Chinese
此中，说一切有部人这样说：‘此处也是由意愿之因产生的，由努力所生的风界，以及砍树等行为的集合，称为砍伐的行为，与砍伐者自性不异，与前一刹那性质不同。凭借何种差别，才能说有砍伐者呢？’因为其因是砍伐者，所以砍伐者砍树吗？这也是不行的。因为砍伐之前没有（砍伐），什么又将砍伐什么呢？因为在砍伐之前没有砍伐者，并且砍伐与砍伐者的自性是相异的，所以在世间是著名的。凭借什么砍伐来显现砍伐呢？那个砍伐不是砍伐那个（砍伐者）。’应该像之前一样，根据情况给予回答。因此，像这样，比喻也没有如实成立，所以理应不会没有意义相违的过失之处，这是总结。因此，像这样，如果用如上所说的道理来衡量，那么，能说行者的人说譬喻的词语，并且说砍伐者砍树，这也是因为行者不能成立行走，没有如实成立事物。能说行者的人说譬喻的词语，并且说砍伐者砍树，以及事物行者行走，对于这些，在自己的自性上，行为本身是不合理的，理应不会没有意义相违的过失之处。对于这些，理应只有意义相违的过失之处。其他的人说：‘因为没有行走之前。’对于此，在行走产生之前，行者与行走分离，因为作为行者本身是不合理的。行者行走这样的名称是不可能的，所以不应该说行者行走。’这样说。解释者，住持佛护（Buddhapālita）就是这样解释词句的根本的。而且，在中观根本论的解释佛护（Buddhapālita）中，因为什么？行者凭借什么行走？对于显现的遮
English
Here, the Sarvāstivādins say: 'Here also, arising from the cause of intention, the wind element generated by effort, and the collection of actions such as cutting trees, called the act of cutting, is not different in nature from the cutter, and is different in nature from the previous moment. By what difference can it be said that there is a cutter?' Because its cause is the cutter, does the cutter cut the tree? This is also not possible. Because there is no (cutting) before the cutting, what will cut what? Because there is no cutter before the cutting, and the cutting is different from the nature of the cutter, it is famous in the world. By what cutting does the cutting appear? That cutting does not cut that (cutter).' One should answer as before, according to the situation. Therefore, in this way, the analogy is not established as it is, so it is reasonable that there will be no fault of contradiction in meaning, this is the conclusion. Therefore, in this way, if we measure with the reason as stated above, then, those who can speak of the goer speak the words of the metaphor, and say that the cutter cuts the tree, this is also because the goer cannot establish walking, and the thing is not established as it is. Those who can speak of the goer speak the words of the metaphor, and say that the cutter cuts the tree, and the thing goer walks, for these, in their own nature, the action itself is unreasonable, and it is reasonable that there will be no fault of contradiction in meaning. For these, it is only reasonable that there will be a fault of contradiction in meaning. Others say: 'Because there is no before walking.' For this, before the arising of walking, the goer is separated from walking, because it is unreasonable to be the goer itself. The name of the goer walking is impossible, so it should not be said that the goer walks.' So they say. The commentator, the abbot Buddhapālita, explains the root of the verses in this way. Moreover, in the explanation of the root of the Middle Way, Buddhapālita himself, because of what? By what does the goer walk? For the apparent obscuration
Chinese
因为要详细解释说，在行走之前有行走的先前，在那之前没有行者。但那是不合理的，因为“行者不行走”这句话已经表达了意义。因此，解释者通过这种方式来证明常住部友称菩提的详细解释是不合理的。为什么那不合理呢？因为常住部友称菩提的详细解释先前已经说过：“暂时行者不行走。”在确立这个誓言的时候，“暂时行者行走。”如何能是合理的呢？如果没有行走，行者也永远不会是合理的。因为那已经表达了意义，所以没有必要说明其他的差别。分别部的人说：“通过什么行走而显现出行者？那行走不是他行走。”虽然这是真实的，但因为那是其他的，所以不会受到我们所说的损害。在这里，分别部的人说：你们中观派的“通过什么行走而显现出行者？那行走不是他行走。”因为对自己的自性起作用是不合理的。虽然通过什么行走而显现的行走的行走，不是那个行者所行，但从我们分别部的宗义来说，被称为“行者”的声音所表达的是实体的词义，被称为“行走”的声音所表达的是作用的词义，因此行走与行者是不同的。因此，对于那（行走），对自己的自性起作用没有过失。因为通过什么行走而显现的行走，与那（行者）不同的行走，是那个行者所行，所以你们对我们说：“因为没有行走的先前，什么将往何处行走？”不会受到如是所说的方式的损害。如果不能成立行走与行者是不同的，那不是不能成立的，因此我们是实体之识和作用之识是不同的。
English
Because it is to explain in detail that before the going there is the prior of going, and before that there is no goer. But that is unreasonable, because the statement "the goer does not go" has already expressed the meaning. Therefore, the commentator proves in this way that the detailed explanation of Sthavira Buddhapālita is unreasonable. Why is that unreasonable? Because the detailed explanation of Sthavira Buddhapālita has previously said: "For a while, the goer does not go." When establishing this vow, "For a while, the goer goes." How can it be reasonable? If there is no going, the goer will never be reasonable. Because that has already expressed the meaning, there is no need to explain other differences. The Vaibhāṣikas say: "Through what going does the goer appear? That going is not his going." Although this is true, but because that is other, it will not be harmed by what we say. Here, the Vaibhāṣikas say: Your Madhyamikas' "Through what going does the goer appear? That going is not his going." Because it is unreasonable to act on one's own nature. Although the going of going that appears through what going, is not what that goer goes, but from our Vaibhāṣika tenets, what is expressed by the sound called "goer" is the meaning of the word of substance, and what is expressed by the sound called "going" is considered to be the meaning of the word of action, therefore going is different from the goer. Therefore, for that (going), there is no fault in acting on one's own nature. Because the going that appears through what going, the going that is different from that (goer), is what that goer goes, so you say to us: "Because there is no prior of going, what will go where?" It will not be harmed by the manner of speaking as such. If it cannot be established that going and goer are different, it is not that it cannot be established, therefore we are the consciousness of substance and the consciousness of action are different.