English
It is not desired that sprouts arise merely from aggregates, because they are dependent on temporary complete change. Therefore, how could this sign of non-dependence be uncertain? It is not. Secondly, there are three: comparing similarities, eliminating the unestablished, and eliminating the uncertain. First, there are two: argument and answer. First, then, the aggregate depends on change, similarly, if it is said that what is made is also the cause of destruction, but depends on time? Second, if it depends on time, then this made thing that needs to depend, changes until the time of destruction, the basis of dependence, has not arrived, then destruction is established as non-dependent, because even if the time has not arrived, it will be destroyed. If what is made does not change until the time of destruction, then because there is no difference in essence, it will remain indestructible later as before, because there is the reasoning that "what is not destroyed at the beginning does not change at the end." Second, there are two: argument and answer. First, The aggregate of causes such as earth and seeds is also the unchanging one from the first moment of its essence to the last moment of producing the result. Therefore, this reasoning that depends on constant change is not established. Second, there are two: the reality and the refutation of its faults. First, because the essence of the previous and subsequent aggregates is the unchanging one, just as the aggregate produces sprouts from the later, that is, the last aggregate. Because these two have the same essence, the first moment of the aggregate, even at the time of mere aggregation, will also produce. Second, there are two: argument and its answer. First, if it is said that although these two have the same essence, it is uncertain whether sprouts will be produced because the first aggregate has obstacles. Second, the first has obstacles, the last has no obstacles, these two are not one but different. Although you promise and think it is one, in reality it will also become two essences. Third, there are two: argument and answer. First, again, some say that any result will definitely arise even if it does not depend on the cause, so it is not pervasive. For example, even if the aggregate of barley causes depends on producing the sprouts of rice, thereby joining the sign of non-dependence. However, because the aggregate of barley causes does not produce the sprouts of rice. Therefore, just as saying that the sprouts of rice are non-dependent, this reasoning of non-dependence is uncertain. Second, there are two: the answer and the way in which the answer itself is not similar. First, the sprouts of rice are dependent because they themselves depend on the seed.
Chinese
因此，不依赖的标志没有成立。第二，关于相似的辩论和驳斥，分为两部分。第一： 如果像稻芽依赖于自己的种子一样，即使有毁灭的原因，也不会立即不依赖地毁灭，而是依赖于毁灭的原因，如锤子等，因此不依赖的标志不成立，那么。 第二，这两者不相似，因为幼苗必须依赖于各自的原因。事物的毁灭是附加在事物本身的性质上的，因此不依赖于事物的原因之外的其他毁灭原因。如果将毁灭视为非事物，仅仅是否定，则不需要原因。因此，不需要其他的毁灭者。第三，对三个非常荒谬的辩论的驳斥。如果常与无常是矛盾的，那么瓶子等物质会变成一种，并且如果毁灭被认为是该事物本身或他物，则不合理。如果在已做方面相同，常与无常两种情况不可能存在，那么在事物相同的情况下，有碍与无碍两种情况也不可能存在。通过这三个荒谬的推论，通过已做来证明一切事物都是无常的，这是无法阻止的，因为无法造成损害。第二，关于有损害的理由，首先陈述损害的领域，然后是驳斥。第一，自在天派等说：就像乌鸦大多是黑色的，但也可能存在白色的乌鸦一样，由于事物的能力多种多样，瓶子等大多是无常的，但自在天等事物和常的事物存在一些共同的基础，这并不矛盾。第二，分为两部分：如果进行分析，则不合理；通过理由来证明。 第一，如果自在天等常的事物不能发挥作用，那么因为它们是非事物，除了被命名为自在天之外，在意义上是一致的，所以不争论名称。然而，如果它们能够发挥作用，那么在发挥作用时，它们会改变还是不改变？如果改变，那么常的性质就会丧失。如果不改变，那么发挥作用是矛盾的，因为它们像以前一样保持不变。第二，分为两部分：陈述根本的理由；确定结合的意义。第一，因此，任何不是知识的对象，也不是发挥作用的事物，都必然不存在事物，例如虚空。自在天等常的事物也空无作用。这样陈述理由。第二，关于
English
Therefore, the sign of independence is not established. Second, regarding the debate and refutation of similarity, there are two parts. First: If, like a rice sprout depending on its own seed, even though there is a cause for destruction, it does not immediately perish independently, but depends on other causes of destruction, such as a hammer, then the sign of independence is not established. Second, these two are not similar, because a sprout must depend on its respective cause. The destruction of a thing is attributed to the nature of the thing itself, so it does not depend on other causes of destruction apart from the cause of the thing. If destruction is regarded as a non-thing, merely a negation, then no cause is needed. Therefore, no other destroyer is needed. Third, refuting the three extremely absurd debates. If permanence and impermanence are contradictory, then substances such as vases will become one, and if destruction is considered to be the thing itself or something else, it is unreasonable. If they are the same in being made, it is impossible for permanence and impermanence to exist, then in the same way, if things are the same, it is also impossible for obstruction