English
Because it doesn't hold all at once, because it is multiple things. Therefore, if multiple things are held by knowledge, then it is universally held sequentially, so you consider consciousness to be the object of all realms, if you think so. The second part has five points: sesame etc. are not held simultaneously, this is wrong. Variegated colors are not held simultaneously, this is wrong. Knots etc. are not held simultaneously, this is wrong. Multiple things are not known in other ways, this is wrong. Holding multiple things simultaneously also exists in other things. The first part has two points: stating the thesis, refuting other answers. The first point is: for multiple things such as sesame and barley, the subject of debate. How does it appear to be held simultaneously? Because it doesn't appear, because they are multiple different things. The second point is: if it is said that sesame etc. are seen sequentially by knowledge, but because the entry is rapid, it appears to be held simultaneously. Because the entry is rapid, it appears to be simultaneous, this is the subject of debate. You are not reasonable, because for you, letters will also become heard simultaneously, because the very large fault has already been stated. Furthermore, sesame etc. falling sequentially downwards from the sky, that itself is the subject of debate. For you, why wouldn't consciousness become holding non-sequentially but simultaneously? It will definitely become holding simultaneously, because consciousness enters rapidly for you. Furthermore, all minds, the subject of debate. Why in these minds, do some appear to hold non-sequential objects, while others appear to hold sequential objects? It will not become like that, but it will definitely appear that all hold non-sequential objects, because the time of arising between before and after is the same. If you admit, then for the mind that holds all things, the subject of debate. This object will definitely become only appearing as non-sequential and simultaneous, because the rapid entry is the same. The second part has two points: stating the damaging thesis, refuting the reason not being established. The first point is: if it is impossible to hold multiple things simultaneously, then the multiple blue, yellow etc. colors of butterflies, peacocks, and variegated woolen cloth etc., the subject of debate. Why would it appear to be appearing simultaneously in the mind? It will not appear, because they are not multiple different things. The second part has two points: disparaging the school that considers multiple things to be one, showing the proof that multiple things are not one. The first point is: if it is said that the reason is not established, the multiple colors of the variegated butterfly are one thing with limbs, so it
Chinese
如果问原因。这种杂多为一的宗派，比蝴蝶的杂色还要更加稀奇，因此是最为可笑之处。第二有三：以杂多故，无有一体性；安立杂多的理由；遮破依赖粗显的争论。第一有二：安立理由；破斥他答。第一是：蝴蝶的杂色的蓝黄等，是法。不是一体性的自性，因为是杂多的事物。譬如堆积多种不同种类的宝珠之形。第二是：如果说不相同，堆积多种宝珠之时，能区分这个是蓝色，这个是黄色等等。毛料和杂色垫子等，是法。与堆积多种宝珠之形和有支的不是一个事物相同，因为区分这个是蓝色，这个是黄色等等，你也能同样做到。如果说区分的智慧，对于蝴蝶等的蓝黄等支分之形才能区分，对于有支的事物不能区分。执持杂色的智慧，是法。如果舍弃一切支分的蓝色等，除了支分之外的有支杂色，你能够见到，这很稀奇。因为除了支分的蓝色等之外的有支蓝色等，你没有见到显现的缘故。如果说蝴蝶的杂色是天然的杂色，因此有一体性的事物。颜色数量相同的在蝴蝶上制作的杂色，和天然的蝴蝶的杂色，执持它们的智慧，是法。你对于那些，一个是显现为有次第的境，意义或境是多的，一个是显现为没有次第的同时的境，意义或境是一个事物显现的差别是什么，没有差别。因为你对于二者，都了知同时显现自己的境，意义的相是显现为杂多是相同的。第二有三：安立理由；破斥他答；归纳成立之义。第一是：蝴蝶等杂色
English
If asked for the reason. This doctrine of manifold as one is even more wondrous than the variegation of a butterfly, and is therefore the most laughable thing. The second has three parts: Because it is manifold, there is no oneness; Establishing the reason for manifoldness; Refuting arguments based on coarse appearances. The first has two parts: Establishing the reason; Refuting other answers. The first is: The blue, yellow, etc. of the variegation of a butterfly, are the subject. They are not of the nature of a single entity, because they are manifold things. For example, like the form of piling up many different kinds of jewels. The second is: If you say they are not the same, because when piling up many jewels, one can distinguish this is blue, this is yellow, etc. Woolen cloth and variegated cushions, etc., are the subject. They are the same as the form of piling up many jewels and the non-existence of a single substance with parts, because you can also distinguish this is blue, this is yellow, etc. If you say that the discriminating wisdom can only distinguish the forms of the blue, yellow, etc. parts