherness arises, what is that? Is it that all appearances possessing generality appear, thereby generating the thought of clinging to them all as one? Or is it generated by the appearance of any one? If it is the former, then the thought of recognition is impossible, because if all appearances cannot appear simultaneously, then it will not arise, so even if admitted, it is not accepted. If the thought of clinging to one arises from the appearance of any one, then even if those appearances do not gather together individually, for the thought to be generated by any one of those appearances, the remaining appearances will become ineffective. Therefore, such a general clinging thought will also not cling to the remaining appearances. Even if there is no reason, if something arises, then it is not its cause, for example, even if there is no seed of rice, there is a sprout of barley. The general thought is also, even if there are no remaining appearances, it arises, so it is not the cause of the remaining. If that is the case, then the general thought arising from seeing a copper vase will also not cling to the remaining vases as the same kind of vase, because it is a consciousness that did not arise from the object of apprehension, just as a vase-clinger does not cling to a pillar. If the remaining appearances are not clung to, then it will also not become a thought of calling a single dharma general, because there is no following after many. Someone says, this fault does not exist, because a blue flower with five petals gathered together also generates a blue-clinging eye consciousness, and at the end of removing each petal, one petal also generates a blue-clinging eye consciousness, so when each petal generates, the other petals do not become useless. Even if appearances are removed one by one, one appearance can generate a general thought, but this does not make the remaining appearances useless at all times and places. That is not the same, because for the consciousness of the eye that clings to itself, such as blue, yellow, etc., the ability to generate it is also seen separately. There, the gathering of the collection also establishes the ability to generate eye consciousness, but for appearances, whether each one or the collection, it is not established like blue that there is the ability to generate a general thought through its own appearance, because all appearances do not
Chinese
如前所述，了知对境，仅凭一相无法生起。其要点在于，由于蓝色等事物是实有的，所以它们能生起蓝色显现的根识，但总相本身并非实有，因此，即使想方设法寻求其他帮助，也无法让它生起自执识，最终也是徒劳。因此，如果总相本身是实有的，即使没有一切显现，也能生起对它的执着。如果它本身不存在，即使聚集一切显现也不会生起，更不用说一个一个了。因此，应当了知，总相的执着并非源于总相实有，而是由于分别念将显现的事物强行归为一类而安立的。如果总相遍在于一切事物中，但它的心识生起需要依赖于那些显现中的任何一个，总相才能生起自执的心识，而不是在没有显现的情况下，仅凭总相实有就能生起。例如，没有纺锤就无法织布，但如果有多个纺锤，即使缺少其中一些，也能用一个纺锤织布。即使依赖于其中任何一个而了知它，但它的本体是无分、唯一的，并且遍在于它自身的一切差别中，如果这样认为。如果众多显现对唯一的果——总相有所助益，那么为什么众多显现即使没有总相，也不能对唯一的总相心识有所助益呢？这两者是相同的。因此，如果不承认这一点，却为了总相心识的因，而努力证明这种多余的总相，又有什么意义呢？如果认为显现没有帮助总相，但却有助于总相心识的生起，那么即使没有总相，众多显现又有什么理由不能生起总相心识呢？如果认为没有总相，那么它的心识就会变成无因，那么如果总相存在，又有什么理由不只依靠它，反而要依赖其他事物呢？因此，以前无法生起自执识，后来依赖于显现才能有所帮助，这是因为没有帮助总相，却不知如何帮助对它的执着心识。因为总相的执着心识并非仅由显现所生起，而是希望由总相所生起。因此，这个总相也会成为那些显现的果，原因是任何有所助益的事物，都是它的生起者。因此，由因而产生的境，有时会间隔
English
As mentioned earlier, knowing an object, it cannot arise with just one aspect. The key point is that since blue and other things are real, they can generate the root consciousness of blue appearance, but the general characteristic itself is not established as real. Therefore, even if you try to seek other help, it will not be helpful for it to generate self-grasping consciousness, and in the end it will be in vain. Therefore, if the general characteristic itself is real, even if there is no appearance at all, grasping of it can arise. If it itself does not exist, even if all appearances are gathered, it will not arise, let alone one by one. Therefore, it should be understood that grasping of the general characteristic does not originate from the reality of the general characteristic, but is merely established by conceptual thought that forcibly categorizes appearances into one type. If the general characteristic pervades all things, but the arising of its mind needs to rely on any of those appearances, then the general characteristic can generate the mind of self-grasping, but it cannot arise solely from the reality of the general characteristic without appearance. For example, cloth cannot be woven without a spindle, but if there are multiple spindles, even if some of them are missing, cloth can be woven with one spindle. Even if it is known by relying on any one of them, but its essence is indivisible, unique, and pervades all its own distinctions, if you think so. If many appearances are beneficial to the single result, the general characteristic, then how can many appearances not be beneficial to the single mind of the general characteristic even without the general characteristic? These two are the same. Therefore, if