Chinese
既然不是随顺于，那是什么呢？说成灰尘就什么也不是了。如果说要遮止唯一性成为绝对的定论，那也不是，因为没有指示那个，所以也会变成得到相违。唯一性成为绝对的定论，对于那些没有先于生处的事物，因为没有见到，所以就会得到总和别。随顺于多种和排除而来的那些，也会变成无差别。因为在那里没有绝对的定论，所以不应该结合成各异。因此，仅仅因为没有指示理由，就变成推翻那个，那是不行的。推翻所要成立的才是道理。这样转变，不相异的事物之前，一个先行是绝对的定论，因此从那之中推翻，就会变成各异。即使那样，最初的随顺是对于相违的。即使那样转变，对于同类的事物，随顺于一个先行的事物，从最初的随顺中，没有先行的事物等等，就会变成各异，不是从最初的随顺中随顺于一个先行的事物。在那里也会变成各异。那个陈述是因为各异的事物被陈述为随顺于同类，所以应该从这个具足中区分出各异。结合也应该是这样合理的，如果排除本身不是从一个产生，那么因为没有生处，就会变成各异，意思是会变成没有同类。像这样，同类和随顺相关的事物，被看作是一个先行的事物，不是被看作是没有先行的事物，也不是被看作是自在天等等先行的事物。说成从最初的随顺中排除而来，对于排除一个，这不合理。那样的结合是不合理的，对于从无产生，说成最初的随顺是从主物产生也是不合理的。另外，如同具足一样，不是五性。应该结合排除而来的那些的五性。那样的话，就和最初的随顺的特征没有关联了。
English
Since it is not following, what is it? Saying it is dust is nothing at all. If it is said that the determination of oneness as absolute is to be prevented, that is not the case, because that is not indicated, so it will also become obtaining the opposite. The determination of oneness as absolute, for those things that have not preceded the place of birth, because they have not been seen, the general and the particular will be obtained. Those that follow the various and come by exclusion will also become non-different. Because there is no absolute determination there, it should not be combined into different. Therefore, merely because the reason is not indicated, it becomes overturning that, that is not possible. Overturning what is to be established is reasonable. In this way, one preceding the non-different things is an absolute determination, therefore overturning from that will become different. Even so, the initial following is for the contradictory. Even if it transforms in that way, for things of the same kind, following one preceding thing, from the initial following, things without a preceding thing, etc., will become different, it is not following one preceding thing from the initial following. There, too, it will become different. That statement is because different things are stated as following the same kind, so it should be distinguished as different from this complete one. The combination should also be reasonable in this way, if exclusion itself is not born from one, then because there is no place of birth, it will become different, meaning it will become without the same kind. In this way, things of the same kind and related to following are seen as one preceding thing, not as things without a preceding thing, nor as things with Ishvara etc. preceding. Saying that it comes by excluding from the initial following, for excluding one, this is not reasonable. Such a combination is not reasonable, and for arising from nothing, saying that the initial following arises from the chief thing is also not reasonable. Furthermore, like being complete, it is not the five natures. The five natures of those that come by exclusion should be combined. In that case, there is no connection with the characteristics of the initial following.
