English
Therefore, if it is not realized, it is because the appearance of blue has not manifested. The consciousness that cognizes blue, is the manifestation of the blue image, and not other, because the manifestation of the blue image is your own nature. The fourth question is: If the measure and the result are of the same nature, and there is no other action, then the term of action will become inappropriate, right? Yes. The nature of the root consciousness that appeared earlier, appearing as the image that blue bestows from itself, this is the subject. Even if there is no other action in meaning, it appears as if it has the action of establishing blue cognition, because even if there is no other action in meaning, you have the ability to establish cognition of blue. For example, just as because the fruit of the son's body is born similar to the parents' image, it is said that this son inherits the parents' image. The second part is divided into two parts: general negation and separate negation. The first part is: Yes. Observing meaning, tangible roots, root-object encounter, and the wisdom of holding differences, these are not the establishers of the measure of meaning cognition, because the measure of meaning cognition and matter are different. Pervasive. Because among the three establishers of the measure of meaning cognition, at this time it is the establisher of the measure of meaning cognition, so it must be considered as the establisher of the measure of meaning cognition. The second part is divided into four parts: the root is not the establisher of meaning cognition, holding differences is not the establisher, root-object encounter is not the establisher, and habitual conditioned phenomena are not the establisher. The first part is: In short. Tangible eye root, this is the subject. It cannot separately cognize meaning, because eye consciousness is the common cause of all things. Yes. This, is the subject. Eye consciousness cannot separately cognize blue, yellow, etc., because the images of blue, yellow, etc. have not manifested. Therefore. The reasoning that shows that the root is not the establisher of meaning cognition, is the subject. There are other necessities, because observing meaning, etc. are also not the establishers of meaning cognition. The second part is: Yes. The wisdom of holding differences such as qualities, is the subject. It cannot be said that the object of the one with differences is different from the object of the one with differences, because they are the same in not manifesting these two images. Wisdom. Holding the matter of the one with differences
Chinese
对于智慧也这样解释。བྱཾ།（藏文，梵文天城体，梵文罗马拟音，汉语字面意思） 有差别和有差别者的知识，法。不可能进入不同的事物，因为它是确立安立的所立和能立。དོནཾ།（藏文，梵文天城体，梵文罗马拟音，汉语字面意思） 如果没有过失，因为这两个知识在时间上有先后，所以进入同一个事物，如果这样说。有差别的知识，法。对于同一个事物，在你之后，有差别者的知识变得没有意义，因为你的事物已经以引导决定的方式被理解。这两个智慧，法。次第产生是不合理的，因为它们是从同一个所取境产生的。བློཾ།（藏文，梵文天城体，梵文罗马拟音，汉语字面意思） 如果它们同时产生，那么这两个智慧，法。不是所立和能立，因为它们是同时产生的。遍是承认的。如果说这和你自己也一样。དེཾ།（藏文，梵文天城体，梵文罗马拟音，汉语字面意思） 执持蓝色的根识现量，法。你可以在一个事物上安立量果的所立和能立，因为你的一个事物上有像蓝色一样的部分，和了知蓝色的部分。第三个是。བདཾག（藏文，梵文天城体，梵文罗马拟音，汉语字面意思） 执持瓶子的眼识，法。即使与瓶子的所有法相遇没有差别，也不一定只了知瓶子的形状，因为与瓶子的刹那等所有法相遇没有差别。如果说这个过失和你自己也一样。དེཾ།（藏文，梵文天城体，梵文罗马拟音，汉语字面意思） 即使与瓶子的所有法相遇没有差别，但是瓶子的形状从自身所对的显现，法。是了知瓶子形状的现量的能立，因为它是它的安立者。第四个是。如果说，先前的知识通过使后来的知识执持不同的事物而安立不同的事物理解。འདུསཾ།（藏文，梵文天城体，梵文罗马拟音，汉语字面意思） 那个使执持不同事物的行为，法。不能安立不同的事物理解，因为没有事物的显现。第三个是。གཾལ།（藏文，梵文天城体，梵文罗马拟音，汉语字面意思） 事物理解和事物相似，法。不是所立和能立，因为是同一个事物，如果这样说。不遍及，因为在不同的反体上可以安立所立和能立。བྱཾ།（藏文，梵文天城体，梵文罗马拟音，汉语字面意思） 所有作用和作者不同的名称，法。仅仅是反体不同，但在意义上没有不同，因为是作用和作者的名称。ཐཾ།（藏文，梵文天城体，梵文罗马拟音，汉语字面意思） 例如，萨埵用刀砍树
English
