Chinese
就像可以衡量的事物显现的对境，以及执持它的有境各自存在一样，在现象的支配下，虽然安立了所取相和能取相，但实际上，任何一种识，与车子和墙壁等无情物的自性，即与不具明觉的事物相反，会极大地生起为具有明和觉的体性。因此，任何不是无情物的自性，就像这样，就是我自身知道，或者说是自知自明。第二，安立它为自知的道理。 无分一体自性故， 三性自体不应理， 彼之自性自证者， 非是能作所作事。 是故此乃知识性， 是故能知自我可。 如是说。就像这样，所谓的自识本身，是断除了其他事物而成为一体的，并且必须是与自身不同的无分自性。实际上，产生者，作为安立的原因，是可知的对境；由它所生，是能知对境者；以及所生之果，即知，也就是能作、所作、业三者的自性是不应理的。因此，所谓识的自性自己证知自己，就像用斧子砍树一样，实际上是生起与自己相异的自执识，或者识所要证知的对境，以及认为对境是能证知的实有，不是这样的，因此，这是识的自性，所以安立和允许自我知晓的名称。如果实际上认为是自知，即有境和对境，能生和所生的自性，那是不应理的。如果事物自己产生自己，要么是未生，要么是已生。如果是前者，那是不应理的，因为在生起之前它不存在，所以没有产生的能力。如果已经生起，在有能力的时候，所生之物也与它成为一体，自己对自己作用是相违的，就像剑不能砍自己一样。因此，对境瓶子等是无情物，所以它们不可能具有明和觉。因此，要知道它们的体性，必须依赖于与自己不同的明和觉的智慧。但是，这个识的体性不是像无情物一样，所以要知道自己的体性
English
Just as the objects of various measurable things appear, and the subjects that hold them exist separately, under the sway of phenomena, although the apprehended aspect and the apprehending aspect are posited, in reality, any kind of consciousness, as opposed to the nature of inanimate objects such as carts and walls, that is, things devoid of clarity and awareness, arises greatly as having the nature of clarity and awareness. Therefore, whatever is not the nature of an inanimate object, like this, is knowing oneself, or self-knowing and self-illuminating. Second, the reason for establishing it as self-knowing. Because of the indivisible one's own nature, The three natures are not reasonable, That which knows itself by itself, Is not the object of action and agent. Therefore, this is the nature of knowledge, Therefore, it is possible to know oneself. Thus it is said. Like this, the so-called self-consciousness itself, is cutting off other things and becoming one, and must be an indivisible nature different from oneself. In reality, the producer, as the cause of establishing, is the object to be known; what is produced by it, is the knower of the object; and the result of production, that is, knowledge, that is, the nature of the three, agent, object, and action, is not reasonable. Therefore, what is said to be the self-nature of consciousness knowing itself, like chopping a tree with an ax, in reality, is generating a self-grasping consciousness different from oneself, or the object to be known by consciousness, and thinking that the object is the real thing that can be known, it is not like that, therefore, this is the self-nature of consciousness, so it is reasonable and permissible to establish the name of self-knowing. If in reality it is thought to be self-knowing, that is, the nature of the subject and object, the producer and the produced, that is not reasonable. If things produce themselves, either they are unborn, or they are already born. If it is the former, it is not reasonable, because it does not exist before it is born, so there is no ability to produce. If it has already been born, when it has the ability, the thing to be produced also becomes one with it, and it is contradictory for oneself to act on oneself, just like a sword cannot cut itself. Therefore, objects such as vases are inanimate objects, so it is impossible for them to have clarity and awareness. Therefore, to know their nature, one must rely on the wisdom of clarity and awareness that is different from oneself. However, the nature of this consciousness is not like an inanimate object, so to know one's own nature
Chinese
