English
Is there not even a slight understanding of the meaning? Or does it seem that it is understood but spoken of in a reversed manner? For example, when refuting self-origination, Master Buddhapālita said: "Things do not originate from themselves, because their origination would become meaningless, and it would become extremely excessive. For those things that already exist in their own nature, there is no need for further origination. If they exist and still originate, then they will never cease to originate." To this, Master Bhāvaviveka said: "That is not reasonable, because no reason or example has been stated, and the faults stated by others have not been refuted." And so on, he made such criticisms. To this, Candrakīrti eliminates the faults by saying: "'Because no reason or example has been stated' means that no autonomous reason or example has been stated. Or is it said that 'the faults stated by others have not been refuted'? Or is it said that no reason or example known to others has been stated, and that 'the faults stated by others have not been refuted'? If it is the former, then there is no need for an autonomous reason or example, because the words of Master Buddhapālita have already revealed that the Sāṃkhyas acknowledge self-origination, that is, the effect exists at the time of the cause, and then originates again, and that acknowledging existence and then originating again is contradictory. Because revealing the self-contradiction in what is acknowledged can prevent the opponent's wrong conceptions, there is no need to state an autonomous reason or example. If revealing the self-contradiction in what is acknowledged cannot prevent wrong conceptions, then stating an autonomous reason or example will also not prevent them. If one is a Madhyamika, if one makes an autonomous assertion that the internal sense bases do not originate from themselves, then the autonomous reason put forward to establish it is unreasonable, because apart from the internal sense bases not originating from themselves, it is not autonomously acknowledged that other aspects do not originate from themselves. To illustrate this, the quotations from the Four Hundred Verses and the Refutation of Disputes are cited, so the meaning of these is that, as an establisher without inherent existence, it is stated that there is no acknowledgment of phenomena established by their own nature, and there is a connection between these.
Chinese
一点也没有。关于这一点，知识总汇的尊者（ཤེས་བྱ་ཀུན་རིག་གི་ཞལ་སྔ་ནས།）曾说：“如果是中观派，就不应该使用通过遮止自生来成立他生的自续因，因为除了自生之外，没有承认其他的他生方式。”虽然这样说了，但这里是在争论是否存在成立自生不存在的自续，所以我觉得不合理。因此，由于内部的生处等没有不从自生的自续誓言，所以对于他人所说的过失，如果说不是从果的自性产生，那就是对已成立的事物进行成立；如果说是从因的自性产生，那就是变成了因相违背的意义，所以不需要消除这个过失。因为这样的过失是安住在没有自生的自续誓言上的。如果说是因为没有陈述因和比喻，如果说是为了没有陈述其他所知的因和比喻，那也是不合理的。因为这里也没有必须陈述其他所知的后比量的规定。如果一定要陈述，那么圣天（སངས་རྒྱས་བསྐྱངས་）的语言已经陈述了。其中的“那些”的意思是“存在于自己的自性中”，因此显示了因；“因为生是无意义的”则显示了所立的法。比喻是通过暗示来显示的，所以会变成这样：凡是存在于自己的自性中的，都遍及于再次生是无意义的。例如，如同面前存在的显而易见的瓶子。泥土状态的瓶子也是存在于自己的自性中的。因此，圣天论师的语言已经显示了。关于这一点，《明句论》（ཚིག་གསལ་）中说：“自己的后比量”和“有时是其他所知的后比量”这两种术语，前者是针对后立者说的，后者是针对前立者说的，所以应该理解为意义相同。因此，其他所知的后比量的意义是：两个法和因以及周遍，全部都是仅仅由后立者承认的，需要一个前立者不承认的；并且这些需要在前立者和后立者双方的共同显现中成立一个。这就像在智者面前丢脸的话语一样。
English
There is none whatsoever. Regarding this, the venerable omniscient one (Śes-bya Kun-rig-gi Zhal-snga-nas) said, "If one is a Madhyamika, one should not use the svatantrika reason that establishes other-origination by refuting self-origination, because there is no acceptance of other-origination in any way other than self-origination." Although this was said, here, since it is a debate about whether or not there is a svatantrika that establishes the non-existence of self-origination, I think it is unreasonable. Therefore, since there is no svatantrika vow that the internal sources of origination do not arise from themselves, the fault spoken by others to that, if it is said that it does not arise from the nature of the result, then it is establishing what has already been established; if it arises from the nature of the cause, then it becomes the very meaning of contradictory reason, so there is no need to remove this fault. Such a fault is close to the svatantrika vow of the non-existence of self-origination. If it is said that it is because the reason and example are not stated, if it is said that it is because the reason and example known to others are not stated, that is also unreasonable. Because here there is no necessity to state the inference known to others. If it is necessary to state it, then the words of Sangye Kyang (Sangs-rgyas bskyangs) have stated it. The meaning of "those" is "existing in one's own nature," thus showing the reason. "Because birth becomes meaningless" shows the dharma to be established. The example is shown implicitly, so it becomes like this: Whatever exists in its own nature is pervaded by the meaninglessness of being born again. For example, like the clearly visible vase in front. The vase in the state of clay also exists in its own nature. Therefore, the words of the teacher Sangye Kyang have shown it. Regarding this, in the Clear Words (Tshig gsal), it is said that the two terms "one's own inference" and "sometimes the inference known to others" are spoken in relation to the later opponent and the former opponent, respectively, so they should be understood as having the same meaning. Therefore, the meaning of the inference known to others is: the two subjects, the reason, and all the pervasions are accepted only by the later opponent, and one is needed that is not accepted by the former opponent; and these need to be established as a common appearance for both the former and later opponents. This is like a shameful speech in front of scholars.
