English
because it would become non-existent. Furthermore, the general medicine, because it does not benefit the fruit, it is also not pacifying epidemics, because it is permanent. Second, the common explanation has two parts: the appearance of the conceptual mind that establishes, and the establishment of other terms for it. First, if conceptual minds hold all appearances as the same and establish them as generalities, then the excluded self-characteristics, because they do not appear in conceptual minds, are not held as the same, and the appearances that appear in conceptual minds, because they cannot accomplish purposes, cannot obtain a place to enter, if one thinks like this. The answer to this is that conceptual minds hold the appearances that appear in conceptual minds as the same, and that conceptual mind has three distinctions, therefore it can obtain a place to enter, what is to be shown is that the conceptual mind that holds the general characteristic of a tree, which arises after the manifest perception that holds the nature of the appearance of a tree, is a dharma, and it has three distinctions, namely, the distinction of the entity, although the appearance is not the meaning of a tree to you, the appearance appears similar to something that has the meaning of a tree; the distinction of the result, because it can obtain the appearance of a tree that is different from something that is not a fruit-bearing tree; the distinction of the cause, because it arises from the ultimate of the self-characteristic of the appearance of a tree. Any conceptual mind that holds a tree with three distinctions, is a dharma, and the way the object appears to you also has three distinctions, namely, its own entity aspect, because it clings to the appearance of the imputation as one, so it is like an external tree; because it appears the same to similar things, it is like one; because it appears different from something that is not a tree. Any appearance that appears in this way, is a dharma, it is not true as it appears, because it cannot accomplish purposes like the appearance of the examined parts. Second, there are seven other names to establish for it: establishing the names of the general and the common basis, establishing the dharma and the subject of the dharma like the general, what is established does not exist in meaning, although it does not exist, it is necessary to explain the necessity of establishing it, establishing the proof that does not exist in meaning, abandoning what contradicts the scriptures, briefly showing the way sound and conceptual mind enter. The first has three parts: establishing the general and the common basis due to the confusion of names, even if it is confusion, it is the cause of obtaining the self-characteristic, although it is similar to confusion, it is not obtained from others. First, it exists in the knowledge of the conceptual mind that holds a tree
Chinese
那些显现为树木形象的事物，是所立宗。因为对你来说，在错觉的显现中，会安立共相和同体这两个名称。因为你以这种方式显现为与非树木相反的自性，所以显现为与树木非异类的单一事物，因此称之为共相。而且，你内部的鹿的形象，也显现为与其他的明亮树木相反。因此，为了使那些具有同体使用对象者的分别念的智慧和言说之声，能够扩展共相和同体的名称的错误含义。第二，所有事物自相的名称，无论是知识还是言说，都是所立宗。你实际上是排除他者的对象，并且是获得进入对象事物自相的所依。因为你是与事物自相有直接或间接联系的名称。而且，你是依赖于互不随顺的自相，即间接产生的名称。例如，就像之前所说的，依赖于果自身之相的现量，不会欺骗进入的对象一样。第三，虽然在显现的对象上看似是错觉，但是从与他者进入的对象没有关联的名称中，无法获得自相。就像把酥油灯的光芒误认为是宝石，却无法获得宝石一样。第二，之前对第三个问题的疑惑，通过分别念来阐明，如果将所取的自相相同的事物普遍地安立，那么法和有法的名称将变得不合理。因为自相上法和有法是不合理的。如果这样说，那么，在分别念中显现的形象，由于许多明亮的树木也显现为能产生同类果实，以及依赖于非该树果实的其他事物的原因，因此，言说之声和分别念的智慧，会将树木称为同类，并广泛地使用该名称。同样，在分别念中显现的一只鹿，也会被理解为具有各种各样的相异属性。因为显现为与非该树的果实，以及非该鹿的果实的事物不同。对于一只鹿，分别念没有区分多种相异属性，这是有必要的。因为鹿产生多种果实，是为了完全显示鹿的本体。这就是“因为没有将一者误认为一者，所以为了理解而进行区分”的含义。这里是……