Chinese
像这样，通过遮止其他的一切方面，就应当联系说，这是从一切的最初的后续中排除唯一性而来的。从一一遮止反驳者来说，如果认为后续是最初的，那么对于反驳者的回答就没有边际，就会成为在排除而来的事物中出现过失。这是中间的偈颂。因此，那些说结合的特征没有明显关联的人，不仅认为数论者的理由是不合理的，而且还说是有差别的和排除而来的。在陈述了理由之后，应当考察相似的理由，对此，从争论确立来说，他们说：未成、不定和相违的意义，就是相似的理由。对此，未成等等，如果举例来说，就不是特征，例如，因为是眼睛的所取，所以是无常的，这是未成。因为不是有身体者，所以是常的，这是不定。正理论者的官能所生，所以是无常的，这是一个相违。数论者的因中有果，因为存在而产生，这是第二个相违。对此，未成的差别没有说，这是因为没有显示对于一方完全未成等等的多种差别。对于错乱也没有说，会变成没有说差别。那也有不共的，也有不迷惑的相违，我们就像所见一样陈述。一个相违说成是相同的，正理论者的总的官能所生是常的，因为在常和无常二者中都能见到，所以这只是不定，而不是相违。一个是未成的不共，第二个相违是，未成和不共的那个，因为这样，从先产生的产生和出现时不是存在的，而且一切都确立为从先产生的存在，从先产生的产生和出现也不是。即使承诺，也只是在那上面存在。这不是相违，因为不成立相违。对于相违的理由和，对于所许的损害也没有说。
English
Thus, by blocking all other aspects, it should be connected by saying that this comes from eliminating uniqueness from the very first consequence of everything. From blocking each opponent, if the consequence is considered to be the first, then there is no limit to the opponent's answer, and it will become a fault in the things that have been eliminated. This is an intermediate verse. Therefore, those who say that the characteristics of combination are not obviously related not only consider the reasons of the Samkhyas to be unreasonable, but also say that they are different and eliminated. After stating the reason, one should examine the seemingly valid reasons. In this regard, from the perspective of establishing the argument, they say: the meanings of unestablished, uncertain, and contradictory are seemingly valid reasons. Regarding this, unestablished and so on, if an example is given, it is not a characteristic. For example, because it is the object of the eye, it is impermanent, which is unestablished. Because it is not embodied, it is permanent, which is uncertain. Because it arises from the senses of the Vaisheshikas, it is impermanent, which is one contradiction. In the Samkhyas, the cause has an effect, because it exists and arises, which is the second contradiction. Regarding this, the divisions of the unestablished are not stated, because the various divisions of completely unestablished on one side and so on are not shown. The divisions are not stated even for confusion, it will become not stating the divisions. There are also uncommon ones, and there are also contradictions that are not confusing, we state as we see them. One contradiction is stated as the same, the general arising from the senses of the Vaisheshikas is permanent, because it is seen in both permanent and impermanent, so this is only uncertain, not contradictory. One is the unestablished uncommon, the second contradiction is, that which is unestablished and uncommon, because in this way, it is not existent when arising and occurring from what was previously produced, and everything is established as existing from what was previously produced, and arising and occurring from what was previously produced is also not. Even if promised, it exists only on that. This is not a contradiction, because the opposite is not established. The reason for the opposite and, the harm to what is accepted is also not stated.
Chinese
哦。因此显得少。也不能将那些包含在其中，也不能说不是似是而非的理由，因为是能遣除和损害的理由。有理智的人说，伴随错乱、相违、与时机相同、与所要证明的相同、以及过时的，这些都是似是而非的理由。其中，伴随错乱的是不决定的。这样就没有差别了。如果问什么是不决定的呢？不是与其他的差别，也不是在时机成熟时存在，因为存在于声音的共相和自相是二者的功德，就像这样。如果这样，共相 这不是声音，因为是遮止唯一决定的，而且那将变成所要证明的种类本身，如果说这也是遮止唯一决定的。像这样也没有差别，那样也没有所要证明的，并且要知道实际上也适用于与那不同的以及与那相违的。先前说过，不是在所有方面都是错乱的。如果承诺已成立的宗派，因为与那相违，就会变成相违，例如像说因为不是胜论派的有身，所以不是作者，就像极微一样。同样，对于所要观察的，因为与已成立的宗派相违，所以所要说的是能立的过失。还能获得其他的相违，不仅是似是而非的理由，而且对于这个，因为是有身，对于未成立的意义来说是理由的过失，并且不是作者，这也是承诺的过失，因为与先前承诺的相违。如果又是那未成立本身和相违本身二者都变成，那么就是承诺的过失和相违本身，对于陈述来说，那二者会同时相违，并且那也会指责另一方的作者，如果这样，那就取决于那样，如果像作者的陈述一样，以这其他的法相违本身来显示，那么在那里也要说是未成立本身，承诺的过失也不是那样。在那里成
English
Oh. Therefore it seems few. It is also not possible to include those within it, and it is also not possible to say that it is not a seemingly valid reason, because it is a reason that can dispel and harm. Those with reason say that those accompanied by confusion, contradiction, being the same as the occasion, being the same as what is to be proven, and being outdated, are seemingly valid reasons. Among them, that accompanied by confusion is uncertain. In this way, there is no difference. If asked what is uncertain? It is not different from others, nor does it exist when the time is ripe, because existing in the general and specific characteristics of sound is the merit of both, like this. If so, the general This is not sound, because it prevents a single determination, and