English
Like a pot and something made being impermanent, their essence is one, but it is absolutely impossible for them to exist as multiple in meaning, and it is never possible for phenomena that are not multiple in essence to exist as one in meaning, and for a single substance that is indistinguishable in essence, it is impossible to appear as two parts, clear and unclear. Second, because the object is such, the way the mind grasps also appears in all direct perceptions as it exists in meaning, so there is no appearance of multiplicity in one object. Likewise, it is impossible for multiple objects to appear as one. Appearance is the entrance, and for what exists in the object, there is no alternation of some phenomena appearing and some not appearing. For example, when an image appears in a mirror, it appears as the color and shape of the image are. Third, how the mind and object correspond. Therefore, there are two ways to establish that direct perception does not require determination. First, because the sense consciousness that grasps it arises by the power of how the object exists, it is certain that if the object does not exist, the consciousness that grasps it will not arise, because there is a necessary pervasion. Therefore, the mind with an object and the object meaning do not confuse each other. Here, if anything is one and the same in essence, it does not have two parts, appearing and not appearing, so this pervasion cannot be exemplified by substances famous in the world such as pots. It must be exemplified by the substance of just what appears to the senses. The substance of the sense bases mentioned in the scriptures is the key point. The পক্ষধর্ম，pakṣadharma (homologous property), व्याप्तिसिद्धि，vyāptisiddhi (pervasion establishment), विवाद，vivāda (dispute) and परिहार，parihāra (refutation) etc. of this reason (hetu) are to be seen in the footnotes. Second, establishing that direct perception does not require determination, and explaining why determination is unreasonable other than by exclusion. First, in two parts: the text and the dispute and refutation of it. First, therefore, direct perception is also valid cognition, because it is non-conceptual consciousness, so it does not need to be determined, because determination is conceptual. Second, refuting the dispute of becoming non-valid cognition: If someone says that it is not valid cognition because it has not directly cut off superimposition. Answer: Although direct perception is free from concepts and has no determination, it is established as valid cognition because it is not mistaken about the object. If someone asks, then how does it perform refutation and establishment? Answer: If there is no cause for delusion, then direct perception is valid cognition, or if there is a cause for delusion, then it cannot be determined in the face of concepts by direct perception alone, but by the power of other inference valid cognition, after cutting off superimposition, it performs refutation and establishment by the power of determination.
Chinese
