Chinese
如果产生，谁做了那个？给予他人的另一个人，除了痛苦之外是什么？因为我所做的没有成立，痛苦怎么会被别人做呢？别人所做的痛苦，那会变成他的我所做。就像这样。如果人不做人的痛苦，而是人做了自己转生为天人的天人的痛苦并给予他，如果想要人的补特伽罗（梵文：pudgala，意为“人”）从天人之外产生天人的痛苦，那也是不合理的。如果另一个人做了那个痛苦，那么给予谁的那个补特伽罗，除了被给予的那个痛苦之外，怎么可能存在呢？因为那样的话，受苦的天人只是被安立在自己的痛苦蕴上而已。如果想要天人的痛苦从另一个人身上产生，那也是不合理的。因为谁做了那个天人的痛苦并给予另一个天人，那个另一个人除了自己的痛苦蕴之外是什么呢？因为从那之中没有分离。痛苦谁给予谁等等，因为没有自性成立。此外，痛苦我所做没有自性成立，如前所述。那么，天人的痛苦相对于天人，怎么会被别人做呢？因为天人之外的别人所做的痛苦，那会变成那个人我所做。第三个是：稍微痛苦不是我所做，它自己没有做它。如果不是他者我所做，痛苦怎么会是他者所做呢？就像这样。稍微，痛苦不是我所做，因为痛苦它自己没有做它自己。因为自己对自己做是相违的。如果痛苦不是他者我所做，那么说那个痛苦是被他者所做，那怎么会成立呢？因为安立为“这个做”的那个他者没有自性成立。因为痛苦依赖于因。如果不依赖，那么所有受苦者都会变成总是受苦等等，那是不合理的。因为看到痛苦偶尔产生。第二个是：如果各自做了，痛苦会被两者所做。别人没有
English
If it arises, who did that? The other person who gives to others, what is it other than suffering? Because what I did is not established, how could suffering be done by others? The suffering done by others, that will become his I did. Like this. If a person does not do the suffering of a person, but a person does the suffering of the gods who are born as gods themselves and gives it to them, if one wants the suffering of the gods to arise from a person other than the gods, that is also unreasonable. If another person does that suffering, then how could the person to whom it is given exist as something other than that suffering that is given? Because in that case, the suffering god is only labeled on his own aggregate of suffering. If one wants the suffering of the gods to arise from another person, that is also unreasonable. Because who did that suffering of the gods and gave it to another god, what is that other person other than his own aggregate of suffering? Because there is no separation from that. Suffering who gives to whom, etc., because there is no self-nature established. Furthermore, the suffering I did is not established by its own nature, as mentioned before. Then, how could the suffering of the gods be done by others relative to the gods? Because the suffering done by others other than the gods, that will become what that person did. The third is: Slightly, suffering is not done by me, it itself did not do it. If it is not done by the other self, how could suffering be done by the other? Like this. Slightly, suffering is not done by me, because suffering itself did not do itself. Because it is contradictory for oneself to do to oneself. If suffering is not done by the other self, then how could it be said that that suffering is done by the other? Because that other who is labeled as "this does" has no self-nature established. Because sufferings depend on causes. If they do not depend, then all sufferers will become always suffering, etc., which is unreasonable. Because we see suffering arising occasionally. The second is: If each did it individually, suffering would be done by both. Others did not
Chinese