不必依赖其他条件，因此安立为“自证”，这个词语非常恰当。因为它自身生起时就具有明觉的自性。如果它没有其他能认知它的东西，那么它就不是自己不认知自己。这就像说船夫自己将自己从水中救起，蜡烛自己照亮自己一样。即使蜡烛照亮了黑暗房间里的瓶子等事物，但蜡烛自己照亮自己不需要其他原因，所以才安立为“自明”，而不是蜡烛自己将自己作为对境来照亮。因此，将体验生起为明觉的体性安立为“自证”，一般来说，只要是识，就从体性的角度来说，普遍存在自己认知自己。但是，从将所取和能取分为二的能取方面安立自证的角度来看，则不普遍，需要了解这些。因此，如果了解了安立“自证”这个词语的方式，就不会对世俗中自证的合理性造成任何损害。如果识自己照亮自己，那么就像眼睛自己看到自己，或者有斧头的人自己骑在自己的肩膀上一样，诸如此类不合理的情况。以及如果蜡烛自己照亮自己，那么黑暗就会遮蔽自己等等所有推理，只有在承认自证是真实存在的情况下才会成立。如果是自己，那么是对境就相违；如果是对境，那么是自己就相违。如果不是相违，那么黑暗就必须遮蔽自己等等，不可避免地会产生过失。仅仅是从体验对境的显现方式上，安立为所取和能取，但实际上是从没有差别的角度安立的词语，这种安立方式没有任何过失。例如，梦中的心识认为对境马和牛在外边，能取根识在里边，但实际上，识只是显现的明分，因此，显现为所取和能取，这些都不是识之外的东西，并且有明晰地体验，因此安立“自证”这个词语是合理的。虽然我和自己不可能有自利的关系，但就像将不同反体的各种形态在某个事物的体性上相同安立为一体关系一样。因此，所有体验到的所知事物的形态，都生起为体验明觉的体性。因此，在名言上，识体验所有对境是合理的，并且依赖于此。
English
It is most appropriate to establish it as "self-awareness" because it does not need to rely on other conditions. Because it has the nature of clarity and awareness from the moment it arises, if there is no other knower for it to know, then it is not that it does not know itself. This is like saying that a boatman saves himself from the water, or that a candle illuminates itself. Even though a candle illuminates things like vases in a dark room, it does not need another cause to illuminate itself, so it is called "self-illuminating," but it is not like the candle illuminates itself by making itself the object. Therefore, since experience arises as the essence of clarity and awareness, it is called "self-awareness." In general, if it is consciousness, then it is universally true that it knows itself from the perspective of its essence. However, from the perspective of establishing self-awareness in the aspect of grasping, which is divided into grasper and grasped, it does not universally apply. One should understand these things. Therefore, if one understands the way to establish the mere term "self-awareness," then there will be no harm to the validity of self-awareness in conventional truth. If consciousness illuminates itself, then all reasoning, such as the eye seeing itself, or a person with an axe riding on his own shoulders, and if a candle illuminates itself, then darkness should obscure itself, only apply if one accepts that self-awareness is truly existent. If it is self, then it contradicts being an object; if it is an object, then it contradicts being self. If it is not contradictory, then darkness must obscure itself, and so on, and faults will inevitably arise. However, there is no fault in this way of establishing the mere term, which is established from the perspective of no difference in meaning, even though it is labeled as grasper and grasped from the appearance of experiencing objects. For example, in the dream mind, it seems that the objects, horses and cattle, are outside, and the grasping sense consciousness is inside. However, in reality, consciousness is merely the clarity of appearance, so the appearances of grasper and grasped are not other than consciousness itself, and there is clear experience, therefore it is reasonable to establish the term "self-awareness." Although it is impossible for the self to be related to itself for its own benefit, it is like establishing a single relationship where different aspects of different opposites are the same in the essence of some thing. Therefore, all the forms of knowable things that are experienced arise as the essence of experiencing clarity and awareness. Therefore, in terms of convention, it is reasonable for consciousness to experience all objects, and it depends on this.
