Chinese
由于不愿努力而产生陷入错误的疑虑从何而来？没有疑虑的情况下，就不存在以彻底排除为特征的言语。这种疑虑的种子是不存在的，因为能够完全净化论述对象的量，本身就具有觉悟的引导作用，并且也能阻止有害因素。因此，如果不能通过完全净化对象的量来阻止，那么任何人都无法通过言语来阻止。即使量能够阻止和阻碍，言语也无法引导，因为言语本身并不具备引导和阻止的功能，所以它自己的声音是无意义的。有人认为，凡是自己通过自身来证明的，就是有法，否则就不是。体验依赖于事物的本质，因此，通过体验所证明的就是自己证明的。 思考不依赖于事物的本质，因此，通过思考所证明的就不是自己证明的。为了表明，对于自己证明的有法，所希望的法就是所要证明的，所以才说了“自己的声音”。说了“自己的声音”等等。为了完全排除通过宗义的特征所了解的特殊有法，比如具有虚空性质的有法，以及从区分中产生的“声音”之类的有法，而应当抓住自己彻底证明的，所以为了完全抓住普遍著名的有法，其他人这样说。解释说，对于那一点来说，自己的声音也会变得没有意义。因为在辨析的时候，就已经知道作为基础的有法，普遍著名的是通过体验来证明的，所以这个必要性是合理的。有法是辨析的基础，但从宗义上著名的不是辨析的基础。为什么呢？因为说了“自己所希望的”，也就是自己所希望的所考察的差别存在于哪些方面。另外，会变成什么样呢？对于重要的意义，哪些是主要和接近的结合，如果不是那样，对于意义来说，主要
English
From what does the doubt arise that one enters unwillingly due to not wanting to strive? Without doubt, there is no speech that is characterized by striving to completely eliminate. The seed of such doubt does not exist, because the valid cognition that completely purifies the object of discourse itself has the function of leading to realization, and also prevents what is harmful. Therefore, if it cannot be prevented by the valid cognition that completely purifies the object, then no one can prevent it with words. Even if valid cognition prevents and obstructs, words cannot lead, because words themselves do not have the function of leading and preventing, so their own sound is meaningless. Some think that whatever is proven by oneself through one's own self is the subject, and others are not. Experience depends on the nature of things, therefore, what is proven by experience is proven by oneself. Thinking does not depend on the nature of things, therefore, what is proven by it is not proven by oneself. In order to show that for a subject proven by oneself, the desired property is what is to be proven, that is why it is said "one's own sound." It is said "one's own sound" and so on. In order to completely abandon the special subject known by the characteristics of tenets, such as the subject possessing the qualities of space, and subjects like "sound" arising from distinctions, and to grasp what is thoroughly proven by oneself, therefore, in order to completely grasp the universally famous subject, others say so. It is explained that, for that point, one's own sound also becomes meaningless. Because at the time of analysis, it is already known that the basis, the subject, which is universally famous, is proven by experience, so this necessity is reasonable. The subject is the basis of analysis, but what is famous from the tenets is not the basis of analysis. Why? Because it is said "by one's own desire," that is, in what aspects do the differences examined by one's own desire exist. Furthermore, what will it become like? For the important meaning, which are the main and close combinations, if it is not so, for the meaning, the main
Chinese
没有结合的，就是那些。这是这样说的，对于与人的目的相关的那些事物，具有思辨能力的人会进行辨析，而与事物相关的，也只是通过经验证实的语音等等，而不是自己臆想的区别。因此，对于那些事物，建立无常等等的法，是谁也无法阻止的。如果说，事物本身不就是已经确立为具有特殊性的终点了吗？那为何不能进行辨析呢？是这样说的。因为，对于任何一个法，如果辩论者和反驳者都无法通过经验证实其本质相同，那么它就不是具有矛盾属性的名称所依赖的特殊性的基础。这是这样说的，如果认为无常的本质相同可以通过经验证实，那么，这件事就会变成“这是常还是无常”这样的具有特殊性基础的名称。当对于耳朵所能理解的本质，也超越了他人的经验而进行其他方式的思辨时，因为他人所思辨的本身没有成立，又怎么会想到常等等的差别呢？它的意思是说，对于双方都能接受的事物，才能进行辨析，否则就不能。从经文中成立的不是这样。然而，自己语言所宣说的，是清楚地显示出广为人知的法，并且通过清楚地显示出广为人知的事物，也不是以推论的方式来辨析已经成立的法，因为那是在辨析的场合本身就已经成立了辨析。然而，说的是已经成立的法是不需要证明的，意思是说自己成立的法是不需要证明的，是这样吗？也不是，为什么呢？因为说了“自己的体性本身”等等，仅仅以定义的一个方面就成立了。
English
There is no combination, that is for those. It is said like this, for those things that are related to the purpose of a person, those who have the ability to speculate will discern, and what is related to things is also just the sound etc. that is proven by experience, not the differences that are imagined by oneself. Therefore, for those things, establishing impermanence etc. as dharma, no one can prevent it. If it is said that the thing itself is not already established as the end point with particularity? Then why can't it be discerned? It is said like this. Because, for any dharma, if the debater and the refuter cannot prove that its essence is the same through experience, then it is not the basis of the particularity on which the name with contradictory attributes depends. It is said like this, if it is thought that the same essence of impermanence can be proven by experience, then this matter will become a name with a basis of particularity such as "Is this permanent or impermanent". When, for the essence that can be understood by the ear, one speculates in other ways beyond the experience of others, because the speculation of others itself is not established, how can one think of the differences of permanence etc.? Its meaning is that things that can be accepted by both parties can be discerned, otherwise it cannot. What is established from the scriptures is not like this. However, what is declared by one's own language is to clearly show the well-known dharma, and through clearly showing the well-known things, it is also not to discern the established dharma in a deductive way, because that is because discernment is already established in the very occasion of discernment. However, it is said that the established dharma does not need to be proven, meaning that the dharma established by oneself does not need to be proven, is that so? It is not, why? Because it is said "one's own nature itself" etc., it is established only by one aspect of the definition.
