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JLD016 0011.The Arrangement of the Path of Valid Cognition, composed by the Great Dharma King Tsongkhapa..The Arrangement of the Path of Valid Cognition, composed by the Great Dharma King Tsongkhapa..g2.0f

Chinese

以分别念执著早上存在的事物在下午也存在,以执著自性混合的分別念执著花色斑斓的物体也具有黄色和白色,以执著处所混合的分別念执著东方存在的事物也存在于西方。因此,不混合的意义是早上存在下午不存在,花色斑斓的物体存在而黄色白色不存在等等的意义。并不是花色斑斓的物体存在就与黄色白色存在相违背的意义。如果那样,就必须承认有形体存在就与声音存在相违背。从“花色斑斓的体性是什么”到“两者都存在”之间的前后论述就变成了自相矛盾。第二点是,以总相分别念所执著的对境,有法,不是实物,因为与树木既非一体也非他体,也非任何其他。不是其他实物,因为如果那样存在就必须被认知,但实际上没有被认知。你与它不是一体,因为如果那样存在,树木的清晰自相就必须混合为一体,但实际上并没有那样混合。如果那样,树木与杜鹃是同一实物,那么杜鹃和云杉两者也必须混合为一体,如果仅仅是树木不是实物,那么这就能成立我们的观点吗?这是因为没有区分这两者的差别而犯的错误,因此请好好听取在任何方面都不相同之处。如果树木是看起来随顺杜鹃和云杉的总相执著的对境,那么这个心识必须是无分别且不错误的。如果那样,在其所执著的境界面前,不可能存在具有部分和整体的分割,因为其原因是显现为部分和整体的各个部分必须显现为不同。如果那样,部分和整体,有法,成为不同的实物。因为在不错误的心识面前是不同的。因此,如果在不错误的心识面前,树木显现为随顺其自身的清晰显现,那么就不可能像月亮和星星一样,或者像多个柱子上覆盖一个屋顶一样显现。也不可能显现为具有部分,因此仅仅是树木必须显现为与杜鹃在部分上分离的同一实物。与云杉也必须同样显现,因此云杉和杜鹃能够投射为同一实物,因为树木与杜鹃和云杉是同一实物。这两者之间也不需要承认为同一实物,因为这三者是粗大的缘故。

English

The thought that grasps that what exists in the morning also exists in the afternoon, and the thought that grasps the mixture of self-nature grasps that the variegated object also has yellow and white, and the thought that grasps the mixture of places grasps that what exists in the east also exists in the west. Therefore, the meaning of non-mixture is that what exists in the morning does not exist in the afternoon, and that the variegated object exists while yellow and white do not exist, and so on. It is not the meaning that the existence of a variegated object contradicts the existence of yellow and white. If that were the case, it would have to be admitted that the existence of form contradicts the existence of sound. From "What is the nature of variegated?" to "Both exist," the previous and subsequent statements would become self-contradictory. Secondly, the object of apprehension of the general characteristic conceptual thought, the subject, is not a real entity, because it is neither one with the tree nor different, nor anything else. It is not another real entity, because if it existed in that way, it would have to be perceived, but it is not perceived. You are not one with it, because if it existed in that way, the clear self-characteristics of the tree would have to be mixed into one, but they are not mixed in that way. If that were the case, if the tree were one real entity with the rhododendron, then both the rhododendron and the spruce would have to be mixed into one real entity. If only the tree were not a real entity, would that establish our view? This is a mistake because the difference between the two has not been distinguished, so please listen carefully to the ways in which they are not the same in any way. If the tree is the object of apprehension of the general apprehension that appears to follow the rhododendron and the spruce, then that mind must be non-conceptual and non-erroneous. If that were the case, it would be impossible for there to be a division of parts and wholes in its apprehended aspect, because the reason for this is that the parts and wholes must appear differently. If that were the case, the part and the whole, the subject, would be different real entities, because they are different in the face of a non-erroneous mind. Therefore, if in the face of a non-erroneous mind, the tree appears to follow its own clear appearance, then it is impossible for it to appear like the moon and stars, or like a roof covering many pillars. It is also impossible for it to appear with parts, so only the tree must appear as one real entity separated from the rhododendron in terms of parts. It must also appear in the same way with the spruce, so the spruce and the rhododendron can project into one real entity, because the tree is one real entity with the rhododendron and the spruce. It is not necessary to admit that these two are also one real entity with each other, because these three are coarse.