Tibetan
་ཏེ་ཡུལ་དང་ཡུལ་ཅན་དུ་བཏགས་པ་ཙམ་ལ་རང་རིག་པར་ཆེས་འཐད་དོ། །དེའང་རྗེས་དཔག་ཚད་མའི་མཐའ་མངོན་སུམ་ལ་ཐུག་ཅིང་། མངོན་སུམ་དོན་རིག་ཀྱང་མཐར་གསལ་བར་ཉམས་སུ་མྱོང་བའི་རང་རིག་གིས་ཚར་ཕྱིན་པ་ཡིན་པས་ཚུར་མཐོང་ཚད་མའི་རྣམ་གཞག་ཞིག་འདོད་ན་རང་རིག་མེད་དུ་མི་རུང་བ་ཡིན་པས། རང་རིག་མི་འདོད་པའི་ཕྱོགས་སུན་འབྱིན་པ་དང་། དེ་ཡང་དག་པར་གྲུབ་པའི་ཚུལ་རྣམས་རིགས་པའི་དབང་ཕྱུག་གི་གཞུང་ལས་ཤེས་པར་བྱའོ། །གཉིས་པ་དོན་རིག་མི་འཐད་པར་བསྟན་པ། དོན་གྱི་རང་བཞིན་གཞན་དག་ལ། །དེ་ཡིས་ཇི་ལྟར་ཤེས་པར་འགྱུར། །དེ་ཡི་རང་བཞིན་གཞན་ལ་མེད། །གང་གིས་དེ་ཤེས་གཞན་ཡང་ཤེས། །ཤེས་དང་ཤེས་པར་བྱ་བའི་དོན། །ཐ་དད་པར་ནི་འདོད་ཕྱིར་རོ། །ཞེས་གསུངས་ཏེ། དེ་ལྟར་གསལ་ཞིང་རིག་པ་ཡིན་པས་བདག་ཤེས་སུ་རུང་གི གསལ་རིག་མ་ཡིན་པའི་དོན་གྱི་རང་བཞིན་ཤེས་པ་ལས་གཞན་དུ་གྱུར་པ་དག་ལ། ཤེས་པ་དེ་ཡིས་ཇི་ལྟར་ཤེས་པར་འགྱུར་ཏེ་འབྲེལ་བ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དེ་ལ་ཇི་ལྟར་ན་ཤེས་པ་དེ་ཡི་རང་བཞིན་མྱོང་བ་གསལ་རིག་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་དེ་ནི་གཞན་དོན་ལ་མེད་ན། རྒྱུ་མཚན་གང་གིས་ཤེས་པ་དེ་རང་གིས་རང་ཤེས་སུ་རུང་བ་བཞིན་དུ་དོན་གཞན་ཡང་དངོས་སུ་མྱོང་ཞིང་ཤེས་པར་ག་ལ་རུང་སྟེ། དོན་རིག་སྨྲ་བ་ཁྱོད་ཤེས་པ་དང་ཤེས་པར་བྱ་བའི་དོན་གཉིས། ངོ་བོ་ཐ་དད་པར་ནི་འདོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དེ་ལ་ཡུལ་ཡོངས་སུ་གཅོད་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་ཤེས་པའི་ཐུན་མོང་མིན་པ་སྟེ། བདེ་སོགས་ཉམས་སུ་མྱོང་བ་ལྟ་བུ་ཡིན་པས་དེ་དོན་ལ་ཡོད་པར་མི་རིགས་ལ། གང་ ཤེས་པས་ཉམས་སུ་མྱོང་བའམ་ཤེས་ངོ་ལ་སྣང་ཕན་ཆད་གསལ་ཞིང་རིག་ནས་ཤེས་དགོས་ཀྱི་གསལ་རིག་དང་བྲལ་ན་ཤེས་པར་ག་ལ་རུང་། དེས་ན་བུམ་འཛིན་ཤེས་པའི་ངོ་ལ་བུམ་པ་གསལ་བར་སྣང་བ་དེ་ཤེས་པ་ཉིད་མ་ཡིན་པར་ལོགས་ཤིག་ན་བེམ་པོའི་དོན་དུ་གྲུབ་ཡོད་པ་ལྟར་ན། བེམ་པོའི་ཆོས་ཤེས་པ་ལ་མེད། ཤེས་པའི་ཆོས་བེམ་པོ་ལ་མེད་པས་དེ་གཉིས་གསལ་རིག་ཡིན་མིན་གྱིས་ཕན་ཚུན་སྤངས་ཏེ་གནས་པས་ཐ་དད་ལ། ཐ་དད་ཀྱིས་ཐ་དད་ནམ་ཡང་དངོས་སུ་མྱོང་བར་ག་ལ་འཐད་དེ། སྣང་མུན་བཞིན་འབྲེལ་མེད་དུ་འགྱུར་བས་ན། ཤེས་པ་ནི་རྟག་ཏུ་རང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་གསལ་རིག་ཙམ་ལས་འདའ་བ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། དེ་ལ་གསལ་རིག་དང་བྲལ་བའི་བེམ་པོ་ཉམས་སུ་མྱོང་བའི་གོ་སྐབས་ནམ་ཐོབ། དེས་ན་བུམ་འཛིན་ཤེས་པའི་ངོ་ན་སྣང་རྒྱུའི་བུམ་པ་ལྟ་བུའི་རྣམ་པ་དེའང་གསལ་རིག་ཤེས་པའི་རང་བཞིན་ལས་ལོགས་སུ་གྱུར་པ་མི་
Chinese
仅仅在名言上安立为能依和所依，对自证来说是最合理的。而且，后比量最终归结于现量，现量对境的觉知也最终由明亮地体验的自证来完成，因此如果想要建立一种回观的比量体系，就不能没有自证。因此，驳斥不承认自证的观点，以及自证成立的道理，应当从理自在的论典中了解。第二，阐述对境觉知不合理。经中说：对境的其他自性，它如何能知晓？它的自性在其他境上没有，谁知晓它，也知晓其他。识与所识之义，是由于你们承许为异体之故。这样说，因为是明亮和觉知，所以可以成为自识，对于不是明亮觉知的对境自性，与识不同的那些，识如何能知晓呢？因为没有关联的缘故。对此，如果识的自性，体验明亮觉知的体性，在其他对境上没有，那么以什么理由，识如同自己能知晓自己一样，也能直接体验和知晓其他对境呢？因为对境觉知的你们，识和所识的对境二者，是由于承许为本体各异的缘故。对此，所谓的境完全断除，是识的不共之处，如同体验安乐等一样，因此不应存在于境上。凡是以识来体验或者在识相上显现，都必须是明亮和觉知才能知晓，如果脱离了明亮觉知，如何能知晓呢？因此，在取瓶识的识相上，瓶子明亮地显现，如果那不是识本身，而是另外成立为无情物的对境，那么无情物的法在识上没有，识的法在无情物上没有，因此二者以是否明亮觉知而互相排斥而存在，是相异的。以相异如何能直接体验相异呢？因为会像明暗一样变成没有关联。识总是不会超出自己明亮觉知的自性。对此，何时才能获得体验脱离了明亮觉知的无情物的机会呢？因此，在取瓶识的识相上，显现的如同瓶子一样的相，也不是脱离了明亮觉知的识的自性。
English