不是我所造作，痛苦怎会无因生？如是说。如果认为痛苦不是自己或他人各自所造，而是两者聚合所造，那么如果自己或他人各自造作了痛苦，痛苦就理应是两者聚合所造，但这并不合理，因为之前已经驳斥过了。如果不是我所造，也不是他人所造，痛苦又怎会无因而生？因为无因不会产生任何事物。第二是：唯有痛苦这四种方式，不仅不存在于内心，外在事物也不存在这四种方式。如是说。不仅内心中的痛苦不存在自己所造等四种方式，外在的物体，如土地、嫩芽等，也不存在这四种方式，因为正如前面所说的，同样的道理会造成妨害。在此，痛苦自己所造，会被自生和他生遮破的道理以及缘起之理所遮破。痛苦由他所造，会被后者遮破，因此，两者所造也会被其遮破。无因而生则容易遮破。然而，痛苦等依靠缘起而在名言中存在是必须承认的，因此，自宗认为痛苦是由因缘所造。如果痛苦先已成立，那么它就没有造作痛苦的基础。如果受苦者先已成立，那么就没有安立为受苦者的基础，因此痛苦和受苦者是同时的。那时，受苦者是依靠自己的安立基础痛苦而成立的。然而，痛苦生起的基础必须先存在，否则是不合理的。而存在的基础是受苦者的前一世的同类相续，但不会被认为是受苦者，如果这样认为，那么没有被疾病缠身的人也必须被认为是病人，这是不合理的。这种方式可以类推到快乐和感受快乐者等等。第二是：《三摩地王经》等的教证。第三是：关于我所造和他所造的观察，名为第十二品的解释。
English
Not made by myself, how could suffering arise without a cause? So it is said. If one thinks that suffering is not made by oneself or others individually, but is made by the combination of both, then if oneself or others individually create suffering, then suffering should be made by the combination of both, but this is not reasonable, because it has been refuted before. If it is not made by myself, nor made by others, how could suffering arise without a cause? Because nothing arises from no cause. The second is: Only suffering, these four ways, not only do not exist in the mind, but also external things do not exist in these four ways. So it is said. Not only do the four ways of suffering in the mind, such as being made by oneself, not exist, but also external objects, such as land, sprouts, etc., do not exist in these four ways, because, as mentioned earlier, the same reasoning will cause harm. Here, the suffering made by oneself is blocked by the reason that it is born from itself and others, and by the reason of dependent origination. Suffering made by others is blocked by the latter, therefore, what is made by both is also blocked by it. It is easy to block arising from no cause. However, it must be admitted that suffering and so on exist in name because of dependent origination, therefore, our own school believes that suffering is made by conditions. If suffering is established first, then it has no basis for creating suffering. If the sufferer is established first, then there is no basis for being established as the sufferer, therefore suffering and the sufferer are simultaneous. At that time, the sufferer is established by relying on his own basis of establishment, suffering. However, the basis for the arising of suffering must exist first, otherwise it is unreasonable. And the existing basis is the previous life's similar continuum of the sufferer, but it will not be considered the sufferer, if so, then a person who is not afflicted by disease must also be considered a patient, which is unreasonable. This method can be applied to happiness and those who experience happiness, etc. The second is: the teachings of the Samadhiraja Sutra, etc. The third is: An examination of what was made by myself and what was made by others, called the explanation of the twelfth chapter.
