Chinese
因此，這對於具備聽者三種功德的人來說，實際上是有益的。有些聽者不執著於普通的論典，並且具有智慧的能力，因此具有智慧的功德；因為他們追求善說的意義，所以具有追求意義的功德；不僅如此，他們對於善說的作者沒有嫉妒的污垢和憎恨，因此具有公正的功德，也就是說，他們完全具備聽者的三種功德。關鍵的意義是這樣的：這裡直接顯示了對於具備三種容器過失的人來說，實際上沒有利益，因此必須捨棄三種過失。由於「也」的力量，顯示了對於具備三種容器功德的人來說是有益的。從《釋量論》中以不公正為例，顯示了對於具備三種容器過失的人來說，間接地有利益，並且直接顯示了慈愛的發心。總結所有這些意義，在《理藏論》中說：「具慧公正求義者，以慈愛心說此論。」因此，過去的學者們將智慧低劣和沒有智慧分為兩種，並解釋為四種過失，這並非本意。第二，作者自己的心長期習慣於《集量論》的論義，因此對於論義的承擔，也就是毫不費力地產生了理解，所以對於撰寫這部《釋量論》感到高興。這就像《入菩薩行論》中所說：「為自心修習故，我造此論著。」一樣，這是為了捨棄其他作者的傲慢，而謙虛的言辭。有些人認為，衡量的三種境是現量、比量和聖教量，以及將這些指示給他人的語言兩種。第一種，對於隱蔽的，以自利比量來理解。對於極其隱蔽的，為了以聖教量來成立，顯示了《集量論》的供養讚頌的意義，成立了量。將現量理解為現前顯現，這樣分為三種是不合理的。如果認為是為了顯示具有三種所量境的量，而宣說了前三品，那麼《集量論》和《釋量論》就不會具備三種所量境，因為第二品是成立量士夫，而不是主要成立聖教量。
English
Therefore, this is actually beneficial to those who possess the three qualities of a listener. Some listeners are not attached to ordinary treatises and have the ability of wisdom, so they have the quality of wisdom; because they seek the meaning of good sayings, they have the quality of seeking meaning; moreover, they do not have the defilement of jealousy and hatred towards the author of good sayings, so they have the quality of being impartial, that is, they are fully endowed with the three qualities of a listener. The key meaning is this: here it is directly shown that there is actually no benefit for those who possess the three faults of a vessel, so the three faults must be abandoned. Due to the power of "also", it shows that it is beneficial for those who possess the three qualities of a vessel. From the Commentary on Valid Cognition, taking impartiality as an example, it shows that there is indirect benefit for those who possess the three faults of a vessel, and directly shows the altruistic intention. Summarizing all these meanings, it is said in the Jewel of Reasoning: "The wise, impartial, and meaning-seeking, explain this with an altruistic mind." Therefore, the ancient scholars divided inferior wisdom and no wisdom into two, and explained them as four faults, which is not the intention. Secondly, the author's own mind has long been accustomed to the meaning of the Compendium of Valid Cognition, so the undertaking of the meaning, that is, effortlessly generating understanding, is why he is happy to write this Commentary on Valid Cognition. This is like what is said in the Guide to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life: "For the sake of cultivating my own mind, I composed this treatise." This is a humble word to abandon the arrogance of other authors. Some say that the three objects of measurement are perception, inference, and scripture, and the two languages that indicate these to others. First, for the hidden, it is understood by self-interest inference. For the extremely hidden, in order to establish it as scripture, it shows the meaning of the offering and praise of the Compendium of Valid Cognition, and establishes validity. It is unreasonable to divide perception as manifest, which understands the manifest, into three. If it is considered that the first three chapters are explained in order to show the three valid cognitions that have three objects of measurement, then the Compendium of Valid Cognition and the Commentary on Valid Cognition will not be fully equipped with the three objects of measurement, because the second chapter is to establish the valid person, not mainly to establish the valid scripture.