It is most reasonable to establish the object and the subject only in terms of designation, but for self-awareness. Moreover, the end of inferential valid cognition reaches direct perception, and the direct perception of objects is ultimately completed by the self-awareness that is clearly experienced. Therefore, if one wants to establish a system of retrospective valid cognition, self-awareness is indispensable. Therefore, refuting the view that does not accept self-awareness, and the ways in which it is established as correct, should be understood from the treatises of the Lord of Reasoning. Second, explaining that object-awareness is unreasonable. It is said: How can it know the other nature of objects? Its nature is not in other objects, who knows it, also knows others. The meaning of consciousness and objects of consciousness is because you assert them to be different entities. Thus, because it is clear and cognitive, it can be self-aware, but for the nature of objects that are not clear and cognitive, how can consciousness know those that are different from it? Because there is no connection. In this regard, if the nature of consciousness, the characteristic of experiencing clarity and cognition, is not in other objects, then for what reason can consciousness directly experience and know other objects as it knows itself? Because you who speak of object-awareness, consciousness and the object of consciousness, assert that they are different entities. In this regard, the so-called complete cutting off of the object is the unique aspect of consciousness, like experiencing happiness and so on, so it should not exist on the object. Whatever is experienced by consciousness or appears in the aspect of consciousness must be known through clarity and cognition, but if it is separated from clarity and cognition, how can it be known? Therefore, on the aspect of the consciousness that grasps the pot, the pot appears clearly, but if that is not consciousness itself, but is established as an inanimate object separately, then the qualities of the inanimate object are not in consciousness, and the qualities of consciousness are not in the inanimate object. Therefore, the two exist separately by whether or not they are clear and cognitive, and are different. How can the different directly experience the different? Because it will become unrelated like light and darkness. Consciousness always does not go beyond its own nature of clarity and cognition. In this regard, when can one get the opportunity to experience the inanimate object that is separated from clarity and cognition? Therefore, on the aspect of the consciousness that grasps the pot, the appearance that appears like a pot is also not separate from the nature of consciousness that is clear and cognitive.