Chinese
是能成立的。同样地，对于否定词来说，“不是马”和“不是马本身”也变成了有法和法陈述的词语。如果陈述法和有法的这两个在意义上没有差别，那么词语和思维会变成不同种类吗？不会变成不同种类，因为像这样，其他的差别是舍弃和不舍弃，这些依次是法和有法陈述的词语的语词差别或差别。从那之中，任何被陈述的事物，比如被陈述的牛，对于理解者、听者和说话者这两者的知晓和想要陈述的思维来说，仅仅是跟随的所依或基础，因为依赖于内在的陈述意愿。那怎么样呢？如果想要陈述具有肉垂和垂胡的牛，作为与其他马等差别的特殊情况，那么就陈述否定，说“这不是马等，而是牛本身”。这样就通过舍弃其他差别的方式来陈述牛。又，如果没有把想要断除其他差别的思维作为主要，而只是把具有肉垂和垂胡的牛认为是牛本身，那么就仅仅陈述“这是牛”这样的有法的体性。即使对于那两者来说，除了被陈述的牛之外没有其他，但因为词语具有按照陈述意愿来理解的能力，所以说“本身”也不是没有意义的。不仅如此，对于总和具有总、行为和具有行为、功德和具有功德等等其他一切来说，实体即有法陈述和事物即法陈述的词语差别，仅仅是舍弃不舍弃其他差别的区分而已。因此，法和有法的那些在被陈述的事物上没有任何差别，因为两者都陈述同一个事物。陈述那些道理的词语形式是不同的，如果想要了解舍弃不舍弃差别的意义，那么就在那个词语上加上有益的彼益之缘来显示，比如“牛本身”和“仅仅是牛”等等，这是法陈述，或者用具有“地”等作用的缘来成立，那么一般是“煮”仅仅是有法，而显示“煮的行为本身”等是具有法陈述。如果那两者之外没有其他可以详细说明的，就作为是能成立的结尾，那么神
English
it is able to establish. Similarly, for negative words, "not a horse" and "not a horse itself" also become words of subject and predicate statements. If these two, stating dharma and the possessor of dharma, have no difference in meaning, then do words and thoughts become different kinds? They do not become different kinds, because like this, other differences are abandoning and not abandoning, which are, in order, the lexical difference or distinction between the words stating dharma and the possessor of dharma. Among those, whatever is stated, such as the stated cow, for the understanding of the understander, the listener, and the speaker, is merely the basis or foundation that follows the knowing and wanting to state mind of both, because it depends on the inner intention to state. How is that? If one wants to state the cow with dewlap and wattle as a special case that distinguishes it from other horses, then one states the negation, saying "This is not a horse, etc., but the cow itself." Thus, one states the cow by abandoning other differences. Also, if one does not take the mind of wanting to eliminate other differences as primary, but merely thinks of the cow with dewlap and wattle as the cow itself, then one merely states the nature of the possessor of dharma, saying "This is a cow." Even for those two, there is nothing other than the stated cow, but because the word has the ability to understand according to the intention to state, saying "itself" is not meaningless. Moreover, for all others such as the general and the possessor of the general, the action and the possessor of the action, the quality and the possessor of the quality, the difference between the word stating the substance, i.e., the possessor of dharma, and the word stating the entity, i.e., the dharma, is merely the distinction of abandoning or not abandoning other differences. Therefore, those dharma and possessor of dharma have no difference in the stated thing, because both state the same thing. The forms of the words stating those reasons are different. If one wants to understand the meaning of abandoning or not abandoning differences, then one shows it by adding a beneficial "that benefit" condition to that word, such as "the cow itself" and "merely a cow," etc., which is a dharma statement, or by establishing it with a condition that has the function of "ti," etc., then generally "cooking" is merely the possessor of dharma, and showing "the action of cooking itself," etc., is a dharma statement. If there is nothing else to explain in detail other than those two, and it is made into an ending that is able to establish, then the god
