English
If one thinks that for things that appear in relation to causes such as eye consciousness and subsequent arising, they will not transform into being identical to their own essence, then that is also acceptable. Because, like the thought "that is fire," its consciousness is of the same essence. The nature realized through inference is also visible. Merely being of the same essence as that will not transform into the consciousness that holds it, and what should be held by the consciousness that depends on the same cause, because other things held by other consciousnesses such as inference may also be of the same essence. Apart from experiencing two aspects, there is also no other identical essence. If so, what is the difference between identical essence and another? Experiencing two natures is not non-existent even for things of different essences. This is also easy to understand, just like this: Because one thing is done, the term one arises, Having the same essence, the term is also reasonable. How does the term arise merely from a cause? Terms such as identical essence arise from the tradition of terms without beginning. If a thorough analysis is carried out, it is unbearable, because if an analysis is carried out, it will only lead to destruction. Like this: In that consciousness "that is fire," Only the appearance of the two, From the appearance of that nature, There is no other identical essence. This is the concluding verse. If for other things that appear as two, how will it not transform into the term of identical essence? Because the habit is certain, so the term is also certain. The awakening of the habit produced by doing the same thing is also certain. If consciousness is the appearance of two, why will it not transform into a different term? Because the habit is certain, as has been said. Therefore, from things of identical essence, it will not transform into merely a consciousness with discrimination. If the general and the particular are not very different, therefore even if it is the same thing, its particularity is recognized through discrimination, then that is not true. If all self-natures, or some self-natures have no difference, then if one recognizes the particular from the general, then all consciousnesses will become one. If the general appears in discrimination, then for that which is not different from it...
Chinese
如果还有差别显现，那么声音的觉知也会显现，因为道理相同。因为道理相同，所以道理的境不相同是不可能的。因为道理相同，所以道理的境不相同是不可能的。然而，因为没有眼等原因，所以那个差别不显现，如果是这样，那么它怎么会变成不异体呢？不是和它一起随顺的，就不能认识为一体。如果是后来随顺的缘故，那么它在那时是不存在的，所以不是随顺。那是它的自性本身，所以就是那个。如果它在那里显现，怎么会理解为随顺呢？如果它在那里显现，怎么会理解为随顺呢？如果它是先前以什么自性见到的，就以那个自性显现。怎么会理解为随顺呢？就像先前一样。如果它不是以它的自性显现，但因为它本身在其他地方没有，所以怎么会理解为它是随顺呢？因此，不显现和一不是一体，也不是多体。因此，先前显现为不同的，后来才领悟，这又是什么呢？因此，因为没有原因而显现为一体是不可能的，也是多体。因此，如果没有不分别，那么凭借什么来理解差别呢？如果有一些不分别存在，那么它和具有相同原因的，一切都一样，是果的自性。不同的原因来自不同的原因。然而，舍弃分别的自性而领悟差别，是因为眼等原因产生的是差别认知，如果是这样，那么依赖于它的原因的一切都会变成不分别。如果不依赖于不同的原因，那么不同的事物就不可能具有量。因此，和它的同类原因相关联的就是它的同类。有分别的意识和另一个不是相同的原因。就像这样，不依赖于外在事物，从符号记忆中产生结合。同样，不依赖于符号，对于事物的能力本身，眼睛会变成智慧。感官的各种意识和
English
If there is also a difference appearing, then the awareness of sound will also appear, because the reasoning is the same. Because the reasoning is the same, it is impossible for the object of reasoning to be different. Because the reasoning is the same, it is impossible for the object of reasoning to be different. However, because there is no cause such as the eye, that difference does not appear. If that is the case, then how can it become non-different? That which does not follow along with it cannot be recognized as one. If it is because it follows later, then it does not exist at that time, so it does not follow. That is its own nature, so it is that. If it appears there, how can it be understood as following? If it appears there, how can it be understood as following? If it is seen earlier with what nature, it appears with that same nature. How can it be understood as following? Just like before. If it does not appear as its own nature, but because it itself does not exist elsewhere, how can it be understood as following? Therefore, not appearing and one are not one, nor are they many. Therefore, what is this that previously appeared as different and was later understood? Therefore, it is impossible for it to appear as one without a cause, and it is also many. Therefore, if there is no non-discrimination, then by what will the difference be understood? If there are some non-discriminations, then it and that which has the same cause, everything is the same, is the nature of the result. Different causes come from different causes. However, abandoning the nature of discrimination and understanding the difference is because what is produced by causes such as the eye is differential cognition. If that is the case, then everything that depends on its cause will become only non-discrimination. If it does not rely on different causes, then different things cannot be valid. Therefore, what is related to the cause of its kind is its own kind. The consciousness with discrimination and the other are not the same cause. Like this, without relying on external things, combination arises from the memory of symbols. Similarly, without relying on symbols, for the ability of things themselves, the eye becomes wisdom. The various consciousnesses of the senses and
Chinese
