Chinese
因为存在阻碍，所以不应产生不被鬼怪吞噬之物，这就是它的意思。为什么呢？因为没有差别，这指的是依赖于他人承认非刹那性而进行的阐述。如果执着于没有差别的名言，这句经文是经部宗的观点。由于既有刹那性又有非刹那性的情况，所以需要结合两种情况进行解释。首先，非刹那性的情况，即常法方面，用“也”等词语进行连接。或者，用“又”等词语，也将刹那性的情况与刹那前后差别的形态结合起来。其中，“没有把握差别之自性，就不会有名言”的意思是，如果像这样说根识执取第二个刹那，那么因为没有把握第一个刹那，所以就不会有名言。只有在把握了事物之后，才能说“这是指这个”的名言才是合理的。所谓“差别之自性”，是无名言的第二个原因，因为不能对自己的体性进行名言。这也不合理，因为没有进行名言的事物，不能被缘于先前名言的记忆所执取。事物的声音是指所指之境和所需之义，这是通过对不同方面的区分来进行解释的。所谓“有义”，是指具有共同的所指之境。所谓“第二种情况”，是指主张刹那性的第一种情况，即在刹那性方面，想要生起对第一个刹那的记忆，这是相对于非刹那性的情况而言的第二种解释。在这种情况下，记忆是没有所缘的，因为像这样，以第一个刹那为所缘的记忆，由于没有把握差别之自性，所以对于没有进行名言的事物来说，根本没有记忆的所缘。它的所缘也不是第二个刹那，因为那不是原因，而且也没有进行名言。所谓“第三种情况”，是指主张刹那性的第二种情况，也就是用“或者，后来出现的刹那是什么”等语句所阐述的情况。
English
Because there is an obstruction, it should not produce something that is not devoured by demons, that is what it means. Why? Because there is no difference, this refers to the explanation based on others acknowledging non-momentariness. If one clings to the absence of difference in designation, this verse represents the perspective of the Sutra school. Since there are both momentary and non-momentary situations, it needs to be explained by combining both situations. First, the non-momentary situation, that is, the aspect of permanence, is connected with words such as "also." Or, with words such as "again," the momentary situation is also combined with the form of the difference between the prior and subsequent moments. Among them, the meaning of "without grasping the nature of difference, there is no designation" is that if it is said that sense consciousness grasps the second moment, then because the first moment is not grasped, there is no designation. Only after grasping the object, can the designation "this refers to this" be reasonable. The so-called "nature of difference" is the second reason for the absence of designation, because one cannot designate one's own nature. This is also unreasonable, because something that has not been designated cannot be grasped by memory that is based on a previous designation. The sound of things refers to the object to be indicated and the meaning to be needed, which is explained by distinguishing different aspects. The so-called "meaningful" refers to having a common object to be indicated. The so-called "second situation" refers to the first situation of asserting momentariness, that is, in the aspect of momentariness, wanting to generate the memory of the first moment, this is the second explanation in relation to the non-momentary situation. In this situation, memory is without an object, because like this, the memory with the first moment as its object, since it has not grasped the nature of difference, there is no object of memory at all for something that has not been designated. Its object is also not the second moment, because that is not the cause, and it has not been designated. The so-called "third situation" refers to the second situation of asserting momentariness, that is, the situation explained by statements such as "or, what is the later arising moment."
Chinese
哦！就常的一方来说，那本身是第三种。如果问什么是有必要的，那就是没有结果的，像这样，如果想要通过不了解后来出现的刹那来执取，那么它不会产生记忆，因此它不是记忆的对象，这样一来，对它来说记忆是没有结果的。那也已经立刻讲完了。说两者都不是，意思是既不是对象也不是必要。第三方的过失是什么，那也应该作为第一方的过失来说，因为理解意义本身，所以没有分别地说。特别地，说也是执取，是像这样，具有自己特征形象的根识会变得非常确定。现量离分别。现量本身会成立。等等，从那以后，因此对于眼和色等，依靠而产生眼识。直到最后的《释量论》的论典，已经讲了多少《量理宝论》的论典，那就是所讲的。现量离分别。说的是抓住时机等等。现量离分别。与名和种等结合。有些人说声音是与意义相关的理由。另一些人说，用空洞的声音来表达特殊的意义。对于没有那些分别的，那就是现量，只是讲了这些论典。这样一来，当显示三种分别时，显示种等三种分别的论典是用意义来讲述的。正因为如此，才说了用意义来讲述。然而为什么？因为依赖于两者而产生等等，现在要讲述的论典正在讲解。认识根识，是通过根的途径来表达，还是通过对象的途径来表达，像那样，在显示根识的时候，理解本身就是从根的词语中产生的。这样一来，当说根的识时，毫无疑问是根的
English
