English
If it is said that those cognitions are also different, then, the eye consciousnesses that grasp the pot are the subject of the proposition. Although they are different in meaning, they do not have differences in kind in terms of elimination, because they are the same in the cause of the consciousness that grasps the pot, that is, the consciousness that realizes as one. The appearances of the pot, etc., are also the subject of the proposition. Although they are different in meaning, they do not have differences in kind in terms of elimination, because they are the same in the reality of the cause of the same kind of consciousness that directly perceives the pot. If it is said, is not the same fruit a common thing? Then, the many appearances are the subject of the proposition. That same fruit of yours is merely an elimination that appears to be inseparable from its fruit, and not a common thing, because if you had a common thing that exists outside of those and follows, it should be visible, but it is not seen, and it also prevents the establishment of a common meaning. Secondly, establishing the linguistic context accepted by one's own school, because self-character, common things, and those with commonality are not suitable as objects to be expressed, therefore, the term "tree" is the subject of the proposition. The exclusion of others of the tree is the meaning of consciousness, that is, having a result, because there is great attachment to the image of the conceptual thought that grasps the tree, that is the result of consciousness. A part returns, coming from seeing its own characteristics, the aspect that appears in conceptual thought, is because it returns from other aspects. That which has become the exclusion of others is only the nature of not being a proximate entity, it is the object of sound, because only that appears in the consciousness of sound. At that time, it is established that the expression has an object of exclusion. Thus it is said. The sound called "tree" is the subject of the proposition. During the time of expression, you cannot obtain the self-character of the tree, because you have not truly applied the word to the self-character of the tree, but have truly applied the word to the exclusion of others of the tree. If it is said, the sound "tree" that generates the conceptual thought of grasping the tree with three characteristics is also the subject of the proposition. Even if the word is not truly applied to the self-character of the tree, it is believed that during the time of expression, there is no deception regarding the meaning of the tree, because the meaning of the tree is the part that completely abandons the non-tree that does not make the tree, that is, the nature of the cause, and the thing of the tree is indirectly dependent on being different from the non-tree. If asked, what are the three characteristics? Then, the conceptual thought of grasping the tree, the meaning is consistent, is the subject of the proposition. It has three characteristics, because the meaning of the tree is not doing that
Chinese
以树之作用相似之体性显现，且具有与非树之物相异之事物之种子，即因，且自身显现为非树之义。何故？以树为名之声，是具有树之他者排除之境，乃因其为以间接依赖于树之作用之分别识之体性，执着于外境树之境。第三，对于此，破除他宗之诤论有四：破除认识互相依赖之过失，破除无有可断则无有排除，破除考察反体于事物上之有无，破除不可能有共同基础而转变之诤论。第一有四：陈述他者所说之过失，以相同之理智驳斥之，以事物之答复生起定解，成立一切声皆为确定执持者。第一者：若分别识不以成立之方式执持树与非树，而仅以排除之方式执持，则分别识，汝（作为）有法，汝之树与非树二者，定然是认识互相依赖，即在互相执持时，必须先执持另一者。汝必须以从非树中返回，即排除非树来执持树之义，且非树亦必须以排除树之方式来确定。有周遍，因为在未执持树与非树之前，无法排除彼等。若许，则分别识，汝（作为）有法，若无先于执持树与非树之执持，则树与非树二者皆将不被执持。由于有树与非树之认识互相依赖之过失，故对于排除非树之排除，不可能施设声音之名称，而只能以成立之方式对共同事物施设名称，如是某些人，如童女派等说道。第二，对于以排除他者而施设名称，安立认识互相依赖之过失者，彼等之观点亦是，在施设树之名称时，是否区分非树？若区分，则施设树之名称之人，汝（作为）有法，在施设树之名称之时，如何知晓非树？定然不知晓，因为在施设树之名称之时，若无执持树之义，即无有。周遍承许，因为是宗
English
It appears as a nature similar to performing the function of a tree, and it has the seed, i.e., the cause, of just the entity that is different from non-tree things, and its own appearance is devoid of the meaning of a tree. Why is that? The sound called "tree" is the subject, it is the object of excluding others of the tree, because it is the nature of the discriminating consciousness that relies indirectly on performing the function of the tree, the object of clinging to the external tree. Third, there are four ways to refute the opponent's arguments: refuting the fault of mutually dependent cognitions, refuting the absence of elimination when there is nothing to be eliminated, refuting the investigation of the presence or absence of opposites in things, and refuting the argument that a common basis is impossible and changes. First, there are four: stating the fault stated by others, refuting it with the same reasoning, generating certainty with the answer of things, and establishing that all sounds are definite holders. The first is: if the discriminating consciousness does not hold either tree or non-tree by establishing them, but only holds by eliminating them, then the discriminating consciousness, the subject, you must necessarily have mutually dependent cognitions of the two, tree and non-tree, that is, when holding each other, it is necessary to hold the other first. You must hold the meaning of tree by turning away from non-tree, that is, by eliminating non-tree, and non-tree must also be determined by eliminating tree. There is pervasion, because without holding tree and non-tree, one cannot eliminate them. If you accept, then the discriminating consciousness, the subject, if there is no holding that precedes the holding of tree and non-tree, then both tree and non-tree will not be held. Because there is the fault of mutually dependent cognitions of tree and non-tree, it is impossible to apply a sound name to the elimination of eliminating non-tree, but only to apply a name to the common thing in the way of establishing it, as some people, such as the Kumāralāta school, say. Second, for those who establish the fault of mutually dependent cognitions by applying names by eliminating others, according to their view, when applying the name of tree, do they distinguish non-tree or not? If they distinguish, then the person who applies the name of tree, the subject, how does he know non-tree at the time of applying the name of tree? He certainly does not know, because at the time of applying the name of tree, if there is no holding of the meaning of tree, that is, there is none. The pervasion is accepted, because it is the reason.