English
Those phenomena that appear as the form of trees are the subject of the proposition. Because for you, in the appearance of illusion, the terms "universal" and "common ground" are applied. Because you appear in this way as having the nature of being the opposite of non-trees, therefore you appear as a single thing that is not a different kind of tree, and therefore it is called a universal. Moreover, the appearance of a deer within you also appears to be the opposite of other clear trees. Therefore, in order for the discriminating wisdom and speech of those who have common ground as their object to expand the erroneous meaning of the terms "universal" and "common ground." Secondly, all the terms of self-characterized objects, whether knowledge or expression, are the subject of the proposition. You are actually the object of excluding others, and you are the basis for obtaining the self-characterized object that is entered. Because you are a term that has a direct or indirect connection with the self-characterized object. Moreover, you rely on mutually non-concomitant self-characteristics, that is, a term that is indirectly produced. For example, just as it was said earlier that the inference based on the sign of the fruit itself does not deceive the object it enters. Thirdly, although it seems to be an illusion in the object of appearance, the self-characteristic is not obtained from a term that has no connection with the object that others enter. Just as holding the light of a butter lamp as a jewel does not obtain the jewel. Secondly, the previous doubt about the third question is clarified by discrimination. If the self-characteristics that are taken to be the same are generally established, then the terms of dharma and dharmic will become unreasonable. Because dharma and dharmic are unreasonable for self-characteristics. If you say so, then, the image that appears in discrimination, because many clear trees also appear as being able to produce the same kind of fruit, and as relying on other things that are not the fruit of that tree, therefore, the sound of speech and the wisdom of discrimination will call trees the same kind, and widely use that term. Similarly, a single deer that appears in discrimination will also be understood as having various different attributes. Because it appears to be different from things that are not the fruit of that tree, and not the fruit of that deer. It is necessary that discrimination does not distinguish many different attributes for a single deer. Because the deer produces many fruits, it is for the purpose of fully showing the essence of the deer. This is the meaning of "because one is not mistaken for one, therefore it is distinguished for the sake of understanding." Here is...
Chinese
大多数情况下，将“通用术语的应用原因”和“法与有法术语的应用原因”分为不同的章节，是因为不理解将通用术语应用于概念显现，如同将法与有法术语也应用于概念显现一样，是为了引出一个相似的例子，因为通用术语的应用方式已经在前面解释过了。并且，在自释中也说到，对于显现于意识中的事物，通用和共同基础，以及法与有法的术语都会被附加。之所以这样说，是因为在此之前没有提到通用术语。第三个原因是，作为法与有法术语对象的词义，以及之前所说的共同基础本身，作为有法，在自相的事物上是不可能的。虽然实际上不存在，但就像在世间所说的那样，在概念中显现，因此才这样说。因此，将“词义这个”应用于通用，是因为没有理解在“它是如何被假设的”这一段中，已经说明了通用在胜义中是不存在的，并且是基于将共同基础和法与有法应用于胜义中不存在的事物，才特别说明了“词义这个”。第四个原因是，如果在事物上不存在，那么设立术语的必要性是什么呢？对于同一个事物，法与有法的不同区分，以及什么样的不同是共同基础，什么样的不同不是通用的区分，如果不考察这些唯一的意义，而是像世间所说的那样，仅仅依赖于世间的说法，那么建立需要证明的事物和证明的方法，这是智者们所做的，作为有法，是有必要的，因为这是为了进入到证悟胜义谛自相的实相。这是因为误认为显现是常一的，从而进行破立，所以应该将“获得进入的自相”应用于所有情况。第五个原因是，胜义谛的事物自相，作为有法，你对它来说，多体具有单一的本质，以及单一具有多体的术语，都是被意识所迷惑，也就是错误的，因为你多体不会以自己的本质混合为一体，单一也不会成为不同的多体。这是通用。这是特殊。像这样区分差别的术语，作为有法，是应用于概念意识所显现的事物，而不是应用于自相。