Tibetan
སྒྲུབ་པར་བྱ་བ་མ་ཡིན་པར་རྟོགས་པར་ཤེས་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །ཅིའི་ཕྱིར་རྟོགས་ཤེ་ན། གྲུབ་པ་དང་ཞེས་སྨོས་ཏེ། གང་གི་ཕྱིར་གྲུབ་པ་དང་སྒྲུབ་པར་བྱེད་པ་དེ་དག་གི་ངོ་བོར་བསྟན་པ་ཕྱོགས་ཡིན་པར་དོགས་པ་ཡོད་ན་བསྒྲུབ་པར་བྱ་བ་ཁོ་ནར་བསྟན་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་ངག་འདི་གྲུབ་པ་དང་སྒྲུབ་བྱེད་དག་བསྒྲུབ་པར་བྱ་བ་ཉིད་ཡིན་པ་སེལ་བས་འབྲས་བུ་དང་བཅས་པར་འགྱུར་རོ། །དེས་ན་གྲུབ་བའི་ཆོས་ཅན་བསྒྲུབ་བྱ་ཉིད་ཡིན་པ་ནི་འདི་ཁོ་ན་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་བསལ་བ་ན་གྲུབ་པ་བསྒྲུབ་བྱར་ཐལ་བ་མེད་པས་དེ་བཟློག་པའི་ཕྱིར་རང་ཉིད་སྨོས་པ་འདི་དོན་མེད་དོ། །དགོས་པ་གཞན་ སྨྲས་པ་ནི་རང་ཉིད་ཀྱི་སྒྲས་རང་ཉིད་གྲུབ་པའི་ཆོས་ཅན་ཡོངས་སུ་གཟུང་བར་མ་བརྗོད་ན་རྒོལ་བ་འགའ་ཞིག་ཆོས་ཅན་ཉིད་བསྒྲུབ་བྱར་བྱེད་པར་འགྱུར་རོ། །དེས་ན་རབ་ཏུ་གྲགས་པ་ཉེ་བར་བསྟན་པས་རབ་ཏུ་གྲུབ་པའི་ཆོས་ཅན་གང་ཡིན་པ་དེ་བསྒྲུབ་བྱ་མ་ཡིན་ནོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་དོན་འདི་བརྗོད་པ་ནི་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། འོན་ཀྱང་ཆོས་ཅན་གང་ཡིན་པ་ནི་རབ་ཏུ་གྲུབ་པ་ཁོ་ན་ཡིན་གྱི་བསྒྲུབ་པར་བྱ་བ་ནི་མ་ཡིན་ནོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ཡིན་ནོ་ཞེས་དོགས་པ་ལ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ་ཞེས་འགོག་པར་བྱེད་དོ། །ཅིའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེ་ན། རྗེས་སུ་དཔག་པ་སྤྱིའི་ཡུལ་ཅན་ཡིན་པ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་བརྗོད་པར་བྱ་བའམ། དགོས་པའི་དོན་གང་ཡིན་བ་རྟོགས་པའི་དོན་རྒྱུའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །གལ་ཏེ་རྗེས་སུ་དཔག་པ་སྤྱིའི་ཡུལ་ཅན་ཡིན་དུ་ཆུག་མོད། དེ་ཙམ་གྱིས་ཆོས་ཅན་བསྒྲུབ་བྱ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཅི་ལྟར་འགྱུར་ཞེ་ན། ཆོས་ཅན་ཞེས་སྨོས་སོ། །རང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་བསྒྲུབ་བྱར་འགྱུར་ན་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་རང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཁོ་ན་བསྒྲུབ་བྱར་འགྱུར་བ་མ་ཡིན་ནམ། ཅི་སྐད་དུ་ཚད་མ་གཉི་ག་དངོས་པོའི་ཡུལ་ཅན་ཞེས་བརྗོད་པ་ཡིན་ནོ་ཞེ་ན། བདེན་མོད་ཀྱི། འོན་ཀྱང་རྗེས་སུ་དཔག་པའི་ཡུལ་ནི། འདི་ནི་གཞན་དུ་མཐོང་བ་ཅི་འདྲ་བ་བུད་ཤིང་རྣམ་པར་འགྱུར་བའི་རྒྱུ་དྲོ་བའི་རེག་པའི་ཁྱད་པར་འགའ་ཞིག་ཡིན་ནོ་ཞེས་རྗེས་སུ་འགྲོ་བའི་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་དཔེ་དང་ཐུན་མོང་དུ་རྟོགས་པས་ཁྱབ་པ་རབ་ཏུ་སྟོན་པའི་ཡུལ་དུ་གྱུར་པའི་ཆོས་ཅན་དག་ལ་མཐོང་བའི་རང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡིན་ནོ། །དེའི་སོ་སོར་ངེས་པའི་ཁྱད་པར་རྒྱུད་གཞན་ལས་ལོག་ཅིང་རང་གི་རྒྱུད་ལ་གནས་པ་གང་ཡིན་པ་དེ་ནི་རྗེས་སུ་དཔག་པའི་དུས་སུ་མི་རྟོགས་པ་དེས་ན་སྤྱིར་བཤད་པར་ཡིན་ནོ། །ནམ་ཡང་མཐོང་བ་མེད་པའི་ཆོས་ཅན་བསྒྲུབ་བྱ་ཡིན་ན་ནི། དཔེ་ལ་རྗེས་སུ་འགྲོ་བ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་སོ་སོར་ངེས
Chinese