O! In terms of the permanent side, that itself is the third. If asked what is necessary, that is without result, like this, if one wants to grasp by not understanding the momentary arising later, then it does not generate memory, therefore it is not the object of memory, in that way, for it memory is without result. That has already been said immediately. Saying that neither is, means that it is neither an object nor a necessity. Whatever is the fault of the third side, that should also be stated as the fault of the first side, because understanding the meaning itself, therefore it is not stated separately. Especially, saying that it is also grasping, is like this, the sense consciousness with the image of its own characteristic will become very certain. Direct perception is free from conceptualization. Direct perception itself will be established. And so on, from then on, therefore for the eye and form etc., relying on them, eye consciousness arises. Until the end of the commentary of the Pramāṇavārttika, how much of the Compendium on Valid Cognition has been explained, that is what has been explained. Direct perception is free from conceptualization. It is said that taking the opportunity etc. Direct perception is free from conceptualization. It combines with name and kind etc. Some say that sound is the reason related to meaning. Others say that special meanings are expressed by empty sounds. For those without those conceptualizations, that is direct perception, only these texts have been explained. In this way, when showing the three conceptualizations, the texts that show the three conceptualizations of kind etc. are explained by meaning. Precisely for that reason, it is said that it is explained by meaning. However, why? Because it depends on both to arise etc., the texts that are now to be explained are being explained. Understanding the sense consciousness, is it expressed through the path of the sense, or through the path of the object, like that, when showing the sense consciousness, the understanding itself arises from the word of the sense. In this way, when saying the consciousness of the sense, without doubt it is the sense
Tibetan
ཤེས་པ་ཉིད་ཤེས་པར་འགྱུར་རོ། །དེ་སྐད་དུ་བསྟན་པ་ན་ཤེས་པར་འདོད་པའི་དོན་རྟོགས་པར་འགྱུར་རོ། །དེ་བས་ན་མངོན་སུམ་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་ཐ་སྙད་རིགས་པ་ཡིན་གྱི་ཡུལ་གྱི་ཤེས་པ་ཞེས་ནི་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། །དེ་ལྟར་བརྗོད་པ་ན་ངེས་པར་དབང་པོའི་ཤེས་པ་རྟོགས་པར་འགྱུར་རོ། །ཡིད་ཀྱི་རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པ་ཡང་ཡུལ་གྱི་རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པ་ཉིད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་དེ་ནི་ཡུལ་ལ་བརྟེན་པ་ཡིན་ནོ་ཞེས་ཐ་སྙད་དུ་བྱ་བ་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། །སློབ་དཔོན་ཕྱོགས་ཀྱི་གླང་པོས་གོ་བར་བྱེད་པ་ཉིད་འཆད་པར་མཛད་པ་ན། ཐུན་མོང་མིན་པའི་རྒྱུ་ཉིད་ཕྱིར། །དབང་པོ་ལ་དེའི་ཐ་སྙད་བྱས། །ཞེས་བསྟན་ཏོ། །ཐུན་མོང་མ་ཡིན་པའི་རྒྱུ་ཉིད་ཡིན་པས་ན་དབང་པོའི་སྒྲ་ལ་དབང་པོའི་ཤེས་པ་རྟོགས་པ་ལ་གོ་བར་བྱེད་པ་ཉིད་དུ་བསྟན་ཏོ། །དེ་ལྟར་ན་ཡུལ་ནི་ཡིད་ཀྱི་རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པ་དང་རྒྱུད་གཞན་གྱི་རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པ་ཐུན་མོང་གི་རྒྱུ་ཡིན་ཞེས་བཤད་པ་གང་ཡིན་པས་ཡུལ་གོ་བར་བྱེད་པ་ཉིད་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། །དེའི་ཆོས་ཀྱང་ངེས་སྦྱོར་བྱེད། །ཅེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་གོ་བར་བྱེད་པ་དེའི་རང་བཞིན་དུ་གྱུར་པས་ཆོས་ངེས་པར་སྦྱོར་བར་རིགས་སོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་དོན་ཏོ། །གོ་བར་བྱེད་པ་ཁྱབ་པར་བྱེད་པར་སྒྲ་ངེས་པར་སྦྱོར་བར་འོས་པ་ལ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ལ་སོགས་པས་དེ་འཆད་པར་བྱེད་པ་ལ། སྒྲའི་ངེས་པར་སྦྱོར་བར་འོས་པ་ནི་སྒྲ་ངེས་པར་སྦྱོར་བར་རིགས་པ་སྟེ། བརྗོད་པར་བྱ་བ་དང་རྗོད་པ་འབྱེད་པ་ཉིད་དུ་ངེས་པར་སྦྱོར་བར་རིགས་པ་ཉིད་ཡིན་ནོ། །དེ་ལ་གོ་བར་བྱེད་པ་ཁྱབ་པར་བྱེད་པས་ཁྱབ་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། །དེ་ལྟར་ན་རྟོག་པ་སྔོན་དུ་གཏོང་བ་ཅན་སྒྲ་སྦྱོར་བ་གང་ཡིན་པ་དེ་ནི་གོ་བར་བྱེད་པ་ཉིད་དུ་གྱུར་པ་ལ་ཡིན་ཏེ། སྒྲ་སྦྱོར་བ་ནི་བརྗོད་པར་འདོད་པའི་དོན་སྟོན་པར་བྱེད་པའི་ཡན་ལག་ཉིད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དེ་ཡང་གོ་བར་བྱེད་པ་ཉིད་དུ་ནུས་པ་ཡིན་གྱི་ཅིག་ཤོས་ཀྱིས་ནི་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། གོ་བར་བྱེད་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ངེས་པར་སྦྱོར་ན་རྟོག་པ་སྔོན་དུ་གཏོང་པ་ཉིད་ཉམས་པར་འགྱུར་རོ། །དེ་བས་ན་གལ་ཏེ་གོ་བར་བྱེད་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར་འགྱུར་ན། རྟོག་པ་སྔོན་དུ་གཏོང་བ་སྒྲ་ངེས་པར་སྦྱོར་བ་དེ་ཉིད་བྱེད་པར་མི་འགྱུར་རོ། །དེའི་ཕྱིར་བཟློག་ན་གནོད་པ་ཅན་གྱི་ཚད་མ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རྟོག་པ་སྔོན་དུ་ གཏོང་བ་ཅན་སྒྲ་ངེས་པར་སྦྱོར་བར་འོས་པ་ཙམ་དང་རྗེས་སུ་འབྲེལ་པ་ཅན་གྱི་གོ་བར་བྱེད་པ་ཉིད་དེའི་ཁྱབ་པར་བྱེད་པ་ཡིན་པར་འགྱུར་རོ། །འདིས་ནི་སྦྱོར་བའི་དོན་འཐད་པར་བྱེད་པ་ཡིན་ནོ་
Chinese
识即是识。如是宣说，则欲识之义得以领悟。因此，名为“现量”之词是理智，而非境之识。如是说，则必能领悟根识。意之识亦是境之识，故不应称其为依于境。论师陈那阐述能知之理时说：“非共因故，于根立彼名。”如是宣说。以其为非共同之因，故于根之语，宣说根识之领悟。如是，境是意之识与他续之识的共同之因，故所说之境并非能知。其法亦必合。所谓“其法亦必合”，意为能知者已成其自性，故理应使法相合。能知者遍及，故应使语相合，等等，以此阐述。语之应合者，即语应相合，应于所言与言者之间作区分。于此，能知者以遍及而遍及。如是，凡是先有分别之语，皆是已成能知者，因语之结合是显示所欲表达之义的支分。此亦唯有能知者方能为之，他者则不能，若使非能知者相合，则先有分别之性将丧失。因此，若成为非能知者，则先有分别之语的相合便不会成立。故反之则有相违之量，因此，凡是先有分别，应使语相合者，仅与随顺相连之能知者，方能成为其遍及者。此乃使相合之义合理。
English
Consciousness itself becomes consciousness. When it is taught in this way, the meaning of wanting to know becomes understood. Therefore, the term 'perception' is reason, not the consciousness of an object. When it is said in this way, the consciousness of the senses will surely be understood. Since the consciousness of the mind is also the consciousness of an object, it should not be termed as relying on an object. When the teacher Dignāga explained the means of understanding, he stated: 'Because of the uncommon cause, that term is applied to the senses.' Because it is the uncommon cause, it is taught that the term 'senses' is understood as the consciousness of the senses. Thus, since the object is said to be the common cause of the consciousness of the mind and the consciousness of other streams, the object is not the means of understanding. Its qualities also necessarily connect. The meaning of 'its qualities also necessarily connect' is that since the means of understanding has become its nature, it is reasonable to necessarily connect the qualities. The means of understanding pervades, so it is fitting to necessarily connect sound, and so on, which is what it explains. What is fitting to necessarily connect sound is that sound is reasonable to necessarily connect, and it is reasonable to necessarily connect what is to be expressed and the one who expresses it. In this, the means of understanding pervades by pervading. Thus, whatever combination of words precedes conceptualization is for what has become the means of understanding, because the combination of words is a part that reveals the meaning that is intended to be expressed. Moreover, it is capable only as the means of understanding, not by something else, because if what is not the means of understanding is necessarily connected, then the very nature of preceding conceptualization will be lost. Therefore, if it becomes not the means of understanding, then the very combination of words that precedes conceptualization will not be done. Therefore, since there is a contradictory measure if reversed, whatever combination of words that precedes conceptualization is only fitting and the means of understanding that is connected in sequence will become its pervader. This makes the meaning of combination reasonable.