English
Therefore, if a distinction is made, there will be the fault of non-consequence. If merely speaking establishes it, then it is establishment itself. If, by the pot seen in the example, one establishes it as including both, then one falls into the desired fallacy. Furthermore, if one establishes it universally, although it is said that the establisher is the one who establishes what is already established, here, in order to show that even the universal does not become what is to be established, it is said: If one does not accept that the pot, which has such a clear mind, is of a different nature from other things, then even the universal duality will not be established. If the body is not something else, even so, how can it not become a universal to be established? Because there is no other nature of anything. In order to explain this concise statement, it is said: If both are such entities, that is, if they are the nature of other things, then the word "either" will be related to the meaning. "Either" is because the word does not definitely refer to one, but refers to both, and if the body is not the second, then it is not capable. For example, in "such as," etc., if both Lhasin and Chosin can be eaten, then because it is not definitely referring to one, the word "either" is related to the meaning. If for some reason it is impossible to eat one, or if the speaker does not want to eat either one, then it is not. Therefore, this shows that at the time of consequence, since the opponent has not established either one including both, therefore, because it does not follow, the universal is not to be established. Now, in order to show that the opponent does not want the subject to be established to have either one including both, it is said: From this reason, the nature of any other thing is also unreasonable. From where? Because the pot itself, that is, itself admits to being another thing. If one admits, then it is contradictory, and this is said because it is contradictory. If one does not admit, how is it? The pot is not another thing different from the pot. Therefore, the body itself has become another thing, so it is definitely present in the pure meaning of the two itself. Therefore, for what reason is the universal
Chinese
将要成立的任何事物，与二者结合本身并非要成立的事物。因此，提及任何普遍陈述都是没有意义的。如果不是这样，那么声称任何事物都是二者，并且提及任何事物的意义，那么就会产生矛盾。所说的“彼岸美”的成立之词，就会产生矛盾，即产生损害。为什么呢？解释说：瓶子以其自身的本质，与瓶子本身的本质和变成其他事物的本质相反，这些都是矛盾的。如果瓶子本身对于瓶子本身是二者，那么那时瓶子既是瓶子，又是其他事物，那么这就是在一个自身上的矛盾。如何才能从这里理解这种矛盾的意义呢？因为通过暗示的身体本身，瓶子是与二者结合的缘故。解释说：如果想要将此身体本身说成是其他意义。所谓“那样说”就是指其他的意义。任何“任何”的声音都不会变成身体本身。然而，瓶子也是在那里，这意味着它会以其他事物的本质被接受，因此这是矛盾的。因此，这意味着其他的理由也不是依赖于普遍的二者。之前，瓶子和人群是例子和要成立的法，因为不是其他意义，所以说普遍不存在要成立的事物。现在，瓶子或每个人也不是二者，因此不是依赖于普遍的，因为不可能存在所有的显现，所以它的普遍是不合理的。在此，瓶子和人之间没有区别，因此二者的普遍是不合理的。在此，例子就像婆罗门等不是婆罗门等的种姓，没有种姓的基础，只有显现的种姓本身不存在，以及分别的知识，即与分别相关的知识，没有依赖于感官一样。如何呢？就像这样，分别的知识不是依赖于眼睛的，因为它的意思是说，就像眼睛的知识一样，没有理解它的意义。
English
Whatever is to be established, being combined with the two is not what is to be established. Therefore, mentioning any general statement becomes meaningless. If it is not so, then claiming that anything is two, and mentioning the meaning of anything, then it will become contradictory. The word 'other shore beauty' to be established will become contradictory, that is, harmful. Why? Explaining: A vase, by its own nature, is contradictory to its own nature of the vase itself and the nature of becoming other things, these are contradictory. If the vase itself is two for the vase itself, then at that time the vase is both a vase and other things, then this is a contradiction on one's own self. How can one understand this meaning of contradiction from here? Because by the body itself of implication, the vase is combined with the two. Explaining: If one wants to say that this body itself is another meaning. The so-called 'saying like that' refers to other meanings. Any sound of 'any' will not become the body itself. However, the vase is also there, which means that it will be accepted as the nature of other things, therefore this is a contradiction. Therefore, it means that other reasons are also not dependent on the general two. Before, the vase and the crowd were examples and the dharma to be established, because it is not another meaning, so it is said that the general does not exist as something to be established. Now, the vase or each person is also not two, therefore it is not dependent on the general, because it is impossible for all manifestations to exist, so its general is unreasonable. Here, there is no difference between the vase and the person, therefore the general of the two is unreasonable. Here, the example is like the Brahmin etc. are not the caste of the Brahmin etc., there is no basis for the caste, only the caste itself of manifestation does not exist, and the knowledge of distinction, that is, the knowledge related to distinction, is not dependent on the senses. How? Like this, the knowledge of distinction is not dependent on the eyes, because its meaning is, like the knowledge of the eyes, there is no understanding of its meaning.
