English
Objection: If destruction is not real, it cannot destroy things, so things will not be destroyed. Answer: To those who believe that destruction is other than the thing and not real, the absence of the destruction of the thing itself cannot be used as an obstacle, because it is not admitted that things are destroyed by the destruction of other things, because it is believed that things are destroyed by their own cause arising in an instant. If destruction is other than the thing and not real, then the destruction of things is without cause, so how can one analyze causelessness based on this? The thing itself naturally decays, because it does not depend on anything other than the cause of the thing, in order to understand this independence, the speculative mind imagines the thing and its destruction as different, even though they are not different, and describes the state of destruction as having no other cause, but this only says that destruction has no other cause, not that it has no cause at all, so there is a difference. Third, if the non-real destruction of that tree does not depend on other causes than its own cause, but only the tree itself exists, then is destruction one with the tree or other than the tree? This distinction is the same, if it is other, then the tree will not be destroyed, if it is one, then the tree will not have the slightest production. Answer: The destruction of that tree, the dharma, compared to the reality of that tree, neither itself nor other will have the slightest change, because it is only that the tree has decayed and become non-existent. The distinction between thing and one or other only applies to the real, because the establishment of one and other, that is, action, is only related to the real. Therefore, the statement "the tree has decayed, it does not exist" is only a negation of "not real", and not the establishment of other dharmas, so it is neither one with the thing nor other than the thing. Therefore, the negation of the absence of the destruction of the tree, the dharma, if it depends on other causes than the cause of the tree, then it should depend, but it will not depend. Because you have no reality of cause that will produce any effect. This is pervasive, if a certain cause will produce any effect
Chinese
如果不是依靠其他因缘，那就是不依靠的缘故。第四，显示坏灭非实有，这是因为，还有其他的必要，那就是为了消除对坏灭无因的过分指责。什么样的指责呢？一种是坏灭，即坏灭法，从非事物产生，即从非事物最初就存在，这是不合理的，因为它是无因的。如果承认，那么坏灭法，就应该与苗芽等不同而存在，并且是坏灭的，因为它是最初就存在的。如何消除呢？坏灭法，如果是无因的，就不会变成最初就存在等三种情况，因为它不是事物。这里，“坏灭”这个词，理学家认为，当木头坏掉后，即使木头的实体不存在了，但坏灭本身仍然作为事物存在。而佛教徒则认为，木头本身是从自己的因缘中刹那产生的，所以要知道结合的方式不同，而所说的无因，最初是指完全没有因，后来是指从木头的因缘中不依赖其他因缘。第二，避免根本的标志不确定，因为存在并不完全包含坏灭。例如，类似于有生之物，但有些如瓶子等被认为是具有阻碍的，而有些如智慧等则被认为是无阻碍地产生的，同样，在存在中也有两种。有生之物的存在是坏灭的自性，而无生之物的存在则不是坏灭的，这是为什么呢？果，瓶子和智慧的自性，各自确定为有阻碍和无阻碍，因为产生有阻碍和无阻碍的因的自性是各自确定的，所以才会这样产生。存在法，恒常和无常的体性不会不同地出现，因为产生恒常和无常的因并不存在。第二，因此，先前所说的道理成立，即显示如果存在就必然是无常的道理，声音和意义等事物的关系，以及事物本身是恒常的观点都被排除了，因为如果是事物，就必然是无常的。第三，由此否定了能力是恒常的，声音的能力也是如此。
English
If it does not depend on other causes, then it is because it does not depend. Fourth, showing that destruction is non-substantial, this is because there is another necessity, which is to eliminate the excessive accusation of causeless destruction. What kind of accusation is it? One is destruction, that is, the dharma of destruction, arises from non-things, that is, it is unreasonable to exist from the beginning of non-things, because it is causeless. If it is admitted, then the dharma of destruction should exist differently from sprouts, etc., and be destructive, because it exists from the beginning. How to eliminate it? The dharma of destruction, if it is causeless, will not become the three situations such as existing from the beginning, because it is not a thing. Here, the word "destruction", the logicians believe that when the wood is broken, even if the substance of the wood does not exist, the destruction itself still exists as a thing. Buddhists, on the other hand, believe that the wood itself arises momentarily from its own causes, so it is necessary to know that the way of combination is different, and the so-called causelessness, initially refers to the complete absence of cause, and later refers to not relying on other causes from the cause of the wood. Second, to avoid the uncertainty of