是合适的。第二，驳斥认为存在非遣除的确定，以及存在非遣除的语词分别之境的观点，分为两部分。第一部分，确立蓝色反体确定为他遮。断除确定的增益之理。显示那是学者的意旨，分为三部分。第一，有些人说，如果刹那的反体可以容许他遮，但这个蓝色的自反体确定，因为是分别，所以不能是现量，又不依赖于因，所以也不是比量，而且因为没有断除相违，所以也不能是他遮。如果这样说，在没有区分意义部分的情况下，现量见到后，由随之而来的意识以“蓝色”的方式普遍地认识到的蓝色反体确定，因为是分别，所以不是现量，而且它是由此断除非蓝色的他遮之境。因为遣除没有实境，所以在显现和假立上混淆而进入时，进入之境获得自相，而且那也是因为向内看而成为自证，所以被认为是无误的量。第二，对于任何心识有确定的，它没有在非它的相违的其他部分上增益，要知道那正是断除增益，因为确定增益如同光明与黑暗一样，是不能同时存在的相违。第三，同样，确定以及在非它之上增益的犹豫，也都是通过他遮的方式进入的缘故，说这些确定增益不是现量，是遍知者所说的道理。第二，关于语词分别不进入显现之境的方式，分为三种：显现时，同时证悟遮诠和肯定，成为一个意义的名称繁多，如果以反体来区分，则会变成遣除。第一，如果不是那样，如果语词和确定也通过事物显现来衡量，那么有什么过失呢？如果这样说，是有过失的。因为如果通过显现来衡量断除非它的名称的语词和如此确定的分别之义，那么，是与非、有与无的一切遮诠和肯定，也会在显现那个境的同时一起证悟。这样一来，对于见到瓶子的人来说，就不需要在瓶子上再进行遮诠和肯定了，因为瓶子已经显现，并且通过显现已经被语词分别衡量了。第二，又在仅仅显现的时候，要衡量的东西
English
It is appropriate. Secondly, refuting the view that there is a determination of non-exclusion and that there is a realm of verbal discrimination of non-exclusion is divided into two parts. The first part is to establish the determination of the blue counter-entity as other-exclusion. The way to cut off the imputation of certainty. Showing that it is the intention of the scholar is divided into three parts. First, some say that if the counter-entity of a moment can allow other-exclusion, but this determination of the self-counter-entity of blue, because it is a distinction, cannot be a direct perception, and it does not depend on the reason, so it is not an inference, and because it has not cut off the contradiction, it cannot be other-exclusion. If you say so, without distinguishing the meaning part, after seeing it directly, the determination of the blue counter-entity that is generally recognized as "blue" by the consciousness that follows, because it is a distinction, is not a direct perception, and it is the realm of other-exclusion that cuts off non-blue. Because exclusion has no real object, it is confused in appearance and assumption and when it enters, the entering realm obtains its own characteristics, and that is also because it looks inward and becomes self-awareness, so it is considered to be an infallible measure. Secondly, for any mind that has certainty, it does not impute to other parts of the contradiction that are not it, and it should be known that that is precisely the cutting off of imputation, because the certainty of imputation is like light and darkness, and it is a contradiction that cannot exist at the same time. Thirdly, similarly, the hesitation of certainty and imputation on non-it also enters through the way of other-exclusion, so saying that these certainty imputations are not direct perception is the reason spoken by the omniscient one. Secondly, regarding the way in which verbal distinctions do not enter the realm of appearance, there are three types: when appearing, simultaneously realizing negation and affirmation, becoming many names for one meaning, and if distinguishing by counter-entity, it will become exclusion. First, if it is not so, if words and certainty are also measured by the appearance of things, then what is the fault? If you say so, there is a fault. Because if the words