Chinese
是。如果像第一种情况那样，那么那时是了义吗？整部的《现观庄严论》都是了义。如果像第一种情况那样，那么就只是清楚地享用自在而已。如果像后一种情况那样，除了学诚（དབྱིག་གཉེན།）论师等解释为唯识宗之外，其他无论在汉地还是藏地，都没有人这样说过。甚深般若波罗蜜多的隐义，现观的次第，弥勒怙主解释的论典，赡部洲大乘教法的精髓，被认为是了义，并建立了与之不相符的宗派。这才是共同的要点。这样宣称，愚笨未受教导的人们接受它是真的，但自诩为贤哲并具有思辨能力的人们也像这样执持，我认为这是非常可怕和令人担忧的，因此具有思辨能力的人们请谨慎。如果像第二种情况那样，是实事论者的论典吗？如果是自续派的论典，那么因为无法分析，所以只能舍弃。如果像第三种情况那样，与《入行论》不相符这一点并未成立，如前所述。如果成立，即使想用这个理由舍弃《现观庄严论》，但最终似乎是想借口舍弃《入行论》。如果像第四种情况那样，必须说出那个理由，即使说出来，你也没有与经文相符而不是自己编造的理由。在没有获得三乘任何一乘的见道之前，现量证悟了苦等四圣谛的十六行相，并且经常串习，断除了三界现行的烦恼的有情，在任何一个佛教的四宗派中都没有，外道也没有这样说，没有进入宗派的人也没有这样说，因此这只是宗喀巴·洛桑扎巴的宗派。一般来说，对于这种宗派进行破立没有太大的必要，但有些人似乎认为这是真实的。因此，要问他们，这样的有情只能是凡夫，因此是没有进入道吗？是小乘的凡夫吗？是大乘的凡夫？如果像第一种情况那样，没有入道的人现量见到真谛，这非常奇怪。如果是第二种情况
English
Yes. If it is like the first case, then is it definitive at that time? The entire Abhisamayalankara is definitive. If it is like the first case, then it is only clearly enjoying freedom. If it is like the latter case, except for the master Vasubandhu and others who explained it as Mind-Only, no one in either China or Tibet has ever said such a thing. The hidden meaning of the profound Prajnaparamita, the order of Abhisamaya, the treatise explained by Lord Maitreya, the essence of the Mahayana teachings of Jambudvipa, is considered definitive, and a tenet that does not conform to it is established. This is the uncommon key point. It is proclaimed that although it is true that foolish and uneducated people accept it, it is seen as a very frightening and worrying situation that even those who claim to be wise and have speculative abilities hold it in the same way, so those with speculative abilities should be careful. If it is like the second case, is it a Realist's treatise? If it is a Svatantrika's treatise, then it should be abandoned because it cannot be analyzed. If it is like the third case, the point that it does not conform to the Bodhisattvacharyavatara has not been established, as mentioned above. If it is established, even if you want to abandon the Abhisamayalankara for that reason, it ultimately seems to be an excuse to abandon the Bodhisattvacharyavatara. If it is like the fourth case, that reason must be stated, and even if it is stated, you do not have a reason that conforms to the scriptures and is not your own invention. Without having attained the path of seeing of any of the three vehicles, a person who has directly realized the sixteen aspects of the Four Noble Truths, such as impermanence, and has become accustomed to them, and has abandoned the manifest afflictions of the three realms, does not exist in any of the four Buddhist schools, nor do the outsiders say so, nor do those who have not entered a school say so, so this is only the tenet of Tsongkhapa Losang Drakpa. In general, there is not much need to engage in refutation and establishment for this kind of tenet, but some people seem to regard it as true. Therefore, ask them, such a being can only be an ordinary person, so is he not on the path? Is he a Hinayana ordinary person? Is he a Mahayana ordinary person? If it is like the first case, it is very strange that a person who has not entered the path directly sees the truth. If it is the second case,
Chinese
