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DTG178 0001.The Ornament of Commentary on Valid Cognition. Composed by Jñānākaraśānti.. The Ornament of Commentary on Valid Cognition. Composed by Jñānākaraśānti..g2.0f

Chinese

是为了减少。 如果识蕴同时产生,那么有时对境的集合也无法把握,这怎么可能呢?对此回答说: 有些人总是执着, 对近处的事物也无执。 因贪执使生他力衰弱, 二者对此皆有诤。 如果对其他事物贪执而使能力衰弱,那么该识就不会成为产生所有近处事物的识的直接原因。 对二者进行辩驳和考察是相同的。 并不相同,因为只有一种具有意的能力。如果这样,也会显现为同时执取。对于没有太大贪执的事物,只有变化。我们也是这么说的,在贪执的地方是逐渐执取,在其他地方是同时执取。认为一切都是逐渐执取的说法是没有 प्रमाण(pramāṇa, प्रमाण,pramana,量)的。 除了先前的识之外,其他的意识不会成为 प्रमाण(pramāṇa, प्रमाण,pramana,量)的对境。 如果火把是逐渐执取的,难道不是同时显现吗?那也不对,在那里逐渐显现是由于连接,所以心识在那里变化不是这样的,但在那里是唯一的同时显现。 例如: 火把等快速进入的, 随行而有损害的, 从眼中产生轮的错觉。 那不是见连接所致。 快速旋转的火把的刹那的随行使眼睛受到损害,从而产生显现为轮的错觉,但具有事物方面的力量的心识并不是那样变化的。 如果说五境近处存在是同时显现,那只是错觉。那么,一切同时显现都会变成错觉。只是期望吗?不是的,因为错觉本身没有 प्रमाण(pramāṇa, प्रमाण,pramana,量)。同时显现本身是没有错觉的现量证悟。 即使没有损害,那样显现也是错觉,那么一切识都会变成那样。因此,因为没有损害,所以同时缘取的五识是同时的,这样就成立了。因此,现量是没有分别的

English

It is to reduce. If the consciousness aggregates arise simultaneously, then sometimes the collection of objects cannot be grasped, how is that possible? To answer this, it is said: Some people are always attached, Even to nearby things, there is no attachment. Because attachment weakens the power to generate others, Both have disputes about this. If attachment to other things weakens the ability, then that consciousness will not become the immediate cause of generating the consciousness of all nearby things. Arguing and examining the two are the same. It is not the same, because only one has the ability of mind. If so, it will also appear to be grasped simultaneously. For things that are not too attached, there is only change. We also say that where there is attachment, it is gradually grasped, and elsewhere it is grasped simultaneously. The claim that everything is gradually grasped has no प्रमाण(pramāṇa, प्रमाण,pramana,valid cognition/ ಪ್ರಮಾಣ,量). Other mental consciousnesses besides the previous consciousness will not become the object of प्रमाण(pramāṇa, प्रमाण,pramana,valid cognition/ ಪ್ರಮಾಣ,量). If the torch is gradually grasped, does it not appear simultaneously? That is also not true, there the gradual appearance is due to connection, so the mind does not change there like that, but there it is only simultaneous appearance. For example: The torch and so on enter quickly, Following with harm, The illusion of a wheel arises from the eye. That is not caused by seeing connections. The moments of the rapidly rotating torch damage the eye by following, thereby producing the illusion of a wheel, but the consciousness with the power of things is not changed like that. If it is said that the existence of the five objects nearby is a simultaneous appearance, then that is just an illusion. Then, all simultaneous appearances will become illusions. Is it just expectation? No, because illusion itself has no प्रमाण(pramāṇa, प्रमाण,pramana,valid cognition/ ಪ್ರಮಾಣ,量). Simultaneous appearance itself is the direct realization without illusion. Even if there is no harm, such an appearance is an illusion, then all consciousness will become like that. Therefore, because there is no harm, the five consciousnesses that simultaneously perceive are simultaneous, and this is established. Therefore, direct perception is without discrimination.

