Chinese
成为所取之境本身是难以避免的。此外，暂时对于那些认为外境具有支分等事物的显现存在的人来说，他们的观点也像他们自己所建立的宗派那样进行观察，也不会有显现的体验。因为，任何时候都不会有以具有支分的方式来认识的显现体验，而是经常会分别体验到以手等支分集合的多种形态存在的知识。对于体验到蓝色等功德等存在于支分上的知识也是没有的，因为如果所依本身不是显现，那么就不会仅仅执着于存在于其上的功德等。对于因死亡预兆、眼花、黄眼、昏花等导致眼睛受损的人，以及处于远处或近处等位置的人来说，即使是同一个事物，也会产生多种形态各不相同的知识，因此，这些心识与外境的支分等相似也是不存在的，因为那将会导致它们是不同的，因此，不会有那么多的自性或者功德等产生。如果具有功德等相违之法的也是同一个，那么多种也将会成为同一个，因为没有阻碍，所以所有的功德等法也都会成为一切的显现。在梦境等之中，即使没有像蓝色等功德那样存在的其他事物，也会分别体验到显现为蓝色等的知识，因为这本身就是错乱，所以也不能以形态的力量来安立为执着于其他事物。对于那些说蓝色等事物是微尘积聚的自性显现存在的人来说，也有同样的过失，因为不会分别体验到微小物体没有支分的多种形态的知识，并且因为承认相同的集合是境，并且因为总是像梦境等一样分别体验到显现为粗大的知识，并且因为从聚合的事物中聚合不是其他事物，并且因为聚合是通过分别念来观察的，所以也是没有实物的。
English
Becoming the object of grasping itself is unavoidable. Furthermore, for those who temporarily believe that external objects, such as those with parts, exist manifestly, their views, like their own established tenets, are examined, and there is no experience of manifestation. Because, at no time is there a manifest experience of knowledge in the form of understanding with parts; rather, one always separately experiences knowledge in the form of multiple collections of parts such as hands. There is also no experience of knowledge in the form of qualities such as blue existing on the parts, because if the basis itself is not manifest, then one will not merely grasp the qualities and so forth that exist on it. For those whose eyes are impaired by omens of death, blurred vision, yellow eyes, dimness, and so on, and for those who are situated at a distance or nearby, even for the same object, various kinds of knowledge with dissimilar forms arise. Therefore, these minds do not resemble external parts and so on, because that would lead to them being different. Therefore, so many natures or qualities and so on do not arise. If that which possesses contradictory qualities and so on is also the same, then the manifold would also become the same, because there is no obstruction, so all qualities and so on would also become the manifestation of everything. In dreams and so on, even if there are no other objects that possess qualities such as blue, one separately experiences knowledge that appears as blue and so on, because this itself is delusion. Therefore, it is not reasonable to establish that one grasps other objects by the power of form. For those who say that objects such as blue are the nature of aggregates of atoms that exist manifestly, there is also the same fault, because one does not separately experience knowledge of multiple forms of minute objects without parts, and because one acknowledges that the same aggregates are objects, and because one always separately experiences knowledge that appears as coarse, like dreams and so on, and because the aggregate is not other than the aggregated, and because the aggregate is examined by conceptual thought, it is also without substance.
Chinese
如果粗大的错觉是由于执持众多事物聚集而产生，那么，此时的识也因为是错觉，所以应成非量。例如，如果粗大的错觉仅仅是意识的遍计所执，那么，此时它应成不显现，因为分别的对境在任何时候都是不显现的。然而，如果是属于根识的范畴，那么，此时应成微尘永远不被执持，因为任何时候都不会产生具有微尘形象的识。粗大的错觉是执持在先也无法成立，因为你们承认最初就产生粗大的错觉。如果通过其他量成立了微尘，粗大的错觉才能成立是由执持微尘所致，那么，在微尘尚未成立时，怎么能说粗大的错觉是由执持微尘所致呢？在梦境等中，由于没有执持微尘却能见到粗大的错觉，因此，认为粗大的错觉是执持在先并不合理。在旷野中，小物体从远处看也显得很大，并且由于远近的差别，显现的清晰与不清晰的差别也不会有，因为物体本身是相同的，不可能出现那样的现象。此外，如果你们认为诸法是真实的，那么，由于在拉长的图画等上有各种各样的识的形象，因此应成诸法如形象般各不相同。因为各种各样的形象是所量，所以认为产生多种识是合理的。识如同分布在对境上一样而存在也不可能，因为无身者不可能存在于对境中，并且不住于对境中的诸识也不可能产生于北方和东方等方位的差别中。如果不能那样产生，那么像分布在对境上一样显现也是不可能的。由于识是一个，并且本体不是不同的，因此应成诸法如识的本体般本体相同。
English
If the coarse illusion is proximately caused by holding that many things exist in aggregation, then at that time, since the consciousness is also an illusion, it would follow that it is not a valid cognition. For example, if this coarse illusion is merely a conceptual imputation by mind alone, then at that time it would follow that it does not appear clearly, because the object of conceptualization is always unclear. However, if it belongs to the category of sense consciousness, then at that time it would follow that subtle particles are never apprehended, because a consciousness with that appearance does not arise at any time. It also cannot be established that the apprehension of that coarse illusion precedes it, because you assert that the coarse illusion arises only at the beginning. If subtle particles are established by another valid cognition, then it would follow that the coarse illusion is caused by apprehending them. But if they are not established, how can it be said that this coarse illusion is caused by apprehending them? Since coarse illusions are seen in dreams and the like even though there is no apprehension of subtle particles, it is not reasonable to say that the apprehension of them precedes this. In desolate places, even small objects appear to be very large from a distance, and there is no difference in clarity or obscurity due to the difference between being far or near, because it is impossible for the appearance to be like that when the object is the same. Furthermore, if you assert that the appearances are truly existent, then since there are various appearances of consciousness in elongated drawings and the like, it would follow that they are different according to the appearances. Because the various appearances are the object to be measured, it is well understood that many consciousnesses arise. It is also impossible for consciousness to arise as if it were spread out on the object, because it is impossible for a non-corporeal entity to exist in the object, and those that do not exist in the object cannot arise in the distinctions of directions such as north and east. If it does not arise in that way, then it is impossible for it to appear as if it were spread out on the object. Since consciousness is one and its essence is not different, it would follow that the appearances are of the same essence as the essence of consciousness.