Chinese
因为无遮破胜义谛不是真实，并且那成为所知而存在是不合理的，所以详细地说（129a）。 那些人已经从远处抛弃了自续派和应成派的良好宗义，因为无论从自续派和应成派的任何论典的二谛开始，都不会那样出现，如果那样出现，就会广泛地看到那个宗义被驳斥为中观派的宗义。特别是，如果遮破在胜义中存在，那么在胜义中是真实存在还是虚假存在？如果如第二种情况，则与在胜义中存在相矛盾。如果如第一种情况，那么中观派的宗义就有可以被分析的法，因为那样的遮破在胜义中是真实存在的。（第二，在世俗中遮破自生。（1）因为即使因坏灭，也能见到它的果，所以世间也不会承认那些是一体的。因此，想要寻求解脱真如的人，在数论派的宗义中遮止我生之后，即使在不承认它的世间面前，我生也是不合理的，因为世间也不会承认因果那些是一体的。因为即使因坏灭，也能见到它的果。如果不是那样，那么就像因一样，果也不应被见到，因为那些是一体的缘故。第三是：因此，认为事物从我而生的这种分别念，无论在那真实中还是在世间中，都是不合理的。数论派认为诸事物从我而生，这种分别念无论是在胜义谛的真实中，还是在世俗谛的范畴内，都是不合理的，理由是上面已经说过与理相违。这里大论师善护说，遮止四边生需要作胜义的简别，以及有些随学者说，在世俗中生的时候，需要承认从他生是不合理的道理是：作胜义的简别，与中观派、数论派、世间（129b）派、自续派自己的宗义相违，不合理的道理，在上面对此的明句的解释详细阐述的时候已经说过了，已经很好地成立了。如果在世俗中从他生，那是不合理的，如果合理，那么
English
Because the negation without remainder is not the ultimate truth, and it would be unreasonable for that to exist as knowable, so it is said in detail (129a). Those people have abandoned the good tenets of Svatantrika and Prasangika from afar, because no matter which of the two truths is started from in all the treatises of Svatantrika and Prasangika, it will not appear like that, and if it appears like that, it will be widely seen that that tenet is refuted as the tenet of the Madhyamikas. In particular, if negation exists in the ultimate, then does it exist as true or false in the ultimate? If it is like the second case, then it contradicts existing in the ultimate. If it is like the first case, then the tenet of the Madhyamikas has a dharma that can be analyzed, because that kind of negation exists as true in the ultimate. (Second, refuting self-origination in conventional truth. (1) Because even when the cause is destroyed, its effect is seen, so the world does not accept that those are one. Therefore, those who want to seek the reality of liberation, after stopping the self-origination in the Samkhya school, even in the face of the world that does not accept it, self-origination is unreasonable, because the world does not accept that the cause and effect are one. Because even when the cause is destroyed, its effect is seen. If it is not like that, then like the cause, the effect should not be seen either, because those are one. The third is: Therefore, this imputation that things arise from the self is not reasonable either in that reality or in the world. The Samkhyas think that all things arise from the self, this imputation is not reasonable whether it is in the reality of the ultimate truth or in the category of the conventional truth, because the reason has been said above to contradict reason. Here, the great teacher Lekdenjed said that it is necessary to make an ultimate distinction to stop the four extremes of birth, and some followers said that it is unreasonable to admit that birth is from others in the conventional truth: Making an ultimate distinction contradicts the tenets of the Madhyamikas, the Samkhyas, the worldly (129b) school, and the Svatantrikas themselves. The reason why it is unreasonable has been well established because it has been said above when explaining the clear words on this topic. If it arises from others in the conventional truth, it is unreasonable, if it is reasonable, then