Chinese
哦，像这样。梦境显现之时，只是暂时的，会消逝的。因此，有不虚妄的梦，为了再次见到它。另一种梦境的分类，在那里也是不存在的。因为是需要被证成的，所以从欺骗中，如果成立，则是互相依赖的。另外，知道“这个是不存在的”，不会被其他人所证悟。这仅仅是对非共同特征的证悟。这些证悟是如此这般，因为是从无始以来的习气中产生的，所以对于名言者来说是会产生的。有什么不同呢？因为专注于此，显现为觉醒的自性，也显现为觉醒的所缘的体性。从习气的力量中，舍弃睡眠的身体。这也是仅仅是各别的，胜义谛中是没有所谓的觉醒的，因为在梦中也是如此证悟的。如果说，梦境的意识不会认为觉醒的对境是不存在的，那么，这是不确定的。之后成立的那些，会证悟到那是存在或不存在。那些行走等等的，没有障碍，在那上面是成立的。通过行走等等没有障碍地成立，从行为的角度，证悟到主体的空性，通过分别念，还需要用其他什么来证成呢？分别念对于真实的事物，也会证悟为不真实的。如果不是这样，互相矛盾就不会成为分别念了。因此，因为迅速坏灭，以及在醒来的时候没有跟随，所以在梦中见到清净的事物，会显现为不真实的假象，但仅仅凭此，它也不会变成真实的。因此，在梦境的境中，行走和到来，即使没有被其他人看到，但那些事物是存在的，所以没有看到是不确定的。因此，不能确定没有行走和到来。或者，这是在显示不存在。另外，如果觉知与身体不是他体的，并且身体也仅仅是微尘的集合，那么，所有的微尘都会各自成为觉知。然而，如果是有肢分的大体，唯一如此被缘取，那么，
English
O, like this. When a dream appears, it is only temporary and will disappear. Therefore, there are non-deceptive dreams, in order to see them again. Another classification of dreams, there is no establishment there either. Because it needs to be proven, so from deception, if it is established, then it is mutually dependent. Furthermore, knowing "this does not exist" will not be realized by others. This is merely the realization of non-common characteristics. These realizations are such, because they arise from beginningless habits, so they arise for those who use conventional terms. What is the difference? Because of focusing on it, it appears as the nature of awakening, and also appears as the nature of the object of awakening. From the power of habits, abandoning the sleeping body. This is also merely separate, in ultimate truth there is no so-called awakening, because it is realized in the same way in dreams. If it is said that the consciousness of dreams does not think that the objects of awakening do not exist, then this is uncertain. Those that are established later, will realize that it is existent or non-existent. Those walking and so on, without obstacles, are established on that. Through walking and so on being established without obstacles, from the perspective of action, realizing the emptiness of the subject, through conceptual thought, what else needs to be proven? Conceptual thought, even for true things, will realize them as untrue. If it is not like this, mutual contradictions will not become conceptual thoughts. Therefore, because of rapid destruction, and because there is no following when waking up, seeing pure things in dreams will appear as unreal illusions, but merely by this, it will not become true. Therefore, in the realm of dreams, walking and coming, even if they are not seen by others, but those things exist, so not seeing them is uncertain. Therefore, it cannot be determined that there is no walking and coming. Or, this is showing non-existence. Furthermore, if awareness is not different from the body, and the body is merely an aggregate of particles, then all the particles would each become awareness. However, if it is a large body with limbs, only that is apprehended, then,
