English
It is not. The act of offering is not different from the distinction of substances, but to realize that it is the same as the divine offering itself, with the same basis. If asked, what does the divine offering do? The answer is: it burns. Because it is seen to answer: it makes offerings, so the certainty of saying it does is because of doubting offerings and so on. Is it not established as other? It is also said that the body is not wisdom, even if it is established, it is because of doubting the form of wisdom. If you say so, how is that unreasonable? The purpose of the act is the purpose of the offering. If it is different in itself, it is difficult to speak of reasonable reasoning when doubting others. If the function of the act is different from giving and so on, then how can one ask about the definite act when doubting others? Because asking is only reasonable for the uncertain. The meaning of the actor is the nature of the general, and giving and so on are the nature of the particular. If you say so, without distinction, the realization of the general will never exist. When the general is abandoned, it cannot be said to be unrealized. When only the general is realized, it is not reasonable to say that there is doubt about the part of the particular. Or is it that the general abandons the particular? If so, that is also realization itself, so how can there be doubt? Or it is realized, but even so, it is not realized as the nature of the particular, because it is abandoned by the general. Then, is it not the general itself that is abandoning? This itself is being abandoned, what is this? The general is not abandoning other generals, if so, then it is more other than that, and because it is more other than that, there is no end. If it is not reasonable to doubt because the general is manifest, the particular is not manifest, and because of remembering the particular? For those who say that the general is the measure of non-seeing, is it not reasonable that it becomes non-existent because of non-seeing? Or is it that the non-seeing that has become the characteristic of seeing is non-existent because of non-seeing, but it is not so merely because of non-seeing. If so, also because non-seeing itself is doubtful, so saying that the general is manifest is meaningless.
Chinese
是的。如果共相是现量，那么作为所缘的体性却不缘，就不会变成怀疑。如果共相是现量，那么成为所缘体性的不缘本身是不可能的，如果这样说，那么就会变成，不是作为所缘体性的不缘本身就是怀疑的原因。因为特殊忆念的缘故，这句话也是没有意义的。没有与特殊忆念相异的其他的怀疑。因为那是缘二者的部分的忆念的自性。即使共相没有成为现量，在迦若鸠布扎（梵文：Kanyakubja，梵文罗马转写：Kānyakubja）等地，也看到从忆念开始最初就变成了怀疑。因此，说“做”就是，从普遍见到之后推测出不确定的布施等，那就是共相。这里说： “非彼自性之相违， 唯是事物极成故， 相乃共相之境性， 说彼非住于差别。” 仅仅是不确定特殊，就是共相完全断除。有些人认为是事物和非事物的共同，因此，远离其相的智慧本身就是怀疑的原因。智慧的自性或者所缘的义的自性，像那样成为不缘本身就是怀疑的原因。如果从见到笔直形状的共相之后，说“这是高杆还是不是”，如果有体验共相的相状，那么就不是见到怀疑吗？不是没有缘与士夫和高杆的自性相离的其他的笔直形状的共相吗？如果存在，那么那时二者的相的智慧就会变成所缘。这里说： “此中异于差别外， 无有共相异念故， 事物之差别性者， 由诸念之各异生。” 如果远处仅仅是缘与士夫和高杆的自性相离的笔直形状。如果不是那样，因为体验到高杆和士夫的相状，所以不会由此产生怀疑。因此，完全舍弃它而显现本身是与它相异的，因为与它相异的体性仅仅是到此为止的缘故，如果这样说，那么
English
Yes. If the universal is manifest, then not perceiving what has become the nature of the object will not become doubt. However, if the universal is manifest, then it is impossible for the non-perception itself to become the nature of the object. If that is the case, then it will become that the non-perception that has not become the nature of the object is itself the cause of doubt. The statement "because of the memory of the particular" is also meaningless. There is no other doubt that is different from the memory of the particular. Because it is the nature of remembering that focuses on both aspects. Even if the universal has not become manifest, it is seen that in Kanyakubja (Sanskrit: Kanyakubja, Roman transliteration: Kānyakubja) and other places, it becomes doubt from the very beginning of memory. Therefore, the statement "it does" means that from the general perception, the uncertain alms and so on are inferred, and that itself is the universal. Here it is said: "The opposite of its own nature, Only because things are extremely accomplished, The sign is the object of the universal, It is said that it does not reside in the particular." Merely not being certain of the particular is the complete elimination of the universal. Some consider it to be common to things and non-things, therefore, the wisdom devoid of its aspect is itself the cause of doubt. The nature of wisdom or the nature of the object to be perceived, becoming like that, the non-perception itself is the cause of doubt. If, after seeing the universal of a straight shape, one says, "Is this a high pole or not?" If there is experience of the aspect of the universal, then is it not seeing doubt? Is there not some other universal of a straight shape that is not related to the nature of a man and a high pole? If it exists, then at that time the wisdom of the two aspects will become the object. Here it is said: "In this, other than the difference, There is no universal, no different thought, The difference of things is, Born from the difference of thoughts." If in the distance, only the straight shape that is separated from the nature of a man and a high pole is perceived. If it is not like that, because of experiencing the aspect of a high pole and a man, doubt will not arise from it. Therefore, the appearance of completely abandoning it is different from it, because the nature of being different from it is only up to that point, if it is said like that, then
Chinese
