Chinese
以有部的观点，有三种不应辩驳的情况。第一种，对于患有眼翳的人来说，有两种不确定性：一是对于患有眼翳的人来说不确定，二是对于你自己来说不确定。第一种是：凡是患有眼翳等，所见之境有变化的，如毛发等，那些东西并未真实产生。暂时应该对那些人进行诘难，之后再对与无明眼翳相关联的人进行诘难。对此的回答是：凡是成为眼翳等心识之境的，如毛发等，与石女之子未生一样。你们既然能看到不存在的毛发，却看不到石女之子，为什么呢？暂时应该对那些患有眼翳的人进行诘难。之后，对于未生的事物能见，而石女之子不能见，这是因为无明的眼翳使智慧之眼受到关联和遮蔽，所以需要进行辩驳。对于我们来说，不应该进行辩驳，因为我们瑜伽士是这样看待事物的。凡是想要获得瑜伽士智慧的人，也应该特别信奉像这样讲述诸法自性的教言。因此，我们才开始阐述诸法无自性，而不是世间人以自己的意识为权威，从而证实色等存在，石女之子不存在。因为无明的眼翳遮蔽了智慧之眼，所以无法那样证实。因此，虽然与未生相同，但眼翳患者能看到毛发等，却看不到石女之子。同样，在名言中，虽然与无自性相同，但在凡夫的心识之境中，色等会变化，而石女之子等不会变化，应该知道这二者之间没有矛盾。就像没有眼翳的人看不到毛发一样，圣者在见到实相时，对任何世俗谛的法都不见，所以能见到色等，但为什么要见石女之子呢？这种诘难怎么会成立呢？第二种，以理证和教证来说，有两种不确定性。第一种是：如果梦境、乾闼婆城等，阳焰之水和幻术、影像等，在未生时能见到，即使与存在相同，但对你来说，怎么会变成那样呢？这是不合理的。对眼翳患者进行辩驳和诘难暂且放在一边，暂时先这样说。
English
There are three situations in which it is inappropriate to argue from the perspective of the Vaibhashikas. Firstly, there are two uncertainties for those with cataracts: one is uncertainty for those with cataracts, and the other is uncertainty for yourself. The first is: Those who have cataracts, etc., whose perceived realms change, such as hairs, etc., those things are not truly produced. For the time being, those people should be questioned, and then those who are associated with the cataracts of ignorance should be questioned. The answer to this is: Those that become the objects of consciousness of cataracts, etc., such as hairs, etc., are like the unproduced child of a barren woman. Since you can see non-existent hairs but cannot see the child of a barren woman, why is that? For the time being, those with cataracts should be questioned. Afterwards, the ability to see unproduced things but not the child of a barren woman is because the cataracts of ignorance obscure the eye of wisdom, so it is necessary to argue. For us, it is not appropriate to argue, because we yogis see things in this way. Those who wish to attain the wisdom of yogis should also particularly believe in teachings that explain the nature of phenomena in this way. Therefore, we begin to explain that phenomena are without self-nature, rather than worldly people asserting their own consciousness as authority, thereby proving that forms, etc., exist and the child of a barren woman does not exist. Because the cataracts of ignorance obscure the eye of wisdom, it is impossible to prove it that way. Therefore, although it is the same as unproduced, those with cataracts can see hairs, etc., but cannot see the child of a barren woman. Similarly, in conventional terms, although it is the same as without self-nature, in the minds of ordinary people, forms, etc., change, while the child of a barren woman, etc., do not change. It should be understood that there is no contradiction between these two. Just as those without cataracts cannot see hairs, when the noble ones see reality, they do not see any conventional truths, so they can see forms, etc., but why should they see the child of a barren woman? How can such a question be valid? Secondly, there are two uncertainties in terms of reasoning and scripture. The first is: If dreams, Gandharva cities, etc., mirage water, illusions, images, etc., can be seen when unproduced, even if they are the same as existence, how can they become like that for you? This is unreasonable. Setting aside arguing and questioning those with cataracts for the moment, let's just say this for now.
