English
If things are not necessarily changing, or if there is no certainty of change, then sometimes it is possible that they do not change and remain as they are. If it is said that this is impossible because things have many factors of destruction, and one day they will encounter destruction, then it is also possible not to encounter it, because the certainty of encounter cannot be proven, so for some things, destruction may also be impossible, and merely having factors of destruction does not mean that they will necessarily encounter destruction, otherwise the pot would be destroyed as soon as it is formed. Therefore, since there are things that exist for as long as a kalpa despite having factors of destruction, then similarly, it is possible that they will not encounter destruction later, and by what means can it be proven that this is impossible? Therefore, even if a hammer etc. is a factor of destruction, merely being a potential factor does not mean that it necessarily produces a result. Just as a hammer does not necessarily break a pot. Therefore, all the signs that those who say that destruction depends on other factors put forward as causes of destruction are said to be mistaken in proving destruction, just as merely because there is a seed, one assumes that there is a sprout. Therefore, for the destruction of things like pots, those things like hammers that are considered to be the cause, in fact, do not have the slightest ability to destroy that thing. This destruction is a manifestation of the very nature of the thing itself, and does not depend on other factors, just like the wetness of water. Moreover, the word "moreover" also negates that destruction is caused by a cause, and the intention of those who say that the destruction of things is caused by a cause is that, because they have not seen things destroyed while they exist, they think that they cease to exist when they are absent, and they think that the disappearance of the pot is caused by the hammer. If non-existence is produced by a cause, then it will become the result of another dharma, and therefore it will become a thing. Therefore, non-existence, because it has no own-being, can never be a cause. Therefore, foolish people only think of destruction when things disappear, and cannot be certain before that, just as they have actually tasted poison before, but are not sure that it is poison, and only when they see the changes of the poison taking effect later, do they become certain that it is poison. If you ask: Haven't you seen the hammer breaking the pot with your own eyes? If the very nature of the thing itself is not momentary, then even a hammer cannot destroy it, just as you have not seen the sky being destroyed by a hammer. The own-being of
Chinese
如果本体是刹那性的，那就不需要其他的毁灭因素了。而且，过去的刹那无法摧毁，现在的刹那已经成立，并且不会停留在第二个刹那。未来的刹那没有产生，因此无法被毁灭。此外，存在的事物无法毁灭，不存在的事物也无法被毁灭。那些不认为事物是刹那性的人会这样想：他们不认为瓶子已经过去，而是认为之前的瓶子一直存在到现在，然后被锤子摧毁。如果刚产生的瓶子和现在即将消失的瓶子是同一个，那么刚产生时是否与锤子相遇？如果相遇，那么刚产生就会被摧毁。如果没有相遇，那么现在又如何相遇？如果认为仅仅是相遇和不相遇的区别，那么如果毁灭因素相遇的瓶子和未相遇的瓶子没有区别，即使与毁灭因素相遇，也不会像未相遇时那样有毁灭和不毁灭的区别。同样，正在毁灭和正在存在的瓶子之间也没有区别。因此，瓶子的微粒作为近取因，锤子作为俱生缘，变成瓦片的形状，瓶子的形状不再显现，因此说瓶子被摧毁了，这仅仅是对同类后继者没有产生的一种说法。瓶子延续的刹那因为已经成立而不会被摧毁，虽然无法摧毁未来的刹那，但仅仅是阻止了同类相续产生，因此认为瓶子在那之前一直存在，这仅仅是一种假想。因此，事物一旦成立就会毁灭。就像我们看到闪电、蜡烛、瓶子等事物被摧毁时，它们这样被摧毁是可能的，如果这样，那么它们的毁灭不需要寻找原因，而是通过推理成立，那么毁灭就是由事物自身的本性所成立的。除了这个原因之外，对于没有亲眼看到毁灭的山和一切有情众生，只要是事物，那么它们的毁灭就是由其自身的本性所成立的。要知道，这是事物的本性。第三，总结能立和因的意义：如上所述，能立或事物的
English
If the entity is momentary, then there is no need for other destructive factors. Moreover, the past moment cannot be destroyed, the present moment has already been established and does not remain in the second moment. The future moment has not arisen, so it cannot be destroyed. Furthermore, what exists cannot be destroyed, and what does not exist cannot be destroyed. Those who do not think that things are momentary think like this: they do not think that the pot has passed, but think that the previous pot has existed until now, and then it is destroyed by the hammer. If the pot that has just been produced and the pot that is about to disappear now are the same, then did they meet the hammer as soon as they were produced? If they meet, then they will be destroyed as soon as they are produced. If they do not meet, then how do they meet now? If you think that it is only the difference between meeting and not meeting, then if the pot that meets the destructive factor and the pot that does not meet are no different, even if they meet the destructive factor, there will be no difference between destruction and non-destruction as in the case of not meeting. Similarly, there will be no difference between the pot that is being destroyed and the pot that is existing. Therefore, the particles of the pot are the