Chinese
的缘故，而为他利之比量，乃是经由真实显示相状之门，以比量传递显示，并非三种量都是向他宣说的言语之故。又有一些人说，为了讲说经的缘故，首先宣说自利比量。《集论》的供养赞颂文宣说，遮止其他边而宣说现量，宣说为他利之比量。另一些人说，首先宣说自利比量，宣说量经的供养赞颂文，显示数量等而宣说现量，宣说为他利之比量。有些人说，由于必要之故，首先宣说量经的自利品，区分道与非道而宣说量经的供养赞颂偈，遣除四种邪分别而宣说量经的现量品，宣说具有意义的能立语，从而宣说量经的为他利品。这些似乎仅仅是认识了后面三品的各自所诠部分，并未呈现此论典特有的品次第，而且自利比量是讲说量经的原因，因此首先宣说，这在下面也会被遮止，因此不合理。那么应该如何呢？对此有三： 为了区分有义与无义而宣说自利品。 首先显示连接的界限。 为了区分有义与无义而宣说自利品，宣说区分有义与无义之量成立，宣说适当时机应说的剩余两品。第一有三：首先显示连接的界限，中间宣说品本身的论典，最后显示以名称总结。第一是，如果此论著作为《集论》的释论，那么与它和品的次第不一致，首先宣说自利比量的理由是什么呢？在自释《四千五百颂》中说，区分有义与无义是依赖于比量的缘故，而且对于它也有颠倒的分别，因此为了如是安立而宣说。此义有破立二者，第一是，有些班智达认为，有义是利益，无义是不利益，区分它们就是取舍二者，这依赖于比量，因此首先宣说比量，他们这样认为。
English
because of that, and the inference for the sake of others is shown through inference by actually showing the sign, since all three valid cognitions are not words spoken to others. Also, some say that in order to explain the sutra, the inference for oneself is explained first. The offering praise of the Compendium is explained. Having blocked other extremes, the direct perception is explained. The inference for the sake of others is explained. And others say that the inference for oneself is explained first. The offering praise of the Valid Cognition Sutra is explained. Having shown the numbers and so on, the direct perception is explained. The inference for the sake of others is explained. And some say that due to necessity, the chapter on oneself of the Valid Cognition Sutra is explained first. Having separated the path and non-path, the offering praise verses of the Valid Cognition Sutra are explained. Having eliminated the four wrong conceptions, the chapter on direct perception of the Valid Cognition Sutra is explained. Having explained the statement of proof together with its meaning, the chapter on others of the Valid Cognition Sutra is explained. These seem to only recognize the objects of the latter three chapters to some extent, but the unique chapter order of this treatise is not achieved, and since the inference for oneself is the reason for explaining the Valid Cognition Sutra, it is also refuted below that it is explained first, so it is not reasonable. So how should it be? There are three to this: In order to distinguish between meaningful and meaningless, the chapter on oneself is explained. First, the connection of the relationship is shown. In order to distinguish between meaningful and meaningless, the chapter on oneself is explained. It is explained that the valid cognition that distinguishes between meaningful and meaningless is established. The remaining two chapters that should be spoken at the appropriate time are explained. The first has three: First, the connection of the relationship is shown, in the middle the treatise of the chapter itself is explained, and finally the conclusion is shown by name. The first is, if this treatise is composed as a commentary on the Compendium, then what is the reason for first explaining the inference for oneself, which is inconsistent with the order of it and the chapters? In the self-commentary "Four Thousand Five Hundred Stanzas" it is said that distinguishing between meaningful and meaningless is because it relies on inference, and also because there is a reversed conception of it, it is explained in order to establish it as such. There are two aspects to this meaning, refutation and establishment. The first is that some panditas think that meaningful is beneficial, meaningless is not beneficial, and distinguishing them is taking and abandoning the two, which relies on inference, so they think that inference is explained first.