Tibetan
་བསྟན་པ་ལ་གཉིས། དེ་རང་བཞིན་གྱིས་ཡོད་པ་དགག་པ་དང་། རང་བཞིན་ཡོད་པའི་སྒྲུབ་བྱེད་དགག་པའོ། །དང་པོ་ལ་གསུམ། རབ་བྱེད་ཀྱི་གཞུང་བཤད། ལུང་དང་སྦྱར་བ། མཚན་བསྟན་པའོ། །དང་པོ་ལ་གསུམ། གཞན་ལ་གྲགས་པའི་ལུང་གིས་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པར་བཤད་པ། དེའི་རྩོད་སྤོང་། དེའི་དོན་གཞན་དུ་འཆད་པ་དགག་པའོ། །དང་པོ་ནི། བཅོན་ལྡན་འདས་ཀྱིས་ཆོས་གང་ཞིག །བསླུ་བ་དེ་ནི་བརྫུན་པར་གསུངས། །འདུ་བྱེད་ཐམས་ཅད་བསླུ་བའི་ཆོས། །དེས་ན་དེ་དག་བརྫུན་པ་ཡིན། །ཞེས་སོ། །སངས་རྒྱས་བཅོམ་ལྡན་འདས་ཀྱིས་ཆོས་གང་ཞིག་བསླུ་བ་ཡིན་པ་དེ་ནི་བརྫུན་ནོ་ཞེས་བསླུ་བ་ལ་བརྫུན་པས་ཁྱབ་པར་གསུངས་པས། དེས་ན་འདུ་བྱེད་དེ་དག་ཆོས་ཅན། བརྫུན་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ། རང་བཞིན་གྱིས་མེད་ཀྱང་དེར་གྲུབ་པ་ལྟར་སྣང་བའི་བསླུ་བའི་ཆོས་ཅན་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། གཉིས་པ་ནི། གལ་ཏེ་བསླུ་ཆོས་གང་ཡིན་པ། །དེ་བརྫུན་དེ་ལ་ཅིག་ཞིག་བསླུ། །བཅོམ་ལྡན་འདས་ཀྱིས་དེ་གསུངས་པས། །སྟོང་ཉིད་ཡོངས་སུ་བསྟན་པ་ཡིན། །ཞེས་སོ། །གལ་ཏེ་བསླུ་བར་བསྟན་པས་བརྫུན་པར་གསུངས་ན་དངོས་པོ་ལ་སྐུར་འདེབས་ཀྱི་ལོག་ལྟར་མི་འགྱུར་རམ་ཞེ་ན། བསླུ་བའི་ཆོས་གང་ཡིན་པ་དེ་ནི་བརྫུན་ནོ་ཞེས་བཤད་པ་དེའི་ཚེ་དེ་ལ་ཅི་ཞིག་དངོས་པོ་མེད་པར་འཛིན་པའི་སྐུར་འདེབས་ཀྱིས་བསླུ་བར་འགྱུར་བ་མེད་དེ། བཅོམ་ལྡན་འདས་ཀྱིས་འདུ་བྱེད་གང་ཡིན་པ་དེ་བརྫུན་པར་གསུངས་པ་དེས་ནི་དེ་རྣམས་དངོས་པོ་མེད་པར་མི་སྟོན་གྱི་རང་བཞིན་གྱིས་མ་སྐྱེས་པའི་སྟོང་ཉིད་ཡོངས་སུ་བསྟན་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། མ་དྲོས་པས་ཞུས་པ་ལས། གང་ཞིག་རྐྱེན་ལས་སྐྱེས་པ་དེ་མ་སྐྱེས། དེ་ལ་སྐྱེ་བའི་རང་བཞིན་ཡོད་མ་ཡིན། །རྐྱེན་ལ་རག་ལས་གང་དེ་སྟོང་པར་བཤད། །གང་ཞིག་སྟོང་ཉིད་ཤེས་དེ་བག་ཡོད་ཡིན། །ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་ཕྱིར། །གསུམ་པ་ལ་གཉིས། །ལུང་དོན་གཞན་དུ་འཆད་ཚུལ་དང་། དེ་ལྟར་འཆད་པའི་སྒྲུབ་བྱེད་དགག་པའོ། །དང་པོ་ནི། དངོས་རྣམས་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་མེད་ན། གཞན་དུ་འགྱུར་བར་སྣང་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དངོས་པོ་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་མེད་མེད། །གང་ཕྱིར་དངོས་རྣམས་སྟོང་པ་ཉིད། །གལ་ཏེ་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་མེད་ན། །གཞན་དུ་འགྱུར་བ་གང་ཞིག་ཡིན། །ཞེས་སོ། ཁོ་ན་རེ། དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་ལ་རང་གི་ངོ་བོས་གྲུབ་པའི་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་མེད་ན་འདི་རྣམས་གཞན་དུ་འགྱུར་བ་མི་འཐད་པས་གཞན་དུ་འགྱུར་བ་སྣང་བའི་ཕྱིར་རང་གི་ངོ་བོས་མ་གྲུབ་པ་མདོའི་དོན་མིན་གྱི། ངོ་བོ་གཞན་དུ་འགྱུར་བས་རང་བཞིན་ལ་མི་གནས་པ་མདོའི
Chinese
关于教法有二：破斥其自性存在，以及破斥自性存在的论证。第一部分有三：解释论著的宗义，与经文结合，以及标明名称。第一部分有三：以他人所知的经文阐述无自性，驳斥对此的争论，以及破斥将此意义作其他解释。第一部分是：世尊说：任何具有欺骗性的法，都是虚假的。一切行皆具欺骗性，因此它们是虚假的。如是说。佛陀世尊说，任何具有欺骗性的法都是虚假的，即以虚假遍及欺骗性。因此，这些行，作为有法，是虚假的，因为它们具有欺骗性，虽然实际上没有自性，但却显现为存在。第二部分是：如果任何具有欺骗性的法都是虚假的，那么虚假又欺骗什么呢？世尊如此说，是为了完全揭示空性。如是说。如果说，因为揭示了欺骗性就说是虚假的，那么不会变成对事物的诽谤邪见吗？如果说任何具有欺骗性的法都是虚假的，那么在那时，没有什么事物会被执着为不存在的诽谤所欺骗。世尊说任何行都是虚假的，这并不是说它们不存在，而是为了完全揭示它们没有自性的空性。如《无热恼请问经》中说：任何由因缘所生的事物，都不是真正产生的，因为它们没有产生的自性。依赖于因缘的事物被说是空性的。谁了解空性，谁就是谨慎的。如是说。第三部分有二：阐述经文意义的其他方式，以及破斥如此阐述的论证。第一部分是：如果事物没有自性，那么它们会显现为转变。事物并非没有自性，因为事物是空性的。如果事物没有自性，那么什么会转变呢？如是说。有人说：如果事物没有以自己的体性成立的自性，那么这些事物就不会转变，因为转变是显现的。因此，经文的意义不是指没有以自己的体性成立，而是指体性转变为不驻留于自性。
