Chinese
哦！而且，因为所要证明的和另一方的法，在能成立上没有差别，所以是没有差别。这个“也”字等等，对所要证明的法造成损害，就是对所要证明的造成损害，即是相违的法。它的能成立是对所要证明的造成损害的能成立，它的事物是对所要证明的造成损害的能成立本身。在这里，在那争论中，对所要证明的造成损害的能成立本身的声音应当观察，因为争论相违的理由本身，所以是相似相违的意思。为什么呢？因为说了，在法性等等上确定等等，如若常性本身是要证明的，刚一开始产生的本身就是确定本身，同样在法性等等上也是。因此这是相似相违。解释也，用偈颂归纳了刚刚解释的意义。所证损害法上，以等同性而无差别，争论中。这是未完的部分。对于损害所要证明的法的等同性，理由使之没有差别，因此会变成过失。无论什么对理由的争论，如若这个理由对于所希望的法是能成立本身，同样，对于损害所要证明的也是，像这种形态，对于理由的过失，在相似相违上没有差别，会变成等同的后效。不仅仅是因为所要证明的和理由没有差别，那么是什么呢？为了阐明以这种方式也是，所以用了“也”字。如果没有过失，那么对理由的争论，那会变成驳斥，这是偈颂的意义。还有，无论是同品性，还是异品性，以及分别和没有差别，这些等同性，在所有这些中，都仅仅会变成相似的回答吗？或者仅仅也是回答吗？因此说了，回答会变成等等。对于具有完全确定的前一种情况。如果这些完全
English
O! Moreover, because there is no difference between what is to be proven and the dharma of the other party in terms of being able to establish it, there is no difference. This "also" etc., what harms the dharma to be proven is what harms what is to be proven, which is the contradictory dharma. Its ability to establish is the ability to establish that harms what is to be proven, and its entity is the ability to establish that harms what is to be proven itself. Here, in that debate, the sound of the ability to establish itself that harms what is to be proven should be observed. Because the reason itself contradicts, it means that it appears to contradict. Why? Because it is said, in the nature of things, etc., it is certain, etc., if permanence itself is to be proven, the very beginning of its arising is certainty itself, and the same is true of the nature of things, etc. Therefore, this appears to be contradictory. The explanation also summarizes the meaning just explained in verses. On the dharma that harms what is to be proven, the reason makes no difference due to equality, in the debate. This is the unfinished part. For the equality of the dharma that harms what is to be proven, the reason makes no difference, so it will become a fault. Whatever the debate about the reason, if this reason is the ability to establish itself for the desired dharma, then also for harming what is to be proven, in this form, for the fault of the reason, there is no difference in appearing contradictory, it will become the same consequence. Not only because there is no difference between what is to be proven and the reason, then what is it? In order to clarify that it is also in this way, the word "also" is used. If there is no fault, then the debate about the reason will become a refutation, this is the meaning of the verse. Also, whether it is homogeneity, or heterogeneity, and the difference between discrimination and non-discrimination, in all these equalities, will they only become similar answers? Or are they also just answers? Therefore it is said, the answers will become etc. For the former situation with complete certainty. If these are completely
