Chinese
在《禅定经》中说：一个法就能使一切法，如幻如化；如同芭蕉树，不可执持，不能积聚；虚假不实，终不可靠，能如此了知，不久即可趋向菩提之精华。又如《禅定王经》中说：你如何理解我之觉受，就应以同样之理施之于一切。一切诸法皆是如此之体性，清净犹如虚空。以一可知一切，以一可见一切。纵然说了再多，亦不生骄慢。如是说，对于执着“我”的所依处，若以自性去寻觅而不可得，则应将了悟人无我的道理，施之于其他一切法。次第亦应如是，人无我的道理，与法是相同的。第三，如是宣说了蕴的因果，若执着其非仅是假名安立，而是以自性存在，则以理成立因果绝对不可能成立。之后，对于仅是假名安立，生起、将生起及感受等等一切法皆合理，如是于显现分之定解与空性分之定解二者，修习成为互相助益之缘起理。名为“蕴观察”之九偈颂之论著，是第四品之释论。 第三，破斥界之法我，分三：解释论著之文；结合了义之教证；总结要义而标示名称。第一：此处说，因为没有遮破界，而且世尊也说：大王，此士夫是六界。如是宣说了地、水、火、风、空、识之六界，以及彼等之体性：坚硬、湿润、温暖、流动、无碍、能辨识。若无自性，则不应宣说体性，因有体性之故，诸界以自性而存在，如是，如同诸界一般，蕴与处也以自性而存在。若诸界以自性而存在，则其他二者现在存在，然彼等则非以自性而存在。
English
In the Sutra of Samadhi, it says: One dharma can make all dharmas like illusions and transformations; like a banana tree, it cannot be grasped or accumulated; it is false and unreliable, and if one understands this, one will soon approach the essence of Bodhi. Also, as it says in the King of Samadhi Sutra: How you understand my perception, you should apply the same principle to everything. All dharmas are of such nature, pure like the sky. With one, you can know everything; with one, you can see everything. Even if you say more, no pride arises. As it is said, for the basis of clinging to "I", if you seek for its own nature and cannot find it, then you should apply the understanding of the principle of the selflessness of persons to all other dharmas. The order should also be like this, and the principle of the selflessness of persons is the same as that of dharmas. Third, as the cause and effect of the aggregates are explained, if one clings to them as not merely nominal designations, but as existing by their own nature, then it is established by reason that cause and effect can never be established. After that, for merely nominal designations, all dharmas such as arising, will arise, and feeling are reasonable, and thus, one should train the mind in the logic of dependent arising, where the certainty of the appearance aspect and the certainty of the emptiness aspect become mutually beneficial. The treatise called "Analysis of Aggregates," which is the essence of nine verses, is the explanation of the fourth chapter. Third, refuting the self of dharmas in the elements, there are three parts: explaining the text of the treatise; combining the definitive meaning with the scriptures; summarizing the meaning and indicating the name. First: Here it is said that because the elements are not refuted, and the Bhagavan also said: Great King, this man is of the six elements. Thus, the six elements of earth, water, fire, wind, space, and consciousness are explained, as well as their characteristics: solidity, moisture, warmth, movement, unobstructedness, and the ability to distinguish. If there is no own nature, then the characteristics should not be explained, and because there are characteristics, the elements exist by their own nature. Thus, like the elements, the aggregates and sense bases also exist by their own nature. If the elements exist by their own nature, then the other two also exist now, but they do not exist by their own nature.
