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kgs001 0040.extensive commentary on the compendium on valid cognition the splendor of samantabhadra.g2.0f

English

Because it is not allowed, because it is the sound consciousness of mixing many into one and dividing one into many. It is pervasive, because it is impossible to have such a thing on the self-character. If what appears in the consciousness is false, then how can there be different dharmas? Take the appearance of speculation itself as the subject. In illusion, many differences of dharmas are extremely speculated, because in illusion, it appears as something that returns from other different inversions. Sixth, then, the teacher Dignāga takes inference to grasp the difference made by eliminating others. Saying this contradicts grasping the self-character mixed with the common character, if you ask. This is to be established. Take the speculation that this is to be established, this is the reason for establishing as the subject. It does not actually grasp the self-character distinguished by impermanence, because the appearance of the self-character of things, that is, the appearance disappears. Dignāga takes inference to grasp the difference mixed with the common character, for this sentence, take its own nature mixed with the common character, saying that the object to be taken by inference is not to be taken, because the difference appearing in speculation, the common character mixed with the elimination of others, is shown as the object to be taken by inference. That self-character, take the appearance of the common character and the appearance of the difference, and so on, dharma and subject, any speculation is not the actual object to be taken, because the many differences of the differences of dharmas are not allowed on that one. Seventh, sound and speculation are also subjects. The essence of that self-character, not all of its own, that which returns from everything, like that, actually knowing does not exist, because it actually enters the common character. From grasping self-nature to here is the concluding verse. Second, there are four ways to explain the way in which the sound of difference enters, refuting the expression of the wishes of other schools, establishing the expression of the wishes of one's own school, refuting the arguments of other schools on this, and summarizing and showing the meaning of both refutation and establishment. The first has three, refuting that the self-character is the expression, refuting that the common character thing is the expression, and refuting that having the common character is the expression. First, that which knows like that. It is said that sound does not exist. The grammarians say that it is unreasonable that the self-character is not the actual expression of sound, because it is said that the vase comes here.

Chinese

如果说,因为能起到取水的作用才使用它。自性法,不是能表达声音的实际表达对象,因为不是名称的实际对象。周遍,因为能表达的声音都能表示自己被名称指定的事物。理由是,不能把名称实际加在自性上,因为在命名时,没有名称时期的自性,所以。周遍,因为名称是为了在命名时理解意义而设定的。第二种是胜论派和数论派说,按照次第,从显现中,不依赖于与物质不同的事物,以及显现和物质相同的普遍错误,是名称的实际对象,而且它在命名时也存在,所以没有如上所说的过失。如果认为只有种类才是表达对象,那么牛的种类,法,不依赖于错误,不应该是被称为牛的名称的实际对象。因为不能起到牛的作用,周遍,因为在开始命名时,无论如何,寻求牛的人必须知道牛能起到作用,然后才能实现它。因为想到会涉及到能起作用的事物,所以才对事物进行表达,才进行名称的组合。第三部分分为两部分:陈述观点和驳斥观点。第一种是,如果说对具有该种类的显现能起作用的事物进行名称组合,就没有如上所说的过失。第二部分分为三部分:与具有种类的事物、纯粹的显现等相同。不需要考察其他的普遍事物。即使没有其他的普遍事物,也能合理地认识。第一种是,如果有人问,为什么不把名称实际加在普遍认可的显现上呢?如果说,不能把名称加在它上面,因为它太广泛了。具有种类的显现,法,不应该能把名称加在上面,因为这和太广泛的情况相同,因为种类并没有减少显现的数量。第二种是,有人问,为什么不把声音加在与挤奶、耕地等作用相同,与所有不起作用的事物不同的,在外部事物中被误认为是他者的排除上呢?回答是,具有该种类的

English

If it is said that it is used because it can perform the function of taking water. The self-characterized dharma is not the actual object of expression of the expressive sound, because it is not the actual object of the name. It is pervasive because the expressive sounds can all indicate the things that they are named for. The reason is that the name cannot be actually added to the self-characterization, because at the time of naming, there is no self-nature of the time of the name, so. It is pervasive because the name is set up to understand the meaning at the time of naming. The second is that the Vaisheshika and Samkhya schools say that, according to the order, from the manifestation, without relying on things that are different from matter, and the common error of manifestation and matter being the same, it is the actual object of the name, and it also exists at the time of naming, so there is no fault as mentioned above. If it is thought that only the genus is the object of expression, then the genus of the cow, dharma, without relying on error, should not be the actual object of the name called cow. Because it cannot perform the function of a cow, it is pervasive, because when starting to name, in any case, the person seeking a cow must know that the cow can perform the function, and then he can realize it. Because it is thought that it will involve things that can perform functions, so things are expressed, and names are combined. The third part is divided into two parts: stating the view and refuting the view. The first is, if it is said that there is no fault as mentioned above by combining names with the manifestation that has that genus and can perform a function. The second part is divided into three parts: it is the same as things with genus, pure manifestation, etc. There is no need to examine other universal things. Even without other universal things, it is reasonable to recognize them. The first is, if someone asks, why not actually add the name to the universally recognized manifestation? If it is said that the name cannot be added to it because it is too broad. The manifestation with genus, dharma, should not be able to add the name to it, because this is the same as the case of being too broad, because the genus does not reduce the number of manifestations. The second is, someone asks, why not add the sound to the exclusion that is the same as the function of milking, plowing, etc., and different from all things that do not function, and is mistaken for other in external things? The answer is, having that genus