Tibetan
་ཤཱཀྱ་བློས། དེ་རྣམ་པར་འབྱེད་པ་རྗེས་དཔག་ལ་བརྟེན་པ་ཁོ་ན་ཞེས་མི་ལྡན་རྣམ་གཅོད་ཡིན་ནམ། རྗེས་དཔག་ཁོ་ན་ལ་བརྟེན་ཞེས་གཞན་ལྡན་རྣམ་གཅོད་ཡིན། དང་པོ་ལྟར་ན་དེ་རྣམ་པར་འབྱེད་པ་མངོན་གསུམ་ལ་ཡང་བརྟེན་པའི་ཕྱིར། མངོན་སུམ་ཡང་དང་པོར་འཆད་རིགས་པར་འགྱུར་རོ། །ཕྱི་མ་ལྟར་ན་མི་འཐད་དེ། དེ་རྣམ་པར་འབྱེད་པ་མངོན་སུམ་ལ་ཡང་བརྟེན་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །གལ་ཏེ་དེ་རྣམ་པར་འབྱེད་པ་ཁོ་ན་རྗེས་དཔག་ལ་བརྟེན་ཞེས་འཆད་ན་དེ་ཡང་མི་འཐད་དེ། ཕན་གནོད་བར་མ་བཏང་སྙོམས་སུ་བྱ་བའི་ཡུལ་རྣམ་པར་འབྱེད་པ་ཡང་རྗེས་དཔག་ལ་བརྟེན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེས་བཀག་ནས། རང་ལུགས་ལ་ཕྱོགས་གླང་གིས་བཤད་པའི་ཚད་མའི་མཚན་ཉིད་དང་དབྱེ་བ་སོགས་ནི་དོན་ཏེ། རིགས་པ་དང་ལྡན་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཕྱི་རོལ་པས་བཤད་པའི་ཚད་མའི་མཚན་ཉིད་དང་དབྱེ་བ་སོགས་ནི་དོན་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། རིགས་པ་དང་མི་ལྡན་པའི་ཕྱིར། དེ་རྣམ་པར་འབྱེད་པ་རྗེས་དཔག་ཁོ་ན་ལ་བརྟེན་པའི་ཕྱིར་རྗེས་དཔག་དང་པོར་འཆད་ཅེས་ཏེ། ལྷས་ལེའུ་གཉིས་པའི་མཚམས་སྦྱོར་དུ་སློབ་དཔོན་གྱིས་ཚད་མའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱི་བསྟན་བཅོས་བཤད་པའི་རྒྱུ་རྗེས་སུ་དཔག་པ་རྣམ་པར་བཞག་ནས་ཞེས་བཤད་པ་ལྟར་རོ་ཞེས་གསུང་ངོ་། །འདི་ལ་ཡང་དཔྱད་དུ་ཡོད་དེ། རང་དོན་རྗེས་དཔག་དེ་ཕྱོགས་གླང་གིས་བཤད་པའི་ཚད་མའི་མཚན་ཉིད་དང་། དབྱེ་བའི་ཁོངས་སུ་གཏོགས་སམ་མ་གཏོགས། མ་གཏོགས་ན་ཚད་མ་ལ་མངོན་རྗེས་གཉིས་སུ་གྲངས་མ་ངེས་པ་དང་། ཚད་མ་མངོན་སུམ་གཅིག་པུར་འགྱུར་བའི་སྐྱོན་གནས་ཤིང་། གཏོགས་ན་རང་དོན་རྗེས་དཔག་གི་སྔོན་དུའང་རང་དོན་རྗེས་དཔག་འཆད་དགོས་པར་འགྱུར་ཏེ། དེ་རྣམ་པར་འབྱེད་པ་རྗེས་དཔག་ལ་བརྟེན་པའི་ཕྱིར་རྟགས་ཁྱབ་ཁས། ལུགས་སྔ་མ་ཡང་མི་འཐད་དེ། དེ་ནི་རྣམ་ངེས་ལས་ཕན་པ་དང་མི་ཕན་ཐོབ་པ་དང་སྤོང་བ་ནི་ངེས་པར་ཡང་དག་པའི་ཤེས་པ་སྔོན་དུ་འགྲོ་བ་ཅན་ཡིན་པས་ཞེས་གསུངས་པ་དང་དོན་གཅིག་ཏུ་བསམ་པར་སྣང་ན་ཡང་འདི་གཉིས་དོན་མི་གཅིག་སྟེ། རྣམ་ངེས་ལས་གསུངས་པ་ནི་ཀུན་ཏུ་ཐ་སྙད་པའི་ཚད་མའི་འཇུག་ལྡོག་གི་ཡུལ་རང་མཚན་ཡོད་མེད་ཡིན་ལ། དེའི་སྔོན་དུ་འགྲོ་བའི་ཡང་དག་ཤེས་པ་ནི་མངོན་རྗེས་གཉིས་ཆར་ཡིན་གྱི་རྗེས་དཔག་ཁོ་ན་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་དང་། གཞན་དུ་དོན་གཅིག་ན་ལེའུ་ཐམས་ཅད་ཀྱི་ཐོག་མར་ཡང་དག་ཤེས་པ་ཙམ་གྱི་ལེའུ་འཆད་རིགས་པར་འགྱུར་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །ལྷའི་དགོངས་པ་ནི་ཚད་མའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱི་བསྟན་བཅོས་འཆད་པའི་རྒྱུ་ཡིན་པས་རང་དོན་དང་པོ་འཆད་ཅེས
Chinese
释迦智（ཤཱཀྱ་བློས།）说，辨别它（指量）仅仅依赖于比量，这是非遮的单遮吗？仅仅依赖于比量，这是他遮的单遮吗？如果按照前者，那么辨别它也依赖于现量，现量也应该首先讲解。如果按照后者，那么不合理，因为辨别它也依赖于现量。如果说辨别它仅仅依赖于比量，那么这也不合理，因为辨别利益、损害、中间状态作为舍弃对象的，也依赖于比量。这样遮止后，就说，自宗方面，陈那（ཕྱོགས་གླང་།）所说的量的定义和分类等是有意义的，因为与理相符。外道所说的量的定义和分类等是没有意义的，因为与理不符。辨别它仅仅依赖于比量，所以首先讲解比量。如法称（ལྷས།）在第二品结尾的连接处所说，导师（陈那）在确立了比量之后，才宣讲量的定义的论典。对此也有可以研究的地方，自利比量是属于陈那所说的量的定义和分类之中，还是不属于？如果不属于，那么量就不能确定为现量和比量两种，而且会产生量唯有现量的过失。如果属于，那么在自利比量之前也必须讲解自利比量，因为辨别它依赖于比量，这是承认了宗法和周遍。先前的观点也不合理，因为《释量论》（རྣམ་ངེས།）中说，获得和舍弃利益和无益，必定是以正确的认识为先导。虽然似乎认为这两者意义相同，但这两者意义并不相同，因为《释量论》中所说的是普遍世俗的量的取舍对象是自相的有无，而以它为先导的正确认识是现量和比量两者，而不是仅仅比量。否则，如果意义相同，那么所有章节的开头都应该讲解仅仅是正确认识的章节。法称的意图是，因为宣讲量的定义的论典的原因是首先讲解自利。