Chinese
如果问：如何不存在呢？这有两方面：破斥六界自性成立；呵责执着于有无两边的边见。第一方面又分两点：破斥虚空界自性成立；将此理推广到其余各界。第一方面又分三点：破斥虚空界具有体相；破斥成立为实有和非实有；总结以上破斥。第一方面又分三点：破斥所依；破斥自性；总结。第一方面又分两点：破斥自性成立；由此显示所依被破斥。第一方面又分两点：依靠先后关系破斥自性成立；依靠自性有无来破斥自性成立。第一点是：经中虽然先说了地界，但此处首先破斥虚空界自性成立，是因为世间认为虚空是空性的，而其他各界没有这样认为的，所以为了用已知的道理来证明未知的道理，才说“虚空的自性之前”等等。此处任何自宗和他宗都不认为所依先于自性，所以如果说在虚空的自性之前没有虚空，这不合理。答：其他宗派不认为所依先于自性，所以仅仅是没有这一点是不成立的。那么是什么呢？这是佛护论师所说：如果虚空的自性之前稍微有一点叫做虚空的东西，那么说“这个虚空的自性是这个”也是合理的。所以如果存在先后关系，那么这样指示是合理的，如果不存在，那么指示是不合理的，这样如果后者成立，那么前者就是后者的遍，通过破斥遍来破斥。而且经中仅仅说“无障碍是虚空的自性”也是承认的，所以对方认为所依虚空，无障碍成立为自性，如果按照这样认为，那就是自性以自己的体性来表示体相，那么就必须存在先后关系。说明必须存在先后关系的原因是，自性成立的时间确定有三种，对于同时成立的情况，遮破了不是具有自性的情况。自性先于所依，自性成立，以及与此相反的情况，后一种情况难以遮破，因为对于本来就存在的所依，后来者成立的可能性很大。
English
How is it that it does not exist? There are two aspects to this: refuting the self-existence of the six elements; and criticizing the view of clinging to the extremes of existence and non-existence. The first aspect has two points: refuting the self-existence of the space element; and applying this reasoning to the remaining elements. The first aspect has three points: refuting that the space element has characteristics; refuting that it is established as existent and non-existent; and summarizing the above refutations. The first aspect has three points: refuting the basis of designation; refuting the definition; and summarizing. The first aspect has two points: refuting the establishment of the definition; and thereby showing that the basis of designation is refuted. The first aspect has two points: refuting the establishment of the definition based on before and after; and refuting the establishment of the definition based on the existence or non-existence of the definition. The first point is: although the sutra speaks of the earth element first, here, the first refutation of the self-existence of the space element is because space is known as empty in the world, and the other elements are not known in this way. Therefore, in order to prove the unknown by means of the known, it is said, "Before the definition of space," and so on. Here, no school, either our own or others, asserts that the basis of designation precedes the definition. Therefore, it is not reasonable to prove that there is no space before the definition of space. Answer: Other schools do not assert that the basis of designation precedes the definition, so they do not merely prove that it does not exist. What is it then? This is what Buddhapalita says: "If there were something called space slightly before the definition of space, then it would be reasonable to show that the definition of this space is this." So, if there is a before and after, then it is reasonable to show it in this way, but if it does not exist, then it is not reasonable. Thus, if the latter is valid, then the former is shown to be its pervader, and the pervader is refuted by refuting the pervaded. Moreover, even the mere statement in the sutra that "unobstructedness is the definition of space" is accepted. Therefore, the opponent considers the basis of designation, space, to be such that unobstructedness is established as its definition. If it is considered that the definition indicates the characteristic by its own nature, then the before and after must exist. The reason why this is necessary is that the time of the establishment of the definition is definitely threefold, and for the case of simultaneous establishment, it is refuted that it is not with a definition. The establishment of the definition when the definition precedes the basis of designation, and the establishment of the definition when the opposite is the case, the latter is difficult to refute, because there is a great possibility that the establisher will establish later on the basis of what already exists.