English
In most cases, dividing the sections into "the cause of applying general terms" and "the cause of applying terms of dharma and dharmī" is because it is not understood that applying general terms to the appearance of concepts, just as applying terms of dharma and dharmī also applies to the appearance of concepts, is to draw a similar example, because the way of applying general terms has already been explained earlier. Moreover, in the auto-commentary, it is also said that generalities and common bases, as well as terms of dharma and dharmī, are attached to the meaning that appears to consciousness. The reason for saying this is that general terms have not been mentioned here before. The third reason is that the meaning of the word that is the object of the terms of dharma and dharmī, and the common basis itself mentioned earlier, as a dharmī, is impossible for things with self-characteristics. Although it does not actually exist, it is said as it appears in concepts, just as it is said in the world. Therefore, applying "this meaning of the word" to the general is because it is not understood that in the section "how it is assumed," it has already been shown that the general does not exist in the ultimate sense, and it is based on applying the common basis and dharma and dharmī to things that do not exist in the ultimate sense that the special explanation of "this meaning of the word" is given. The fourth reason is, if it does not exist in reality, then what is the necessity of establishing terms? For the same thing, the different distinctions of dharma and dharmī, and what kind of difference is a common basis, and what kind of difference is not a general distinction, if one does not examine these unique meanings, but only relies on the worldly saying as it is said in the world, then establishing the thing to be proven and the method of proof, which is done by the wise, as a dharmī, is necessary, because it is for the purpose of entering into the realization of the ultimate truth of self-characteristic reality. This is because it is mistaken that appearance is permanent and one, and thus refutation and establishment are made, so "obtaining the self-characteristic of entry" should be applied to all situations. The fifth reason is that the self-characteristics of things of ultimate truth, as a dharmī, for you, the terms of many having a single essence and one having many are all delusions, that is, mistakes, because you many do not mix into one with your own essence, and one does not become different many. This is general. This is special. The terms that distinguish differences like this, as a dharmī, are applied to the things that appear to conceptual consciousness, not to self-characteristics.
Chinese
因为不允许，因为是把多个混合成一个，把一个分成多个的语识。普遍存在，因为自相上不可能有那样的。如果显现在识中的是虚假的，那怎么能有不同的法呢？就以思辨的相状本身作为有法。在错觉中，对法的多种差别进行极度思辨，因为在错觉中，显现为从其他不同的颠倒中返回的事物。第六，那么，论师陈那以比量来执取以遣除他者而作区别的差别。这样说与执取与共相混合的自相相违，如果这样问。这是要成立的。就以这是要成立的，这是成立的因这样的思辨作为有法。不会实际执取以无常作区别的自相，因为事物自相显现，也就是显现消失了。陈那以比量执取差别与共相混合，对于这句话，就以自己的体性与共相混合，说示比量的所取境，不是要执取的，因为显现在思辨中的差别，遣除他者的共相混合，显示为比量的所取境的缘故。那个自相，就以共相的相状和差别的相状，以及等等法和有法，任何思辨都不是实际的所取境，因为法的差别的众多差别，在那一个上是不允许的缘故。第七，声音和思辨也是有法。那个自相的本体，不是自己的所有，从一切返回的那个，像那样实际了知是不存在的，因为实际是进入共相的缘故。从执取自性到这之间是总结的偈颂。第二，讲述差别声音的进入方式有四种，遮破他宗的意愿的表达处，成立自宗意愿的表达处，对此驳斥他宗的争论，总结显示遮破和成立二者的意义。第一有三种，遮破自相是表达处，遮破共相事物是表达处，遮破具有共相是表达处。第一，那个像那样了知的。声音不存在这样说。声明家们说，自相不是声音实际的表达境是不合理的，因为说瓶子过来