of the name that cut off non-it and the meaning of the distinction that is so certain are measured by appearance, then all negations and affirmations of yes and no, existence and non-existence, will also be realized together at the same time as that realm appears. In this way, for the person who sees the vase, there is no need to perform negation and affirmation on the vase anymore, because the vase has already appeared, and it has been measured by verbal distinction through appearance. Secondly, also at the time of mere appearance, the thing to be measured
Tibetan
་ལས་གསར་དུ་སྒྲ་རྟོག་གི་དུས་ན་ཤེས་རྒྱུ་མི་སྲིད་དགོས་པས། རྟོག་ཡུལ་དང་སྣང་ཡུལ་སོ་སོ་བ་མེད་པས་སྣང་ཡུལ་དེ་གཅིག་པུ་ཉིད་ལ་བུམ་པ་བྱས་པ་མི་རྟག་སོགས་མིང་ཐ་དད་པའི་སྒྲ་ངེས་པ་ཇི་སྙེད་ཀྱིས་བརྗོད་ཅིང་དུ་མར་བརྟགས་ན་ཡང་། ང་དང་བདག་ལྟ་བུ་མིང་ནི་རྣམ་གྲངས་ཙམ་ཡིན་པར་འགྱུར་གྱི་དོན་ཐ་དད་ཐོབ་ཅིང་ཤེས་པ་མིན་པར་འགྱུར་རོ། །གསུམ་པ། ཁོ་ན་རེ་སྐྱོན་མེད་དེ་བྱས་མི་རྟག་སོགས་དོན་དེ་ཉིད་ལ་ལྡོག་པས་འབྱེད་ཟེར་ན་དོན་སེལ་བ་ཡིན་པ་ལ། དངོས་པོའི་མིང་གིས་བཏགས་པར་ཟད་དོ། །དེ་ལྟ་བུ་ནི་ལྡོག་པ་ལ་སྣང་བར་བཏགས་པས་རྟོག་གེའི་ཐ་སྙད་མི་ཤེས་པའི་སྐྱོན་ཡིན་ཅིང་། སེལ་བ་དེ་ལ་སྣང་བར་རློམ་པ་རྣམས་ནི་འཁྲུལ་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། །གཉིས་པ་སེལ་བ་ལ། མཚན་ཉིད། དེའི་རང་བཞིན། དེ་ལ་རྩོད་སྤོང་གསུམ། དང་པོ། གཞི་དེ་ཅིག་ཤོས་ཡིན་མི་སྲིད་པས་ན་དེ་མིན་གྱི་དངོས་འགལ་བཅད་པའི་རྟོག་པའི་སྒོ་ནས་ཡུལ་ལ་འཇུག་པ་ནི། གཞན་སེལ་གྱི་ཡུལ་ཅན་ནམ་འཛིན་སྟངས་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡིན་པར་བཞེད་དོ། ། གཉིས་པ་ལ། སེལ་བའི་རྣམ་གཞག་དང་། དེའི་རབ་དབྱེ། ཐུན་མོང་དུ་མཇུག་བསྡུ་གསུམ། །དང་པོ་ལ། ཡུལ་གྱི་གནས་ལུགས་དང་། བློས་འཛིན་སྟངས་གཉིས། དང་པོ། གཞན་སེལ་དེ་རྟོག་པས་བརྟགས་པ་ཙམ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་བློ་ངོ་ཙམ་ལས་སེལ་བ་རང་རྐྱ་བ་ལ་དངོས་ཀྱི་ཡུལ་ལམ་ཡུལ་རང་མཚན་ནམ་མཚན་ཉིད་པ་མེད་ཀྱང་སྣང་བརྟག་གཅིག་ཏུ་འཁྲུལ་བའི་འཇུག་ལྡོག་གི་ཡུལ་ནི་རང་མཚན་ལ་དམིགས་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། །འདི་ལ་གང་གིས་གང་ཇི་ལྟར་སེལ་ཚུལ་སོགས་དཔྱོད་པ་ནི་ཟུར་མཆན་དུ་གསལ་ལོ། །གཉིས་པ་ལ། མུ་བཞིའི་འཛིན་སྟངས་སྤྱིར་བསྟན་པ་དང་། བཟློག་པ་གཉིས་བྱེ་བྲག་ཏུ་བཤད་པ་གཉིས། དང་པོ། དེ་ལ་དོན་གྱི་སྟེང་ན་གཅིག་དང་ཐ་དད་ཕན་ཚུན་འདྲེ་བ་མེད་ཀྱང་རང་མཚན་གཅིག་ཡིན་པ་དང་ཐ་དད་ཡིན་པ་ལ། སེལ་བའི་འཛིན་སྟངས་དོན་བཞིན་དུ་བཟུང་བ་དང་བཟློག་སྟེ་བཟུང་བ་གཉིས་ཏེ་མུ་བཞི་སྲིད་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། །གཉིས་པ་ལ། ཐ་དད་ལ་གཅིག་ཏུ་འཛིན་པ་དང་། གཅིག་ལ་ཐ་དད་དུ་འཛིན་པ་བཤད་པ་གཉིས། དང་པོ་ལ། སྒྲོ་འདོགས་པའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན། སྒྲོ་འདོགས་པའི་བློའི་རྣམ་པ། སྒྲོ་བཏགས་པའི་དགོས་པ་གསུམ། དང་པོ། དེ་ལས་བཟློག་པ་གཉིས་འདིར་བཤད་དགོས་པས་དང་པོ་ཐ་དད་གཅིག་ཏུ་འཛིན་པའི་རྒྱུ་མེས་བསྲེག་ཆུས་ངོམས་པ་ལྟ་བུའི་བྱ་བ་དང་ཡལ་འདབ་ལྡན་པ་དང་ནོག་ལྐོག་ཤལ་ལྟ་བུ་མཚན་ཉིད་གཅིག་པ་རྣམས་ལ་གཅིག་ཅེས་པ་ལྟ་བུའོ། །གཉིས་པ་ལ། ཐ
Chinese
因此，在最初产生声音概念的时候，不可能知道。由于概念的对象和显现的对象不是分离的，所以仅仅将显现的对象视为瓶子，并以各种不同的名称，如无常等来表达，即使进行多种推测，像我与自我的名称也只是名称的不同，而不会获得不同的含义和知识。第三，有人说这样做没有错误，因为通过否定，无常等事物本身可以被区分，但这只是用事物的名称来命名的。像这样，将否定视为显现，这是不了解概念术语的错误。那些认为否定是显现的人是错误的。第二，关于否定：定义、其自性、以及对此的辩论和反驳，共有三点。第一点：由于基础不可能与另一事物相同，因此通过以否定性的概念来切断非此之物而进入对象，这被认为是具有他者排除的对象或执持方式的定义。 第二部分包括：否定的分类、其区分、以及共同的总结，共有三点。第一点包括：对象的存在方式和心识的执持方式，共有两点。第一点：由于他者排除仅仅是通过概念来推测的，因此除了心识之外，否定本身没有实际的对象，也没有对象的自相或定义，但将显现和推测混淆，导致进入和退出的对象是针对自相的。关于用什么方式排除什么，将在注释中详细说明。第二点包括：一般展示四句的执持方式，以及分别解释两种颠倒的情况。第一点：虽然在事物本身上，一和异是互不相容的，但在自相是一或异的情况下，存在两种情况：按照事物本身执持排除，以及颠倒执持，共有四种可能性。第二点包括：解释将差异执持为一，以及将一执持为差异两种情况。第一点包括：增益的原因、增益的心识状态、以及增益的目的，共有三点。第一点：由于这里需要解释两种颠倒的情况，首先，将差异执持为一的原因，就像火燃烧和水满足一样，对于具有相同特征的事物，如树枝和隐藏的阴影，会说它们是相同的。第二点：关
