Chinese
因为这个缘故。如果不是作者，也不会做成为业，那个过失应该由前面了解。这里第三个“不”没有遮止做不相违背的事，是考虑到和下面的情况没有差别。第二是，成为作者，因为具有行为，所以不会做不是业、成为业和不是业两种，那个理由是，上面说“成为有却无事可做”等等，因为是作者而做，以及“业没有原因”等等，显示了做非业的过失，以及“是和不是变成一个”等等，因为显示了做业和非业两种的过失。如果不是作者，那么成为业，即具有行为，以及成为业和不是业两种都不会做。那个理由是，上面说不是作者，所以做没有原因，以及做是业，成为有却无事可做等等，以及做业和非业两种，“是和不是变成一个”等等，因为显示了过失。如果是作者和不是作者两种，那么不会一一做成为业和不是业，这里也是，理由是上面，因为是作者和不是作者两种而做， “是和不是变成一个”等等，以及做是业，“成为有却无事可做”等等，以及做非业，“业没有原因”等等，因为显示了过失。因此说，识等等的组合是自性存在的，因为它的原因业和作者是自性存在的，这种说法是不合理的。第二是，如果作者和所作的事物都不存在，你这样确定地认为，就会变成诽谤事物，并且也会变成断言能作所作的事物不存在。如果有人问，对于说事物自性存在的你来说，说事物先前存在后来不存在，比对所有事物进行诽谤更为严重，因为如果自性存在，那么永远不存在是不合理的。而我
English
For that reason. If one is not the agent, one will not do what becomes action, and that fault should be understood by the previous one. Here, the third "not" does not prevent doing what is not contradictory, considering that it is no different from the following situation. Secondly, being the agent, because of having action, one will not do what is not action, what becomes action, and both what is and is not action. The reason for that is that above it says "becoming existent but having nothing to do," etc., because one is the agent and acts, and "action has no cause," etc., showing the fault of doing non-action, and "becoming both existent and non-existent," etc., because it shows the fault of doing both action and non-action. If one is not the agent, then becoming action, that is, having action, and both becoming action and not becoming action, one will not do. The reason for that is that above it says that because one is not the agent, doing has no cause, and doing what is action, becoming existent but having nothing to do, etc., and doing both action and non-action, "becoming both existent and non-existent," etc., because it shows the fault. If one is both the agent and not the agent, then one will not do becoming action and not becoming action one by one. Here too, the reason is above, because one is both the agent and not the agent, "becoming both existent and non-existent," etc., and doing what is action, "becoming existent but having nothing to do," etc., and doing non-action, "action has no cause," etc., because it shows the fault. Therefore, saying that the aggregates of consciousness, etc., are inherently existent, because their cause, action and the agent, are inherently existent, is not reasonable. Secondly, if the agent and the object of action do not exist, and you firmly believe this, it will become slandering things, and it will also become asserting that the agent and the object of action do not exist. If someone asks, for you who say that things are inherently existent, saying that things exist before and do not exist later is more serious than slandering all things, because if they are inherently existent, then never not existing is unreasonable. But I
Chinese