Chinese
因为安住于极微细尘中，触及极微细尘便能了知极微细尘。然而，如果触觉是从那些（极微细尘）中产生的，而不是安住于那些（极微细尘）之中，如果是这样，那么“从那些之中”是从何了知的呢？自证不是他证。然而，如果是他证，而不是自证，那么如何感受快乐呢？如果说是由于了知了转变为他者的缘故，那是不对的。如果了知转变为他者，那么了知会变成什么其他的呢？凡是被称为了知而安住的，那本身就是了知。转变为他者，快乐等等，以及蓝色等等本身就是了知。如果还有其他什么，那么什么会成为所了知的对象呢？如果说是身体本身，那是不对的。除了快乐和蓝色等之外，身体又被认为是怎样的呢？ 那只是所缘境，因此，为何不是能缘境呢？如果眼睛等也是如此，那么为何驴角不是如此呢？如果那（眼睛等）是能力实体，在未被了知的情况下，它又如何能如是转变呢？如果说眼睛等如同驴角一样，没有所缘，就不是具有所缘的能缘，如果说眼睛等是能力的自性，因此不像不存在的驴角，如果能力也是在未被了知的情况下存在，那么这又是从何而来的呢？如果说是通过果来了知它，那么那些果是什么呢？是了知快乐等等和色等等。既然那也是能力本身，难道不是未被了知吗？如果剩余的色等等本身就是那些，那么那些就不是识之能力的果了。如果眼睛等本身就是果，那么就会变成先前不存在的了。如果说是了知的状态是果，那么就会变成分别了知各个极微细尘了。如果没有差别，那么状态也不会变成不同的。如果有差别，那么就会变成自己了知自己了。如果说是与能力一同产生的就是差别，那是不合理的。就像这样：如果一同存在就能衡量能力，并且也认为那是从推测而来，那么互相依赖的过失，又如何能够避免呢？了知本身就是色等等的差别。如果了知是能力
English
Because it abides in the extremely minute particles, touching the extremely minute particles will make the extremely minute particles known. However, if touch arises from those (extremely minute particles) and does not abide in those (extremely minute particles), if that is the case, then how is it known "from those"? Self-cognition is not other-cognition. However, if it is other-cognition and not self-cognition, then how is happiness felt? If it is said that it is because of knowing the transformation into otherness, that is not correct. If one knows the transformation into otherness, then what other thing will cognition become? Whatever is called cognition and abides, that itself is cognition. Transformation into otherness, happiness and so on, and blue and so on, are themselves cognition. If there is something else, then what will become the object of cognition? If it is said that it is the body itself, that is not correct. Apart from happiness and blue and so on, what is the body considered to be? That is only the object of cognition, therefore, why is it not the subject of cognition? If the eyes and so on are also like that, then why is the horn of a donkey not like that? If that (the eyes and so on) is the entity of ability, how can it transform like that without being known? If it is said that the eyes and so on, like the horn of a donkey, have no object of cognition and are not the subject of cognition that has an object of cognition, if it is said that the eyes and so on are the nature of ability, therefore they are not like the non-existent horn of a donkey, if ability also exists without being known, then from where does that come? If it is said that it is known through the fruit, then what are those fruits? It is the cognition of happiness and so on and form and so on. Since that is also ability itself, is it not unknown? If the remaining form and so on are those themselves, then those are not the fruit of the ability of consciousness. If the eyes and so on are themselves the fruit, then it will become previously non-existent. If it is said