English
Because it has the power of seeing, the power of seeing only does the act of seeing; because it has the power of speaking, the power of speaking only does the act of speaking. It means that it is not because there are two abilities to walk in the same person's body, so the two acts of walking are not contradictory. How could this deviate from the topic? The meaning of the later explanation is: when the agent is considered to be a person, one agent does not have two identical actions. The root verse says: "If walking becomes two, then the walker will also become two." This is not contradictory. However, it is not forbidden for one agent to have many different actions. Second, there are three ways to refute by examining the agent in three
Chinese
也会因此改变。如果，在任何时候，或者因为任何原因，对于一个名叫天授的行者来说，只有一种行走的行为，而这行走的行为已经成为了“走”这个词的意义，那么在没有行走的行为时，行者的词义就无法成立。第二种情况是，如果认为行走的行为成为了“行者”这个词的意义，就不会有上述的过失。那么，对于任何一方，如果主张行者与行走的行为相关联，那么“没有行走的行者”这个词中的“行者”一词，因为其意义是指行为，所以“走”这个行为词就会变成没有行走的行为，因为“行者”这个词，作为施事者的词语，其所表达的意义仅仅与行走的行为相关联。第三种情况是，如果认为行走的行为与“行者”这个词和“走”这个词都相关联，就不会有上述的过失。如果是这样，那么如果行走的行为与“行者”和“走”这两个词都相关联，就会导致有两种行走的行为，因为凭借行走的行为，天授被安立和显现为行者的名称，并且因为具有行走的行为而成为行者，因此存在两种行走的行为。这是无法接受的，原因如前所述。第三，对存在行走的论证的驳斥有五点：驳斥原因的起始、驳斥业之路、驳斥对治的安住、驳斥果的返回、驳斥安住存在的论证。第一点分为两种：即使承认业，起始也未成立；不承认业，起始也未成立。第一种情况是，如果认为行走的行为是自性存在的，因为它有起始。那么，对于已经走过的路来说，没有行走的起始，因为行走的起始已经停止了。对于未走过的路来说，也没有行走的起始，因为如果开始行走，就与未走过相矛盾。对于正在走的路来说，也没有行走的起始，因为除了已走过和未走过之外，没有发现正在走的路。因此，在任何道路上开始行走都是不合理的。因为在所有三种道路上都没有行走的起始。第二种情况是，开始行走必须首先成立将要开始的业。
English
it will also change accordingly. If, at any time, or for any reason, for a walker named Devadatta, there is only one act of walking, and this act of walking has become the meaning of the word "walk," then when there is no act of walking, the meaning of the word walker cannot be established. The second case is, if it is thought that the act of walking has become the meaning of the word "walker," then there will be no above-mentioned fault. Then, for any party, if it is asserted that the walker is related to the act of walking, then the word "walker" in the phrase "walker without walking," because its meaning refers to the action, the action word "walk" will become without the act of walking, because the word "walker," as the word for the agent, its expressed meaning is only related to the act of walking. The third case is, if it is thought that the act of walking is related to both the word "walker" and the word "walk," then there will be no above-mentioned fault. If this is the case, then if the act of walking is related to both the word "walker" and the word "walk," it will lead to there being two acts of walking, because by means of the act of walking, Devadatta is established and manifested as the name of the walker, and because of having the act of walking, he becomes a walker, therefore there are two acts of walking. This is unacceptable, for the reasons mentioned earlier. Third, the refutation of the proof of the existence of going and coming has five points: refuting the origination of the cause, refuting the path of action, refuting the abiding of the antidote, refuting the reversal of the result, and refuting the proof of abiding existence. The first point has two aspects: even if the action is admitted, the origination is not established; if the action is not admitted, the origination is not established. The first case is, if it is thought that the act of walking is self-existent, because it has an origination. Then, for the path that has already been walked, there is no origination of walking, because the origination of walking has ceased. For the path that has not been walked, there is also no origination of walking, because if walking begins, it contradicts not having been walked. For the path that is being walked, there is also no origination of walking, because apart from having been walked and not having been walked, the path that is being walked is not observed. Therefore, it is unreasonable to begin walking on any path. Because there is no origination of walking on all three paths. The second case is, to begin walking, the action that is to be begun must first be established.
