Chinese
对于布施等，就像在村庄等地方一样，理解为是具有“去做”这件事的意义的对象，并且陈述那本身就是要做的事。如果有人问“做什么”，回答说：做供养布施，做有意义的事。这是说，缘起的意义就是做事。对于这个“做供养布施”等，就像是声音的界限的意义一样。因此，“那么”这个词的意义就是声音的界限，也就是刀刃的意义。如果有人怀疑，例如“如果怀疑就煮沸”等，要如何回答呢？这是要表达的意思。或者，“做什么”这个刀刃的意义的对象本身，怀疑的本质是什么，这实际上是在说明，怀疑供养布施等的意思。所谓的普遍自性，就是对于特殊的对象也怀疑，这是将它命名为普遍的。这是说，因为没有混淆特殊，所以把它设定为不相异。如果仅仅是普遍的认识，而不是没有混淆，那么对于没有认识到特殊也会怀疑吗？这是在说明太过分了，那就是“没有普遍性”。即使没有混淆，就像从烟中认识到火一样，从普遍中认识到特殊，也不应该怀疑，这是在说明“如果是那样，那也是”。对于有联系的事物，例如仅仅看到等普遍的事物，与矛盾的普遍不明显，这是在说明，安立附近是怀疑的原因，那就是“普遍本身”。就像全知者等一样，仅仅是没有差别的目标，因为是有和无共同的，所以是怀疑的原因。这是在说明，普遍不是显而易见的，那就是“普遍不明显”等。所谓的成为目标的种类，这指的是说没有差别的，不明显的不存在。有人说，没有把握特殊的确定性的忆念本身就是怀疑，那就是“因为忆念特殊”。这是在说明，因为特殊忆念等集合产生，所以对于那个没有差别，那就是“特殊忆念不是其他的怀疑”。ེ་ ཞེས་བྱ་བ་འོ། །其不确定性的缘故，显示为共同之处在于：因此，称为“做”的那个本身，意思是：不确定性被认为是共同的词语之意。对于非特定场所的不显现，仅仅是不显现，而没有确定性的把握。特定场所仅仅是显现的共同之处，除此之外别无他想。有些人提到“事物和非事物”，意思是：显现不清晰或遥远时，形态也不清晰。在这种情况下，凭借不显现的差别，这个清晰的智慧就是不显现之意。为了说明在某些地方不显现的事物，凭借土地而显现的事物，也是不显现的。称为“所缘之义的自性”，就像无误的烟和火一样，是从共同之处理解差别。如果蓝色是显现的，那么从回忆起它的名字，就会像那样理解蓝色的形态。同样，对于不确定的显现，从回忆起它的名字等等，就会产生是高杆还是其他的形态的分别念，这是不确定的。不是的，因为最初就没有回忆起它的名字等等。如果最初也是不确定的，那么对于没有回忆起差别的那个境，会变成什么样呢？如果回忆起差别就会改变吗？如果是那样，回忆起差别却不确定，那不是犹豫吗？不是其他的，因为这是不确定性的自性。因此，与回忆起差别同时存在的根识是不合理的，因为那个回忆起差别却不确定，是从何而来的呢？从缘取两个差别的共同体性而来，就像常与无常是可量度的一样。虽然如此，但从不是高杆的方面来说，是确定的。没有确定地把握高杆等等的差别，会成为回忆的原因。难道不是从那本身就是确定的吗？为什么要犹豫呢？对于确定为蓝色，会犹豫是黄色吗？它的原因也不是。
English
Regarding generosity and the like, just as in villages and the like, it is understood as having the meaning of "to do," and it is stated that that itself is the thing to be done. If someone asks, "What to do?" the answer is: Do offerings and generosity, do meaningful things. This is saying that the meaning of dependent arising is to do things. Regarding this "doing offerings and generosity" and the like, it is like the meaning of the realm of sound. Therefore, the meaning of the word "then" is the realm of sound, which is the meaning of the blade. If someone doubts, for example, "If you doubt, boil it," how should one answer? This is the meaning to be expressed. Or, the object of the meaning of the blade of "what to do" itself, what is the nature of doubt, this is actually explaining the meaning of doubting offerings and generosity and the like. The so-called universal nature is that even for a specific object, there is doubt, and this is what is named as universal. This is saying that because the specific is not confused, it is established as not different. If it is only a universal understanding, and not without confusion, then would there also be doubt about not understanding the specific? This is explaining that it is too extreme, that is, "there is no universality." Even without confusion, just as recognizing fire from smoke, it is not appropriate to doubt from recognizing the specific from the universal, this is explaining that "if that is the case, that is also." For related things, such as merely seeing universal things and the like, the contradiction of the universal is not obvious, this is explaining that establishing proximity is the reason for doubt, that is, "the universal itself." Just like omniscience and the like, merely the aim that has no difference, because it is common to existence and non-existence, it is the reason for doubt. This is explaining that the universal is not obvious, that is, "the universal is not obvious" and so on. The so-called type of object that has become an object, this refers to speaking of the non-existence of the non-obvious that has no difference. Someone says that the memory itself that has not grasped the certainty of the specific is doubt, that is, "because of remembering the specific." This is explaining that because the collection of specific memory and the like arises, therefore for that which has no difference, that is, "specific memory is not another doubt."
English
It is called "e." To show that it is common because its particularity is not determined: Therefore, it is called "doing" itself, meaning that the undetermined particularity is considered a common term. For the non-manifestation of a specific place, there is only non-manifestation, and there is no certainty to be grasped. A specific place is only the manifestation of the commonality, and nothing else is thought of. Some mention "things and non-things," meaning that when the appearance is unclear or distant, the form is also unclear. In this case, by virtue of the distinction of non-manifestation, this clear wisdom is the meaning of non-manifestation. To illustrate that things that do not appear in some places, things that appear by virtue of the land, are also non-manifest. It is called "the nature of the object to be perceived," just like the unerring smoke and fire, understanding the distinction from the commonality. If blue is manifest, then from remembering its name, one understands the form of blue in that way. Similarly, for an uncertain manifestation, from remembering its name, etc., there arises the conceptual thought of whether it is a high pole or something else, which is uncertain. No, because initially there is no recollection of its name, etc. If the beginning is also uncertain, then what will happen to that object where the distinction is not remembered? If the distinction is remembered, will it change? If that is the case, remembering the distinction but being uncertain, is that not hesitation? It is not something else, because this is the nature of uncertainty. Therefore, the sense consciousness that exists simultaneously with the recollection of distinction is unreasonable, because that recollection of distinction is uncertain, from where does it arise? It comes from perceiving the common nature of two distinctions, just as permanence and impermanence are measurable. Although that is the case, it is certain that it is different from not being a high pole. Not definitely grasping the distinctions of high pole, etc., becomes the cause of recollection. Is it not certain from that itself? Why hesitate? For what is determined to be blue, would one hesitate that it is yellow? Its cause is also not.