of butterflies, etc., but cannot distinguish the substance with parts. The wisdom that holds variegation, is the subject. If you abandon all the blue, etc. parts, it is wonderful that you can see another variegated substance with parts other than the parts. Because you do not perceive any blue, etc. substance with parts other than the blue, etc. parts as appearing. If you say that the variegation of a butterfly is a natural variegation, therefore there is a single substance with parts. The wisdom that holds the variegation made on a butterfly with the same number of colors, and the natural variegation of a butterfly, are the subject. What is the difference between one of those appearing to you as a sequential object, with many meanings or objects, and the other appearing as a simultaneous non-sequential object, with the meaning or object appearing as a single substance? There is no difference. Because you understand that both of them simultaneously appear to their own objects, and the aspect of the meaning appears as manifold is the same. The second has three parts: Establishing the reason; Refuting other answers; Summarizing the established meaning. The first is: Butterflies, etc., variegated
Chinese
颜色的意义，法相（有法）。是多种物质的自性，因为对于不迷惑的智慧来说，显现为能够区分的多种物质的自性。第二种情况是：如果不是周遍，因为显现为智慧上的不同，不是意义不同的原因。如果这样说，瓶子、毡子等不同物质的事物，法相（有法）。你所安立的这个不同，以什么理由成立或者不成立呢？因为对于不迷惑的智慧来说，显现为不同，所以你的不同不成立。如果说，因为显现为智慧上的多种，所以不能成立为意义上的多种，因为显现为智慧上的多种，只是具有肢体的单一物质，而蓝色等肢体的多种物质，在智慧上不显现。如果这样说，图画和垫子等的杂色，法相（有法）。不应是显现为智慧上的多种，因为没有具有肢体的单一物质。已承认这个理由，因为不同的微尘种类没有造作具有肢体的单一物质。如果说，即使图画等没有具有肢体的单一物质，但是因为有不同微尘种类相遇的结合，所以它显现为智慧上的多种。如果这样说，结合，法相（有法）。不应显现为不迷惑的根识上的多种物质，因为没有形色，因为是功德。已承认理由的周遍。如果说，即使结合那个没有多种颜色实体，但是因为和蝴蝶等具有的肢体的多种相似，所以假立为多种。如果这样说，结合，法相（有法）。也不应依赖于和蝴蝶等具有的肢体的多种相似，而近似假立为多种，因为蝴蝶等具有的肢体的多种是不可能的。如果说，因为结合和多种颜色这两个在同一个意义上相遇聚合，所以将结合假立为多种。那么，这两个在何处相遇聚合呢？在蓝色等各个肢体上聚合吗？如果这样说，蓝色等各个肢体，法相（有法）。你不应是结合和多种一同相遇聚合，因为你不是多种聚合。如果说，当根识见到图画等时，虽然依次见到蓝色等，但是后来的一个智慧混合后一起执取。
English
The meanings of colors, phenomena (subject). It is the nature of various substances, because for non-deluded wisdom, it appears as the nature of various substances that can be distinguished. The second case is: if it is not pervasive, because appearing as different in wisdom is not the reason for different meanings. If you say so, objects of different substances such as bottles and felts, phenomena (subject). By what reason does this difference you establish become established or not? Because for non-deluded wisdom, it appears as different, so your difference is not established. If you say that because it appears as various in wisdom, it cannot be established as various in meaning, because appearing as various in wisdom is only a single substance with limbs, and various substances of limbs such as blue do not appear in wisdom. If you say so, the variegated colors of paintings and cushions, phenomena (subject). It should not appear as various in wisdom, because there is no single substance with limbs. This reason is admitted, because different kinds of dust do not create a single substance with limbs. If you say that even if paintings etc. do not have a single substance with limbs, but because there is a combination of different kinds of dust meeting, so it appears as various in wisdom. If you say so, combination, phenomena (subject). It should not appear as various substances in non-deluded sense consciousness, because it has no form, because it is a quality. The pervasiveness of the reason is admitted. If you say that even if the combination does not have various color entities, but because it is similar to the various limbs possessed by butterflies etc., it is nominally established as various. If you say so, combination, phenomena (subject). It should also not rely on being similar to the various limbs possessed by butterflies etc., and be approximately nominally established as various, because the various limbs possessed by butterflies etc. are impossible. If you say that because the combination and various colors meet and gather in the same meaning, the combination is nominally established as various. Then, where do these two meet and gather? Do they gather on each of the limbs such as blue? If you say so, each of the limbs such as blue, phenomena (subject). You should not be a combination and various meeting and gathering together, because you are not a gathering of various. If you say that when sense consciousness sees paintings etc., although blue etc. are seen sequentially, later one wisdom mixes and grasps them simultaneously.