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DTG176 0001.Commentary on the Compendium on Valid Cognition Śākya's Intellect·Commentary on the Compendium on Valid Cognition Śākya's Intellect.g2.0f

Chinese

或者处于梦境和模糊不清的迷惑的意识状态中的事情,以及听闻自己宗派的见解时,对宗派的观点进行虚构,还有兔子角和石女儿等词语产生时,对于不存在的兔子角等也进行区分的观察,因为词语的习气并非无始。我们等词语,是指为了成办一个意义,如“一悟义”等,而在此处说明了“有些”。此外,就像桦树和檀香等彼此不同,与牛等不同相似。别人会问,为什么木性只适用于桦树等,而不适用于牛等?对此,可以回答说,桦树等是因为它们本身更接近木性,而不是牛等。如果这样说,那么,如果不同是相似的,那么凭借种类的事物力量的特性,对于某些事物来说,对于想要显现为意义集合之所依的事物来说,会更加适用。存在特殊的能力本身就是随行于声音和意识的原因。因此,凭借分别念的意识所确定的力量,对于事物来说,只有随行的遮遣,而不是成为事物本身,这就是它的状态。在此,数论派提出了“如果遮遣”等说法。事物的随行是事物本身的同一性。所谓“其他”,就是成为事物。那时,一个果实无论是什么,都不会变成其他等等。为什么呢?因为种子和土地等是非常不同的。用“如果”等来解释,所谓“那些”,就是事物,例如种子和水等的芽等一个果实。用“那”等来证明,种子产生芽的自性,是其他土地等所没有的,并且存在于意识虚构的遮遣的特性中,那就是

English

Or, things that are in a state of consciousness confused by dreams and haziness, and when listening to the views of one's own school, fabricating the views of the school, and when words such as rabbit's horn and daughter of a rock are produced, also making distinctions about non-existent things such as rabbit's horns, because the habits of words are not without beginning. The words "we" etc. refer to the fact that in order to accomplish a single meaning, such as "one-understanding meaning" etc., here it is explained that "some". Furthermore, just as birch and sandalwood etc. are different from each other, they are similar in being different from cows etc. Others may ask, why does wood-nature only apply to birch etc., and not to cows etc.? To this, it can be answered that birch etc. are because they themselves are closer to wood-nature, and not cows etc. If it is said in this way, then, if the difference is similar, then by virtue of the characteristics of the power of the kind of thing, for certain things, for things that want to appear as the support of the collection of meanings, it will be more applicable. The ability to exist in particular is itself the cause of sound and consciousness that follows along. Therefore, by virtue of the power determined by the consciousness of discrimination, for things, there is only the accompanying negation, and not becoming the thing itself, that is its state. Here, the Samkhya school puts forward statements such as "if negation". The accompanying of things is the very identity of things themselves. The so-called "other" is becoming a thing. At that time, whatever a fruit is, it will not become other things etc. Why? Because seeds and land etc. are very different. Explaining with "if" etc., the so-called "those" are things, such as a single fruit like the sprout etc. of seeds and water etc. Proving with "that" etc., the nature of the seed producing the sprout, which is not present in other lands etc., and which exists in the characteristic of the negation fabricated by consciousness, that is

Chinese

是故能生。何以故?谓无有翻转,即无有他性之相故。是故唯有种子之自性相能生,何为能生之体性,即是事物。言能生者,谓能生苗芽之自性。言于他者,谓于地等。地等之他不能生苗芽。若彼者,等言唯是语声之义。彼者,谓种子。言于他者,谓于地等。地等者,谓能生苗芽之种子自性,以其与种子无有差别故,是故有随顺自性。是故于若干自性各异者,亦有作一本体之果,若谓譬如根等,是不应理者。成立宗义者说若等言。言于一补特伽罗者,谓若有不异之因集合之补特伽罗,彼即是欲为能生者,以其于诸因中,于一因亦有故。以其唯一能作果故,和合而作则成无义。于翻转者,亦于最后时能生一切故,岂非他因成无义耶?此是不应理,谓彼等集合,唯于最后时有如是之能力。刹那者,以其从因缘所生故,是为至近者。于说他为常者,以其常时有彼体性故,他因则成无义。是故说于一亦有故。谓于远离他因之时亦有之义。解释说若等言。若谓以其自性一故,众多事物作一果,即是能生者,则于诸义中,显现为因者,彼等无有差别,能生之自性,是于一因至近者。是故于一切时中。