that will become the very kind to be proven, if it is said that this also prevents a single determination. Like this, there is also no difference, and in that way, there is also nothing to be proven, and it should be understood that it actually applies to what is different from that and what contradicts that. It was previously said that it is not confusing in all aspects. If one commits to an established tenet, because it contradicts that, it will become contradictory, for example, like saying that because it is not a corporeal being of the Vaisheshika school, it is not a creator, like atoms. Similarly, for what is to be examined, because it contradicts the established tenet, what is to be said is the fault of the proof. Other contradictions can also be obtained, not only seemingly valid reasons, but also for this, because it is corporeal, for the unestablished meaning it is the fault of the reason, and not being a creator is also the fault of the commitment, because it contradicts the previous commitment. If again that unestablished itself and the contradictory itself both become, then it is the fault of the commitment and the contradictory itself, for the statement, those two will contradict each other simultaneously, and that will also accuse the other's author, if so, then it depends on that, if like the author's statement, this other characteristic of contradiction itself shows, then there also it should be said to be the unestablished itself, the fault of the commitment is also not like that. There it becomes
Chinese
从已成立的边际未成立之义而立，与宗相违之过失，其他的唯一是不可说的。对于作者来说，由于存在其他自主和不自主等法，所以没有相违等，另一种结合就像是“箭已射出”，这个“射出”就是例子。对于此，数论派这样说：主物不是因，因为不是有情识的缘故。对此，遣除是：因为不是主物之外的他者，所以是不共的，这是不定性。如果说与他者相异，那么就会变成相违，然而并非如此。那是唯一成立的相违，因为成立了相违的缘故。因为与已成立的边际相违之故，这不是。对于什么情况适合，为了确定它而接近安立，就是与情况相符，例如：我（补特伽罗）是常，因为不是身之外的他者的缘故。此处，也不是从不是身之外的他者而行使我（补特伽罗），这样会变成不定。因为，如此，常如虚空等，以及无常如瓶子等，两者都见到不是身之外的他者，因此，这是常吗？或者这是无常呢？这样进行思考。因此，这并非与不定相异。因为所要成立的和没有差别而成立的缘故，与所要成立的相同，例如：声是常，因为不是可触的缘故，如同智慧一样。此处，对于声来说，因为成立了不是可触的理由。不是未成立。在那里，理由未成立不是。从什么方面来说，因为与所要成立的没有差别，所以会与所要成立的相同。然而，此处例子会与所要成立的相同。在其他地方进行思考，对于例子，没有与所要成立的区分的理由，那就是与所要成立的没有差别，这样正确地进行观察，是基础相同者有很多。在一切处获得不是。承诺之后，理由未成立，这是与所要成立的没有差别的。
English
Having established the meaning of non-establishment from the edge of what is established, another fault of contradiction with the subject is unspeakable. For the agent, since there are other dharmas such as being independent and dependent, there is no contradiction, etc. Another connection is like "the arrow has been shot," this "shot" is the example. For this, the Samkhyas say this: the Pradhana is not the cause, because it is not sentient. To this, the refutation is: because it is not other than the Pradhana, it is uncommon, this is the uncertain nature. If it is said to be different from others, then it will become contradictory, but it is not so. That is the only contradiction that is established, because the opposite is established. Because it contradicts the established edge, this is not. For what situation is suitable, in order to determine it, approaching and establishing is in accordance with the situation, for example: I (Pudgala) am permanent, because it is not other than the body. Here, it is not that I (Pudgala) am exercised from not being other than the body, thus it becomes uncertain. Because, thus, permanent like space, etc., and impermanent like a pot, etc., both are seen as not other than the body, therefore, is this permanent? Or is this impermanent? Thus, one thinks. Therefore, this is not different from the uncertain. Because what is to be established and there is no difference, it is the same as what is to be established, for example: sound is permanent, because it is not tangible, like wisdom. Here, for sound, because the reason of not being tangible is established. It is not unestablished. There, the reason is not unestablished. From what aspect, because there is no difference from what is to be established, it will be the same as what is to be established. However, here the example will be the same as what is to be established. In other places, one thinks, for the example, the reason that is not distinguished from what is to be established, that is no different from what is to be established, thus correctly observing, those with the same basis are many. It is not obtained in all places. After promising, the reason is not established, this is no different from what is to be established.