Tibetan
བོ་མི་སྨྲའོ། །འོ་ན་དེ་སུས་སྨྲས་ན། དྲང་ངེས་རྣམ་འབྱེད་ཀྱི་ཤོག་བུ་ཞེ་བརྒྱད་པའི་ཕྱི་ལོགས་སུ་དེས་ན་གཞན་གྲགས་རྟགས་ཀྱིས་བསྒྲུབ་བྱ་སྒྲུབ་པ་ལ་ཕ་རོལ་པོས་ཁས་བླངས་པ་ཙམ་གྱིས་མི་ཆོག་གི ཆོས་ཅན་གཉིས་དང་རྟགས་ལ་སོགས་པ་རང་ངོས་ནས་གཞལ་ན་ཚད་མས་ཀྱང་གྲུབ་ལ་ཁོ་རང་ཡང་ངེས་པར་འདོད་དགོས་པའམ་འདོད་པ་གཅིག་དགོས་ཏེ། དེ་མེད་པར་ཞེན་ཡུལ་ལ་འཁྲུལ་ན་དེས་དེ་ཁོ་ན་ཉིད་རྟོགས་པའི་ལྟ་བ་བསྐྱེད་པར་མི་ནུས་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །ཞེས་བྲིས་པས་སྨྲས་སོ། །གཞན་ལ་གྲགས་ཀྱི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ལ་ཁྱོད་འདོད་པ་དེ་ལྟར་དགོས་ན། གོང་དུ་ཁོ་བོའི་སྨྲས་པ་དེ་གཞན་ལ་གྲགས་ཀྱི་རྗེས་དཔག་གི་མཚན་གཞིར་དངོས་སུ་ཚིག་གསལ་ལས་གསུངས་པས། ཁྱེད་ཉིད་གྲངས་ཅན་གྱི་གྲུབ་མཐའི་མཐིལ་ཁས་བླངས་པ་སྟེ། ཆོས་ཅན་འཇིམ་དུས་ཀྱི་བུམ་པ་དང་། གཏན་ཚིགས་རང་གི་བདག་ཉིད་དུ་ཡོད་པ་ཁས་བླངས་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །རང་རྒྱུད་པ་དང་དངོས་སྨྲ་བ་གང་གི་ལུགས་ལ་ཡང་། རང་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཀྱི་དོན་ལ་ཁྱེད་འདོད་པའི་གཞན་གྲགས་ཀྱི་རྟགས་ཀྱི་དོན་ལས་ལྷག་པ་བྱས་པ་མེད་པས། གཞན་གྲགས་ཀྱི་རྟགས་ལ་རང་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་གཏན་ཚིགས་བྱས། རང་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ལ་རང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་གྲུབ་པའི་ཆོས་བསྒྲུབ་བྱར་བྱས་པ་ནི། ཐལ་རང་གཉིས་ཀྱི་གཞུང་འགྲེལ་གང་ནས་ཀྱང་བཤད་པ་མེད་པས་གདུལ་བྱ་མགོ་རྨོངས་པའི་ཕྱིར་དུ་སྦྱར་བ་སྣང་ངོ་། །དེས་ན་སློབ་དཔོན་ལེགས་ལྡན་འབྱེད་ཀྱིས། དངོས་པོ་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པར་སྒྲུབ་པ་ལ། རང་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཁས་བླངས་པ་ཡིན་པས། དེའི་ཚེ་རང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་གྲུབ་པའི་ཆོས་སྒྲུབ་པ་ཡིན་ན། ཆོས་ཅན་མྱུ་གུ་ལྟ་བུའི་དངོས་པོ་དེ་རང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་གྲུབ་པར་སྒྲུབ་པ་ཡིན་ནམ། བསྒྲུབ་ཆོས་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་རང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་གྲུབ་པར་སྒྲུབ་པ་ཡིན་ནམ། དེ་གཉིས་ཚོགས་པའི་ཚོགས་དོན་དེ་སྒྲུབ་པ་ཡིན། དང་པོ་ལྟར་ན་ཤིན་ཏུ་མི་འཐད་དེ། མྱུ་གུ་སྐྱེ་མེད་དུ་སྒྲུབ་པའི་སྐབས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །གཉིས་པ་དང་གསུམ་པ་ཡང་མི་འཐད་དེ། སྐབས་འདིར་འབྲེལ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དེས་ན་ནང་གི་སྐྱེ་མཆེད་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་སྐབས་སུ་རང་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་གཏན་ཚིགས་མི་རིགས་པའི་ཤེས་བྱེད་དུ། རང་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཡིན་ན། ཆོས་ཅན་རྒོལ་ཕྱི་རྒོལ་གཉིས་ཀའི་མཐུན་སྣང་དུ་གྲུབ་པ་གཅིག་དགོས་པས། དེའི་ཚེ་ཆོས་ཅན་མཐུན་སྣང་དུ་གྲུབ་པ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །ཞེས་
Chinese
