Chinese
如果认为，不只是有概念的共相作为对境，也有一些无概念的自相作为对境的识，那么，因为这个无概念识和前述三个条件具有相同的因，所以所有不错误的根识也都会同样地变成无概念的。 因为果的体性不同，是因不同的缘故。因此，由所取义自相所生的识，与不是共相的对境没有任何差别。第二，由因成立见与分别不同。 因此，依赖是不合理的。 因此，遮遣根识的其他因。第一，现量见与分别识是不同的，因为是从不同的因所生的缘故。 如何呢？分别是不依赖外境，只是忆念名称符号，而显现于意境中的，是结合或产生者。同样地，从那个因产生那个果，是不依赖符号，而是从义自相的事物本身的力量，转变为眼识的。 因此，不同因的果，不会互相混淆，就像从青稞和小麦的种子长出的苗一样。第二，真实和破除其过失的反驳。第一，如果认为，境色自相是依赖于自己的符号忆念，才具有产生根识的能力，如果没有符号忆念，就不能仅凭自身不依赖地产生根识，那么，就像产生相的执著心，不是仅仅见到相的事物，如果没有忆念为相就不会产生一样，这里也必须是产生色的识，仅仅是色的符号忆念，而没有其他的，但是，对于没有忆念符号和不认识符号的人，也见到仅仅见到色就产生识，因此被驳斥了。另外，也说见到那个色会成为忆念其他的，而不会成为对自己的分别。如果认为，符号忆念是仅仅见到那个事物，就自然地 联系而产生的，所以不可能没有符号忆念，那么，因为那是联系而产生的，即使所取义不接近，也仅仅从符号忆念产生根识，或者，如果不产生，就没有同时产生的决定，所以有见到色的识，却没有产生符号忆念。
English
If it is thought that there are some minds that take self-characterized objects without conceptuality, not just conceptual universals, then, since that non-conceptual mind and the three conditions mentioned above have the same cause, all non-erroneous sense consciousnesses will also become non-conceptual in the same way. Because the nature of the result is different, it is due to the difference in cause. Therefore, the consciousness that arises from the self-character of the apprehended object will be no different from not being a universal object. Second, from the cause, it is established that seeing and conceptualization are different. Therefore, reliance is unreasonable. Therefore, refuting other causes of sense consciousness. First, direct perception and conceptual consciousness are different, because they arise from different causes. How is it? Conceptualization does not rely on external objects, but only remembers names and symbols, and what appears in the mental realm is the combiner or producer. Similarly, from that cause arises that result, which does not rely on symbols, but from the power of the object itself of the self-character of meaning, it is transformed into eye consciousness. Therefore, the results of different causes do not mix with each other, just like the sprouts that grow from the seeds of barley and wheat. Second, the actual and the refutation of its faults are refuted. First, if it is thought that the self-character of the object is dependent on the memory of its own symbol, it has the ability to generate sense consciousness, and if there is no memory of the symbol, it cannot generate sense consciousness without relying on itself, then, just like the arising of the mind that grasps the sign, it is not just seeing the object of the sign, if there is no memory as a sign, it will not arise, so here also, the arising of the consciousness of form must be only the memory of the symbol of form, and there is no other, but, for those who do not remember the symbol and do not know the symbol, it is also seen that the consciousness arises from just seeing the form, so it is refuted. Furthermore, it is also said that seeing that form will become a memory of others, but will not become a conceptualization of oneself. If it is thought that the memory of the symbol is just seeing that thing, it is naturally Because it arises in connection, it is impossible not to have the memory of the symbol, then, because it arises in connection, even if the apprehended object is not close, the sense consciousness arises only from the memory of the symbol, or, if it does not arise, there is no certainty of simultaneous arising, so there is consciousness of seeing the form, but there is no arising of the memory of the symbol.