Chinese
如果这些部分各自独立存在，那么它们就只会变成反驳。因为各自独立存在是相同的，所以它们不是那样显现的。以其他方式也显示会变成回答，例如“如果前一方也具有不确定性”等等。对于具有不确定性的前一方，如果说出这种错误的相似性，例如与相似性相同等等，并且处于对立的位置，那么即使那样，它们也会变成反驳。依靠这个，因此通过反驳的方式等等。其中，对于相似的相同性和不相似的相同性，因为只有具有不确定性的前一方才与具有不确定性的对立位置相同，所以通过反驳的方式争论共同的不确定性。对于具有唯一性的一方，因为唯一性处于对立的位置，所以通过建立的方式争论矛盾和不确定性。对于相似的分别念，因为共同和非共同的不确定性以及前一方，共同和非共同的事物处于对立的位置，所以通过反驳的方式争论共同和非共同的不确定性。对于具有唯一性的一方，因为不是唯一存在的事物处于对立的位置，所以通过建立的方式争论矛盾和不确定性。同样，对于无差别的相似性是第一种情况，对于第三种情况，因为具有确定性的一方与确定性本身处于对立的位置，所以通过反驳的方式争论对所要建立的事物的损害。这些只会变成反驳。如果对所见没有损害，那么就排除了对所要建立的事物的损害的争论。所见是通过量度完全确立的。如果问，通过所见如何造成损害？回答说，例如等等。仅仅是承诺的过失，如果承诺说，由耳识所确立的声音没有自相，那么由于现量完全确立会造成损害，所以承诺不会成立。如果说，不应听闻的声音的表达不会变成声音
English
If these parts exist separately, then they will only become refutations. Because existing separately is the same, they are not how they appear. It is said that showing that they also become answers in other ways, such as "if the former side also has uncertainty," etc. For the former side that has uncertainty, if such a mistake of saying, such as being the same as similarity, etc., and being in an opposing position, then even so, they will become refutations. Relying on this, therefore, by way of refutation, etc. Among them, for the similarity of sameness and the sameness of dissimilarity, because only the former side with uncertainty is the same as the opposing position with uncertainty, therefore, by way of refutation, arguing about common uncertainty. For the one with uniqueness, because uniqueness is in an opposing position, therefore, by way of establishing, arguing about contradiction and uncertainty. For similar conceptualizations, because common and uncommon uncertainties and the former side, common and uncommon things are in opposing positions, therefore, by way of refutation, arguing about common and uncommon uncertainties. For the one with uniqueness, because things that do not exist uniquely are in opposing positions, therefore, by way of establishing, arguing about contradiction and uncertainty. Similarly, for the similarity of no difference is the first case, for the third case, because the one with certainty is in an opposing position with certainty itself, therefore, by way of refutation, arguing about the harm to what is to be established. These will only become refutations. If there is no harm to what is seen, then it excludes the argument of harm to what is to be established. What is seen is completely established through measurement. If asked, how does seeing cause harm? It is said, for example, etc. It is only the fault of the commitment, if it is committed that the sound established by ear consciousness has no self-character, then because the present amount completely established will cause harm, the commitment will not be established. If it is said that the expression of the sound that should not be heard will not become sound