Chinese
之故。所謂依眼之識，即是各別之色，若所取之分別非色，以其於他方面為眼之識所取故。因此，彼亦非眼所取，以眼不隨彼轉故。凡依於某者，即隨彼轉，如所見之眼識。此分別之識則不如是。又，凡為某之果者，即說為依於彼。分別之識非眼之果，以分別之識於無眼時亦有故。如是，以如是三種理由，分別之識亦非依於耳等，故非依於根。如是之語，乃次第之意，如是彼非如是之意。身與瓶二者，是否承許為一，或如是之異物？瓶與身等，凡身之任何轉為異義者，如是總體，具有總體之異義自性，成為所立。如是者，乃異義之自性。如是之身，以疑不隨譬喻而行，故未自許，瓶亦以與瓶相異之義自性相違故，未承許。故具有總體之所立亦不可能。為以譬喻之門闡明不可能，故說：如是世間之語義存在耶？意即不存在。如何耶？謂從天施與祭祀施等說起。於此，了知為天施之食施，乃食施之差別，如是亦了知為祭祀施。此食施本身，亦為總體，任何語義之境亦不可能。如是思惟，此義乃
English
Therefore. That which is called consciousness based on the eye is the perception of individual forms. If the apprehended conceptualization is not form, it is because it is apprehended by the eye's consciousness in another way. Therefore, it is not to be apprehended by the eye, because the eye does not follow it. Whatever relies on something follows it, like the consciousness of the eye that sees. This consciousness of conceptualization is not like that. Furthermore, whatever is the result of something is said to rely on it. The consciousness of conceptualization is not the result of the eye, because the consciousness of conceptualization exists even when the eye is absent. Likewise, with these three reasons, the consciousness of conceptualization does not rely on the ear, etc., so it does not rely on the senses. The word "likewise" means sequentially, meaning "likewise, it is not like that." Are the body and the pot acknowledged as one and the same, or as different entities? Are the pot and the body, etc., any transformation of the body into a different meaning, such that the generality, the nature of the different meaning possessing generality, becomes the proposition? "Thus" is the nature of a different meaning. Such a body is not acknowledged because it is suspected of not following the example, and the pot is not acknowledged because it contradicts the nature of a meaning different from the pot. Therefore, a proposition possessing generality is also impossible. To clarify the impossibility through the door of example, it is said: Does the meaning of such worldly speech exist? The meaning is that it does not exist. How is it? It is said from the beginning of the offering to the gods and the offering of sacrifices. Here, the offering of food understood as an offering to the gods is a distinction of the offering of food, and likewise, it is also understood as an offering of sacrifices. This offering of food itself is also a generality, and the object of any meaning of words is also impossible. Thinking thus, this meaning is...
Chinese
因为相违背。因为说“不是施于天授，也不是施于祭祀”的这句话，并不是仅仅遮止了成立，而是为了遮止决定的意义。为了显示那决定本身而说：应当像这样确定地遮止“不是仅仅施于天授”。想法是这样的：因为成立和破斥在一个事物上是相违背的。如果说，在任何一个对象上成立布施食物时，破斥就是具有决定的对象，那么，不是的。因为仅仅说任何一个，就没有必然的过失。如果必然有过失，那么是为了遮止它而说的。仅仅安置具有分别意义的“任何一个”的词语，就没有过失。因为如果执持“任何一个”的词语，就没有必然的过失，因此，不仅仅是完全执持两者，而是在执持一个时，说“任何一个”这个是有道理的。什么时候呢？如果执持一个是不相违背的时候。如果相违背，那么就仅仅是没有道理的。如果不相违背，那么就说明了有道理本身，例如说。即使吃了一个，也能说吃了任何一个，因此能够说“任何一个”。如果所应理的两件事中，有一件不可能，那么以两者为对象的“任何一个”的词语，不是没有道理吗？回答说：因为这个“任何一个”的词语的对象是分别。因为成立对任何一个布施食物，就会理解分别的意义，而不是决定。因此，即使一个不可能，也认为成立的那个对象是第二个。安置“任何一个”的词语时，并不是要成立在哪个上它是不可能的那个本身，
English
Because they contradict. Because this statement, "It is not given to Devadatta, nor is it given to a sacrifice," does not merely negate establishment, but is for the purpose of negating certainty. To show that very certainty, it is said: It should be definitely negated in this way, "It is not given only to Devadatta." The thought is this: because establishment and refutation are contradictory on one thing. If it is said that when giving food is established on any object, then refutation is the very one with a definite object, then, it is not so. Because merely saying "any one," there is no fault of necessity. If there is a fault of necessity, then it is said to negate it. Merely placing the word "any one" which has the meaning of distinction, there is no fault. Because if the word "any one" is held close, there is no fault of necessity, therefore, not only is it completely holding both, but when holding one, saying "any one" is reasonable. When is it? If holding one is not contradictory. If it is contradictory, then it is only unreasonable. If it is not contradictory, then it explains the very fact that it is reasonable, for example. Even if one eats, one can say that one eats any one, therefore one can say "any one." If one of the two things that should be done is impossible, then is the word "any one" which has both as its object not unreasonable? Answer: Because the object of this word "any one" is distinction. Because establishing giving food to any one, one will understand the meaning of distinction, but not certainty. Therefore, even if one is impossible, it is considered that the object of that establishment is the second. When placing the word "any one," it is not the meaning of establishing that very thing on which it is impossible,