Chinese
因为，你是能被表达的，具有能被表达之境的量。因此，以彼对彼进行妨害的指示，是所立宗。因为显示了对于随欲之声，其自体之义是不确定的，并且显示了一切义都不能被随欲之声所表达，这与名声的比量相违。第三，因此，以彼显示彼之相违，是所立宗。有必要，因为为了阻止具有理由之声无理由地使用，以及为了阻止随欲之声以自力使用于自体之境，所以显示了名声的比量不会妨害。第四，因此，在简要解释遣除者的根本差别之际，从现势力量比量中将名声的比量区别开来，是所立宗。有必要，因为是为了显示二者的妨害境是不同的。如同从现势力量比量中将可信比量区别开来的必要一样。第三，详细显示妨害方式的必要性是：成立。在为他利品中，详细阐述了以可信和名声进行妨害的方式，是所立宗。有必要，因为为了显示可信和名声的比量二者与现势力量比量不同，所以以妨害方式的不同来显示必要性。现量和现势力量比量，是所立宗。你们的妨害方式在为他利品中没有详细阐述的原因是，因为已经在现量和自利品中详细阐述过了。第二，解释义和所听现量清晰，分为二：解释说义的必要，解释说所听的必要。第一：现，现量的遣除，是所立宗。在为他利品中稍微可以阐述，因为在为他利品中可以通过义和所听的必要性来阐述。那么，说义的必要是什么呢？声。在量经的根本颂词中，说义这个词，是所立宗。有必要，因为虽然在遮除方面，声音有许多相违之法，但是为了知晓显现于听觉现量的声音自相，是此时的遮除之基础。声音自相，是所立宗。为了驳斥你是所听，听觉现量会妨害，因为你作为所听是由听觉现量所成立的。
English
Because, you are expressible, possessing the measure of that which can be expressed. Therefore, the indication of that hindering that, is the subject. Because it shows that for arbitrary sounds, the meaning of their own objects is uncertain, and it shows that all meanings cannot be expressed by arbitrary sounds, this contradicts the inference of fame. Third, therefore, the indication of that contradicting that, is the subject. It is necessary, because in order to prevent the use of reasoned sounds without reason, and in order to prevent arbitrary sounds from being used in their own objects by their own power, it shows that the inference of fame does not hinder. Fourth, therefore, when briefly explaining the fundamental distinctions of eliminators, distinguishing the inference of fame from the inference of actual power, is the subject. It is necessary, because it is to show that the objects of hindrance of the two are different. Just like the necessity of distinguishing the reliable inference from the inference of actual power. Third, the necessity of explaining the way of hindering in detail is: Established. In the chapter on benefiting others, the way of hindering by reliability and fame is explained in detail, is the subject. It is necessary, because in order to show that the two inferences of reliability and fame are different from the inference of actual power, the necessity is shown by the difference in the way of hindering. Direct perception and the inference of actual power, are the subject. The reason why your way of hindering is not explained in detail in the chapter on benefiting others is because it has already been explained in detail in the chapters on direct perception and self-benefit. Second, explaining the clarity of object and audible direct perception is divided into two: explaining the necessity of mentioning object, explaining the necessity of mentioning audible. First: Direct, the elimination of direct perception, is the subject. It can be explained slightly in the chapter on benefiting others, because in the chapter on benefiting others it can be explained through the necessity of object and audible. So, what is the necessity of saying object? Sound. In the root verses of the Pramāṇasūtra, the word object is mentioned, is the subject. It is necessary, because although there are many contradictory qualities in sound in terms of elimination, it is to know that the sound self-character appearing to auditory direct perception is the basis of elimination at this time. Sound self-character, is the subject. In order to refute that you are audible, auditory direct perception will hinder, because your being audible is established by auditory direct perception.