Tibetan
ར་རོ་ཞེས་པ་དེ་ལྟ་ཡང་གྲགས་པས་གྲུབ་པས་སོ། །གང་ལ་ཞེས་པ་ལ་སོགས་པ་སྟེ། རྡུལ་གཉིས་པ་ཅན་ནི་རྡུལ་སྔོན་མ་ཅན་ཡིན་ཏེ། རགས་པ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ཕྱིར་བུམ་པ་བཞིན་ཞེས་བྱས་པ་ལ། ཇི་ལྟར་གཏན་ཚིགས་འདིས་རྡུལ་སྔ་མ་ཅན་ཉིད་དུ་སྒྲུབ་པར་བྱེད་ཅིང༌། འདི་ལྟར་རགས་པའི་རྡུལ་སྔོན་མ་ཅན་ཉིད་དུ་ཡང་ཞེས་པ། ཤིན་ཏུ་རགས་པ་ལ་ལྟོས་པས་གང་རྡུལ་ཡིན་པ་དེ་རགས་པའི་རྡུལ་ལོ། །དེ་ལྟ་ན་ཡང་རྡུལ་ཕྲ་རབ་རྣམས་རགས་པ་ཉིད་དུ་ཡང་འགྲུབ་སྟེ། འདིར་ཚད་མ་འགའ་ཞིག་གིས་ཀྱང་རྡུལ་ཕྲ་རབ་རྣམས་རགས་པ་ཉིད་དུ་བསྒྲུབ་པར་བྱ་བཞིན་པ་ལ་གནོད་པའང་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། །དེ་ལ་ལན་ཅི་ཡིན་ཞེ་ན་གསུངས་པ། གནོད་བྱེད་མོད་ན་འགལ་པ་ཉིད། །ཅེས་པའོ། །ཅིའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེ་ན་གསུངས་པ། བསྒྲུབ་བྱ་གནོད་བྱེད་སྒྲུབ་བྱེད་ཕྱིར། །ཅེས་པའོ། །ཡང་ཅི་ལྟར་རགས་པ་ཉིད་ལ་རགས་པའི་རྡུལ་སྔོན་མ་ཅན་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ཁྱབ། ཇི་སྲིད་དུ་འདིར་འབྲེལ་བ་འགའ་ཞིག་ཀྱང་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། དེ་ལས་ཀྱང་རགས་པ་ཡང་འགྱུར་ཞིང་རགས་པ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་རྡུལ་སྔོན་མ་ཅན་ཡང་ངོ་ཞེས་པས། ཅི་ཞིག་ལས་འགལ་བ་ཉིད་ཡིན་ཞེ་ན། ཇི་ལྟར་ འགལ་བ་དེ་ལྟར་བརྗོད་པར་བྱ་སྟེ། ཡན་ལག་ཅན་གྱི་རྫས་ནི་མཚུངས་པའི་ཡུལ་ས་ཅན་ནོ་ཞེས་པའི་གཞུང་ལས། ཇི་སྲིད་དུ་ནམ་མཁའི་ཡུལ་ཕྱོགས་ཡན་ལག་གི་རྫས་ཐོབ་པ་དེ་སྲིད་ཁོ་ནར་ཡན་ལག་ཅན་གྱི་རྫས་ཀྱང་སྟེ། དེའི་ཕྱིར་རྡུལ་གཉིས་པ་ཅན་རགས་པ་ཉིད་དུ་འདོད་པ་པོས་དེ་རྩོམ་པར་བྱེད་པའི་རྡུལ་གཉིས་པ་ཅན་ཡང་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། དེ་དང་མཚུངས་པའི་ཡུལ་ཕྱོགས་ཅན་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ཕྱིར་རམ། ཡུལ་ཕྱོགས་ཐ་དད་པ་ཉིད་ན་རྡུལ་ཕྲན་ནི་དེའི་ཡན་ལག་ཏུ་མི་འགྱུར་རོ། །དེའི་ཕྱིར་རྡུལ་གཉིས་པ་ཅན་རགས་པ་ཉིད་དུ་ཁས་ལེན་པ་པོས་གདོན་མི་ཟ་བར་དེའི་ཡན་ལག་ཀྱང་ཁས་བླང་པར་བྱའོ་ཞེས་པས་འགལ་བ་ཉིད་དོ། །དམིགས་པ་མཚུངས་པ་ཞེས་པ་མཚོན་བྱ་སྟེ། ལྷག་མ་མཚན་ཉིད་དོ། །གཏན་ཚིགས་གཞན་གྱིས་ཀྱང་ཞེས་པའི་ཀྱང་གི་སྒྲ་ནི་ངེས་པར་གཟུང་བའི་དོན་ཅན་ཏེ། གཏན་ཚིགས་གཞན་ཁོ་ནས་ཞེས་པའི་དོན་ཏོ། །གལ་ཏེ་གློག་ལ་སོགས་པ་ལ་གཞན་ལས་མི་རྟག་པ་ཉིད་འགྲུབ་མོད། དེ་ལས་གང་གིས་དེ་མི་རྟག་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་སུ་མི་འགྱུར་བ་བརྩལ་མ་ཐག་ཏུ་བྱུང་བ་ཉིད་ལ་ཅི་ཞིག་འོངས་ཤེ་ན་བཤད་པ། དེ་ནི་མ་ཡིན་ཞེས་པ་ལ་སོགས་པ་སྟེ། རྒྱུ་ནི་བྱེད་རྒྱུའོ། །རྒྱུའི་སྒྲས་བསྣན་པ་ལས། བྱེད་པ་ཅན་གྱི་ཆོས་ཤེས་པར་བྱེད་པའི་རྒྱུ་ལ་སྒྲོ་བཏགས་ནས། གང་ཞིག་གང་མེད་ཀྱང་འགྱུར་བ
Chinese