English
Shakya Blo said, is distinguishing it (referring to valid cognition) solely dependent on inference, is this a non-affirming single exclusion? Is solely dependent on inference, is this an other-affirming single exclusion? If according to the former, then distinguishing it also depends on direct perception, and direct perception should also be explained first. If according to the latter, then it is unreasonable, because distinguishing it also depends on direct perception. If it is said that distinguishing it solely depends on inference, then this is also unreasonable, because distinguishing objects to be abandoned, such as benefit, harm, and the intermediate state, also depends on inference. After thus refuting, it is said that, in our own system, the definition and classifications of valid cognition as explained by Dignāga are meaningful, because they are in accordance with reason. The definition and classifications of valid cognition as explained by outsiders are meaningless, because they are not in accordance with reason. Distinguishing it solely depends on inference, so inference is explained first. As Dharmakīrti said in the connection at the end of the second chapter, the teacher (Dignāga) explained the treatise on the definition of valid cognition after establishing inference. There is also something to be investigated here, does self-benefit inference belong to the definition and classifications of valid cognition as explained by Dignāga, or does it not belong? If it does not belong, then the number of valid cognitions cannot be determined as two, direct perception and inference, and the fault of valid cognition being only direct perception will occur. If it belongs, then self-benefit inference must also be explained before self-benefit inference, because distinguishing it depends on inference, and this is an admission of the subject property and pervasion. The previous view is also unreasonable, because the Pramāṇavārttika says that obtaining and abandoning benefit and non-benefit are necessarily preceded by correct knowledge. Although it seems that these two have the same meaning, these two do not have the same meaning, because what is said in the Pramāṇavārttika is that the objects of acceptance and rejection of universally conventional valid cognition are the existence and non-existence of self-characteristics, and the correct knowledge that precedes it is both direct perception and inference, not just inference. Otherwise, if the meaning is the same, then the chapter on just correct knowledge should be explained at the beginning of all chapters. Dharmakīrti's intention is that the reason for explaining the treatise on the definition of valid cognition is to explain self-benefit first.