Chinese

哦,是这样。现在将其他人的观点陈述出来并进行驳斥。有些人说,因为是根识等所生,就像孩童的心识一样没有分别念,孩童的无分别念的因,就是不熟悉符号。另一些人说,现量是没有分别念的,因为是从根产生的,并且以体验的方式进入,而且不是意识,就像孩童的识一样。孩童的根识没有分别念,是因为不能掌握符号。对于这些说法:因为它们没有分别念,所以仅仅是孩童的现量。因为它们与符号的因分离,所以之后也不会改变。说了这些话的人认为,孩童只有现量,他们认为孩童的一切都是没有分别念的。但事实并非如此,孩童在做自己的事情时,也会有先后的认识。如果在那个时候没有认识,那么之后也不会有分别念,因为没有掌握符号的方法。掌握符号的方法就是分别念,而孩童没有分别念。然而,如果对符号不熟悉,有意识,如果他们这样认为,那么根识也会如此。这种说法也是多余的。如果因为孩童们使用意识的词语,所以孩童们有辨别能力。因此,为了掌握符号,之后意识会变得具有分别念。如果是这样,那么根识也会如此。根识之后也会变得具有分别念,这怎么能阻止呢?孩童的根识为什么不能掌握符号呢?如果说因为是根所生的,那么就不是这样,因为没有关联。另外,即使孩童的根识没有分别念,但为什么一定要全部都这样呢?因为没有通过妨害性的量成立关联,仅仅通过例子并不能理解理由。如果说凡是从根所生的,都只是抓住近取,因此是空无先后执取的缘故。

English

Oh, that's how it is. Now, I will present the views of others and refute them. Some say that because it arises from sense consciousness, etc., it is without conceptual thought like the mind of a child, and the cause of a child's non-conceptual thought is unfamiliarity with symbols. Others say that direct perception is without conceptual thought because it arises from the senses, enters in the manner of experience, and is not mind, just like the consciousness of a child. The sense consciousness of a child is without conceptual thought because it cannot grasp symbols. To those who say this: Because they are without conceptual thought, they are merely the direct perception of a child. Because they are separated from the cause of symbols, they will not change even later. Those who have said these words think that children only have direct perception, and they believe that everything in children is without conceptual thought. But this is not the case, children also have prior and subsequent recognition when doing their own things. If there is no recognition at that time, then there will be no conceptual thought later, because there is no way to grasp symbols. The way to grasp symbols is conceptual thought, and children do not have conceptual thought. However, if one is unfamiliar with symbols and has consciousness, if they think so, then it will also be the same for sense consciousness. This statement is also redundant. If it is because children use the words of consciousness, then children have the ability to discriminate. Therefore, in order to grasp symbols, later consciousness will become with conceptual thought. If this is the case, then it will also be the same for sense consciousness. How can one prevent sense consciousness from also becoming with conceptual thought later? Why can't the sense consciousness of a child grasp symbols? If it is said that it is because it arises from the senses, then it is not so, because there is no connection. Furthermore, even if the sense consciousness of a child is without conceptual thought, why must it all be like that? Because the connection is not established through a valid cognition that obstructs, one cannot understand the reason merely through examples. If it is said that whatever arises from the senses only grasps the immediate object, therefore it is empty of prior and subsequent grasping.

