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DTG178 0001.The Ornament of Commentary on Valid Cognition. Composed by Jñānākaraśānti.. The Ornament of Commentary on Valid Cognition. Composed by Jñānākaraśānti..g2.0f

English

It should be determined that this is not another view. Therefore, it is said: From the differences of those things themselves, arise different feelings such as pleasure and pain. For example, consciousness itself has differences such as clarity, non-clarity, and doubt. If it is said that feelings and happiness, etc., have the same cause, then consciousness would only be consciousness, how would one understand that happiness, etc., are different? This is due to the difference of the collection itself, like the collection of seeds of amalaka fruit nourished by milk, etc. Even if there are nourishing ingredients such as milk, the amalaka seed will not produce a fruit different from amalaka, but it will produce other differences that do not exceed its own nature. If it is said why doesn't it produce different fruits? It cannot be said that it will produce different fruits. If it is established that the collection that produces the fruit is different, then it becomes showing that the cause is different. Furthermore, wisdom, etc., are also produced from Dharma, etc., therefore, they should also become different from consciousness. If it is said that wisdom, etc., are produced from habituation, etc., not from Dharma, etc., then happiness, etc., should also be produced from habituation such as desire and non-desire, etc., therefore, it will not become the cause of those Dharmas, etc. If it is said that the proximity of desire, etc., itself is produced from Dharma, then happiness, etc., will not be produced from Dharma, but from capable attention, etc. Since attention with undiminished capacity is also the cause of consciousness, happiness, etc., are not produced by different collections. If it is also said that wisdom, etc., are not the cause of happiness, etc., nor do they have the cause of Dharma, etc., but the happiness that arises from the existence of wisdom is what has the cause of Dharma, etc. Therefore, happiness, etc., are not established as having the same cause, then this is also not well said, just like this: Wisdom, etc., arise from Dharma, etc., happiness, etc., do not arise from those Dharmas, etc., from what valid cognition do you establish this? This cannot be established. It is not established through valid cognition.