material cause, and the hammer is the accompanying condition, and when they become the shape of tiles, the shape of the pot no longer appears, so it is said that the pot is destroyed, which is only a statement that the subsequent similar one has not been produced. The moments of the pot's continuity are not destroyed because they have already been established, and although the future moments cannot be destroyed, it only prevents the continuous production of the same kind, so it is only an assumption that the pot has existed until then. Therefore, things are destroyed as soon as they are established. Just as when we see lightning, candles, pots, etc. being destroyed, it is possible that they are destroyed in this way, and if so, then their destruction does not need to find a reason, but is established by reasoning, then destruction is established by the nature of the thing itself. Apart from this reason, for the mountains and all sentient beings who have not seen destruction with their own eyes, as long as they are things, then their destruction is established by their own nature. Know that this is the nature of things. Third, to summarize the meaning of the two proofs and signs: As mentioned above, the proof or the thing's
Chinese
具有事物的推论有两种，哪两种呢？就是将果和遍相的自性作为理由，从这些理由中成立所要成立的事物是不欺骗的。其原因是，这些理由与各自所要成立的事物的因和遍相之一，如前所述，具有无则不生的必然联系。第二，关于遮遣理由，宣说两种未见，以此消除诤论。第一，具有确定存在的进入遮止，不显现未见，以及确定不存在的成立，显现可能未见两种。第一种，之所以说该法具有确定存在的 词语进入，是因为该法本身就是以缘取它的心识为先导的缘故。对于成为时机的事物，如果成为时机的补特伽罗以现量和比量在任何地方都未见到，那么就不会使用“该法存在”的知、语、入三种词语，也就是说，它变得如同自身不存在一样。因此，对于面前这里确定不存在的瓶子，以及虽然没有成立确定存在和确定不存在，但未见的食肉者二者存在，也不会使用这样的词语，因为它们变得平等了，所以不会对二者使用。因此，不显现的未见，在此遮遣理由的情况下被视为量，仅仅是作为一种分类来宣说，而不是成为真正成立该事物存在与否的遮遣理由的量。如果不是遮遣事物的量，为何要作为量来宣说呢？如果不宣说这一点，就无法区分仅仅未见是否能够遮遣，因此作为遮遣理由的一种分类的量来宣说。那么，会变成相似理由吗？不会变成相似理由，因为仅仅是对面前的这个处所，像食肉者一样，不使用具有确定存在的词语，这就是真正的理由。因此，所谓遮止具有确定存在的词语，也就是遮止具有确定存在的词语的进入。对谁遮止呢？对成为时机的那一补特伽罗的相续。那么，难道也不遮止确定不存在的词语的进入吗？虽然也存在确定不存在的词语的进入，但那不是未见的果，所以没有必要说。实际上，这是因为具有确定存在的词语进入的因， 由于未见而导致果被遮止。那么，为什么未见该事物却不被遮止呢？
English
Inference of things with qualities has two aspects. What are they? It is unfailing to establish what is to be established from those which have the nature of effect and pervasive as reasons. The reason for this is that these reasons have a definite connection of not arising without the cause and one of the pervasive aspects of their respective establishments, as mentioned above. Second, regarding refutation reasons, two non-apprehensions are explained to dispel disputes. First, there are two types: non-apprehension that prevents the entry of certain existence and non-apprehension that allows the establishment of certain non-existence. First: The term 'certain existence' is applied to a phenomenon because the phenomenon itself is preceded by a mind that apprehends it. If a person who has become a time of opportunity does not apprehend with direct perception or inference in any place, then the three terms of knowledge, expression, and entry of 'that phenomenon exists' will not be used, that is, it becomes as if it does not exist in itself. Therefore, for a vase that is certainly non-existent here, and for two meat-eaters who are not established as certainly existent or certainly non-existent, the term 'they exist' will not be used, because they become equal, so it will not be used for the two. Therefore, non-appearance, non-apprehension, is counted as a valid cognition in this case of refutation reasons, and is explained only as a category, but it is not a valid cognition that has become a true refutation reason for establishing whether that object exists or not. If it is not a valid cognition that refutes objects, why is it explained as a valid cognition? If this is not explained, the difference between whether or not mere non-apprehension can refute cannot be distinguished, so it is explained as a valid cognition of a category of refutation reasons. Then, will it become a seemingly valid reason? It will not become a seemingly valid reason, because it is only that the term 'certain existence' is not applied to a place in front of us, like a meat-eater, and that is a true reason. Therefore, the so-called prevention of the term 'certain existence' is also the prevention of the entry of the term 'certain existence'. Who is prevented? The continuum of that person who has become a time of opportunity. Then, does it not also prevent the entry of the term 'certain non-existence'? Although there is also the entry of the term 'certain non-existence', it is not the result of that non-apprehension, so there is no need to say it. In reality, this is because the cause of the entry of the term 'certain existence' is the result is prevented by non-apprehension. Then, why is it that the object is not prevented even though it is not apprehended?