English
There are two aspects to the teachings: refuting inherent existence and refuting the arguments for inherent existence. The first part has three sections: explaining the tenets of the treatise, connecting with scripture, and stating the title. The first part has three sections: explaining the lack of inherent existence with scriptures known to others, refuting objections to it, and refuting other interpretations of its meaning. The first part is: The Blessed One said, 'Whatever dharma is deceptive is false. All conditioned things are of a deceptive nature, therefore they are false.' Thus it is said. The Buddha, the Blessed One, said that whatever dharma is deceptive is false, thus stating that falsity pervades deception. Therefore, those conditioned things, as subjects, are false, because they are of a deceptive nature, appearing as if they exist even though they lack inherent existence. The second part is: 'If whatever is deceptive is false, then what does the false deceive? The Blessed One said this to fully reveal emptiness.' Thus it is said. If saying something is false because it is shown to be deceptive, wouldn't that become a nihilistic view of denying entities? If it is said that whatever dharma is deceptive is false, then at that time, nothing will be deceived by the nihilistic imputation of holding things as non-existent, because the Blessed One said that whatever is conditioned is false, which does not mean that they do not exist, but to fully reveal the emptiness of not being born from themselves, as it is said in the Questions of Anavatapta: 'Whatever is born from conditions is unborn; it does not have the nature of being born. Whatever depends on conditions is said to be empty. Whoever knows emptiness is mindful.' Thus it is said. The third part has two sections: the way of explaining the meaning of the scriptures in other ways, and refuting the arguments for explaining it in that way. The first part is: 'If things do not have self-nature, then they appear to change. Things are not without self-nature, because things are empty. If there is no self-nature, then what changes?' Thus it is said. Some say: If things do not have self-nature established by their own essence, then these things would not change, because change is apparent. Therefore, the meaning of the sutra is not that they are not established by their own essence, but that the essence changes and does not abide in self-nature.