Tibetan
་ས་སྔར་མེད་པར་ངེས་ན་སྔར་ཞུགས་པར་འཛིན་པ་ཆུང་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དེས་ན་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱི་སྔ་རོལ་དུ་མཚན་གཞི་ཡོད་པ་ཙམ་འགོག་པར་མཛད་དོ། །གལ་ཏེ་སྒྲིབ་ཐོགས་མེད་པ་ནམ་མཁའ་ལ་མཚན་ཉིད་དུ་འཇུག་པ་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ཡོད་ན་དུས་གཞན་གཉིས་སུ་འཇུག་པ་མི་འཐད་པས། མཚན་ཉིད་དེ་ལས་སྔ་རོལ་དུ་མཚན་གཞི་ནམ་མཁའ་ཡོད་པ་ལ་འཇུག་དགོས་ན། ནམ་མཁའི་མཚན་ཉིད་སྒྲིབ་ཐོགས་མེད་པའི་སྔ་རོལ་ན་འཇུག་གཞི་ནམ་མཁའ་དེ་ཅུང་ཟད་ཀྱང་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་མཚན་ཉིད་གང་དུ་འཇུག་པར་འགྱུར། གལ་ཏེ་མཚན་ཉིད་སྒྲིབ་ཐོགས་མེད་པ་ལས་ནམ་མཁའ་སྔ་བར་གྱུར་ན་དེའི་དུས་ན་མཚན་ཉིད་དེ་མེད་པར་ཐལ་བར་འགྱུར་ལ་དེ་ལྟ་ན་ནམ་མཁའ་ཡང་མེད་པར་འགྱུར་ཏེ། མཚན་ཉིད་མེད་པའི་དངོས་པོ་སྟེ་དོན་འགའ་ཡང་གཞུང་ལུགས་གང་ནའང་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །གལ་ཏེ་རེ་ཞིག་མཚན་ཉིད་འཇུག་པ་ནི་ཡོད་ལ་འཇུག་པ་དེ་ཡང་མཚན་གཞི་ལ་ཡིན་པས་མཚན་ཉིད་འཇུག་པ་ཡོད་པས་མཚན་གཞི་ ཡང་ཡོད་དོ་ཞེ་ན། མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱི་སྔ་རོལ་ན་མཚན་ཉིད་མེད་པའི་དངོས་པོ་སྟེ་དོན་མེད་དོ་ཞེས་ནི་བཤད་ཟིན་ཏོ། །དེ་ལྟ་ཡིན་ན་མཚན་ཉིད་དེ་གང་དུ་འཇུག་པར་འགྱུར་བའི་གཞི་མེད་པས་མཚན་ཉིད་འཇུག་པ་མེད་དོ། །འདི་ནི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱི་སྔ་རོལ་ན་མཚན་ཉིད་མེད་ཀྱང་མཚན་ཉིད་འཇུག་པ་ཡོད་སྙམ་པ་འགོག་པའོ། །གཉིས་པ་ནི། གཞན་ཡང་མཚན་ཉིད་འཇུག་པ་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ཡོད་ན་གསུམ་ལས་མི་འདའ་ལ་དེ་ཡང་མཚན་ཉིད་མེད་པ་ལ་མཚན་ཉིད་ནི་མི་འཇུག་སྟེ། མཚན་ཉིད་མེད་པའི་ཆོས་ཐ་སྙད་དུ་ཡང་མི་སྲིད་པས་གཞི་མེད་པ་ལ་འཇུག་པ་འགལ་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །མཚན་ཉིད་དང་བཅས་པའི་དོན་ལ་ཡང་མཚན་ཉིད་འཇུག་པ་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ཡོད་པ་མིན་ཏེ། དེ་ལ་ནི་མཚན་ཉིད་འཇུག་པ་དགོས་པ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ་རང་གི་ངོ་བོས་མཚན་ཉིད་དང་བཅས་པར་གྲུབ་པ་ལ་སླར་ཡང་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ཅི་ཞིག་བྱ། དེ་ལྟར་གྲུབ་ཀྱང་མཚན་ཉིད་འཇུག་ན་ནི་རྟག་ཏུ་མཚན་ཉིད་འཇུག་པས་ཐུག་པ་མེད་པར་འགྱུར་རོ། །དེ་ལ་མཚན་ཉིད་སྒྲིབ་མེད་ལ་སོགས་པ་དེ་མཚན་གཞི་ནམ་མཁའ་ལ་སོགས་པའི་སྒྲུབ་བྱེད་ཡིན་ལ་དེ་ཐ་སྙད་དུ་ཡོད་པ་ལ་མི་འགལ་ཡང་དོན་དམ་པར་གྲུབ་པ་ལ་མི་རིགས་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ། རང་གི་ངོ་བོས་གྲུབ་པའི་དུས་མཉམ་པ་ལ་ལྟོས་པ་མི་རིགས་པ་མང་དུ་གསུངས་པས་མཚན་མཚོན་རང་གི་ངོ་བོས་གྲུབ་པའི་དུས་མཉམ་པ་ལ་འབྲེལ་བ་མེད་པས་མཚན་ཉིད་སྒྲུབ་བྱེད་དུ་མི་འཐད་དོ། །འདི་ཡང་རང་གི་ངོ་བོས་གྲུབ་ན་རང་དབང་དུ་གྲུབ་པ་དང༌། རང་
Chinese
如果确定了之前没有，那么认为先前进入是不足的。因此，他致力于遮止在定义之前仅存在所定义之物。如果无碍虚空作为定义本质上存在，那么在其他两个时间进入是不合理的。如果必须在定义之前进入存在所定义之物虚空，那么在虚空的定义无碍之前，作为进入之基础的虚空丝毫也不存在，定义将进入何处？如果虚空早于定义无碍，那么在那时定义将不存在，如果那样，虚空也将不存在，因为没有任何事物，即没有任何东西，在任何论典中存在。如果暂时定义进入是存在的，并且进入也是在所定义之物上，因为定义进入是存在的，所以所定义之物也是存在的，那么，在定义之前，没有没有定义的事物，即没有东西，这已经说过了。如果是那样，定义将进入何处的基础不存在，所以定义进入不存在。这是遮止认为在定义之前即使没有定义，定义进入也存在。第二，此外，如果定义进入本质上存在，那么不会超过三种情况，也就是没有定义的事物上定义不会进入，因为没有定义的事物甚至在名言中也不可能存在，所以在没有基础的事物上进入是相违的。在具有定义的事物上，定义进入也不是本质上存在的，因为对于它来说，不需要定义进入，因为以自己的自性成立为具有定义的事物，还需要定义做什么？即使那样成立，如果定义进入，那么将永远定义进入，没有穷尽。其中，定义无碍等是所定义之物虚空等的成立者，这在名言中存在并不相违，但在胜义中成立是不合理的，因为已经多次说过以自己的自性成立的同时依赖是不合理的，所以名称所指以自己的自性成立的同时没有关联，所以定义不适合作为成立者。这也是如果以自己的自性成立，那么就是自主成立，并且自己