是为了知晓通达不是所要成立的缘故。为何通达呢？因为说了“已成立”等。因为如果怀疑已成立和成立之事的自性被显示为宗法，那么“唯独显示为所要成立”的这个语句，通过遣除已成立和能成立是所要成立的自性，就会成为具有果实的。因此，如果仅仅通过这个遣除已成立的法是所要成立的，那么因为没有已成立成为所要成立的过失，为了遮遣它，说自己是没有意义的。其他的必要是，如果不用自己的词语完全摄取自己已成立的法，那么有些论敌会把法自身作为所要成立的。因此，并不是说通过显示极著名的，凡是极已成立的法就不是所要成立的这个意义，而是说凡是法，就是极已成立的，而不是所要成立的，为了遣除这个怀疑，就进行遮止。为什么呢？因为理证本身是总相的行境，或者是因为通达必要的意义的缘故。如果理证姑且是总相的行境，仅仅凭此，法如何成为不是所要成立的呢？因为说了法。如果自己的自性成为所要成立的，难道不是自己的自性唯独成为所要成立的吗？如是说，两种量都是实物的行境。回答说：虽然是真实的，但是理证的行境是：这个如同在其他地方所见到的，是木柴转变之因的温暖的触觉的某种差别，如是与比喻共同通达随行之自性，是成为极显示周遍之行境的法等所见的自己的自性。它的各个决定的差别，从其他的相续中返回，并且安住于自己的相续中的，在理证的时候是不通达的，因此是总的宣说。如果任何时候都没有见过的法成为所要成立的，那么因为比喻中没有随行，所以不能各个决定。
English
It is to know and understand that it is not to be established. Why understand? Because it is said "established" and so on. Because if there is doubt that the nature of what is established and what establishes is shown as the property of the subject, then this statement "only shown as what is to be established," by eliminating that what is established and what establishes are the nature of what is to be established, will become fruitful. Therefore, if only by this is eliminated that the established dharma is what is to be established, then because there is no fault of the established becoming what is to be established, to avert it, saying oneself is meaningless. Another necessity is that if one does not completely grasp oneself as the established dharma with one's own words, then some opponents will make the dharma itself as what is to be established. Therefore, it is not to say that by showing the extremely famous, whatever is the extremely established dharma is not what is to be established, but rather to say that whatever is the dharma is only extremely established, and not what is to be established, to dispel this doubt, one prevents it. Why? Because inference itself is the object of the general characteristic, or because of the reason for understanding the meaning of necessity. If inference is assumed to be the object of the general characteristic, how does the dharma become not what is to be established merely by this? Because the dharma is said. If one's own characteristic becomes what is to be established, is it not that one's own characteristic alone becomes what is to be established? As it is said, both valid cognitions are the object of reality. Answer: Although it is true, the object of inference is: this is like what is seen elsewhere, it is some difference of the warm touch that is the cause of the transformation of firewood, thus the nature of following along is commonly understood with the example, it is the own characteristic seen in the dharmas that have become the object of extremely showing pervasion. Its individual determined differences, returning from other continuums, and abiding in one's own continuum, are not understood at the time of inference, therefore it is a general statement. If the dharma that has never been seen becomes what is to be established, then because there is no following along in the example, it cannot be individually determined.