Tibetan

་རྣམ་པར་རྟོག་པ་མེད་པ་ཡིན་ནོ་ཞེ་ན། འདི་སྔ་ཕྱི་འཛིན་པས་སྟོང་པ་ཉིད་དུ་ཇི་ལྟར་འགྲུབ། མངོན་སུམ་དུ་བྱེད་པ་ནི་སྔ་མ་དང་ཕྱི་མ་དེ་དག་ལ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་དང༌། མངོན་སུམ་དུ་བྱེད་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ནི། མངོན་སུམ་ཉིད་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ་ཞེ་ན། དེ་ལྟ་ན་ནི་འོ་ན་དབང་པོའི་ཤེས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། བྱིས་པའི་རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་བཞིན་ནོ། །ཞེས་བྱ་བ་དོན་མེད་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། །རྟོག་པ་མེད་པ་ཉིད་ནི་མངོན་སུམ་གྱིས་གྲུབ་པར་འགྱུར་ཏེ་མངོན་སུམ་དུ་བྱེད་པར་སོ་སོར་ངེས་པ་ཉིད་ནི། མངོན་སུམ་གྱིས་ཉམས་སུ་མྱོང་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དེ་ལྟ་མ་ཡིན་ན་གལ་ཏེ་ གང་དུ་ཡང་མངོན་སུམ་རྟོག་པ་མེད་པ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་སྒྲུབ་པར་བྱེད་པ་མ་ཡིན་ན་ཇི་ལྟར་དེའི་རྗེས་སུ་འབྲངས་ནས་རྗེས་སུ་དཔག་པ་འཇུག །ཅི་སྟེ་བྱིས་པའི་རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པ་མངོན་སུམ་དུ་བྱེད་པའི་རྣམ་པ་ཅན་ཡིན་པ་དེའི་ཕྱིར་དབང་པོའི་ཤེས་པ་གཞན་ཡང་ད་ལྟ་བུ་ཉིད་དོ་ཞེ་ན། དེ་ལྟ་ན་ནི་འོ་ན། བྱིས་པ་ལ་སྒྲུབ་གང་ཡིན་པ། །དེ་ཉིད་འདིར་ཡང་བརྗོད་བྱ་སྟེ། །དབང་པོའི་བློ་ནི་མཚུངས་ཕྱིར་རོ། །འདིས་ནི་མྱོང་སོགས་བཤད་པ་ཡིན། །བསྐལ་བ་ལ་མངོན་དུ་བྱེད་པ་མ་མཐོང་བའི་ཕྱིར་དང༌། གཞན་ལ་མཐོང་བའི་ཕྱིར་ལྐོག་ཏུ་མ་གྱུར་པའི་ཡུལ་ཅན་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་མངོན་སུམ་རྟོག་པ་མེད་པ་ཡིན་ནོ་ཞེས་སྤྱིར་བསྒྲུབ་པར་བྱ་བ་ཡིན་གྱི། དབང་པོ་ལས་སྐྱེས་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཀྱིས་ཅི་ཞིག་བྱ། མངོན་སུམ་དུ་བྱེད་པ་ནི་དེ་ནི་རྣམ་པར་རྟོག་པ་མེད་པ་ཉིད་དུ་བརྗོད་དོ། །རྣམ་པར་རྟོག་པ་ཉིད་ནི་རྟོག་པ་དང་བཅས་པ་འགལ་བའི་ཕྱིར་མངོན་སུམ་དུ་བྱེད་པ་ཡིན་པ་དེ་ནི་རྣམ་པར་རྟོག་པ་མེད་པ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ཁྱབ་པ་ཡིན་པ་དེའི་ཕྱིར་འདི་ནི་འགལ་བས་ཁྱབ་པའི་དམིགས་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། །ཡང་ན་རྣམ་པར་རྟོག་པ་མེད་པ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ནི་རྟོག་པ་དང་བཅས་པ་འགལ་བའི་ཕྱིར་མངོན་སུམ་དུ་བྱེད་པ་སྒྲུབ་ཅིང་དེ་ལས་ཀྱང་མངོན་སུམ་ཉིད་དོ། །གལ་ཏེ་རྣམ་པར་རྟོག་པ་མེད་པ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ནི་མངོན་སུམ་དུ་བྱེད་པ་སྒྲུབ་པ་ཡིན་ལ། དེས་མངོན་སུམ་ཉིད་ཡིན་ན་ཟླ་བ་གཉིས་ལ་སོགས་པ་རིག་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱང་འགྱུར་རོ་ཞེ་ན། མ་འཁྲུལ་པ་ཉིད་ཡིན་ན་ཞེས་རྗོད་པར་བྱེད་པ་ཡིན་ན། །གལ་ཏེ་མ་འཁྲུལ་པ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ཆོག་མོད་རྣམ་པར་རྟོག་པ་མེད་པས་ཅི་བྱ་ཞེ་ན། ཁྱད་པར་ནི་གཞན་ལ་ལྟོས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དེ་སྐད་དུ་ཡང་མཚན་ཉིད་ལ་གཞན་གྱི་ལུགས་ལ་ལྟོས་ནས་ཁྱད་པར་དུ་བྱས་སོ་ཞེས་བཤད་དོ། །ཐམས་ཅད