Chinese
其次，第二部分分为两种：区分的必要性和完全排除的必要性。第一种是：嗡（藏文：ངོཾ，梵文天城体：，梵文罗马拟音：，汉语字面意思：）。那么，说出所听之物的必要性是什么呢？以声音之上的自相为首的其他众多反体法，作为有法。你不是听觉意识现量的所取义，因为你是无实有的缘故。登（藏文：དེཾས，梵文天城体：，梵文罗马拟音：，汉语字面意思：）。经部的注释中说出“所听之物”这个词，作为有法。有必要，因为为了避免众多声音的反体成为所听之物，为了表明听觉意识现量不会造成损害。第二种是：然姆（藏文：རྣཾམ，梵文天城体：，梵文罗马拟音：，汉语字面意思：）。以听觉意识现量的行境，仅仅以所听之物的名称来称呼的必要性是什么呢？听觉意识现量的行境的声音自相，作为有法。你不能用任何名称来真实地表达，因为你不是声音的真实的表达对象。以听觉意识现量的行境，在名言中以所听之物的名称来指示，作为有法。有必要，因为为了了解声音是所听之物的成立法，以及不是的破立，依赖于听觉意识现量。第三，解释排除的基础——自立的必要性，分为四部分：详细解释三种必要性，消除对必要性意义的争论，用比喻总结成立的意义，断除对无有依处等的疑惑。第一部分分为三部分：解释确立自宗的必要性，解释消除疑惑的必要性，解释消除邪见的必要性。第一种是：简而言之，在“自立”中，说出自己的有法有什么必要呢？衮（藏文：ཀུནཾ，梵文天城体：，梵文罗马拟音：，汉语字面意思：）。简而言之，说出自己的有法，作为有法。有必要，因为在辩论的场合，如果对方损害了自己所承认的成立法的依处，那么就会损害当时的所立，如果损害了其他的有法，那么就不会损害当时的所立，为了了解这一点。第二种是：顿（藏文：དོཾན，梵文天城体：，梵文罗马拟音：，汉语字面意思：）。难道不是因为将那个必要性本身显示为所希望的成立法的体相就能理解了吗？那个，作为有法。还有其他的必要性，因为不仅损害了法，而且损害了有法，也会导致损害当时的所立，为了了解这一点。然（藏文：གཞཾན，梵文天城体：，梵文罗马拟音：，汉语字面意思：）。仅仅是损害了法，就会损害当时的所立吗？有产生这种疑惑的理由，因为所立
English
Secondly, the second part is divided into two: the necessity of distinction and the necessity of complete exclusion. The first is: Om (藏文：ངོཾ，梵文天城体：，梵文罗马拟音：，汉语字面意思：). Then, what is the necessity of mentioning the object of hearing? The many reverse dharmas, headed by the self-character on sound, as the subject. You are not the apprehended object of auditory consciousness, because you are unreal. Deṃ (藏文：དེཾས，梵文天城体：，梵文罗马拟音：，汉语字面意思：). In the commentary of the sutra, mentioning the word "object of hearing" is the subject. There is a necessity, because in order to avoid the many reverse dharmas of sound from being objects of hearing, in order to show that auditory consciousness does not cause harm. The second is: Raṃm (藏文：རྣཾམ，梵文天城体：，梵文罗马拟音：，汉语字面意思：). What is the necessity of referring to the object of auditory consciousness only by the name of "object of hearing"? The sound self-character of the object of auditory consciousness, as the subject. You cannot be truly expressed by any name, because you are not the true object of expression of sound. Referring to the object of auditory consciousness by the name of "object of hearing" in conventional terms, as the subject. There is a necessity, because in order to understand that the proof that sound is the object of hearing, and the refutation that it is not, depend on auditory consciousness. Thirdly, explaining the necessity of the basis of elimination—self-establishment, is divided into four parts: explaining the three necessities in detail, eliminating disputes about the meaning of the necessities, summarizing the established meaning with examples, and cutting off doubts about the absence of a basis, etc. The first part is divided into three parts: explaining the necessity of establishing one's own system, explaining the necessity of eliminating doubts, and explaining the necessity of eliminating wrong views. The first is: In short, in "self-establishment," what is the necessity of mentioning one's own subject? Kunaṃ (藏文：ཀུནཾ，梵文天城体：，梵文罗马拟音：，汉语字面意思：). In short, mentioning one's own subject, as the subject. There is a necessity, because in the context of debate, if the opponent harms the basis of the established dharma that he himself accepts, then it will harm the current proposition, and if he harms other subjects, then it will not harm the current proposition, in order to understand this. The second is: Doṃ (藏文：དོཾན，梵文天城体：，梵文罗马拟音：，汉语字面意思：). Isn't it understood because that necessity itself is shown as the characteristic of the desired proposition? That, as the subject. There is another necessity, because not only does it harm the dharma, but also harming the subject will lead to harming the current proposition, in order to understand this. Ghaṃ (藏文：གཞཾན，梵文天城体：，梵文罗马拟音：，汉语字面意思：). Does merely harming the dharma harm the current proposition? There is a reason to generate this doubt, because the proposition
