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DTG174 0009.The Ascertainment of Valid Cognition. Dharmakirti, glorious one..The Ascertainment of Valid Cognition. Dharmakirti, glorious one..g2.0f

Chinese

因此,这个声音,无论是根、接触、自我还是其他,对于产生自己的知识,并非依赖于产生知识的某些条件。因为一切都丝毫不能对它起作用。这排除了为了根和声音的紧密结合,所作的努力和结果。即使根对声音有所帮助,使之能够一起作用,由于没有依赖性,这也应该排除。因此,作为目标的对象,由于没有从自己的本性中转移,所以将永远是目标。如果对某些事物来说,能力既不会获得也不会丧失,那么它将是永恒的,因为产生知识的能力不是与它不同的事物。如果它是不同的事物,也会成为缺陷。这个声音在没有努力和中断时,从未被观察到。因此,人们认识到它对那个自性有所作用,因为看到了作者的性质。因此,刚刚产生的知识成为了原因——无常性质的果。先前存在的知识不是刚刚产生的,因为阻碍者——根,对声音没有在任何时候都紧密结合。没有依赖性,在某些时候,不会产生结果,因为这是矛盾的。这样的知识,作为某些时候的结果而成立,是那个标志。这些是总结的偈颂。虽然这个例子本身显示了理由的定义的范围,但从结果的例子中将自性分开,是为了使一切都不会被理解为它的自性。即使解释了意义,为了推论而陈述理由的权力也应该被理解为是特殊的。因此,这里只解释了一个区别,定义就是这个本身。结果的理由的例子也应该被理解为解释了在一个方向上稳定的自性。他自己也像例子一样说,因为对刚刚产生的清晰和生起是这样说的。凡存在则不出现,或自性与自体无差别者,不会与彼混淆。说

English

Therefore, this sound, whether it is the root, contact, self, or anything else, does not depend on certain conditions for generating knowledge in order to generate its own knowledge. Because everything does not do anything to it at all. This eliminates the effort and result for the close combination of the root and sound. Even if the root helps the sound, making it able to work together, this should also be eliminated because there is no dependence. Therefore, the object to be aimed at will always be the object because it has not shifted from its own nature. If, for some things, the ability is neither gained nor lost, then it will be eternal, because the ability to generate knowledge is not something different from it. If it is something different, it will also become a defect. This sound has never been observed when there is no effort and interruption. Therefore, it is recognized that it has some effect on that self-nature, because the nature of the author is seen. Therefore, the knowledge that has just arisen becomes the result of the cause—the impermanent nature. The previously existing knowledge is not just produced, because the obstructer—the root—is not closely combined with the sound at any time. Without dependence, at some times, it will not produce results, because this is contradictory. Such knowledge, established as a result at some times, is that sign. These are the summarizing verses. Although this example itself shows the scope of the definition of reason, separating the nature from the example of the result is to prevent everything from being understood as its self-nature. Even if the meaning is explained, the power to state the reason for inference should be understood as special. Therefore, only a distinction is explained here, the definition is this itself. The example of the reason for the result should also be understood as explaining the stable nature in one direction. He himself also speaks like an example, because it is said that way for the clarity and arising that have just arisen. Whatever exists does not appear, or whatever has no difference between self-nature and self, will not be confused with that. Saying

Chinese

为了了知其义而善加辨别。凡是具有“有”等属性的事物,如果不存在这样的关联,那么它们就可能产生错误,因此被称为非理性的论证。即使存在关联,那也只是为了理解它而建立的论证。如果不确定,就不会发生。如果不确定,就不是论证。这些是中间的偈颂。如果像前面所说的具有特征的非显现不存在,那么为什么不举出第三个论证的例子呢?那是因为它已经包含在自性论证的范畴内,所以才只举例说明。例如:对于不可见的事物来说,没有比非显现更重要的了。因此,从它的存在可以推导出对原因的认知。没有可见的自性,就与非显现没有什么不同。如果这一点成立,那么就可以推导出对原因不存在的认知和声音。这已经说过了。即使有原因,也不能确定结果的存在。那么,如何才能理解这一点呢?如果说“可见而未见,故无”,那么这个说法就成立了。即使它是结果,也能从中产生对智慧和声音的毫无疑问的认知。不能确定什么,就不能随意使用名称。然而,对于未见之可见事物,说“不存在”这一点已经成立。即使在没有明确说明的情况下,这个名称也能被理解,但无论情况如何,即使对象存在,它也会使拥有对象者不稳定。对于不存在的事物,在任何地方都没有其他原因。这是因为它以前已经被多次使用过了。这些关联不是要建立的。因此,如果确定了未见之可见事物,那么对于原因不存在的认知和声音的可能性,也就没有疑问了,就像确定了隐蔽的事物,就像牛的名称一样。即使对象存在,由于愚昧,这里也不再提及其他事物。由于它与已确立的事物和法相一致,所以它仅仅是指示符号。就像从见与不见中,可以确定原因和结果一样。对于这两者,结果等词语,是为了表达意义而使用的。从原因产生结果。