Chinese

如果说是无分别,这以前后执著如何成立空性?现量是由于对先前和之后那些没有的缘故,如果不是现量,那是因为不是现量本身的缘故。如果是这样,那么因为是根识的缘故,就像孩童的识一样,这说法就变得没有意义了。无分别本身会由现量成立,因为对现量所做的事情分别确定,是因为现量所经历的缘故。如果不是这样,如果 在任何地方都不是现量无分别本身的成立者,那么如何跟随它之后而进行比量呢?如果孩童的识是具有现量的相状,因此其他的根识也像现在这样吗?如果是这样,那么,孩童有什么成立,那也应该在这里说,因为根识是相同的缘故。这说明了经历等等。因为在劫中没有见到现量所做的事情,并且因为在其他地方见到,因为是具有非隐蔽的对境的缘故,所以普遍要成立是现量无分别,从根所生的缘故,这样的理由有什么用呢?现量所做的事情,那被说是无分别本身。因为分别本身与有分别相违,所以现量所做的事情是被无分别本身所遍及的,因此这是被相违所遍及的目标。或者无分别本身因为与有分别相违,所以成立现量,并且从那之中也是现量本身。如果无分别本身成立现量,并且它本身是现量,那么二月等等的识也会变成那样吗?如果说是无错乱本身,那么就应该这样说。如果无错乱本身就足够了,那么无分别做什么呢?因为差别是依赖于其他的缘故。也如是说,对于体相,依赖于其他的宗派而做了差别。一切

English

If it is said to be non-conceptual, how does emptiness become established with this prior and subsequent clinging? Direct perception is because those prior and subsequent ones do not exist, and if it is not direct perception, it is because it is not direct perception itself. If that is the case, then because it is sense consciousness, it is like the consciousness of a child, and that statement becomes meaningless. Non-conceptual itself will be established by direct perception, because the determination of what is done by direct perception is separate, because it is experienced by direct perception. If it is not like that, if nowhere is the establisher of non-conceptual direct perception itself, then how does inference follow after it? If the consciousness of a child has the aspect of doing direct perception, therefore other sense consciousnesses are also like this now? If that is the case, then, whatever establishment a child has, that should also be said here, because the sense consciousnesses are the same. This explains experience and so on. Because what is done by direct perception is not seen in a kalpa, and because it is seen elsewhere, because it has a non-hidden object, therefore it is generally to be established as non-conceptual direct perception, what is the use of the reason that it is born from the senses? What is done by direct perception, that is said to be non-conceptual itself. Because conceptualization itself contradicts conceptualization, what is done by direct perception is pervaded by non-conceptual itself, therefore this is an object pervaded by contradiction. Or non-conceptual itself, because it contradicts conceptualization, establishes direct perception, and from that also is direct perception itself. If non-conceptual itself establishes direct perception, and it itself is direct perception, then the consciousnesses of two moons and so on will also become like that? If it is said to be non-erroneous itself, then it should be said like that. If non-erroneous itself is sufficient, then what does non-conceptual do? Because the difference depends on others. It is also said that for characteristics, the difference is made by relying on other schools. Everything