you do not admit this, but try to prove this superfluous general characteristic as the cause of the mind of the general characteristic, what is the point? If you think that appearance does not help the general characteristic, but it helps the arising of the mind of the general characteristic, then even without the general characteristic, what reason is there that many appearances cannot generate the mind of the general characteristic? If you think that without the general characteristic, then its mind will become causeless, then if the general characteristic exists, what reason is there not to rely only on it, but to rely on other things? Therefore, the reason why self-grasping consciousness could not arise before, but later it can be helped by relying on appearance, is because it does not help the general characteristic, but does not know how to help the mind that grasps it. Because the mind that grasps the general characteristic is not generated only by appearance, but it is hoped that it will be generated by the general characteristic. Therefore, this general characteristic will also become the result of those appearances, because whatever is helpful is its generator. Therefore, the object that arises from the cause sometimes has intervals
Chinese
转变吧！还有那些外道这样说：如果不能以众多不产生一个果的原因，来说明显现的事物不产生一个总的意识。那么，应该怎么说呢？不希望从不同的显现中产生那不不同的、显现为一个的总的意识。因为就像在不同的境中没有同样执著的、不不同的总一样，那样执著是不合理的，就像不能把青色的境理解为黄色一样。如果认为显现通过确立自己的相状来产生总的意识，那么就会有那样的责难，但不是那样，因为是通过见到显现而产生把相似的事物混为一的虚假分别，所以那样的责难是不可能的，因为总执著中不显现自相。如果显现，那么是像在根识中显现一样在总的意识中显现吗？ 还是像总显现一样在自相上成立呢？如果考察为一部分显现在总执著上，一部分显现在根识上，那么，不是第一种情况，因为即使没有自相也有总的意识的缘故。不是第二种情况，因为在根识上境、时、相没有混杂地显现，而在总的意识上仅仅是义总通过各种各样的名言来显现，那样在意义上是不成立的。不是第三种情况，因为一个事物上没有显现和不显现的两部分。如果认识到在显现的法上有很多没有见到的部分，那么对任何法都不能安立为一，因此会变得非常过分。因此，把自相不同的事物混为一的总的意识，即使是自相作为有者的因所造成的，或者是由它的力量所产生的，因为是虚假的意识的缘故，所以没有必要如实地执著。虽然是那样颠倒，但通过混合显现和考察，由于特别执著的力量而运用名言的方式，以前已经说过了。另外，如果像他们那样说总为实有，那么，如何避免显现不同而不能产生一个意识的责难？如果认为因为有不不同的总，所以没有过失，那么，即使总存在，也不能遮止显现不同的显现，而且因为总不显现为形状、颜色等，以及见到显现上有形状等，所以对显现为一个没有任何帮助，如果没有增益，仅仅是总也不能使显现为不不同。如果显
English
Transform! Furthermore, those other heretics say this: If one cannot use the reason that many do not produce one fruit to explain that manifest things do not produce one general consciousness. Then, what should be said? They do not wish that general consciousness, which appears as one that is not different, arises from different manifestations. Because just as there is no non-different general that holds onto different objects in the same way, it is unreasonable to hold onto it in that way, just as one cannot understand a blue object as yellow. If it is thought that manifestation produces general consciousness by establishing its own characteristics, then there would be such a criticism, but it is not so, because it is through seeing the manifestation that a false conceptualization arises, mixing similar things into one, so such a criticism is impossible, because self-characteristics do not appear in general apprehension. If it appears, does it appear in the general consciousness as it appears in sense consciousness? Or is it established on self-characteristics as in general appearance? If it is examined as one part appearing in general apprehension and one part appearing in sense consciousness, then it is not the first case, because there is general consciousness even without self-characteristics. It is not the second case, because in sense consciousness, objects, times, and aspects appear without being mixed, while in general consciousness, only the general meaning appears through various expressions, and it is not established in that way in meaning. It is not the third case, because there are no two parts of appearance and non-appearance in one thing. If one realizes that there are many unseen parts in the manifest dharma, then it is not permissible to establish anything as one, so it will become very excessive. Therefore, this general consciousness that mixes things with different self-characteristics into one, even if it is caused by the self-characteristic as the cause of the owner, or produced by its power, because it is a false consciousness, there is no need to hold onto it as it is. Although it is such a reversal, the way of using expressions through mixing appearance and examination, due to the power of special attachment, has been said before. Furthermore, if they say that the general is real, how can one avoid the criticism that different manifestations cannot produce one consciousness? If one thinks that there is no fault because there is a non-different general, then even if the general exists, it cannot prevent the appearance of different manifestations, and because the general does not appear as shape, color, etc., and because one sees that there are shapes, etc. in the manifestation, it is of no help to appearing as one, and without superimposition, the general alone cannot make it appear as non-different. If the manife