English

To understand its meaning, distinguish it well. If there is no such connection for things that have attributes such as "existence," then they are likely to be mistaken, therefore they are said to be irrational arguments. Even if there is a connection, it is only an argument established to understand it. If it is uncertain, it will not happen. If it is uncertain, it is not an argument. These are the intermediate verses. If some non-appearances with the characteristics as described above are not the third argument, then why are they not exemplified? That is because it is already included in the category of self-nature arguments, so only examples are given. For example: For invisible things, there is nothing more important than non-appearance. Therefore, from its existence, the cognition of the cause can be deduced. The absence of visible self-nature is no different from non-appearance. If this is established, then the cognition and sound of the absence of the cause can be deduced. This has already been said. Even if there is a cause, the existence of the result cannot be determined. So, how can this be understood? If it is said that "visible but unseen, therefore non-existent," then this statement is established. Even if it is the result, it can produce an undoubted cognition of wisdom and sound. What cannot be determined cannot be arbitrarily used as a name. However, for unseen visible things, it has already been established that they are said to be "non-existent." Even if the name is understood without explicit explanation, no matter what the situation, even if the object exists, it will make the possessor of the object unstable. For non-existent things, there is no other reason anywhere. This is because it has been used many times before. These connections are not to be established. Therefore, if the unseen visible thing is determined, then there is no doubt about the possibility of the cognition and sound of the absence of the cause, just like the hidden thing is determined, just like the name of a cow. Even if the object exists, due to ignorance, other things are no longer mentioned here. Because it is consistent with the established things and Dharma, it is only an indication of symbols. Just as from seeing and not seeing, the cause and effect can be determined. For these two, words such as result are used to express meaning. The result arises from the cause.

Tibetan

་བུ་རབ་བསྒྲུབ་པ། །འདི་ནི་རང་བཞིན་ནང་འདུས་ཕྱིར། །གཏན་ཚིགས་རབ་དབྱེ་བཤད་པ་ལས། །ཐ་དད་པར་ནི་དཔེར་མ་བརྗོད། །ཅེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་བར་སྐབས་ཀྱི་ཚིགས་སུ་བཅད་པ་དག་གོ །མི་དམིགས་པ་ལས་ནི་ཁྱད་པར་བྱེད་པའི་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པའི་ཐ་སྙད་དུ་རུང་བ་ཉིད་བསྒྲུབ་བོ། །ཁྱབ་པ་ཡང་གཞན་དུ་ཐ་སྙད་དེ་ཙམ་ལས་གྲུབ་པ་སྟེ་ཁྱད་པར་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །མི་དམིགས་པའི་བདག་ཉིད་དུ་གྱུར་པའི་མེད་པ་གྲུབ་པས་མེད་པའི་ཐ་སྙད་དུ་བསྒྲུབ་པ་ཡིན་ནོ་ཞེས་བཤད་ཟིན་ཏོ། །མི་དམིགས་པ་དེ་ཉིད་ཇི་ལྟ་བུ་གྲུབ་ཅིང་མེད་དེ་འགའ་ཞིག་གི་རྒྱུད་ཡང་ཇི་ལྟར་འགྱུར་ཞེ་ན། ཉེས་པ་དེ་ནི་མེད་དེ་འདི་ལྟར། གཅིག་དམིགས་ཉམས་སུ་མྱོང་བ་ལས། །འདི་ནི་དམིགས་སོ་ཞེས་བྱའམ། །མི་དམིགས་སོ་ཞེས་རྟོག་ཅན་གྱི། །བློ་ནི་སྐྱེ་བར་འགྱུར་བ་ཡིན། །གང་ལས་མེད་པའི་ཐ་སྙད་དུ་འགྱུར་བ་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་རང་གི་ཡུལ་ཅན་གྱི་ཤེས་པ་མེད་པ་ཙམ་གྱིས་ནི་འདི་མི་དམིགས་སོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་དེ་ལྟར་འགྱུར་བ་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། །འོ་ན་ཅི་ཞེ་ན། རང་ལས་ཁྱད་པར་ཅན་གྱི་ཤེས་པ་ཡོད་པ་ལས་ཏེ། འགའ་ཞིག་ཏུ་ཐམས་ཅད་མ་རྟོགས་ན་དངོས་པོ་མེད་པར་མི་རྟོགས་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དེའི་ཕྱིར་འགའ་ཞིག་མངོན་སུམ་དུ་གྱུར་ན་དེའི་ཚད་མའི་སྟོབས་ཀྱིས་འདི་ནི་དམིགས་སོ་ཞེའམ། གཞན་དམིགས་སོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་རྣམ་པར་རྟོག་པ་གཉིས་འབྱུང་བར་འགྱུར་རོ། །གང་གི་ཕྱིར་དོན་གྱི་ ཁྱད་པར་རྟོགས་པ་ནི་མྱོང་བའི་ཁྱད་པར་ལས་ཡིན་ལ། མྱོང་བའི་ཁྱད་པར་རྟོགས་པ་ནི་རྣམ་པ་དེ་ལྟ་བུའི་བདག་ཉིད་ཉམས་སུ་མྱོང་བ་ལས་ཡིན་ནོ། །དེས་ན་རང་ཉིད་གྲུབ་པའི་ཁྱད་པར་ནི་དོན་གྱི་དོན་ཁྱད་པར་དུ་བྱེད་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། །དེ་ལྟ་མ་ཡིན་ན་ནི་མྱོང་བའི་ཁྱད་པར་ཡང་མྱོང་བ་གཞན་གྱི་ཁྱད་པར་ལས་ཡིན། དེའི་ཡང་གཞན་ལས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཐུག་པ་མེད་པར་འགྱུར་བས་ཁྱད་པར་འགའ་ཡང་འགྲུབ་པར་མི་འགྱུར་རོ། །དོན་ནི་རང་གི་ཡོད་པ་དང་ཁྱད་པར་དག་གི་དེ་བསྒྲུབ་པ་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། །འོ་ན་ཅི་ཞེ་ན། རང་གི་ཤེས་པའི་ཡོད་པ་དང་ཁྱད་པར་དག་གིས་ཏེ། དེས་ན་རང་དབང་དུ་གྲུབ་པ་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། །ད་བཞིན་དུ་མྱོང་བ་ན་མྱོང་བ་གཞན་གྱི་ཡོད་པ་དང་ཁྱད་པར་དག་ལས་དེ་གྲུབ་པ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། ཐམས་ཅད་མི་རྟོགས་པར་ཐལ་བར་འགྱུར་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དེའི་ཕྱིར། རང་བཞིན་ཁྱད་པར་ཅན་མྱོང་ལས། །གཞན་གསལ་བ་ནི་གཞན་མ་ཡིན། །དེ་ཕྱིར་དེ་མི་དམིགས་པ་ཡང༌། །དེ་ལས་ཁྱད་པར་ཅན་དམིགས་ཉིད། །དེས་ན་མི་དམིགས་པ་འདི་ནི། །