English
If it is certain that it did not exist before, then it is insufficient to assume that it entered earlier. Therefore, he is dedicated to preventing the mere existence of the defined before the definition. If unobstructed space exists inherently as a definition, then it is unreasonable to enter at the other two times. If it is necessary to enter the defined object, space, before that definition, then since the basis for entering, space, does not exist even slightly before the definition of space as unobstructed, where will the definition enter? If space precedes the definition of unobstructedness, then the definition will not exist at that time, and if that is the case, space will also not exist, because no thing, that is, nothing, exists in any treatise without a definition. If, for the time being, the entry of definition exists, and that entry is also on the defined object, then since the entry of definition exists, the defined object also exists, then it has already been said that before the definition, there is no thing without a definition, that is, nothing. If that is the case, the basis on which the definition will enter does not exist, so the entry of definition does not exist. This is to prevent the idea that even if there is no definition before the definition, the entry of definition exists. Secondly, moreover, if the entry of definition exists inherently, then it will not exceed three cases, that is, definition does not enter into what has no definition, because what has no definition cannot even exist nominally, so entering into what has no basis is contradictory. In the case of things with definitions, the entry of definition is also not inherently existent, because for it, the entry of definition is not necessary, because what is established as having definition by its own nature, what else does it need from definition? Even if it is established in that way, if definition enters, then definition will always enter, without end. Among them, the definition of unobstructedness and so on is the establisher of the defined object, space and so on, and it is not contradictory for it to exist nominally, but it is unreasonable to establish it ultimately, because it has been said many times that it is unreasonable to rely on simultaneity when establishing by one's own nature, so the name and the named are not related when they are established simultaneously by their own nature, so definition is not suitable as an establisher. This is also if it is established by its own nature, then it is established autonomously, and self