The same explanation applies to wisdom. BYAṂ. Knowledge of difference and the possessor of difference, dharma. It is impossible to enter different objects, because it is the establisher and the established of the arrangement. DONAṂ. If there is no fault, because these two knowledges occur in sequence, they enter the same object, if you say so. Knowledge of difference, dharma. For the same object, after you, the knowledge of the possessor of difference becomes meaningless, because your object has already been understood in the manner of leading to certainty. These two minds, dharma. It is unreasonable to arise in sequence, because they arise from the same object of apprehension. BLOṂ. If they arise simultaneously, then these two minds, dharma. They are not the established and the establisher, because they arise simultaneously. The pervasion is admitted. If you say that this is the same for you. DEṂ. The direct perception of the root consciousness grasping blue, dharma. You can establish the established and the establisher of measure and result on one object, because your one object has a part that is like blue, and a part that understands blue. The third is. BADAṂGA. The eye consciousness grasping a pot, dharma. Even if there is no difference in encountering all the dharmas of the pot, it is not necessarily certain to only understand the shape of the pot, because there is no difference in encountering all the dharmas of the pot, such as its moments. If you say that this fault is the same for you. DEṂ. Even if there is no difference in encountering all the dharmas of the pot, but the appearance of the pot's shape directed from its own side, dharma. It is the establisher of the direct perception that understands the pot's shape, because it is its establisher. The fourth is. If you say that the previous knowledge establishes different object understandings by causing the later knowledge to grasp different objects. ADUSAṂ. That action of causing the grasping of different objects, dharma. It cannot establish different object understandings, because there is no appearance of the object. The third is. GAṂLA. Object understanding and object similarity, dharma. They are not the established and the establisher, because they are the same object, if you say so. Not pervasive, because the established and the establisher can be established on different reverses. BYAṂ. All the names of action and agent being different, dharma. They are merely different reverses, but they are not different in meaning, because they are the names of action and agent. THAṂ. For example, Sattva cutting a tree with a knife
Chinese
例如，砍树的动作和砍伐工具斧子这两者，除了能做和所做的作用外，没有其他不同的意义。因为将树被砍成段叫做“做”，将斧子叫做“能做”，这只是假立的名称而已。第二，解释习气稳固生起的名言和胜义的量和果，分为两种：解释胜义的自证量和果，解释名言的境识量和果。第一种又分为两种：遮破显现是境之果，成立自证是果；遮破显现是外境，成立自证是果。第一种又分为两种：遮破所取和能取是异体实有，因此成立自证是果。第一种又分为五种：遮破外境识的成立之因，因此成立能取和所取无二；遣除对自识的辩驳；指出境识的妨害；说明即使没有也显现为错觉。第一种又分为两种：询问外境识的成立之因，详细遮破言说的成立之因。第一种是：དོཾན། （藏文，梵文天城体，梵文罗马拟音，汉语字面意思）如果经部宗你认为境识是果，那么它的根据是什么？如果回答说是显现为色声等形象的现量，那么用什么来安立它是境识呢？如果回答说是和境相似，那么第二种又分为三种：遮破仅仅相似就能成立，遮破由生而相似就能成立，遮破以确定就能成立。第一种是：འཁྲུཾལ། （藏文，梵文天城体，梵文罗马拟音，汉语字面意思）和境相似者，作为法，不应该是境觉悟的安立之因，因为如果是，那么就不遍及境觉悟。如果问，那么境相的意识，领受境的安立之因是什么呢？དོཾན། （藏文，梵文天城体，梵文罗马拟音，汉语字面意思）境相的意识，作为法，用理智分析时，不应该有你领受境的安立之因，因为那时你领受境本身就不能成立。རྡུལཾ། （藏文，梵文天城体，梵文罗马拟音，汉语字面意思）境相的意识，作为法，不应该和外境微尘相似，因为你显现为粗大的形象。དེཾ། （藏文，梵文天城体，梵文罗马拟音，汉语字面意思）它，作为法，不应该从外境产生和外境相似，因为外境不是产生和你相似的产生者。ཡིཾན། （藏文，梵文天城体，梵文罗马拟音，汉语字面意思）如果即使相似，和境相似者，作为法，你也不能用境相的意识成立境觉悟，因为你用那样成立的周遍没有确定。第二种是：དེཾ། （藏文，梵文天城体，梵文罗马拟音，汉语字面意思）从境产生且和境相似，那是因为领受境而安立
English