因为是从缘而生，所以对一切事物不执著于自性。因此，对胜义和世俗中存在的任何一方加以否定，都是不合理的。因为胜义中什么也不存在，而且承认一切世俗的生起都是依赖于因缘的。正如《宝鬘论》中所说：‘对于海市蜃楼，心想这是水，并且前去取水，如果认为那里没有水，那是愚蠢的行为。同样，对于如海市蜃楼般的世间，认为存在或不存在，那是愚昧的，有愚昧就不会解脱。’从不了解开始进行观察，之后才确定其意义，当事物不被执著时，怎么会变成不存在呢？’因此，阻止执著事物以自性存在，就像阻止执著海市蜃楼为水一样，所以不是诽谤。当事物不被执著为以自性存在时，事物的不存在，也就是没有自性，又怎么会在胜义中成立呢？因为胜义中任何事物都不可能存在，所以它们的非存在在胜义中也是不存在的。因此，世俗的事物，如同海市蜃楼的水一样，是承认世间人的错觉之后，仅仅承认因缘是‘这样’就成立了，而不是通过其他方式。例如，不作且不依赖于业力，是不可能成为作者的，天授成为作者，是因为依赖于业力，即依赖于它而产生，即成立。作者不作，就不会成为业力，所以不仅是作者，业力也依赖于作者而产生，即成立，除此之外，没有其他自性成立的原因或方法。这表明了承认相互依赖而存在，而不承认自性存在，区分了中观派和有部宗在‘存在’方式上的差异，同时也表明了在‘不存在’方式上的差异。第三，就像业力和作者仅仅是相互依赖而成立，而不是以自性成立一样，因为此近取，所以是近取，即近取之所取；以此近取，所以是近取，即近取者，也是相互依赖而成立的。
English
Since all things arise from conditions, there is no clinging to inherent existence in any phenomenon. Therefore, it is unreasonable to deny either conventional or ultimate existence. For nothing exists ultimately, and all conventional arising is accepted as dependent on conditions. As it is said in the Ratnavali: 'Thinking of a mirage, "This is water," and going there, it is foolish to think that there is no water there. Similarly, for the world, which is like a mirage, to think that it exists or does not exist is foolish, and with foolishness, there is no liberation.' Examining from not understanding, and then determining its meaning later, when things are not clung to, how can they become non-existent? Therefore, preventing the clinging to things as inherently existent is like preventing the clinging to a mirage as water, so it is not slander. When things are not clung to as inherently existent, how can the non-existence of things, that is, the absence of inherent existence, be established ultimately? Because nothing can exist ultimately, their non-existence is also non-existent ultimately. Therefore, conventional things, like the water of a mirage, are established only by acknowledging the illusion of worldly people and merely acknowledging that the condition is "such," and not by other means. For example, not acting and not relying on karma cannot be an agent, Devadatta becomes an agent because he relies on karma, that is, arises in dependence on it, that is, is established. If the agent does not act, it will not become karma, so not only the agent but also the karma arises in dependence on the agent, that is, is established, and apart from that, no other cause or method of self-existence is seen. This shows that existence is acknowledged as mutually dependent and that self-existence is not acknowledged, distinguishing the difference between the Madhyamaka and the Vaibhashika in the way of "existence," and also showing the difference in the way of "non-existence." Third, just as action and agent are merely established in mutual dependence and not established by their own nature, so too, because this is taken closely, it is the close taking, that is, the object of close taking; because this takes closely, it is the close taking, that is, the close taker, is also established in mutual dependence.