如是，必须指出，在那一生中，从已断除烦恼的状态中死去，会转生到哪个界。第三种情况是，他将证悟法的无我。此外，如果有人问，那个人现量证悟的道，即以理成立的四种决定生起，以及四种寂静殊胜的决定生起是什么？那么，圣者马鸣就必须像回答大梵天“这四大在哪里止息”一样回答。入行论的注释中说：“灭谛是胜义谛的自性”，也无法摆脱这个说法。解释《入行论》的经文意义的理由另有解释，并且与“贪虽非烦恼，然如愚痴般，何故不得有”的经文直接相违，因为他已承认，那个人的转世之因的贪欲是烦恼。对于不承认阿赖耶识和自证，而承认外境存在的方式，也应加以考察。其他中观派认为，如果存在，就必须以自性存在；如果自性不存在，就必须不存在。这样说，对于印度的大成就者们来说，这仅仅是诽谤，有什么必要呢？《中观庄严论》的注释中说：“诸事物未经观察，单独存在令人愉悦，如所有影像等。”《二谛论》中说：“若以理智力，世俗亦不生，是真实故此，云何显现耶。”又说：“如其所显现，即是彼之体，故于此不应，作任何观察。世俗如其所显现，故于此无有如是所说之观察处。”论师善护说：“所谓‘唯一’，即是未被自性之垢所染污者。”论师狮子贤说：“未经观察，单独存在令人愉悦，即是因果相联。”等等，从自续派的可靠论典中，像这样解释是正确的。因为即使对于应成派来说，也没有比这更殊胜的世俗安立方式了。业果的所依
English
Thus, it must be pointed out which realm one will be reborn into after dying in that very life without diminishing from the state of having abandoned afflictions. According to the third case, he will realize the selflessness of phenomena. Furthermore, if someone asks what are the four definitive emergences that are established by reason as the path realized directly by that person, and what are the four peaceful and excellent definitive emergences? Then, the noble Ashvaghosa must give the same answer as when he asked the great Brahma, "Where do these four elements cease?" In the commentary on the Entering the Middle Way, it says, "The truth of cessation is the very nature of the ultimate truth," and one cannot escape from this statement either. The reason for explaining the meaning of the verses of the Engaging in Bodhisattva Activities differently is explained elsewhere, and it also directly contradicts the verse, "Although craving is not an affliction, why should it not exist as if it were ignorance?" because he has admitted that the craving that becomes the cause for that person's rebirth is an affliction. The way of not accepting the alaya consciousness and self-awareness, and accepting external objects should also be examined. Other Madhyamikas believe that if something exists, it must exist by its own nature; and if its own nature does not exist, it must not exist. To say this is merely slandering the great accomplished scholars of India, what purpose does it serve? In the commentary on the Ornament of the Middle Way, it says, "Things that are delightful to experience alone without being examined, like all images and so on." In the Two Truths, it says, "If by the power of reason, even conventionally it does not arise, that is the truth, therefore, how does this appear?" And again, it says, "As it appears, so is its essence, therefore, no examination should be made of it. Convention is as it appears, therefore, there is no place for such examination as has been said." The teacher Lekdenjey said, "The term 'unique' means that which is not stained even by a trace of inherent existence." The teacher Senge Zangpo said, "Being delightful to experience alone without being examined is the connection between cause and effect." And so on, from the reliable treatises of the Svatantrika school, explaining it in this way is valid. Because even for the Prasangikas, there is no more excellent way of establishing convention than this. The basis of karma and its results
Chinese
已经变成…的阿赖耶识，经由理性能审查的应成派不承认，但总的来说必须承认阿赖耶识。如《菩提心释》中所说：“因为实际宣说了阿赖耶识存在。”如果承认外境是应成派的不共之宗，那么导师善护也与承认外境相违背。如果承认的方式有差别，因为有承认与不承认以自相成立的差别，这样想的话，以自相成立的意义，是指经由理性能审查的吗？还是指成为自相和共相之部分的自相呢？还是指不共的安立者呢？如果是第一种情况，自续派会变成承认真实成立，如果也这样认为，就会变成不是中观派。如果也这样认为，在《辨了不了义》第四十八页的内页中，“那些智者也从多种理性的角度遮止了法真实存在的宗派，并且很好地承认了无实有，所以是中观派。”请记住所写的这些。如果是第二种情况，就必须像五蕴在《俱舍论》中同时讲述自相和共相一样来理解，这与此相违背。如果是第三种情况，就与圣者月称所说的，从色到一切种智之间的所有法的安立者相违背。对于自续的理由和承诺不存在的方式也应当进行观察，自续的必要性是为了成立以自相成立的法，因此如果承认以自相成立的法，就需要自续。如果不承认，就不需要自续，这样认为就是实事师，也不是中观应成派和自续派中的任何一派的观点。因为实事师们为了成立总相无实有，安立了很多自续的论证，因此必须说那些论证所成立的法，是法相总相，法无实有，以及所立二者的集合，其中哪一个是以自相成立的，但却无话可说。自续派为了成立以自相成立而承认自续，就像《中观明句论》中所说的那样，其中多次宣说了自续的有无之诤论。