Chinese
如果认为，在行走产生之前，在哪个道路上行走会产生呢？行走的行为，已止息的已逝之路是没有的；与当下相应的正在行走的道路也是没有的；未逝之路又怎么会有行走的产生呢？因为行走的行为尚未开始，尚未产生之故。第二种情况是，行走的行为是自性存在的，因为它的三种道路之前没有被真实地遮止，所以是自性存在的。如果这样认为，按照之前所说的道理，行走的产生在任何情况下，在理智上都是不显现、不明显的，因此，行走的产生，已止息的已逝之路是什么？已生而未止息的正在行走的道路是什么？未生起的未逝之路是什么？应当分别考察。如果所关联的对境，行走的产生不存在，那么依赖于它的三种道路是不合理的。第三种情况是，行走的行为是自性存在的，因为它的对治，安住是自性存在的。如果这样认为，稍微思考一下，行者是不安住的，因为二者是相互矛盾的。作为行者也不是安住，因为非行者就是安住，因此对于他来说，安住的行为是不存在的。除了行者和非行者之外，还有哪个第三者会安住呢？因为这二者是直接相违的，所以否定的第三种情况是不可能的。如果认为，后两种情况不安住，但是行者本身安住。稍微思考一下，行者安住，怎么能成立呢？不能成立。因为当行走的行为不存在时，行者的词义就不能成立，因此，即使安住的词义成立，也因为缺少行者的词义而空洞。第四种情况是，行走的行为是自性存在的，因为结果与它相异。如果这样认为，除了已逝和未逝之外，对于正在行走的道路来说，不可能与行走相异，因为没有观察到它。对于已逝之路和未逝之路来说，也不可能与行走相异，因为与什么相异的行走的行为已经止息，并且尚未产生，所以不存在。第五种情况是，行走的对治，安住是自性存在的，因为它的竞争对
English
If it is thought that before the act of going arises, on which path will the going arise? The act of going, the path of the past that has ceased, does not exist; the path of the present that is being gone is also non-existent; how can there be the arising of going on the path that has not been gone? Because the act of going has not yet begun and has not yet arisen. The second case is that the act of going is inherently existent, because its three paths have not been truly obstructed before, so it is inherently existent. If this is thought, according to the previously stated reasoning, the arising of going in any case is not apparent or obvious to the intellect, therefore, what is the path of the past that has ceased for the arising of going? What is the path that is being gone that has arisen but not ceased? What is the path that has not arisen and has not been gone? It should be examined separately. If the object of relation, the arising of going, does not exist, then the three paths that depend on it are unreasonable. The third case is that the act of going is inherently existent, because its antidote, abiding, is inherently existent. If this is thought, consider for a moment, the goer does not abide, because the two are contradictory. Being a goer is also not abiding, because the non-goer is abiding, therefore, for him, the act of abiding does not exist. Who is the third person who will abide other than the goer and the non-goer? Because these two are directly contradictory, the third case of negation is impossible. If it is thought that the latter two cases do not abide, but the goer himself abides. Consider for a moment, how can it be established that the goer abides? It cannot be established. Because when the act of going does not exist, the meaning of the word goer cannot be established, therefore, even if the meaning of the word abiding is established, it is empty because it lacks the meaning of the word goer. The fourth case is that the act of going is inherently existent, because the result is different from it. If this is thought, apart from the past and the not-yet-past, for the path that is being gone, it is impossible to be different from going, because it has not been observed. For the path of the past and the path of the not-yet-past, it is also impossible to be different from going, because the act of going that is different from what has ceased, and has not yet arisen, so it does not exist. The fifth case is that the antidote to going, abiding, is inherently existent, because its rival
Chinese
如果认为有住的阻碍，有住的因，以及有与住相反的果，那么，作为住的成立依据而提出的住的对治——行，也与先前行的对治——住的破斥相同。先前说“稍微行者不住”等，这里也同样可以转换成“稍微住者不行，住者非行，非行者非住”等来破斥。破斥住的因或进入，也与先前破斥行的因相同。先前说“已行无行之始”等，这里也同样可以转换成“住于住无住之始”等来破斥。作为住的成立依据而提出的相违，也与先前与行相违相同。先前说“不行则不变，非行亦非不行”等，这里也同样可以转换成“住则不变，非住亦非非不住”等来破斥。第四，考察行之作用与行者是一还是异，并进行破斥，有三点：立宗概要；详细阐述道理；总结已成立之义。第一点是：行之作用与所依行者二者，既不能说是同一，也不能说是行之作用与所依行者本体各异。第二点是：为什么不能这样说呢？不能说是同一，如果行之作用与行者是同一的，那么普遍而言，作者与所作也会变成同一。也不能说是各异，如果行之作用与行者本体被认为是各异的，那么就会出现没有所依行者的行之作用，以及没有行之作用的行者，这些都是不合理的。第三点是：虽然不能说是一或异，但也不能说自性存在，因为按照先前所说的道理，行者与行，无论是同一还是相异，都不可能成立，这两者自
English
If it is thought that there is an obstruction to staying, a cause for staying, and a result that is the opposite of staying, then the antidote to staying, which is presented as the basis for establishing staying—going—is also the same as the previous refutation of the antidote to going—staying. Previously it was said, "A slight goer does not stay," etc. Here, it can also be transformed into "A slight stayer does not go; a stayer is not a goer; a non-goer is not a stayer," etc., to refute. Refuting the cause or entry of staying is also the same as previously refuting the cause of going. Previously it was said, "The gone has no beginning of going," etc. Here, it can also be transformed into "Staying in staying has no beginning of staying," etc., to refute. The contradiction presented as the basis for establishing staying is also the same as the previous contradiction to going. Previously it was said, "Not going does not change; not going is also not not going," etc. Here, it can also be transformed into "Staying does not change; not staying is also not not staying," etc., to refute. Fourth, examining whether the action of going and the goer are the same or different, and refuting them, there are three points: stating the proposition in brief; explaining the reason in detail; summarizing the established meaning. The first point is: the action of going and the dependent goer, neither can be said to be the same, nor can it be said that the action of going and the dependent goer are essentially different. The second point is: why can't it be said like this? It cannot be said to be the same, because if the action of going and the goer were the same, then generally speaking, the agent and the action would also become the same. It also cannot be said to be different, because if the action of going and the goer were considered to be essentially different, then there would be the action of going without a dependent goer, and the goer without the action of going, which are all unreasonable. The third point is: although it cannot be said to be the same or different, it also cannot be said to exist by nature, because according to the reasons previously stated, neither the goer nor the going, whether the same or different, can be established. These two self-