Chinese
比如“以陈（lhas byin）而卧”之类，以及“布匹的白色”之类，以陈和布匹所限定的卧和白色，因为排除了不是那两者的其他卧和白色，就变成了排除其他差别的语声，从而变成了说法的对象。自然地，如果仅仅说“陈卧”和“布匹白色”，因为不排除其他差别，仅仅停留在一般状态，就变成了陈述有法。诸如此类，即使以其他方式陈述也可以，除了排除或不排除差别之外，没有任何其他的差别。总之，所有的条件，如“苏扎（su bra）”和“德（ti）”等，都是具有作用的条件，以及那之后的条件，以及除此之外，补充不完整的名称和词性变化等，被称为具有能动作用的结尾，即条件的结尾归纳为这三种。无论以何种条件陈述，意义都相似，仅仅在于排除或不排除差别。因此，像“瓶子是无常的”这样，仅仅陈述瓶子本身是无常的，是陈述有法；而像“瓶子的无常”这样，特别指定瓶子之上的无常，就变成了说法，但实际上两者都显示了瓶子是无常的。前者因为没有排除其他差别，所以显示了既是瓶子又是无常的；后者因为排除了其他差别，所以仅仅显示了瓶子之上的无常，不显示与瓶子是同一基础，而是显示瓶子是限定的法。同样，如果应用于一般和具有一般者，比如“树和树本身”、“有肉的树”、“树的肉”、“肉的树”等等。如果应用于行为和具有行为者，比如“烹饪”、“烹饪本身”、“烹饪者陈”、“陈在烹饪”、“陈的烹饪”、“烹饪的行为”等等。如果应用于功德和具有功德者，比如“白色”、“白色本身”、“仅仅是白色”、“只是白色”、“颜色白色”、“白色的颜色”、“布匹白色”、“颜色的白色”、“布匹的白色”等等，应该应用于所有像有法和法一样的事物来理解。像这样，这些陈述法和有法的语声，因为想要陈述而为了排除或不排除其他差别，所以才这样使用词语。因此，如果陈述像“瓶子之上的法无常”这样，那么反过来说，陈述“瓶子之上的反体法无常”，那么它就表示存在于瓶子自身之上
English
Like "lying down with Chen (lhas byin)" and "the white of cloth," the lying down and white qualified by Chen and cloth, because they exclude other lying down and white that are not those two, become sounds that exclude other differences, thus becoming the object of statement. Naturally, if only "Chen lying down" and "cloth white" are stated, because other differences are not excluded and remain in a general state, they become statements of the subject of dharma. Even if stated in other ways, there is no other difference than excluding or not excluding differences. In short, all conditions, such as "su bra" and "ti," are conditions with action, and conditions after that, and in addition, supplementing incomplete names and inflections, etc., are called endings with active function, that is, the endings of conditions are summarized into these three. No matter what condition is stated, the meaning is similar, only in excluding or not excluding differences. Therefore, like "the vase is impermanent," stating that the vase itself is impermanent is stating the subject of dharma; and like "the impermanence of the vase," specifically designating the impermanence on the vase, it becomes a statement of dharma, but in fact both show that the vase is impermanent. The former, because it does not exclude other differences, shows that it is both a vase and impermanent; the latter, because it excludes other differences, only shows the impermanence on the vase, does not show that it is the same basis as the vase, but shows that the vase is the qualifying dharma. Similarly, if applied to general and having general, such as "tree and tree itself," "fleshy tree," "meat of tree," "tree of meat," and so on. If applied to action and having action, such as "cooking," "cooking itself," "cook Chen," "Chen is cooking," "Chen's cooking," "the act of cooking," and so on. If applied to qualities and having qualities, such as "white," "white itself," "only white," "just white," "color white," "white color," "cloth white," "color of white," "cloth's white," and so on, it should be applied to all things like subject of dharma and dharma to understand. Like this, these sounds of stating dharma and subject of dharma, because they want to state and in order to exclude or not exclude other differences, that is why words are used in this way. Therefore, if stating like "the dharma of impermanence on the vase," then conversely, stating "the reverse dharma of impermanence on the vase," then it indicates that it exists on the vase itself.