the fundamental sign, because existence does not completely include destruction. For example, similar to living things, but some such as bottles are considered to have obstacles, while some such as wisdom are considered to be produced without obstacles, similarly, there are two types of existence. The existence of living things is the nature of destruction, while the existence of non-living things is not destruction, why is that? The nature of the fruit, the bottle and wisdom, are each determined to be obstructive and unobstructed, because the nature of the cause that produces obstructive and unobstructed is each determined, so it will be produced in this way. The dharma of existence, the nature of permanence and impermanence will not appear differently, because the causes that produce permanence and impermanence do not exist. Second, therefore, the previously stated reasoning is established, that is, the reasoning that shows that if there is existence, it must be impermanent, the relationship between sound and meaning and other things, and the view that things themselves are permanent are excluded, because if it is a thing, it must be impermanent. Third, this negates that the ability is permanent, and so is the ability of sound.
Chinese
因为是常的缘故。如是所说的联系，以常的过失而遣除，因为有能力者是不常的缘故。能力不是常有的。因为念诵这样的话语就足够了。第二，遮破具有遍和能立的，有三：显示未作因是错乱的，也显示因相违的过失，遮破不错乱的能立。第一，所谓由士夫贪等引发的未作，是法，你因为是如理如实的意义的唯一的生因，所以不是能立，因为如果是你，则由如理如实的意义的唯一产生所不遍。如果不成立，士夫的过失由贪等引发而作的没有过失的士夫未作，是法，如果是你，则由不错乱的知识唯一产生所不遍，因为如果是你，则见到火光和月光等是不错乱的知识的因，此外也作为错乱的因，次第是，夜晚将青莲花看成红色，将黄色看成白色的因的缘故。第二，吠陀是法，不成为意义的因，因为是未作的常的缘故。周遍，因为从常法中不会产生任何事物的能力的缘故。如果这样，那么执持虚空的分别不是从虚空常法中产生的吗？答：从自因前念的分别的习气中产生，并且是具有境假立的行境的执持虚空的分别识，有些是法，将要从前念的习气中产生，而不是虚空的所取义的行境，如果是，则成为恒常产生的过失。第三有二：说所许，遮破它。第一，如果未作是能立，虽然没有后随，但是有反周遍，所以是正确的因，那也是在士夫未作的吠陀的词句上，因为遍士夫所作的反面，所以遍所遍反面的意义的反面，成立为真实的意义，因为从因士夫未作的反面所作而成立。
English
Because it is permanent. The connection mentioned as such is eliminated by the fault of permanence, because those with abilities are impermanent. Ability is not permanent. Because reciting such words is sufficient. Second, there are three refutations of what possesses pervasiveness and proof: showing that the unmade reason is confused, also showing the fault of contradictory reason, and refuting the non-confused proof. First, what is called unmade, caused by the desires of a person, etc., is the subject. Since you are the sole cause of knowing the meaning as it is, you are not a proof, because if you are, you are not pervasive by being solely produced by knowing the meaning as it is. If it is not established, the fault of a person caused by the desires of a person, etc., the unmade by a person without fault, is the subject. If you are, then you are not pervasive by being the sole cause of non-confused knowledge, because if you are, it is seen that the light of fire and moonlight, etc., are the cause of non-confused knowledge, and also act as the cause of confusion in other ways, in order, because they cause the blue lotus to be seen as red at night, and the yellow to be seen as white. Second, the Veda is the subject, it does not become the cause of meaning, because it is considered to be the unmade and permanent. It is pervasive, because no ability of things arises from permanent things. If so, then is the concept of grasping space not produced from the permanent space? Answer: Some of the conceptual minds that grasp space, which arise from the habitual tendencies of the previous conceptual thought that is its own cause, and which have the object of imputation as their object, are the subject. They will arise from the habitual tendencies of the previous thought, but they are not the object of the perceived meaning of space, because if they were, they would always arise. Third, there are two: stating the assertion, and refuting it. First, if the unmade is a proof, although there is no subsequent concomitance to prove that the Veda is true, there is reverse pervasiveness, so it is a correct reason. That is also because the opposite of what is made by a person pervades the words of the Veda that are unmade by a person, so the opposite of the meaning of the opposite of what is pervaded is established as the true meaning, because it is established by the opposite of the unmade by the reason, which is made.