Tibetan
ཉིད་དུ་འདོད་པ་དེ་ལྟ་བུའི་རྣམ་པ་ཅན་གྱི་ཆོས་བསྒྲུབ་བྱ་ཡིན་ཞེས་བརྗོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །གསུམ་པ་ལ་གསུམ་སྟེ། བསལ་བྱའི་ལོག་རྟོག་ཡོད་པར་བསྟན། ལོག་རྟོག་དེ་ཡི་དཔེར་བརྗོད་བཤད། དེ་ཉིད་ཇི་ལྟར་སེལ་བའི་ཚུལ་ལོ། །དང་པོ་ནི། འདིཾ། དགོས་པ་དེ་ཡང་ཆོས་ལ་གནོད་ན་སྐབས་ཀྱི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱ་ལ་གནོད་པར་བསྟན་པས་གྲུབ་པ་མིན་ནམ་སྙམ་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་བསལ་བྱའི་ལོག་རྟོག་གཞན་ཡང་ཡོད་དེ། རྒོལ་བ་འགའ་ཞིག་འབྲེལ་མེད་ཀྱི་ཆོས་ཅན་འབའ་ཞིག་པ་བཀག་པས་སྐབས་ཀྱི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱ་ལ་གནོད་པར་འདོད་པས་ལོག་རྟོག་དེ་ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་བསལ་བྱའི་ལོག་རྟོག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། གཉིས་པ་ནི། དཔེཾར། དེ་ལྟ་བུའི་ལོག་རྟོག་ཅི་ལྟ་བུ་ཞེ་ན། བྱེ་བྲག་པས་མཁའ་སོགས་རྟག་དངོས་སུ་འདོད་པ་ལ་སངས་རྒྱས་པས་མཁའ་སོགས་ཆོས་ཅན། རྟག་རྫས་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། རང་འབྲས་ཅིག་ཅར་དུ་མི་བསྐྱེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེས་བཀོད་པ་ལ། བྱེ་བྲག་པ་ན་རེ། གཏན་ཚིགས་དེ་ནམ་མཁའ་དངོས་པོ་བ་ལ་གནོད་པས་ཆོས་ཅན་ནམ་མཁའ་ལ་གནོད། དེས་ན་འདི་ལྟར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱ་ལ་གནོད་ཅེས་འདོད་པ་ལྟ་བུའོ། །གསུམ་པ་ནི། དེཾ། རང་འབྲས་ཅིག་ཅར་དུ་མི་སྐྱེད་པར་དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། ནམ་མཁའ་དངོས་པོ་བ་ལ་གནོད་ཀྱང་ནམ་མཁའ་རྟག་རྫས་མིན་པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱ་ལ་གནོད་པ་མེད་པར་ཐལ། ནམ་མཁའ་དངོས་པོ་བ་ལ་གནོད་ཀྱང་ནམ་མཁའ་རྟག་རྫས་མིན་པ་སྒྲུབ་ནུས་ཀྱི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། འདིཾས། མདོར་ན་རང་གི་ཆོས་ཅན་ཞེས་སྨོས་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། ཚོགས་དོན་གྱི་ནང་ཚན་གྱི་ཆོས་ཅན་ལ་གནོད་ན་སྐབས་ཀྱི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱ་ལ་གནོད་པར་བསྟན་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ། དེ་ལ་གནོད་ན་དེ་ཚད་མས་བཀག་པ་བསྟན་པའི་ཕྱིར། དེཾ། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། འབྲེལ་མེད་ཀྱི་ཆོས་ཅན་འབའ་ཞིག་ལ་གནོད་ཀྱང་སྐབས་ཀྱི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱ་ལ་གནོད་པ་མིན་པར་བསྟན་ཏེ། རང་གི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱའི་ཆོས་ཀྱིས་ཁྱད་པར་དུ་བྱས་པའི་ཆོས་ཅན་བསྒྲུབ་བྱར་བསྟན་པའི་ཕྱིར། གཉིས་པ་ལ་གཉིས་ཏེ། འདོད་པ་བརྗོད། དེ་དགག་པའོ། །དང་པོ་ནི། གལཾ། གལ་ཏེ་ཆོས་ཅན་དང་ཆོས་ལ་གནོད་པས་སྐབས་ཀྱི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱ་ལ་གནོད་ན། སངས་རྒྱས་པས་གྲངས་ཅན་པ་ལ་བདེ་སོགས་ཆོས་ཅན། རྟག་རྫས་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། རང་འབྲས་ཅིག་ཅར་དུ་མི་བསྐྱེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེས་བཀོད་པ་ན། དེས་སྐབས་ཀྱི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱ་ལ་གནོད་པར་འགྱུར་ཏེ། སྐབས་ཀྱི་ཆོས་ཅན་ལ་གནོད་པར་འགྱུར་བའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། གཏན་ཚིགས་དེས་བདེ་སོགས་རྟག་རྫས་ཡིན་པ་ལ་གནོད་པས་བདེ་སོགས་མི་རྟག་པའི་ངོ་བོའང་བཀག་པའི་
Chinese