For example, the action of cutting a tree and the axe, the tool for cutting, have no other different meanings than the action of doing and what is done. Because calling the tree being cut into pieces "doing" and calling the axe "capable of doing" are merely imputed names. Second, explaining the measurement and result of the habitual stability arising in terms of both conventional and ultimate reality, there are two types: explaining the measurement and result of ultimate self-awareness, and explaining the measurement and result of conventional object-awareness. The first is further divided into two: refuting that appearance is the result of the object and establishing self-awareness as the result; refuting that appearance is an external object and establishing self-awareness as the result. The first is further divided into two: refuting that the apprehended and the apprehender are substantially different, thereby establishing self-awareness as the result. The first is further divided into five: refuting the proof of external object-awareness, thereby establishing the non-duality of the apprehended and the apprehender; refuting arguments against self-awareness; pointing out the harm to object-awareness; and explaining that even without it, appearance is shown as illusion. The first is further divided into two: questioning the proof of external object-awareness, and extensively refuting the proof of speech. The first is: དོཾན། (Tibetan, Devanagari, Romanized Sanskrit, Literal Meaning) If you, the Sautrantika, consider object-awareness to be the result, then what is its basis? If you answer that it is the direct perception that appears as forms, sounds, etc., then by what is it established as object-awareness? If you answer that it is because it is similar to the object, then the second is further divided into three: refuting that mere similarity can establish it, refuting that similarity by arising can establish it, and refuting that certainty can establish it. The first is: འཁྲུཾལ། (Tibetan, Devanagari, Romanized Sanskrit, Literal Meaning) That which is similar to the object, as a subject, should not be the cause of establishing object-cognition, because if it were, it would not pervade object-cognition. If you ask, then what is the cause of establishing the experience of the object by the consciousness of the object-appearance? དོཾན། (Tibetan, Devanagari, Romanized Sanskrit, Literal Meaning) The consciousness of the object-appearance, as a subject, when analyzed by reason, should not have the cause of establishing your experience of the object, because at that time, your experience of the object itself would not be established. རྡུལཾ། (Tibetan, Devanagari, Romanized Sanskrit, Literal Meaning) The consciousness of the object-appearance, as a subject, should not be similar to the external object's particles, because you appear as a coarse image. དེཾ། (Tibetan, Devanagari, Romanized Sanskrit, Literal Meaning) That, as a subject, should not arise from the external object and be similar to the external object, because the external object is not the producer that produces something similar to you. ཡིཾན། (Tibetan, Devanagari, Romanized Sanskrit, Literal Meaning) If even if it is similar, that which is similar to the object, as a subject, you cannot establish object-cognition with the consciousness of the object-appearance, because the pervasion of establishing it in that way is not certain. The second is: དེཾ། (Tibetan, Devanagari, Romanized Sanskrit, Literal Meaning) That which arises from the object and is similar to the object is established because of experiencing the object.