所谓的“粗大”也是由名声所成立的。关于“于何”等等，具有两个微尘的是具有先前微尘的，因为是粗大的缘故，就像瓶子一样。那么，这个理由如何成立是具有先前微尘的呢？像这样，粗大的具有先前微尘也是，因为依赖于非常粗大的，凡是微尘就是粗大的微尘。即使那样，极微也成立是粗大的，在这里，一些量式也正在成立极微是粗大的，这也没有妨碍。对此有什么回答呢？回答说：妨害虽多是相违。这是什么意思呢？回答说：所立妨害能立故。又如何粗大本身被粗大的先前微尘所遍及？只要这里没有任何关联，从那之后也会变成粗大，并且也会有不是粗大的先前微尘。那么，从什么方面是相违的呢？如何 相违应该那样说：具有支分的物质是具有相同处所的。从这个论典中，只要获得虚空的处所支分物质，那么就只有具有支分的物质。因此，认为具有两个微尘是粗大的人，也不是造作那个的具有两个微尘，因为是和那个相同处所的缘故吗？如果处所是不同的，那么微尘就不会变成它的支分。因此，承认具有两个微尘是粗大的人，必定也要承认它的支分，所以是相违的。目标相同是指所诠释的，剩余的是自性。以其他理由也是，这个“也”字是必须把握的意思，意思是唯有其他理由。如果闪电等等成立了从他者的无常，那么从那之中什么不会变成那个无常的理由呢？如果问刚刚产生的会怎么样呢？回答说：那不是，等等。原因是能作因。从原因的词语增加来说，对于能作的法，在知道的原因上加上虚构，无论什么，无论没有什么也会变化
English
The so-called "coarse" is also established by reputation. Regarding "in what" etc., that which possesses two atoms is that which possesses prior atoms, because it is coarse, like a pot. How does this reason establish that it possesses prior atoms? Like this, the coarse one also possesses prior atoms, because it relies on the extremely coarse, whatever is an atom is a coarse atom. Even so, the subtle atoms also become coarse, and here, some valid cognitions are also establishing that the subtle atoms are coarse, and this is not contradictory. What is the answer to this? The answer is: If there are many obstacles, it is contradictory. What is the reason? The answer is: Because the object to be proven, the obstacle, and the proof exist. Also, how is it that the coarse itself is pervaded by the prior atoms of the coarse? As long as there is no connection here, after that it will also become coarse, and there will also be prior atoms that are not coarse. So, from what aspect is it contradictory? How contradictory should be stated like that: A substance with parts is one that has the same location. From this treatise, as long as the element of space is obtained as a substance of a part, then only the substance with parts exists. Therefore, the one who considers that having two atoms is coarse is also not the one who creates that having two atoms, because it is the same location as that? If the locations are different, then the atom will not become its part. Therefore, the one who admits that having two atoms is coarse must also admit its part, so it is contradictory. The same target refers to what is to be expressed, the remainder is the nature. Also with other reasons, the word "also" here is a meaning that must be grasped, meaning only other reasons. If impermanence from others is established for lightning etc., then from that, what will not become the reason for that impermanence? If you ask what will happen to what has just arisen? The answer is: That is not, etc. The cause is the efficient cause. From the addition of the word cause, for the phenomenon of the efficient, adding fabrication to the cause of knowing, whatever, even without anything, will change.