Chinese
因为所立之法，遍于真实义的反面虚妄义，因为一切虚妄之语，皆被视为人造之故。若问：第二有三：无能立故无相违，三相决定于因，有相违则随行成。第一，非人造者，是为法，于相违品虚妄义中，生起存在之疑，为于彼处成立无有，虽未示因，实则无所可示。不成，虚妄义为法，人造非人造二者相违，不可能存在，汝为一法之故。若问：见一法相违，不能定于其他相违五者无有彼法，因见勤作生与非勤作生之相违事物，亦为一无常所遍故。若谓仅不缘相违品，即可成立定无，则于一切可显现不可显现之事物，是为法，仅不缘不能成立定无，因彼法之无，不以不缘彼法而成立，如是已于前述。是故，非人造者，是为法，于自之相违品相违性生疑，是故相违周遍不成。于自之相违品无有性不成，因不定故。第二，若于相违周遍生疑，则能立必非真实，若随行与相违，于自所立之法具有之自性，即是周遍之三相，彼是决定之果，若由成为因之量识所成立，则彼即是真实能立之故。第三，声明，是为法，汝为成立真实义之因，非人造等一切，皆是于同品随行成立者，汝为成立真实义之因，非人造者，定于相违品相违之故。周遍，于何处所立之法，真实义之相违品为虚妄义，彼相违性之宣说，即是此因非人造者之同品
English
Because the established dharma pervades the opposite of the true meaning, the false meaning, because all false words are seen as man-made. If you ask: The second has three: without proof, there is no contradiction; the three characteristics must be determined by the sign; if there is contradiction, then the following will be established. First, non-human-made is the dharma, and in the contradictory product, the false meaning, there is doubt about its existence. In order to establish its non-existence there, although the reason is not shown, there is actually nothing to show. It is not established that the false meaning is the dharma, and the two contradictions of human-made and non-human-made cannot exist, because you are one dharma. If you ask: Seeing one dharma is contradictory, it cannot be determined that the other five contradictions do not have that dharma, because it is seen that the contradictory things produced by effort and non-effort are also pervaded by one impermanence. If it is said that only by not relying on the contradictory product can it be established that there is no certainty, then for all manifestable and unmanifestable things, it is the dharma, and not relying on it alone cannot establish that there is no certainty, because the absence of that dharma is not established by not relying on that dharma, as has been said before. Therefore, non-human-made is the dharma, and there is doubt about the contradictory nature of its own contradictory product, so the contradictory pervasiveness is not established. The non-existence of one's own contradictory product is not established, because it is uncertain. Second, if there is doubt about the contradictory pervasiveness, then the establisher must not be true. If the following and the contradiction have the nature of being in the dharma established by oneself, that is, the three characteristics of pervasiveness, then it is the result of determination. If it is established by the knowledge of the measure that has become the cause, then it is the true establisher. Third, the statement is the dharma, and you are the cause of establishing the true meaning. All non-human-made things are established as following in the same category. You are the cause of establishing the true meaning, and the non-human-made is determined to be contradictory to the contradictory product. Pervasiveness, in whatever place the established dharma is, the contradictory product of the true meaning is the false meaning, and the declaration of that contradictory nature is the same category of this cause, the non-human-made.