Chinese

子之善成。此乃自性内摄故,从理智善分之说中,于差别则未言譬喻。名为间断之偈颂也。从不缘中,成立能作差别之自性无有之名言。周遍亦由他处唯名言而成,以无差别之故。已说由成不缘之自体之无,而立为无之名言也。若问不缘彼者如何成立,又无者如何,于某者之相续又如何转变耶?彼过失乃无有,如是。由缘一而体验故,当言此乃缘耶?或不缘耶?具分别之,心乃生起也。由何而转为无之名言,谓诸事物之自体境之识无有,仅由此则不缘之说,非如是转变也。若问何耶?谓由有自性差别之识也。若于某处未尽了知一切,则不觉事物为无之故。是故,若某者现前,则由彼之量力,此乃缘耶?或他缘耶?之二种分别生起也。以何之故,了知义之 差别乃由体验之差别也。了知体验之差别乃由体验如是之体性也。是故,自性成立之差别乃是事物之事物作差别也。若不如是,则体验之差别亦由他体验之差别也。以彼亦由他者之故,以成无有穷尽,则任何差别亦不能成立也。义非由自之有与差别等而成立也。若问何耶?谓由自之识之有与差别等也。是故非为自立也。如是,于体验时,非由他体验之有与差别等而成立,以致一切皆成不了知之过失故。是故,由自性差别之体验,他之显明非为他者。是故,彼不缘者,亦由彼而缘差别者也。是故,此不缘者。

English

The son's perfect accomplishment. This is because it is included within its own nature. From the explanation of the well-divided reasoning, no example is given for the difference. This is called an intervening verse. From non-apprehension, it is established that the very term for the absence of a nature that differentiates is valid. The pervasion is also established from just that term elsewhere, because there is no difference. It has already been explained that by establishing absence as the very nature of non-apprehension, the term for absence is established. If it is asked how that non-apprehension is established and absent, and how it transforms in the continuum of someone, that fault is not there, like this: From experiencing the apprehension of one, will one say, 'This is apprehended'? Or, 'Not apprehended'? A mind with discrimination will arise. That from which it transforms into the term for absence, it is not the case that just because there is no awareness of the objects themselves, one says, 'This is not apprehended.' What then? It is from having an awareness that is distinct from oneself. If one does not understand everything in some place, one does not understand that things are absent. Therefore, if something becomes manifest, then by the power of its valid cognition, two kinds of discrimination will arise: 'This is apprehended,' or 'Another is apprehended.' Because the difference of meaning is understood from the difference of experience. Understanding the difference of experience is from experiencing such a nature. Therefore, the difference of establishing oneself is making the difference of the thing of the thing. If it is not like that, then the difference of experience is also from the difference of another experience. Because that is also from another, since it becomes endless, no difference will be established. The meaning is not established by its own existence and differences. What then? By the existence and differences of one's own awareness. Therefore, it is not established independently. Similarly, in experience, it is not established by the existence and differences of another experience, because it would follow that everything would become uncomprehended. Therefore, from the experience of a nature with differences, the clarity of another is not another. Therefore, that non-apprehension is also the very apprehension of what is different from that. Therefore, this non-apprehension.