Chinese
也會變成許多有情眾生。那麼，經中說：「我自己在那個時候，那個時代，變成了受到許多轉輪王尊敬的人。」釋迦牟尼佛這樣說是不合理的，因為受到許多人尊敬的我和釋迦牟尼佛的我不是同一個。如果這樣問，這個經文是遮止了這兩者是不同的相續，而顯示為一個相續，並不是顯示這兩者的我是同一個。像這樣，在眾多經部中，敘述了過去的事情之後，如果認為從那時起被稱為這個名字的那個人是另一個人，那就不應該那樣看，因為經中主要以遮止相續是他者的方式說：「我自己在那個時候，那個時代變成了那樣。」我所說的作為「我」這個詞語基礎的補特伽羅，對於沒有區分前後時間的總體概念的用法，之前已經說過了。如果前後世的我變成同一個，會有什麼過失呢？對於這個問題，已經說過了會犯上恆常的過失。還有其他的過失要說，如果認為前世的我和今世的我變成同一個，那麼，因為取蘊的我是同一個，所以這兩個階段的取蘊也變成同一個，但取蘊是各自不同的，因為它們的原因和時間是不同的。如果認為取蘊是各自不同的，而這兩個階段的我是同一個並不相違背，所以認為我在過去的時間裡是自性存在的，這是合理的。如果取蘊和我以自相成立為各自不同的，那麼這兩者是不相違背的，但是，除了取蘊之外，也就是說，和你自性不同的我是什麼呢？因為沒有，所以這個回答是不合理的。如果說除了取蘊之外，我不是自性存在的，那麼，如果認為取蘊本身就是自性存在的我，那樣的話，你所承許的我自性存在就沒有了，因為只不過是蘊的名稱而已，所以沒有我的意義。如果認為取蘊本身不是我和自性一體的，
English
it will also become many sentient beings. Then, the sutra says, "I myself at that time, in that era, became someone who was respected by many Chakravartin kings." It is unreasonable for Shakyamuni Buddha to say this, because the "I" who is respected by many and the "I" of Shakyamuni are not the same. If you ask this, this scripture prevents these two from being different continuums and shows them as one continuum, but it does not show that the two "I"s are the same. Likewise, in many sutras, after narrating past events, if one thinks that the person who was called by this name from that time is another person, then one should not look at it that way, because the sutra mainly says in a way that prevents the continuum from being other, "I myself became like that at that time, in that era." The usage of the person who is the basis of the term "I," which I spoke of, for the general concept that does not distinguish between past and future times, has already been explained before. If the "I"s of the past and future lives become the same, what fault would there be? To this question, it has already been said that one would commit the fault of permanence. There are other faults to be said as well. If one thinks that the "I" of the past life and the "I" of this life become the same, then, because the "I" of the aggregates of appropriation is the same, the aggregates of appropriation of these two stages would also become the same. But the aggregates of appropriation are each different, because their causes and times are different. If one thinks that the aggregates of appropriation are each different, and that the two "I"s of these two stages being the same is not contradictory, so it is reasonable to think that "I" exists inherently in the past time. If the aggregates of appropriation and "I" are established as being each different by their own characteristics, then these two are not contradictory. However, apart from the aggregates of appropriation, that is to say, what is your "I" that is different in nature from it? Because there is none, this answer is unreasonable. If one says that apart from the aggregates of appropriation, "I" does not exist inherently, then, if one thinks that the aggregates of appropriation themselves are the inherently existing "I," then your assertion that "I" inherently exists would be nonexistent, because it is merely a name of the aggregates, so there is no meaning of "I." If one thinks that the aggregates of appropriation themselves are not one with "I" by nature,