如果不同意，因为它们与它是不同的。如果不显得长，就不显得。显得长是因为近，所以非常显现。处在遥远地方的时候，所显现的，与近处的建立相联系，是非常显现的。如果总体的意义是不同的，既然它本身是显现的，怎么会变成对其他不明显显现的名称呢？蓝色事物的显现，不会变成白色不明显显现的名称。如果按照你的观点，这个所谓的不明显是什么？这个不明显显现，是不显现，还是显现其他，还是它不明显显现呢？如果，不明显显现的本身是显现的话：自己的体性显现时，怎么会变成不明显呢？如果显现的是其他，那它怎么会是不明显呢？如果没有显现，事物又怎么会显现呢？如果那样显现，心本身是不明显的吗？当心的自性是清晰的时候，事物不会不明显显现。那不是那样的，当没有那些相状的心，从那产生变化的时候，那时，明与不明显现的名称，在流传中也是认可的。或者，如果它本身是总体，如果是那样，颜色和形状就不会显现。总体不是具有颜色和形状的，因为它们两个依赖于物质。或者，如果颜色和形状依赖于物质，那样就没有与它不同的总体，因为不显现。如果显现是颜色和形状本身，而且它们两个也是共同的，在高低和不纯净中产生怀疑，那也不是，像这样：颜色形状即自性，他者如何成他者？如果这样理解，心就变成错乱的了。如果颜色和形状理解成其他的，那就是错乱，怎么会是总体现量呢？或者，在那里显现的是有支分的事物，不是总体，也不是颜色和形状，颜色形状的自性之外，不同的事物是显现的，在那些之中，有其他的，各自的显现吗？蓝色等等颜色的自性本身是显现的。
English
If disagree, because they are different from it. If it does not appear long, it does not appear. It appears long because it is near, so it appears very much. When staying in a distant place, what appears is very much apparent in connection with the establishment of the near. If the meaning of the general is different, since it itself is apparent, how can it become a name for the appearance of something not clear to others? The appearance of a blue thing will not become the name of a white thing appearing unclearly. If according to your view, what is this so-called unclear? Is this unclear appearance non-appearance, or appearance of something else, or is it that it appears unclearly? If, the unclear appearance itself is appearance: When one's own nature appears, how can it become unclear? If what appears is something else, how can it be unclear? If there is no appearance, how can things appear? If it appears that way, is the mind itself unclear? When the nature of the mind is clear, things do not appear unclearly. That is not the case, when the mind without those aspects arises and changes from that, at that time, the name of clear and unclear appearance is also recognized in circulation. Or, if it itself is the general, if that is the case, color and shape will not appear. The general is not endowed with color and shape, because the two depend on matter. Or, if color and shape depend on matter, then there is no general different from it, because it does not appear. If appearance is color and shape themselves, and the two are also common, there is doubt in high and impure, that is not the case, like this: Color shape is self-nature, how does the other become the other? If understood in this way, the mind becomes confused. If color and shape are understood as other, that is confusion, how can it be a general manifest? Or, what appears there is a thing with limbs, not the general, nor color and shape, outside the nature of color and shape, different things are apparent, among those, is there another, separate appearance? The nature of blue and other colors themselves is apparent.
Chinese
于此，他物显现是不存在的，因为没有和它相异的他物各自显现的缘故。如果说它本身是物，那是不对的，因为颜色和形状是功德的缘故。如果说是有颜色形状的物，那也是不对的，因为没有和它相异的其他形态显现的缘故。从明显和不明显的颜色形状之外，没有其他可辨识的物，因为不明显的颜色和形状也被从它之外的聚合产生的意识所损害的缘故。如果产生了明显显现的意识，就会变成“这不是这样的”。与此相反的自性辨识本身就是损害。如果认为因为没有产生“这不是”的想法，所以不是那样，那么“这不是”的想法难道不是已经产生了吗？像这样，这个形状不是那个颜色，与此无别的形状，产生损害的意识是必然的。如果不是损害相异，因为损害无别的形状，因此形状是相异的，那是不对的。如果怎样 先前认识，对那样的事物造成损害，如果未曾认识为其他，还有什么其他的剩余？如果形状或物，与颜色没有差别地认识，怎样的事物造成损害，还有什么其他的剩余？以什么对它本身，对一个造成损害，而对另一个则不然的，以这样的方式，没有其他区分差别的作用。或者，那个颜色不是获得的，那是形状和物，因此因为获得是其他的物，因此以前也是理智。如果认识到先前和后来的事物，以及不是那样的，这两者是由于存在相违的法，所以不应是不异的。相异的事物应当被证明是那样的，如果认为相异的证明者是没有其他的缘故，那也是不对的。在那本身，如果那，是其他，是先前还是之后？显现上什么显现不显现二者，何时见到会延续？如果究竟上
English
Here, the appearance of another substance is non-existent, because there is no separate appearance of another substance different from it. If it is said that it itself is a substance, that is not correct, because color and shape are qualities. If it is said to be a substance possessing color and shape, that is also not correct, because no other form different from it appears. Apart from clear and unclear colors and shapes, there is no other discernible substance, because unclear colors and shapes are also harmed by the consciousness arising from a collection other than it. If a consciousness of clear appearance arises, it will become "This is not like this." The very perception of the opposite nature is what harms it. If it is thought that because the thought "This is not" has not arisen, therefore it is not so, then hasn't the thought "This is not" already arisen? Like this, this shape is not that color, and the consciousness that harms the shape that is no different from this is bound to arise. If it does not harm the different, because it harms the non-different shape, therefore the shape is different, that is not correct. If how Previously understood, causes harm to such things, if it has not been understood as other, what other remains? If the shape or substance is recognized as not different from color, what kind of thing causes harm, what other remains? By what does it harm one but not the other, in that way, there is no other action that distinguishes the difference. Or, that color is not obtained, that is shape and substance, therefore because obtaining is another substance, therefore it was reasonable before as well. If one recognizes the former and later things, and what is not like that, these two should not be non-different because contradictory dharmas exist. Different things should be proven to be like that, if one thinks that the proof of difference is because there is no other, that is also not correct. In that itself, if that, is other, is it prior or later? What appears and does not appear manifestly, when seen, will it continue? If ultimately