English

Therefore, it is capable of producing. Why? Because there is no reversal, meaning there is no characteristic of otherness. Therefore, only the nature of the seed itself can produce, and what is the essence of that which produces? It is the thing itself. The term 'that which produces' refers to the nature of producing sprouts. The term 'to others' refers to earth and so on. Others, such as earth, cannot produce sprouts. 'If that is' and so on, the word 'is' is merely a sound. 'That' refers to the seed. 'To others' refers to earth and so on. Earth and so on, meaning the seed's nature of producing sprouts, because it is not different from the seed, therefore there is adherence to the nature. Therefore, even in some cases where the natures are different, they produce one result of the essence, but if it is said that it is like the senses and so on, it is not reasonable. The one who establishes the doctrine says 'if' and so on. 'To one person' means that if there is a person who is a collection of non-different causes, that person is the one who desires to produce, because it exists in one of the causes among those causes. Because that one alone produces the result, acting together becomes meaningless. To the one who speaks of reversal, since everything is produced at the final moment, isn't the other cause rendered meaningless? This is not reasonable, because those collections only have such power at the final moment. Moments are very close because they arise from causes and conditions. To those who say that others are permanent, because they always have that essence, the other cause becomes meaningless. Therefore, it is said that it also exists in one, meaning that it also exists at the time of being separated from other causes. Explaining 'if' and so on. If it is said that because their nature is one, many things produce one result, that is, they are capable of producing, then among the meanings, those that appear as causes are not different, the nature of producing is very close to one cause. Therefore, at all times.

Tibetan

རྒྱུ་དང་མ་བྲལ་བའི་ཕྱིར། གང་ལ་གནས་པ་དེ་ལ་གཅིག་ཀྱང་སྐྱེད་པར་བྱེད་པར་འགྱུར་རོ། །དེ་ཉིད་བསྟན་པར་བྱ་བའི་ཕྱིར་འདི་ལྟར་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ལ་སོགས་པ་སྨོས་ཏེ། ཐ་དད་པ་མེད་པའི་ངོ་བོ་དེ་སྤྱི་འབྲས་བུ་སྐྱེད་པར་བྱེད་པ་དེ་ནི་ས་བོན་ལ་སོགས་པ་ཉེ་བ་གཅིག་ལས་ཀྱང་བྱེད་མི་ནུས་སོ། །ཐ་དད་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་ཁྱད་པར་རྣམས་དང་བྲལ་བའོ། །ཐ་དད་པའི་རང་བཞིན་དེ་ལས་ས་བོན་ལས་དོན་གཞན་ས་ལ་སོགས་པའི་ཁྱད་པར་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། །ཅིའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེ་ན། ཁྱད་པར་ཡོད་ན་ཐ་དད་པ་མེད་པ་ཉམས་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཐ་དད་པ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །ཐ་དད་པ་མེད་པ་སྐྱེད་པར་བྱེད་པར་འདོད་པའི་རང་བཞིན་དེ་ཡང་ས་བོན་འབའ་ཞིག་པོ་དེ་ལ་ཡང་ཡོད་པས་ས་བོན་གཅིག་གི་གནས་པ་ལ་ཡང་དེའི་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ཐ་དད་པ་མེད་པའི་ངོ་བོ་སྐྱེད་པར་བྱེད་པ་འདོད་པའི་འབྲལ་བ་སྟེ། འཇིག་པ་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། ཡོན་ཏན་གསུམ་ནི་བདག་ཉིད་ཐམས་ཅད་ཐམས་ཅད་ཀྱི་ཚེ་ཡོད་པ་ངེས་པའི་ཕྱིར། གང་ཁྱད་པར་གྱི་གནས་ཀྱི་ཁྱད་པར་དེ་དག་ལྷན་ཅིག་གནས་པ་ངེས་པ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་བྲལ་བར་འགྱུར་རོ། །དེ་དག་ཀྱང་ཁས་བླངས་ནས་བཤད་ཀྱི་གཞན་དུ་ན་གནས་པ་པོ་ནི་རྟག་པ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ཕྱིར་ལྡོག་པ་མེད་པའི་ཁྱད་པར་དག་ཀྱང་ཇི་ལྟར་བྲལ་བར་འགྱུར་རོ། །དེ་དག་སྐྱེད་པར་བྱེད་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་ཁྱད་པར་རོ། །ཅིའི་ཕྱིར་མི་འདོད་ཅེ་ན། ལྷན་ཅིག་བྱེད་བྱེད་པ་དག་ནི་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ལ་སོགས་པ་སྨོས་སོ། །དེ་བས་ན་ས་བོན་ལ་ སོགས་པའི་གནས་པའི་གཅིག་ལ་ཡང་སྐྱེད་པར་བྱེད་པའི་བདག་ཉིད་གནས་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །གནས་པ་མེད་པ་ནི་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་ཁྱད་པར་ནིའོ། །གནས་པ་གཅིག་གིས་ཀྱང་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ས་བོན་ལ་སོགས་པ་གཞན་གནས་པས་ཀྱང་འབྲས་བུ་བསྐྱེད་པར་འགྱུར་རོ། །འགྱུར་བ་ཡང་མ་ཡིན་པ་ནི་འབྲས་བུ་བསྐྱེད་པར་འགྱུར་བའོ། །དེ་བས་ན་སྤྱི་གནས་ན་ཡང་ལྷན་ཅིག་བྱེད་པའི་ནང་ནས་ཁྱད་པར་གཅིག་དང་བྲལ་ནའང་འབྲས་མེད་ཕྱིར། ཁྱད་པར་རྣམས་ལས་དེ་དག་འབྱུང་སྟེ། འབྲས་བུ་དེ་དག་འབྱུང་གི་སྤྱི་ལས་ནི་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། །འབྲས་བུ་དེ་ནི་མྱུ་གུ་ལ་སོགས་པའོ། །ཇི་ལྟ་བུར་གྱུར་པ་ཞེ་ན། ལྷན་ཅིག་བྱེད་པ་དུ་མའི་ཐུན་མོང་དུ་གྱུར་པ་སྟེ། ལྷན་ཅིག་བྱེད་པ་དུ་མས་བསྐྱེད་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་དོན་ཏོ། །ཁྱད་པར་གཅིག་དང་བྲལ་ན་ཡང་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་ལྷན་ཅིག་བྱེད་པའི་ཁྱད་པར་གཞན་དང་བྲལ་ན་ཡང་ངོ༌། །འདིས་ནི་ལྡག་པ་བསྟན་ཏོ། །ཁྱད་པར་ཐམས་ཅད་དང་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ལ་སོགས་པས་ནི་རྗེས་སུ་འགྲོ་བ་ཡིན་ནོ། །དེ་བ