Tibetan
་ཙམ་ཡིན་གྱི་རང་གི་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་གྲུབ་པ་མིན་པར་ཤེས་པར་བྱའོ། །ཡང་ཅིའི་ཕྱིར་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་གྲུབ་པ་མ་ཡིན་ཞེ་ན། རིགས་པ་གང་གིས་ལས་དང་བྱེད་པ་པོ་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་གྲུབ་པ་བསལ་བའི་རིགས་པ་དེ་ཁོ་ནས་ཉེ་བར་བླང་བྱ་དང་ལེན་པ་པོ་ཡང་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ཡོད་པ་ བཀག་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དེའི་སྦྱོར་ཚུལ་ནི་ལེན་པ་པོ་ཡིན་མིན་རེ་རེ་བ་དང་གཉིས་ཀས་བླང་བྱ་ཡིན་མིན་རེ་རེ་བ་དང་གཉིས་ཀ་མི་ལེན་པ་སྟེ་ཕྱོགས་མི་མཐུན་པ་ལ་ཡང་སྦྱར་རོ། །ལས་དང་བྱེད་པ་པོ་རང་བཞིན་གྱིས་ཡོད་པ་བཀག་པས་ཉེ་བར་ལེན་པ་གཉིས་ཕན་ཚུན་ལྟོས་གྲུབ་ཏུ་ངེས་པར་བྱ་བ་ཁོ་ནར་མ་ཟད་ཀྱི། གཞན་ཡང་བྱེད་པ་པོ་དང་ལས་དག་གིས་ཏེ་དེ་གཉིས་ལ་རྣམ་པར་དཔྱད་པའི་རིགས་པས་བྱེད་པ་དང་ཉེར་ལེན་ཟུང་གཉིས་ཀྱི་ལྷག་མ་སྟེ་དེ་དག་ལས་ཐ་དད་པའི་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་ཀྱང༌། ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ཡོད་པ་བཀག་སྟེ་ཕན་ཚུན་ལྟོས་གྲུབ་ཉིད་དུ་ཤེས་རབ་ཅན་གྱིས་ཤེས་པར་བྱའོ། །དེ་དག་ཀྱང་བསྐྱེད་བྱ་སྐྱེད་བྱེད་དང་འགྲོ་བ་དང་འགྲོ་བ་པོ་དང་བལྟ་བྱ་དང་ལྟ་བྱེད་དང་མཚན་ཉིད་དང་མཚན་གཞི་དང་འབྱུང་བྱ་འབྱུང་བྱེད་དང༌། དེ་བཞིན་དུ་ཡན་ལག་དང་ཡན་ལག་ཅན་དང་ཡོན་ཏན་དང་ཡོན་ཏན་ཅན་དང་ཚད་མ་དང་གཞལ་བྱ་ལ་སོགས་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་དོ། །དེའི་སྦྱོར་ཚུལ་ནི་སྐྱེད་བྱེད་དང་འགྲོ་བ་པོ་ཡིན་མིན་རེ་རེ་བ་དང་གཉིས་ཀས་བསྐྱེད་བྱ་དང་འགྲོ་བ་ཡིན་མིན་རེ་རེ་བ་དང་གཉིས་ཀ་མི་སྐྱེད་ཅིང་དེར་མི་འགྲོ་བ་སྟེ། ཕྱོགས་མི་མཐུན་པ་ལ་ཡང་སྦྱར་བར་བྱ་ལ་ལྷག་མ་ཡང་དེ་ལྟར་རོ། །ཡན་ལག་དང་ཡོན་ཏན་ཡིན་མིན་རེ་རེ་བ་དང་གཉིས་ཀ་ཡང་ཡན་ལག་ཅན་དང་ཡོན་ཏན་ཅན་ཡིན་མིན་རེ་རེ་བ་དང་གཉིས་ཀ་ལ་མི་འཇུག་ཅེས་སྦྱར་ཏེ་ཕྱོགས་མི་མཐུན་པ་ལ་ཡང་སྦྱར་རོ། །དེས་ན་རབ་བྱེད་དང་པོར་བསྐྱེད་བྱ་སྐྱེད་བྱེད་དང་གཉིས་པར་འགྲོ་འོང་དང་གསུམ་པར་བལྟ་བྱ་ལྟ་བྱེད་དང༌། ལྔ་བར་མཚན་མཚོན་ལ་དཔྱད་ནས་བཀག་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་ནི་བསྐྱེད་བྱ་ སྐྱེད་བྱེད་སོགས་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ཡོད་པ་ཙམ་འགོག་པས་ཡོད་པ་བཀག་པ་མིན་ནོ། །དེ་བཀག་པ་ན་དེ་རྣམས་ཕན་ཚུན་ལྟོས་ནས་བཞག་པའི་རྟེན་འབྱུང་གི་ཡོད་པར་འགྲུབ་ཅིང་ཚད་མ་དང་གཞལ་བྱ་ཡང་དེ་དང་འདྲ་བས། ཕན་ཚུན་ལྟོས་གྲུབ་ཀྱི་ཚད་མ་དང་གཞལ་བྱ་ཁས་མི་ལེན་པ་མིན་ཏེ་དེ་ནི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱ་སྒྲུབ་བྱེད་ལ་ཡང་ཁྱད་པར་མེད་དོ། །རྒྱུ་འབྲས་ལ་སོགས་པ་དེ་དག་ཀྱང་ཐ་སྙད་ཕན་ཚུན་ལྟོས་པ་ཙམ་དུ་མ་ཟད་དོན་གཉིས་ཀྱང་ཕན་ཚུན་ལྟོས་པ་གཞུང་གི
Chinese
仅仅是这样，应当知晓并非以自己的自性成立。又为何不是以自性成立呢？因为以任何理性能破除业和作者以自性成立的道理，同样也能遮止所应取和取者以自性存在。其结合方式是，取者是或不是，各自一次，两者都是，所应取是或不是，各自一次，两者都不取，也应安立于不相顺的品类上。由于遮止了业和作者以自性存在，所以不仅必须确定能取二者是互相观待而成立的，而且，其他的作者和业等，即以对这二者进行辨析的道理，作者和近取二者的剩余，即那些与它们相异的事物，也应遮止以自性存在，有智慧者应知晓是互相观待而成立的。这些也包括所生和能生，行者和所行，所见和能见，自相和相基，所生和能生等。同样，支分和有支，功德和有功德，量和所量等等一切。其结合方式是，能生者和行者是或不是，各自一次，两者都是，所生和所行是或不是，各自一次，两者都不生也不行于彼处。也应安立于不相顺的品类上，剩余的也应如此。支分和功德是或不是，各自一次，两者也都是，有支和有功德是或不是，各自一次，两者都不属于，这样安立，也应安立于不相顺的品类上。因此，在第一品中，对所生能生，第二品中，对来往，第三品中，对所见能见，第五品中，对相和有相进行观察而遮破的那些，仅仅是遮止了所生能生等以自性存在，并非遮止了存在。在遮止了它之后，那些互相观待而安立的缘起之存在才能成立，量和所量也与此相同。因此，并非不承认互相观待而成立的量和所量，因为这与所立和能立也没有差别。因果等那些，不仅是名言互相观待，而且意义二者也是互相观待的，经论中说。