因为要说具有如是自性的法是所立宗的缘故。第三有三：显示有应遣除的邪分别；说彼邪分别的例证；彼如何遣除之理。第一：此。如果必要也损害法，难道不是显示损害了当下的所立宗而成立了吗？彼法者，你的应遣除的邪分别还有其他的，因为有些论者认为仅仅遮止了不相关的法者就损害了当下的所立宗，所以彼邪分别是你的应遣除的邪分别的缘故。第二：例。如是邪分别是什么样的呢？比如，胜论师认为虚空等是常实有，对此佛教徒说，虚空等法者，不是常实，因为不一时产生自果的缘故。胜论师说：彼因损害了虚空实有者，所以损害了法者虚空。因此，就像认为损害了如此成立的所立宗一样。第三：彼。不一时产生自果，彼法者，即使损害了虚空实有者，也不损害成立虚空不是常实的所立宗，因为即使损害了虚空实有者，也是能成立虚空不是常实的因的缘故。此。总之，说自己的法者，法者，如果损害了集合意义的内涵的法者，就是显示损害了当下的所立宗，因为如果损害了彼，就是显示彼被量所遮止的缘故。彼。彼法者，显示了即使损害了仅仅不相关的法者，也不损害当下的所立宗，因为显示了以自己的所立宗的法所区分的法者是所立宗的缘故。第二有二：说所许；彼破斥。第一：若。如果损害了法者和法就损害了当下的所立宗，那么佛教徒对数论师说，乐等法者，不是常实，因为不一时产生自果的缘故。那么，彼会损害当下的所立宗，因为会损害当下的法者的缘故，因为彼因损害了乐等是常实，所以也遮止了乐等无常的自性。
English
Because it is said that the dharma with such a nature as desired is the object to be established. The third has three: showing that there is a wrong conception to be eliminated; explaining the example of that wrong conception; and the way to eliminate it. The first is: This. If the necessity also harms the dharma, is it not established by showing that it harms the object to be established in the present case? That dharma possessor, you also have other wrong conceptions to be eliminated, because some debaters think that merely stopping the unrelated dharma possessor harms the object to be established in the present case, so that wrong conception is the wrong conception to be eliminated by you. The second is: Example. What is such a wrong conception like? For example, when the Vaisheshikas think that space, etc., are permanent substances, the Buddhists say that space, etc., dharma possessor, is not a permanent substance, because it does not produce its own results at the same time. The Vaisheshikas say: That reason harms the space substantialist, so it harms the dharma possessor space. Therefore, it is like thinking that it harms the object to be established in this way. The third is: That. Not producing its own results at the same time, that dharma possessor, even if it harms the space substantialist, it does not harm the object to be established in establishing that space is not a permanent substance, because even if it harms the space substantialist, it is the reason that can establish that space is not a permanent substance. This. In short, saying one's own dharma possessor, dharma possessor, if it harms the dharma possessor within the meaning of the collection, it is showing that it harms the object to be established in the present case, because if it harms that, it is showing that it is prevented by valid cognition. That. That dharma possessor, it shows that even if it harms only the unrelated dharma possessor, it does not harm the object to be established in the present case, because it shows that the dharma possessor distinguished by the dharma of one's own object to be established is the object to be established. The second has two: stating the assertion; refuting it. The first is: If. If harming the dharma possessor and the dharma harms the object to be established in the present case, then when the Buddhists say to the Samkhyas, pleasure, etc., dharma possessor, is not a permanent substance, because it does not produce its own results at the same time. Then, it will harm the object to be established in the present case, because it will harm the dharma possessor in the present case, because that reason harms the fact that pleasure, etc., is a permanent substance, so it also prevents the nature of pleasure, etc., being impermanent.