Chinese
因此，应该对您进行深入的辩论和考察。如果连您也看到梦境和乾闼婆（梵文：Gandharva）的城市连同城墙，以及海市蜃楼的水、幻术和影像等等，岩石上的回声和蛇等，明明没有自性却显现，那么就像石女的儿子实际上并不存在一样，您怎么能看到梦境等等，而石女的儿子却看不到呢？这样对自己进行辩论考察，之后也会对我们进行辩论考察的。因此，如果色等没有自性，就和石女的儿子一样，存在与不存在都一样，这样说是没有道理的。第二是：即使如此，这如何是无生呢？为何不像石女之子一样，不是世间所见的对境呢？因此，这种说法是不确定的。您说：如果诸法在那样的实性中不存在，那么在名言中也像石女的儿子一样。这样说是没有遍及性的，因为色等这些在胜义中就像梦境等等一样，即使没有生起，但为何不像石女的儿子一样，不是世间所见的对境呢？（258a）因此啊。话语的意思是，世间上幻术的八个比喻和石女的儿子在没有自性上是相同的，但梦境等幻术的八个比喻可以显现，而石女的儿子不能显现，就像色和石女的儿子在没有自性上相同，但显现与不显现没有差别的遍及是不确定的。第二，有不违背理性和教证两种。第一是：石女的儿子以自己的自性，在那样的实性中没有生起，在世间中也不存在，同样，这些事物的一切自性，也没有在世间中在那样的实性中生起。因此，对于中观派来说，您没有进行辩论考察的机会，因为我们已经承认色等在世俗中以自性生起，但并不是在胜义中遮止生起。就像石女的儿子以自己的自性生起，在那样的实性中，即在胜义中不存在，而且在世间名言中也不存在一样，色等的事物的一切自性，也没有在世间世俗和在那样的胜义中生起，如果进行观察，真
English
Therefore, you should be thoroughly debated and examined. If even you see dreams and the city of Gandharvas (Sanskrit: Gandharva) along with its walls, and the water of mirages, illusions, and images, etc., echoes on rocks and snakes, etc., appearing without inherent existence, then just as a barren woman's son does not actually exist, how can you see dreams, etc., while a barren woman's son cannot be seen? By debating and examining yourself in this way, you will later debate and examine us as well. Therefore, if form, etc., have no inherent existence, saying that they are the same as a barren woman's son, whether existing or not, is unreasonable. Secondly: Even so, how is this unborn? Why is it not an object of sight in the world like a barren woman's son? Therefore, this statement is uncertain. You say: If things do not exist in such reality, then in name, they are like a barren woman's son. Saying this is not pervasive, because form, etc., in ultimate reality are like dreams, etc., even if they do not arise, why are they not objects of sight in the world like a barren woman's son? (258a) Therefore. The meaning of the words is that the eight examples of illusion in the world and a barren woman's son are the same in lacking inherent existence, but the eight examples of illusion such as dreams can appear, while a barren woman's son cannot appear. Just as form and a barren woman's son are the same in lacking inherent existence, the pervasiveness of no difference between appearing and not appearing is uncertain. Secondly, there are two types: not contradicting reason and scripture. The first is: A barren woman's son, with his own nature, does not arise in such reality, nor does he exist in the world. Similarly, all the nature of these things does not arise in such reality in the world. Therefore, for the Madhyamikas, you have no opportunity to debate and examine, because we have already admitted that form, etc., arise with inherent existence in conventional truth, but we are not negating arising in ultimate truth. Just as a barren woman's son arises with his own nature, not existing in such reality, that is, in ultimate truth, and not existing in worldly convention, similarly, all the nature of things such as form does not arise in worldly conventional truth and in such ultimate truth. If examined, true