English
It is merely so; one should know that it is not established by its own nature. Furthermore, why is it not established by its own nature? Because the reasoning that eliminates the establishment of action and agent by their own nature is the very reasoning that also prevents what is to be taken and the taker from existing by their own nature. The way to apply this is: the taker is or is not, each once; both are; what is to be taken is or is not, each once; both do not take. This should also be applied to dissimilar categories. Since the existence of action and agent by their own nature is prevented, it is not only necessary to ascertain that the two that take are necessarily established in dependence on each other. Furthermore, by the action and agent, that is, by the reasoning that analyzes these two, the remainder of the pair of action and close taking, that is, those things that are different from them, should also be prevented from existing by their own nature. The wise should know that they are established in dependence on each other. These also include what is produced and what produces, going and the goer, what is seen and the seer, characteristic and basis of characteristic, what arises and what causes to arise, and so on. Similarly, parts and whole, qualities and possessor of qualities, valid cognition and object of valid cognition, and so on, all of them. The way to apply this is: the producer and the goer are or are not, each once; both are; what is produced and going are or are not, each once; both do not produce and do not go there. This should also be applied to dissimilar categories, and the remainder should be treated similarly. Parts and qualities are or are not, each once; both are; whole and possessor of qualities are or are not, each once; both do not belong to them. Apply this, and it should also be applied to dissimilar categories. Therefore, in the first chapter, what is produced and what produces; in the second chapter, coming and going; in the third chapter, what is seen and the seer; and in the fifth chapter, those that are analyzed and refuted regarding characteristic and sign, only prevent what is produced, what produces, etc., from existing by their own nature, not preventing existence. When that is prevented, the existence of dependent arising, which is established in dependence on each other, is established, and valid cognition and object of valid cognition are similar to this. Therefore, it is not that valid cognition and object of valid cognition, which are established in dependence on each other, are not accepted, because there is no difference between what is to be proven and what proves. Those such as cause and effect are not only terms that depend on each other, but the two meanings also depend on each other, as stated in the scriptures.