结合的证悟是互相舍弃，以存在的自性，由各组的力量所产生。如同从自己的自性之组所生起，成为具有依赖性的自性，并具有关联性。结合是不依赖外境，从忆念符号的力量所产生；而根识是不依赖符号，依赖外境而产生。因此，其中没有分别念，因为没有分别念的因。没有因，果的产生是不可能的。如果说，由于与声音和总相等关联的外境力量所产生，因此根的识成为具有分别念的识，这也是不真实的。因为，任何与任何事物直接关联，必定与其同时显现，这件事已成为量士夫的领域。如果这样，那么在见到孔雀等时，所有的关联都应显现。如果认为，任何存在于任何事物中的总相等，只有在它显现时才显现，这也是不真实的，因为会导致不执持声音。因为在布匹等事物中，声音是不存在的。如果不是这样，即使没有执持符号，也会产生“这是布匹”的识，但这是不存在的。因为见到对所说之事物产生怀疑，即使该事物成立，但表达方式的差别是不确定的。如果认为，只是对总相的形态确定，那也不是，因为在初次见到时并不存在，并且因为认识到“与此不同”等等。 如果又认为，像“这是牛”等等的识，是由具有分别念的根与共同作用的色等，依赖于忆念符号而产生。不是不依赖，因为是从果的集合中成就的。无论何时，声音和总相，或者其他差别，只要是忆念先前执持的，那时是由与忆念同时的眼等所产生。因此，对于没有执持符号，以及与先前所见分离的事物，就不会产生这种识，这是一种没有很好考察的说法。例如，如果色依赖于忆念符号，那么根的智
English
The realization of combination is mutually abandoning, generated by the power of the aggregates through the nature of existence itself. How does it become a dependent nature and related, arising from its own aggregate of nature? Combination does not rely on external factors but arises from the power of remembering symbols, while sensory consciousness does not rely on symbols but depends on external factors. Therefore, there is no conceptualization in it, because there is no cause for conceptualization. Without a cause, the arising of a result is impossible. If it is said that the sensory consciousness becomes conceptual because it is generated by the power of external objects related to sound and universals, etc., that is also not true. Because, whatever is directly related to something, must appear simultaneously with it, and this has become the domain of valid cognition. If that were the case, then when seeing peacocks, etc., all relations would have to appear. If it is thought that whatever exists in something, such as universals, only appears when it appears, that is also not true, because it would lead to not apprehending sound. Because sound does not exist in things like cloth. If it were not so, even without grasping the symbol, the cognition "this is cloth" would arise, but that is not the case. Because doubt is seen to arise about what is to be said, even if the thing is established, the difference in the way of expressing it is uncertain. If it is thought that only the form of the universal is certain, that is not so, because it does not exist when first seen, and because of the recognition that "it is different from this," etc. If it is further thought that cognitions such as "this is a cow" are produced by the senses acting together with conceptualization, relying on the remembrance of symbols through forms, etc. It is not independent, because it is accomplished from the collection of results. Whenever sound and universals, or any other difference, are remembered as having been previously grasped, then it is produced by the eye, etc., which are simultaneous with the remembrance. Therefore, it will not change for those who have not grasped the symbol and are separated from what was previously seen, which is a statement that has not been well investigated. For example, if form depends on the remembrance of symbols, then the wisdom of the senses
Chinese
哦，如果能力转变不是无所依赖的，就会像征兆一样变成记忆。如果没有事先体验过，就不会与它结合。如果没有分别确定的记忆，如果没有分别确定的声音等等，就不会与它结合。分别确定的种子没有苏醒是不可能的。使分别确定的记忆种子苏醒，也不是没有看见，因此看见它，就会忆起它的陈述者，忆起就会结合。这样，如果看见而忆起它，那么使之完全苏醒的色等等，就会变成征兆。因此，所有结合的知识都会变成只有征兆。如果仅仅是没有看见一般，那么如何从征兆中领悟呢？部分相同性就被称为一般，那也仅仅是先前的目标。因此，应该是被忆起的，因为具有那样的部分，是与它相似的名言的对境。部分之间的相同性，也是因为是那样相同的部分的相同性，从那里直到心变得相同为止，心也是从那样变得执着而来，直到执着也是从无始以来的习气而来，所以没有过失。因此，与声音或一般等等的结合，就会变成仅仅是从征兆而来。这仅仅是记忆的随念。如果说官能的作用陈述结合是现量，如果是那样，那么所有随念都是从官能所生，因此会变成现量。例如： 此方有火， 不离官能的作用， 方和火是结合者， 如何不变成现量？ 如果认为仅仅是对火进行随念，而结合仅仅是现量，那也是不了解。因为也能这样说： 仅仅对方是现量， 结合是从随念而来， 对火没有官能的知识， 没有执取就不是结合。 结合理应仅仅是从随念而来，因为对火没有官能的作用。没有被现量执取
English
Oh, if the transformation of ability is not independent, it will become like memory as a sign. If there is no prior experience, there will be no combination with it. If there is no separately determined memory, if there is no separately determined sound, etc., there will be no combination with it. It is impossible for the separately determined seed not to awaken. What awakens the separately determined seed of memory is not unseen either, so seeing it will recall its speaker, and recalling will combine. Thus, if seeing recalls it, then the form, etc., that fully awakens it will become a sign. Therefore, all knowledge of combination will become only signs. If it is only that the general is not seen, then how can it be understood from the sign? The similarity of parts is called the general, and that is only the previous object. Therefore, it should be remembered, because having such parts is the object of the term similar to it. The similarity between the parts is also because it is the similarity of such similar parts, from there until the mind becomes the same, the mind also comes from being attached in that way, until the attachment also comes from beginningless habits, so there is no fault. Therefore, the combination with sound or general, etc., will become only from the sign. This is only a recollection of memory. If it is said that the function of the senses states that combination is direct perception, if that is the case, then all inferences are born from the senses, so it will become direct perception. For example: There is fire in this direction, Not separated from the function of the senses, The direction and fire are the combiners, How can it not become direct perception? If it is thought that only inference is made about fire, and combination is only direct perception, that is also not understanding. Because it can also be said: Only the direction is direct perception, The combination comes from inference, There is no sensory knowledge of fire, Not grasping is not combination. Combination should only come from inference, because there is no function of the senses for fire. Not grasped by direct perception.