and non-obstruction to exist. Through these three absurd inferences, proving that all things are impermanent through being made, this cannot be prevented because it cannot cause harm. Second, regarding the reason that has harm, first state the field of harm, then refute it. First, the Ishvaravadins and others say: Just as crows are mostly black, but there may also be white crows, because the abilities of things are diverse, vases and the like are mostly impermanent, but there are some common bases for things like Ishvara and permanent things, which is not contradictory. Second, there are two parts: if analyzed, it is unreasonable; proving it through reason. First, if permanent things like Ishvara cannot function, then because they are non-things, except for being named Ishvara, they are consistent in meaning, so there is no dispute over the name. However, if they can function, then when they function, do they change or not change? If they change, then the nature of permanence is lost. If they do not change, then functioning is contradictory, because they remain the same as before. Second, there are two parts: stating the fundamental reason; identifying the meaning of the combination. First, therefore, whatever is not an object of knowledge and does not function, necessarily does not have a thing, like space. Permanent things like Ishvara are also devoid of function. Thus, the reason is stated. Second, regarding
Chinese
有法，所立，因的三义。第一，对于成立此理，有法是外方所承认的自在等常法的名言，对于从无常中稍微返回的异体假立执着为自相而已。第二，不是口中所说的仅是无实，而是以意义理解的空性的无遮自性，事物遮遣本身是所立之法。第三，有法和周遍的成立二者。第一，遮破、安立、舍弃三者。第一，遮破有法以现量成立和唯独以自证成立的两种观点。第一，其中一些人说，常法以次第同时空性的有法在常法之上以无用处而现量成立。这不合理，因为在进行遮破时，不需要产生执着或缘取所破的量。第二， 有些人说，常法不变而以无用处来认知，是通过体验的自证而成立的。如果是这样，那么外道认为常法是作者的邪分别也不可能存在，因为是通过体验而成立的。第二，自宗。因此，自宗有法是外方辩论者所承认的常法，在认知为空性时，如果这样，那么以次第同时起作用是不可能的，或者说以遮止的正确之因，有法才能成立，因为是从因中推论而成立的。第三，对于那个因的辩论的舍弃，舍弃与常法的状态不相违背，舍弃与常法的自性不相违背两种。第一，有前派和回答两种。又是他们说，自性虽然是常，但是状态等，因为变化，所以即使是常法，起作用也是合理的，如果这样说。第二，自性和状态两者如果是一体，那么具有变化和不变的两种法相违背，如果是他体，那么状态不是常法，虽然可以起作用，但是自性是常法，所以起作用是相违背的。第二，有前派和回答两种。第一，又是他们说，常法如果没有刹那坏灭的常法，但是有显现为作用的粗大变化，所以起作用是合理的，如果这样说。第二，如果一开始就没有刹那坏灭，那么粗大的变化又在哪里呢？
English
Subject, predicate, the three meanings of reason. First, to establish this principle, the subject is the name of eternal phenomena such as self-existent, which is accepted by the opponent, and it is merely clinging to the self-characteristic as a negation of otherness that slightly returns from impermanence. Second, it is not just an unreal thing spoken in words, but the nature of non-affirming emptiness understood by meaning, and the negation of things themselves is the predicate. Third, there are two establishments: subject and pervasion. First, there are three: refutation, establishment, and abandonment. First, there are two views: refuting that the subject is established by direct perception and that it is established solely by self-awareness. First, some say that the subject, which is empty of sequential simultaneity, is manifestly established on the eternal by being useless. This is unreasonable, because when refuting, it is not necessary to generate a valid cognition that grasps or focuses on what is to be refuted. Second, Some say that the eternal, unchanging, and useless cognition is established by the self-awareness of experience. If so, then the heretical view that the eternal is the agent is also impossible, because it is established by experience. Second, one's own system. Therefore, the subject of one's own system is the eternal, which is accepted by the opponent, and when it is recognized as emptiness, if so, then it is impossible to function sequentially and simultaneously, or the subject can be established by the correct reason of prevention, because it is established by inference from the reason. Third, regarding the abandonment of the debate on that reason, there are two types: abandoning what is not contradictory to the state of the eternal, and abandoning what is not contradictory to the nature of the eternal. First, there are proponent and answer. Again, they say that although the nature is constant, the states, etc., change, so even if it is constant, it is reasonable to function, if so. Second, if the nature and state are one, then having two characteristics of change and immutability contradicts, and if they are other, then the state is not constant, although it can function, but the nature is constant, so functioning is contradictory. Second, there are proponent and answer. First, again, they say that if the eternal does not have the eternal destruction of moments, but there is a gross change that appears to function, so it is reasonable to function, if so. Second, if there is no destruction of moments from the beginning, then where is the gross change?