English
The ālaya-vijñāna that has become... is not accepted by the Prasangikas who can be examined by reason, but in general, the ālaya-vijñāna must be accepted. As it is said in the Bodhicitta-vyākaraṇa, "Because it is actually stated that the ālaya-vijñāna exists." If admitting external objects is the uncommon tenet of the Prasangikas, then the teacher Suvarnadvipa also contradicts the admission of external objects. If there is a difference in the way of admitting, because there is a difference between admitting and not admitting what is established by its own characteristics, then, what is the meaning of being established by its own characteristics? Does it refer to what can be examined by reason? Or does it refer to the own-character that has become a part of the own-character and the common-character? Or does it refer to the uncommon establisher? If it is the first case, the Svatantrika will become admitting true existence, and if they also think so, they will become non-Madhyamikas. If they also think so, inside page forty-eight of Differentiation of Definite and Indefinite Meanings, "Those scholars also refuted the tenets of the Dharma being truly existent from many rational perspectives, and they have well admitted non-existence, so they are Madhyamikas." Please remember what is written. If it is the second case, it must be understood as the five aggregates are described together with their own and common characteristics in the Abhidharma, which contradicts this. If it is the third case, it contradicts what the glorious Chandrakirti said, the establisher of all dharmas from form to omniscience. The way in which the reason and commitment of the Svatantrika do not exist should also be examined. The necessity of the Svatantrika is to establish the Dharma established by its own characteristics, so if the Dharma established by its own characteristics is admitted, the Svatantrika is needed. If it is not admitted, the Svatantrika is not needed, and thinking so is a realist, and it is not the view of any of the Madhyamika Prasangika and Svatantrika. Because the realists have established many Svatantrika arguments to establish the general characteristic as non-existent, therefore it must be said that what is established by those arguments is the general characteristic of the Dharma, the non-existence of the Dharma, and the collection of the two to be established, which one is established by its own characteristics, but there is nothing to say. The Svatantrika admitted the Svatantrika in order to establish what is established by its own characteristics, as it is said in the Madhyamakāvatāra, in which the debate of the existence and non-existence of the Svatantrika is often proclaimed.
Chinese
一点意义也不明白吗？或者似乎是明白却颠倒着说。比如在遮止自生的时候，导师佛护说：事物从自性产生是不合理的，因为它们的产生会变成无意义，而且会变得非常过分。对于那些事物本身就存在于自性中的，再次产生就没有必要了。如果存在也产生，那就永远不会停止产生。对于这些话，导师善护说：那是不合理的，因为没有说出理由和比喻，而且没有消除他人所说的过失。等等，作了这样的责难。对此，月称论师消除过失是这样：没有说出理由和比喻，意思是说没有说出自续的理由和比喻，或者说，对于此，说没有消除他人所说的过失吗？还是说，没有说出他人共许的理由和比喻，并且对于此，说没有消除他人所说的过失？如果是前者，就不需要自续的理由和比喻，因为导师佛护的那些话，已经揭示了数论派承认自生，即果在因位时存在，然后再次产生，以及承认存在再次产生没有必要，这是相违的。因为揭示了所承认的自相矛盾，就能阻止对方的邪分别念，所以没有必要说出自续的理由和比喻。如果揭示了所承认的自相矛盾也不能阻止邪分别念，那么说出自续的理由和比喻也不能阻止。如果是中观派，如果以自续立宗说内部的生处不从自性产生，那么为了成立它而提出的自续理由是不合理的，因为除了内部的生处不从自性产生之外，其他方面不从自性产生也没有以自续的方式承认。为了说明这一点，引用了《四百论》和《诤理论》的教证，所以这些的意义是，作为没有自性的能立，安立了没有承认以自性成立的法，这之间是有关联的。