Chinese
因此，为了认识那棵树，就要寻求树的名称的意义，为了证实树。如果承认，那么那个法，从树的名称中，不排除那些不是树的所说之义，因为在树的名称的时候，不知道不是树。承许宗和遍。如果承认，不是树的法，从树的语音之后，给树安立名称，也就是那些运用，你完全舍弃了它，也不会变成运用，因为那个称为树的语音没有排除你。例如，树的差别，如沙瓦等，在树的名称的境中没有排除，因此从名称中舍弃了它，不会运用。如果说，在命名的时候，先前遮止了其他的不是树，不证实，以唯独证实的方式，在面前存在的沙瓦一样，对于一个所具有的共同意义，另外一个完全显示，然后说这是树，这样对共同体命名，也会对所有显现的事物命名。从那个语音之后，安立名称，也就是在运用的时候，也会领悟那个共同体或者具有那个共同体的显现，因此，互相依赖或者可能运用到不是树上的过失是没有的，如果这样想，那么对于那个也有，具有枝叶的这个也是树，这样以不具有的决断，或者唯独这个是树，这样以具有其他的决断的方式，如果像第一个命名那样，在安立名称的时候，从树的语音中排除不是树，不会运用，因为在命名的时候，树的名称没有排除不是树。如果像第二个那样，排除不是树，然后命名树，如果是那样，那么不会排除不是树，因为不知道不是树，因为不知道树，这样的推论是没有退转的。第三个是，对于树和不是树的显现的事物，分别看到树的共同体实有存在与不存在，因此在命名的时候，唯独这个是树，这样命名，在安立名称的时候，没有运用到不是树上的过失，因为对共同体命名，也会对所有排除的事物命名，因此，因为它遍及所有。对于说排除的人来说，与那个不相同，因为共同体不是实有，并且命名时候的意义被阻断，因此会推论出不知道安立名称时候的意义，如果这样说，那么按照我们来说，树等果实相同的事物，称为领悟为一个种类，这样的知识是安住在同一个上的领悟
English
Therefore, in order to recognize that tree, one must seek the meaning of the name of the tree, in order to prove the tree. If acknowledged, then that dharma, from the name of the tree, does not exclude those meanings that are not trees, because at the time of the name of the tree, one does not know what is not a tree. Accept the subject and pervasion. If acknowledged, the dharma that is not a tree, after the sound of the tree, establishes a name for the tree, that is, those applications, you completely abandon it, and it will not become an application, because that sound called tree has not excluded you. For example, the difference of the tree, such as Shava, etc., is not excluded in the realm of the name of the tree, so it is abandoned from the name and will not be applied. If it is said that when naming, previously preventing other non-trees, not proving, in the manner of only proving, like Shava existing in front, for a common meaning possessed by one, another is completely shown, and then it is said that this is a tree, so naming the community will also name all manifested things. After that sound, establishing a name, that is, when applying, one will also realize that community or the manifestation possessing that community, therefore, the fault of mutual dependence or possible application to non-trees is not there, if you think so, then for that too, this with branches and leaves is also a tree, thus with the determination of not possessing, or only this is a tree, thus with the determination of possessing others, if like the first naming, when establishing a name, excluding non-trees from the sound of the tree, it will not be applied, because at the time of naming, the name of the tree has not excluded non-trees. If like the second, excluding non-trees, then naming the tree, if that is the case, then non-trees will not be excluded, because non-trees are not known, because the inference that trees are not known has no reversal. The third is that for the manifestations of trees and non-trees, one sees separately the existence and non-existence of the tree's common entity, so at the time of naming, only this is a tree, thus naming, at the time of establishing a name, there is no fault of applying to non-trees, because naming the community will also name all excluded things, therefore, because it pervades all. For those who say exclusion, it is not the same as that, because the community is not real, and the meaning of the time of naming is blocked, so it will be inferred that the meaning of the time of establishing a name is not known, if you say so, then according to us, things with the same fruit such as trees are called realizing as one kind, such knowledge is the realization that resides on the same one.