English
Therefore, it is impossible to know at the time of newly arising sound concepts. Since the object of conception and the object of appearance are not separate, even if the object of appearance is regarded as a single entity, such as a pot, and expressed with various different names such as impermanence, and even if it is speculated in various ways, names like "I" and "self" will only be different in name, and will not attain different meanings and knowledge. Thirdly, some say that there is no fault in this, because by negating, the very meaning of impermanence and so on can be distinguished, but this is merely naming with the name of the object. Such is the fault of not knowing the terminology of conception by regarding negation as appearance. Those who presume negation to be appearance are mistaken. Secondly, regarding exclusion: definition, its nature, and debate and refutation concerning it, there are three points. Firstly, since the basis cannot be the same as something else, entering the object through the conception of cutting off the direct opposite of what is not that, is considered to be the definition of having the object of other-exclusion or the manner of apprehension. Secondly, there are three parts: the structure of exclusion, its divisions, and the common conclusion. The first part includes: the way the object exists and the way the mind apprehends it, there are two points. Firstly, since other-exclusion is merely speculated by conception, therefore, apart from the mind, exclusion itself does not have an actual object, nor does it have the self-character or definition of the object, but the object of entering and leaving, confusing appearance and speculation, is focused on the self-character. How and what is excluded by what will be explained in detail in the commentary. The second point includes: generally showing the apprehension of the four possibilities, and specifically explaining the two reversed situations. Firstly, although one and different are mutually incompatible on the thing itself, there are two situations where the self-character is one or different: there are four possibilities: apprehending exclusion according to the thing itself, and apprehending it in reverse. The second point includes: explaining the apprehension of difference as one, and the apprehension of one as different. The first point includes: the reason for imputation, the state of mind of imputation, and the purpose of imputation, there are three points. Firstly, since two reversed situations need to be explained here, firstly, the reason for apprehending difference as one, is like fire burning and water satisfying, for things with the same characteristics, such as branches and hidden shadows, it is said that they are the same. Secondly, con