that the state of cognition is the fruit, then it will become separately cognizing each extremely minute particle. If there is no difference, then the state will also not become different. If there is a difference, then it will become self-cognizing. If it is said that what arises together with ability is the difference, that is not reasonable. Like this: If ability can be measured when existing together, and it is also considered to be from inference, then how can the fault of mutual dependence be avoided? Cognition itself is the difference of form and so on. If cognition is ability
Tibetan
་དང་ལྷན་ཅིག་པ་ཉིད་ཡིན་ན་ཅི་ལྟར་ནུས་པ་མ་གྲུབ་པར་ལྷན་ཅིག་པ་ཉིད་གྲུབ། དེ་མ་གྲུབ་ན་ཅི་ལྟར་ནུས་པ་རྗེས་སུ་དཔག །དེའི་ཕྱིར་རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པ་ནི་གཟུགས་ལ་སོགས་པ་དང་བདེ་བ་ལ་སོགས་པ་ཙམ་རང་རིག་པ་ཉིད་ཡིན་ཏེ། རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པ་བདེ་བ་ལ་སོགས་པ་ཞེས་གཞི་མཐུན་པར་རྟོགས་པ་སྐྱེ་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །གཞི་མཐུན་པ་ནི་གཙོ་བོ་དང༌། བརྟགས་པའི་དབྱེ་བ་ལས་གཞན་མེད། །སྐྱེས་བུ་དབྱུག་པ་དེ་བཞིན་དུ། །སྐྱེས་བུ་སེམས་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བཞིན། །གལ་ཏེ་གཙོ་བོ་མ་ཡིན་ན། །འཁྲིའུ་འབོད་དོ། །སྐྱེས་བུ་དབྱིག་པའོ་ཞེས་ བྱ་བ་དེ་ལྟར་འགྱུར་ན། དེ་ནི་འདིར་རབ་ཏུ་མ་གྲུབ་པ་ཉིད་དེ། གཟུགས་ལ་སོགས་པའི་རང་བཞིན་ལས་ཐ་དད་པའི་རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པ་དམིགས་པ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དཔེ་འདི་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་རྗེས་སུ་དཔོག་གོ་ཞེ་ན། མ་ཡིན་ཏེ་རྗེས་སུ་དཔག་པ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །གྲངས་ཅན་པ་རྣམས་སེམས་པ་སྐྱེས་བུ་ཞེས་གཙོ་བོའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ་ཁས་ལེན་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དེའི་ཕྱིར་གང་ཇི་ལྟར་རིག་པ་དེ་དེ་ལྟ་བུ་ཉིད་དུ་ཁས་བླང་བར་བྱའོ། །གོམས་ལས་དེ་ལྟ་བུར་འགྱུར་བའི། །གཟུགས་སོགས་ལ་གནས་རིག་པ་ནི། །གཟུགས་སོགས་གཞན་དང་གཞན་དག་ཏུ། །འཕོ་བ་ཉིད་དུ་ཡོད་པར་འགྱུར། །རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པ་དམིགས་པ་མ་གཏོགས་པ་གཞན་དང་འདྲེ་བ་ནི་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། །དེས་ན་བདེ་བ་དང་འདྲེས་པར་བྱས་པ་ནི། །གཟུགས་ལ་སོགས་པ་དང་འདྲེས་པར་འགྱུར་རོ། །གཟུགས་ལ་སོགས་པ་དང་འདྲེས་པར་འགྱུར་བ་ནི་གོམས་པ་ལས་རྟགས་ཀྱི་རྣམ་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་བཟུང་བས་དེའི་རྣམ་པ་མཐའ་དག་རྟོགས་ན་གཞན་གྱི་བདེ་བ་ལ་སོགས་པ་དང་འདྲེ་བར་འགྱུར་བ་ཡིན་ནོ། །འོ་ན་ཇི་ལྟར་གཟུགས་ལ་སོགས་པ་དང་གཞན་གྱི་བདེ་བ་ལ་སོགས་པ་དག་ལོགས་ཤིག་ཏུ་གནས་པ་དག་ཏུ་དམིགས་ཤ་ན། དེ་ནི་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། རང་གི་ངོ་བོར་རིག་པ་ལ། །ལོགས་གནས་མི་གནས་ཡོད་མིན་ཏེ། །འདི་ནི་རྟེན་ལ་ལྟོས་པའི་ཐ་སྙད་འབའ་ཞིག་ཡིན་པར་ཟད། རང་གི་ངོ་བོ་རིག་པ་ལས་མ་གཏོགས་པ་བདེ་བ་ལ་སོགས་པ་དང་གཟུགས་ལ་སོགས་པའི་རིག་པ་རྣམ་པ་གཞན་ནི་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། །དེས་ན་འདིས་ནི་ལོགས་ཤིག་ན་གནས་པ་འམ་གཞན་ཡིན་ནོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་རྣམ་པར་དབྱེ་བ་འདི་ག་ལ་ཡོད་དེ། ལུས་ཀྱི་རྟེན་ལ་ལྟོས་ནས་འདི་ནི་ལོགས་ཤིག་པའམ་གཞན་ཡིན་ནོ་ཞེས་ཐ་སྙད་པའི་རྣམ་པར་དབྱེ་བ་འབའ་ཞིག་ཏུ་ཟད་དོ། །གལ་ཏེ་ལྟོས་པ་མེད་པར་ནི། །དེ་ཡི་རང་བཞིན་རིག་མིན་ནོ། །དེ་ཡི་རང་བཞིན་རིག་པ་ལ། །ལྟོས་པ་གཞན་ནི་ཡོད་མིན་ན། །དེ་བརྟེན་དེ