Chinese

因为与因不分离的缘故。在何处安住,就在那里也能够生起一个。为了显示那个,所以说了“如此”等等。没有差别的自性,那个总的能生果,不是仅从种子等一个近取因就能做到的。与各个差别的事物的所有差别相离。从各个差别的自性来说,没有种子之外的其他事物,如土地等的差别。为什么呢?如果有差别,那么没有差别就会丧失,因为没有差别。想要生起没有差别的自性,那个自性也存在于唯一的种子中,因此在唯一种子的安住处,也想要生起那个被称为没有差别的自性,是分离的。不是存在的坏灭,因为三种功德是自性,在一切时都是确定的存在。哪些是差别的处所的差别,那些一起安住是不确定的,所以会分离。那些也是承认之后说的,否则安住者是常恒的缘故,不可逆转的差别又怎么会分离呢?那些生起的是差别。为什么不承认呢?说了“一起作用的那些”等等。因此,在种子等安住的一个处所,也因为安住着能生起的自性。没有安住的是差别。一个安住的,即种子等其他安住的,也会生果。不是变化的,即会生果。因此,即使总的安住,如果从一起作用的当中分离出一个差别,也会没有果。因为那些从差别产生,那些果产生,但不是从总的产生。那个果就是苗芽等。变成什么样呢?变成多个一起作用的共同的,即多个一起作用的所生之义。即使与一个差别分离,即与一起作用的另一个差别分离。这显示了返回。用“与所有差别”等等,是随行。

English

Because it is not separate from the cause. Wherever it abides, it will also be able to generate one there. In order to show that, it is said "like this" etc. That nature without difference, that general cause of fruit, cannot be done by just one proximate cause such as a seed. It is separated from all the differences of the various different things. From the nature of each difference, there is no difference from the seed other than other things such as land. Why? If there is a difference, then the absence of difference will be lost, because there is no difference. Wanting to generate a nature without difference, that nature also exists in the unique seed, therefore in the abode of the unique seed, it is also wanting to generate that which is called the nature without difference, it is separate. It is not an existing destruction, because the three qualities are nature, and are certainly existent at all times. Which are the differences of the places of difference, those that abide together are uncertain, so they will be separated. Those are also said after admitting, otherwise the abider is permanent, how can the irreversible differences be separated? Those that arise are differences. Why not admit it? It is said "those that act together" etc. Therefore, in one place where seeds etc. abide, also because the nature that can arise abides. That which does not abide is the difference. One that abides, that is, other seeds etc. that abide, will also produce fruit. It is not changing, that is, it will produce fruit. Therefore, even if the general abides, if one difference is separated from among those that act together, there will be no fruit. Because those arise from differences, those fruits arise, but not from the general. That fruit is sprouts etc. What does it become like? It becomes a commonality of many acting together, that is, the meaning of being produced by many acting together. Even if separated from one difference, that is, separated from another difference acting together. This shows the return. Using "with all differences" etc., it is following.