我不说了。那么是谁说的呢？在《正理分别》第四十八页的外面写着：因此，以他人共许的理由来成立所立宗，仅仅是对方承认是不行的。作为有法和理由等，从自身方面衡量，也要通过量成立，而且他自己也必须确实地承认或者需要一个承认，因为没有这个，如果对所执境产生错觉，就不能生起证悟其真实性的见解。这样写了，所以说了。对于他人共许的因，如果你需要这样，那么，我上面所说的那样，在《明句论》中明确地说是他人共许的比量的例子。你已经承认了数论宗的要点，即承认有法陶师的瓶子，以及理由自身存在的自性。无论自续派还是实事师的宗派，对于自续因的意义，都没有比你所认为的他人共许的理由的意义更多。因此，把他人共许的理由作为自续因，把自续因作为以自性成立的法作为所立宗，这在应成派和自续派的论著中都没有说过，似乎是为了迷惑所化众生而编造的。因此，导师善慧说，为了成立事物不是从自性产生的，就承认了自续因。那时，如果成立以自性成立的法，那么，是有法如苗芽的事物成立为以自性成立呢？还是所立宗不是从自性产生成立为以自性成立呢？还是成立那两者聚合的聚合意义呢？如果是第一种情况，则非常不合理，因为这是成立苗芽无生的场合。第二种和第三种也不合理，因为与此时无关。因此，在成立内在的生处不是从自性产生的场合，作为自续因不合理的认识依据，如果是自续因，则需要有法在敌对双方的共同显现中成立一个，那时，因为没有有法在共同显现中成立。
English
I won't say it. Then who said it? On the outside of page forty-eight of the 'Distinction of Right Reasoning,' it is written: Therefore, to establish the thesis with a reason known to others, it is not enough for the opponent to merely accept it. As for the subject and the reason, etc., measured from one's own side, they must also be established by valid cognition, and he himself must definitely acknowledge or need one acknowledgment, because without this, if one is mistaken about the object of attachment, one cannot generate the view that realizes its reality. Having written this, he said. If you need it that way for a reason known to others, then, as I said above, it is explicitly stated in the 'Clear Words' as an example of inference known to others. You have already acknowledged the essentials of the Samkhya school, that is, acknowledging the subject, the potter's pot, and the reason existing in its own nature. In the system of both the Svatantrika and the Realist, there is nothing more done for the meaning of the Svatantrika reason than for the meaning of the reason known to others that you desire. Therefore, taking the reason known to others as the Svatantrika reason, and taking the Svatantrika reason as the dharma established by its own nature as the thesis, this is not mentioned in any of the treatises of the Prasangika and Svatantrika schools, and it seems to be fabricated to confuse sentient beings. Therefore, the teacher Lekdenjye said that in order to establish that things do not arise from themselves, the Svatantrika reason is accepted. At that time, if the dharma established by its own nature is established, then is the subject, such as the sprout, established as established by its own nature? Or is the thesis, not arising from itself, established as established by its own nature? Or is the aggregate meaning of the combination of the two established? If it is the first case, it is very unreasonable, because this is the occasion for establishing the non-arising of the sprout. The second and third are also unreasonable, because they are irrelevant at this time. Therefore, in the case of establishing that the inner sense-sphere does not arise from itself, as the basis for knowing that the Svatantrika reason is unreasonable, if it is the Svatantrika reason, then there must be one subject established in the common appearance of both the proponent and the opponent, at that time, because there is no subject established in the common appearance.