Chinese
如果与能力同时存在，那么在能力未成立的情况下，如何成立同时存在？如果它不成立，又如何推断能力？因此，识只是色等和乐等自证，因为会产生识是乐等，这种基础相同的认识。基础相同是指主和推测的差别之外没有其他。如人与杖，如称人为心。如果不是主，则称为蔓草。如称人为杖，就会变成那样，这在这里是完全不成立的，因为没有缘于色等自性之外的识。如果用这个例子来推断，那是不行的，因为没有推断。数论派承认心是人，是主的相同基础。因此，应当承认如何认识，它就是那样。从串习而变成那样的，安住于色等的识，会变成色等各不相同地转移。识不是与所缘之外的其他混合。因此，与乐混合，就会与色等混合。与色等混合，就是从串习中执持一切相的形相，如果通达其一切形相，就会与其他的乐等混合。那么，如何缘于色等和其它的乐等各自独立存在呢？那不是的，在自性中认识，没有独立存在或不独立存在，这只是依赖于所依的假名而已。除了在自性中认识之外，没有其他的乐等和色等的识。因此，哪里会有这个区分，即它独立存在或它是其他的呢？只是依赖于身体的所依，而说这是独立的或其他的假名区分而已。如果不是依赖，则不能认识它的自性。在认识它的自性时，没有其他的依赖，它依赖于它
English
If it exists simultaneously with ability, how can simultaneity be established when ability is not established? If it is not established, how can ability be inferred? Therefore, consciousness is only self-awareness of form and so on, and pleasure and so on, because the understanding that consciousness is pleasure and so on arises from a common basis. A common basis is nothing other than the distinction between the principal and the inferred. Like a man and a staff, like calling a man mind. If it is not the principal, it is called a creeper. If it becomes like calling a man a staff, then it is completely unestablished here, because there is no object of consciousness that is distinct from the nature of form and so on. If you infer from this example, it is not possible, because there is no inference. The Samkhyas acknowledge that mind is man, the common basis of the principal. Therefore, one should acknowledge that whatever is known is just as it is. The knowledge that abides in form and so on, which becomes like that from habituation, will exist as a transformation into different forms and so on. Consciousness is not mixed with anything other than the object. Therefore, what is mixed with pleasure will be mixed with form and so on. What is mixed with form and so on is that by grasping all aspects of the sign from habituation, if all its aspects are understood, it will be mixed with other pleasures and so on. Then, how do you perceive form and so on and other pleasures and so on as existing separately? That is not so, because in knowing one's own nature, there is no separate existence or non-existence, this is only a mere designation dependent on the support. Other than knowing one's own nature, there is no other knowledge of pleasure and so on and form and so on. Therefore, where is this distinction that it exists separately or it is other? It is only a mere designation distinction that, depending on the support of the body, this is separate or other. If there is no dependence, then its own nature cannot be known. When its own nature is known, there is no other dependence, it depends on it.