Chinese
也断除其他差别等。如果仅以“瓶子是无常的”作为有法来表达，则不会特意断除瓶子上的造作等，而是仅将瓶子的无常性作为表达的对象来显示。那么，既然一切声音都具有遍除的对境，为什么在将“牛”作为有法来表达时，不会断除其他差别，如马等呢？因此，认为“排除其他差别”是不合理的。如果这样想，那么，即使是表达“牛”这个有法的声音，也必定会断除其他差别，但由于表达意愿的缘故，应该理解为仅仅是牛。为了理解断除其上存在的马等，用“ཉིད་（藏文，梵文天城体，梵文罗马拟音，汉语字面意思）”这个词来表达遣返，但实际上，表达的是排除自身之外的一切的牛，这并没有什么区别，这就是原因。因此，虽然名相、助词和词语的表达在意义上没有差别，但就像天授的丸子一样，以不同的方式，仅仅是被词语的力量抛向心识的领域，应该理解为仅仅是表达意愿的缘故而进入。因为这样的原因，如果承认一切声音都仅仅进入排除他者的对境，那么就可以消除声音所表达的常法总相与之相应的宗派的表达上的过失。否则，如果声音所表达的总相或种姓是什么，以及与该种姓相应的显现是不同的，那么就会有过失。如《集论》中所说：“无自主故彼非有，假立故且不可能，如臣民之被立王。”就像这样，如果牛的声音所表达的真实对象是牛的常法总相，那么，对于与之相应的显现，声音不会自主地进入不同的事物，就像柱子的名称不会进入瓶子一样。因此，表达总相的声音不会理解为与之相应。此外，牛的名称仅仅是假立在牛的显现上，这是不合理的。即使那样，假立也是没有意义的，因为所表达的常法总相和牛的无常显现二者不可能在同一基础上存在，就像臣民被立为国王一样，是没有意义的。以上。第二，如果认为声音的对境是事物，那么一个事物有多个声音进入等是不合理的。按照语法学家和胜论派的观点，词语是凭借所表达的自相的事物而进入的。
English
It also cuts off other differences, etc. If one expresses "the pot is impermanent" merely as a subject, then one does not specifically cut off the made-up nature on the pot, etc., but merely shows the impermanence of the pot as the object of expression. Now, since all sounds have the object of exclusion, why is it that when "cow" is expressed as a subject, other differences such as horses are not cut off? Therefore, it is unreasonable to think that "excluding other differences." If you think so, then even the sound of expressing "cow" as a subject must cut off other differences, but because of the intention to express, it should be understood as just a cow. In order to understand that horses, etc., are cut off from it, the word "ཉིད་（Tibetan, Devanagari, Romanized Sanskrit, literal meaning）" expresses the reversal, but in reality, there is no difference in expressing a cow that excludes everything other than itself, which is the reason. Therefore, although there is no difference in meaning from the expressions of case endings, particles, and words, they are merely thrown into the realm of consciousness by the power of words in a different way, like the pills of Lhas Byin, and should be understood as merely entering because of the intention to express. For such a reason, if one admits that all sounds enter only into the object of excluding others, then one can eliminate the faults of expression in the aspect of believing that the sound is associated with the permanent general characteristic that is expressed. Otherwise, if what is expressed by the sound is a generality or a kind, and the manifestations that are associated with that kind are different, then it will be a fault. As stated in the Compendium, "Because it has no independence, it is not possessed, because it is imputed and impossible, like a subject being made a king." Like that, if the real object expressed by the sound of cow is the permanent general characteristic of cow, then the sound will not independently enter into different substances that are associated with it, just as the name of a pillar does not enter into a pot. Therefore, the sound expressing the general characteristic is not understood as being associated with it. Furthermore, it is unreasonable for the name of cow to be applied only to the manifestations of cow. Even so, the imputation is meaningless, because it is impossible for the expressed permanent general characteristic and the impermanent manifestations of cow to exist on the same basis, just as it is meaningless for a subject to be made a king. The above. Second, if one thinks that the object of sound is a thing, then it is unreasonable for multiple sounds to enter into one thing, etc. According to the views of grammarians and Vaiseṣikas, words enter by the power of the objects of self-characterization that are expressed.