Chinese

对于陈述,正理派的陈那论师安立了“因为彼具有无自主”等等的过失,这方面也同样。如果说:因为我方的“具有种”和你方的“反体”二者除了名称之外是相同的。答:此过失在下文将阐述,是没有的。即使此过失转变,也是可以的。成为所立的明显诸法,你方对于一个声音的理解,不需要其他的种类的实物,因为即使没有其他的种义,也因为从非彼的相异方面相同而产生一个声音的理解。其理由是,称为“牛”的声音,不是对非彼进行区分吗?如果按照前者,称为“牛”的声音,成为所立,如何安立为有意义,因为没有意义?因为你方对于不欲求的意义的那些,如果不区分欲求的意义,就是因为那个缘故。普遍存在,因为讲述者想到完全舍弃欲求的意义之外的其他,听者将进入欲求的意义,因此才说声音,就是因为那个缘故。然而,不仅是舍弃非彼,而且有进入其中的必要,或者在解释中说是仅仅为了那个意义。如果按照后者,这个声音不是没有区分,而是有区分,因此声音不会变成无意义。答:胜论师,成为所立,声音的行境是其他的种义,这不合理,因为声音的必要不是仅仅在于区分其他而进入欲求吗?因为区分其他而进入欲求,你方在那里其他的总义能做什么呢?因为丝毫也不需要。第三方面有三:宣说产生认识的因,遮止产生认识的其他因,遣除对于认识之因的诤论。第一方面是:如果没有一个总的,对于众多的显现就不会产生认识的智慧。答:瓶子的显现诸法,成为所立,即使没有一个总的,不同的事物也能产生认识的智慧,因为行为是汲水,对于做那个和那个相同的事情,比如陶瓶等,先前见到之后,后来即使见到金瓶等其他的,也因为汲水和具有持瓶之果,以及不作其他的果,和远离的简择的对境的语词,即内在的表达者们,先前的那就是这个,

English

Regarding statements, Dignāga, the logician, established faults such as "because it possesses no autonomy," and this is similar here as well. If you say: Because our "possessing genus" and your "opposite entity" are the same except for the name. Answer: This fault will be explained below, and it does not exist. Even if this fault transforms, it is still acceptable. The clear phenomena that are to be established, for you, understanding a single sound does not require other kinds of entities, because even without other generic meanings, a single sound understanding arises due to being the same in terms of differing from what it is not. The reason for this is, does the sound called "cow" not differentiate from what is not it? If according to the former, the sound called "cow," being the subject of the proposition, how can it be established as meaningful, since it is meaningless? Because if you do not differentiate the desired meaning from those meanings that are not desired by you, it is for that reason. It is pervasive, because the speaker thinks that the listener will enter the desired meaning by completely abandoning others besides the desired meaning, and therefore the sound is uttered, and it is for that reason. However, not only is it abandoning what is not it, but there is also a need to enter into it, or it is said in the explanation that it is solely for that meaning. If according to the latter, this sound is not without differentiation, but has differentiation, therefore the sound will not become meaningless. Answer: Vaiśeṣika, being the subject of the proposition, the object of the sound is another generic meaning, which is unreasonable, because is the necessity of sound not merely to differentiate others and enter into what is desired? Because differentiating others and entering into what is desired, what can other general meanings do for you there? Because there is no need for it at all. The third aspect has three: Explaining the cause of the arising of recognition, refuting other causes of the arising of recognition, and dispelling disputes about the cause of recognition. The first aspect is: If there is no single universal, recognition of wisdom will not arise for many clear appearances. Answer: The clear appearances of pots, being the subject of the proposition, even without a single universal, different substances can still give rise to recognition of wisdom, because the action is drawing water, and for doing that and that same thing, such as earthenware pots, after seeing them before, even if later seeing other things like golden pots, because of drawing water and having the result of holding the pot, and not doing other results, and the words of the object of selection that is separated, that is, the inner expressers, saying that the previous one is this one,