English
can be established. If it is not manifest, then it is too much. The first part is divided into two points: establishing the reason and refuting the unestablished. The first point is: establishing the thesis. Feelings of pleasure and pain, etc., are the subject of the thesis. It is the mind itself, because from the difference of the three causes, the experience of different degrees of comfort and pain arises. That, that is the subject of the thesis. It is the object of self-cognizant manifest, because you have an experiencer, and your experiencer is not a different entity from you. The second part is divided into two points: stating the claim and explaining the refutation. The first point is: others. The reason is not established, because merely knowing through the consciousness of others is considered experience. If so, the second part is divided into two points: inferring that one's own pleasure, etc., is experienced by others, and inferring that yogic manifest experiences suffering. The first part is divided into two points: establishing the inference and refuting the answers of others. The first point is: others. The pleasure, etc., in the continuum of Devadatta, is the subject of the thesis. It is experienced by the consciousness in the continuum of another person, because he cognizes it. The second part is divided into two points: refuting the difference between whether or not there is a similar origin, and refuting the difference between whether or not there is a manifest. The first point is: if. The consciousness of another person's continuum is the subject of the thesis. It is not experiencing the pleasure, etc., in the continuum of Devadatta, because it is not produced from the same kind as it. If so, then, is the pleasure, etc., of Devadatta, the consciousness of another person's continuum that focuses on it, acting as an objective condition or not? If it is the former, then, object. (དམཾིགས，梵文天城体：Dmaṃigs，梵文罗马拟音：Dmaṃigs，汉语字面意思：Object.) The consciousness of another person's continuum that focuses on the pleasure, etc., of Devadatta is the subject of the thesis. It should be produced from the same kind as the pleasure, etc., of Devadatta, because it is your objective condition. If, if it is not produced from the same kind as it, then, that. That is the subject of the thesis. That is not your object of apprehension, because it is not produced from the same kind as you. If the consciousness of another person's continuum does not apprehend the self-character of Devadatta's pleasure, etc., but apprehends the general character of pleasure, etc., therefore it is not without an object, if so, then, that. The consciousness of another person's continuum that focuses on the pleasure, etc., of Devadatta is the subject of the thesis. It should not take the general character of Devadatta's pleasure, etc., as the object of apprehension, because its general character has already been refuted. That. Pleasure, etc., is the subject of the thesis. The mind that experiences itself is established as manifest and self-cognizant, because the mind that experiences itself and it are the same entity. The second part is divided into two points
Chinese
驳斥：反驳过失之辩。第一：གཾལ། （藏文种子字，梵文天城体：गंल，梵文罗马拟音：gaṃla，汉语字面意思：暂无）。如果说，他相续的意识虽然能执持天授相续的乐等，但不是现量执持。而天授自己相续的意识能现量执持乐等，因此有感受与不感受的差别。那么，执持自他之乐等的二心有法，应成没有实际执持自他之乐等的差别，因为同样执持自己隐蔽的乐等。第二：མཾ། （藏文种子字，梵文天城体：मं，梵文罗马拟音：maṃ，汉语字面意思：暂无）。如果说，感受自己相续的乐等，是因为有不见之业等；而执持他相续的乐等，因为没有不见之业等，所以有感受与不感受的差别。那么，天授的乐等有法，应成也不被他相续的意识执持，因为他相续的意识执持时没有不见之业等。如果说，仅仅是执持相同，但有感受与不感受的差别。那么，自己的心有法，应成感受与不感受自他之乐等的差别不合理，因为已经显示自他之乐等同样是隐蔽的。第二分为二：驳斥，反驳过失之辩。第一：གཾང་། （藏文种子字，梵文天城体：गंग，梵文罗马拟音：gaṃga，汉语字面意思：暂无）。瑜伽现量有法，应成被他相续的痛苦所折磨，因为感受他相续的痛苦，即因为了知它。第二：གཾལ། （藏文种子字，梵文天城体：गंल，梵文罗马拟音：gaṃla，汉语字面意思：暂无）。如果说，瑜伽士没有他相续痛苦的对境，也没有自己的根识聚合，因此不感受他相续的痛苦。那么，སྡུགཾ （藏文种子字，梵文天城体：सदुगं，梵文罗马拟音：sadugaṃ，汉语字面意思：暂无），瑜伽士有法，不能成立因为没有生起他人的痛苦，所以不是感受他人的痛苦，因为仅仅了知他人的痛苦，就能感受他人的痛苦。如果说，那个过失在你那里也相同。那么，སྡུགཾ （藏文种子字，梵文天城体：सदुगं，梵文罗马拟音：sadugaṃ，汉语字面意思：暂无），法称有法，应成仅仅缘他人的痛苦，就感受他人的痛苦的过失在你那里没有，因为你是认为感受痛苦的意义是生起痛苦的自性，缘痛苦的意义是了知痛苦的智者。དེཾས། （藏文种子字，梵文天城体：देस，梵文罗马拟音：desa，汉语字面意思：暂无），义显现的意识有法，你的对境的意义和感受的意义是不同的
English
Refutation: Refuting the defense against the fault. First: Gaṃla. If it is said that although the consciousness of another's continuum can grasp the happiness etc. of Deva's continuum, it does not grasp it directly. And Deva's own consciousness directly grasps happiness etc., so there is a difference between experiencing and not experiencing. Then, the two minds that grasp the happiness etc. of self and others, the subject of the proposition, should not have the difference of actually grasping or not grasping the happiness etc. of self and others, because they are the same in grasping the happiness etc. that are hidden to oneself. Second: Maṃ. If it is said that experiencing the happiness etc. of one's own continuum is because there is unseen karma etc., and grasping the happiness etc. of another's continuum is because there is no unseen karma etc., so there is a difference between experiencing and not experiencing. Then, the happiness etc. of Deva, the subject of the proposition, should also not be grasped by the consciousness of another's continuum, because there is no unseen karma etc. when the consciousness of another's continuum grasps. If it is said that although it is the same in merely grasping, there is a difference between experiencing and not experiencing. Then, one's own mind, the subject of the proposition, should not reasonably have the difference of experiencing and not experiencing the happiness etc. of self and others, because it has already been shown that the happiness etc. of self and others are the same in being hidden. The second has two parts: Refutation, refuting the defense against the fault. First: Gaṃga. The yogic direct perception, the subject of the proposition, should be tormented by the suffering of another's continuum, because it experiences the suffering of another's continuum, that is, because it knows it. Second: Gaṃla. If it is said that the yogi does not have the object of the suffering of another's continuum, nor does he have the aggregation of his own sense faculties, therefore he does not experience the suffering of another's continuum. Then, Sadugaṃ, the yogi, the subject of the proposition, cannot establish that because the suffering of others has not arisen, therefore he does not experience the suffering of others, because merely knowing the suffering of others, he experiences the suffering of others. If it is said that the fault is the same for you as well. Then, Sadugaṃ, Dharmakirti, the subject of the proposition, should have the fault that merely focusing on the suffering of others, he experiences the suffering of others, but that fault does not exist for you, because you are a wise person who believes that the meaning of experiencing suffering is the arising of the nature of suffering, and the meaning of focusing on suffering is knowing suffering. Desa, the consciousness of the appearance of the object, the subject of the proposition, the meaning of your object and the meaning of experiencing are different.