English
Just as being drawn by force, the previous fruit produced from the (causal) place, because the cause is not incomplete, it will never change. In this way, naming the co-operative condition as the power of cause, self-existent, etc., and saying that they sequentially produce the fruits, is also refuted. If its own nature and power are different, then the co-operative cause is merely given the name of power; if they are not different, then as just said, it will be harmed by the constant non-change of the fruit, etc. Therefore, once it is promised to produce sequential fruits, it should be known that it is impossible for the only true existence that is a permanent cause. If the prior and subsequent are not the only true, then it must be impermanent. Furthermore, they see that those faults just mentioned are unavoidable, if it is thought that the cause is permanent, but not the only one, but that for each fruit, the nature of those causes also exists in other and other sequentially different ways, then why would those things like self-existent not decline from permanence? Because they change in different states. So it is said. To this, the opponent might think: Even if it is not a whole, but as long as the nature or continuum, etc., is one, then even if the states are different, what contradiction is there in being permanent? For example, in the world, even if participating in various dances, it is thought that the morning dancer and the afternoon one are the same. Analyzing this, if it is not the only indivisible part, then permanence is unreasonable, therefore, the first half of the verse negates the only truth that is thought to be permanent. The latter half negates the permanence that is not one. There are various explanations for this, but only this one does not mistake the meaning of the text. Among them, nature and continuum, etc., are merely naming similarities as one, but the true one can never be established. If it is the true one, then it cannot avoid the previous faults. And merely the imputed one is not negated here, and because it does not exist in reality, it cannot be established as permanent either. Therefore, once the states are different, it is not the only truth, therefore, it is impossible to separate it and establish it separately as a permanent one. Second, refuting the permanent entity posited by one's own school, first briefly state the reasoning for refuting:
Chinese
关于此理的广说有二。第一，以从禅定中生起的智慧，认为所知非为有为法的宗派，也不成立单一真实，因为它们与次第的智慧相关联。如是说。自宗的小部派说一切有部认为三种非有为法是常法。即虚空，以及虽非由分别的势力所断灭，但因自性之因缘不具足，故不生者，于其未生之分，即是阻碍彼法生起的非有为法非择灭，如是执为实有。又以修道之力，烦恼断灭之分，执著为由分别而断灭之实有。于此三者之中，此处遮止一者，即是分别灭，以同一理路，其他二者亦遮止一者真实。对此，说一切有部的人说：由禅定之力所生起的瑜伽现量之境，远离一切有为法之相的非择灭非有为法，是胜义谛实有。因为那是瑜伽士智慧的殊胜之境，所以是胜义谛实有，但其自性安住之体性，仅是瑜伽士智慧所了知而已。并非由此生起缘于自身的意，因为生果是有为法的体性，而此是无为法之故。如是说。在他们的想法中，认为若是境，则不会仅仅成为因的体性。因此，即使以次第的前后智慧来认知境无为法，但它与智慧无关，所以分别灭自身的体性，是以无为法的体性而恒常安住的。对此，应如是理解：以从禅定中生起的瑜伽现量之智慧，认为所知分别灭无为法是真实成立的宗派，若以理智来观察，则境无为法并非单一真实，因为境无为法是与次第的前后智慧，以及所知与能知相关联的缘故。如是说。而且，不仅外道认为常法实物能生瓶等果是不合理的，而且不能生果
English
There are two extensive explanations of this principle. First, by the wisdom arising from meditation, the tenet that asserts knowable unconditioned phenomena also does not establish a single truth, because they are related to sequential wisdom. It is said thus. The Sautrāntikas of our own school assert that the three unconditioned phenomena are permanent entities. Namely, space, and that which is not severed by the power of discrimination, but because the conditions of its own nature are incomplete, it does not arise; in its unarisen state, it is the unconditioned non-discrimination cessation that obstructs the arising of that phenomenon, thus they consider it to be real. Also, by the power of cultivating the path, the aspect of the cessation of afflictions is clung to as a real entity that is severed by discrimination. Among these three, here, one is refuted, namely, discrimination cessation, and by the same reasoning, the other two are also refuted as a single truth. To this, the Sautrāntikas say: The unconditioned non-discrimination cessation, which arises from the power of meditation and becomes the object of yogic direct perception, and is devoid of all characteristics of conditioned phenomena, truly exists ultimately. Because it is the supreme object of the wisdom of yogis, it exists ultimately, but its own nature of abiding is merely cognized by the wisdom of yogis. It does not generate a mind that focuses on itself, because generating a result is the nature of conditioned phenomena, and this is unconditioned. Thus they say. In their thinking, they believe that if it is an object, it will not merely become the nature of a cause. Therefore, even if the object unconditioned phenomenon is cognized by sequential prior and subsequent wisdom, it is not related to wisdom, so the nature of discrimination cessation itself constantly abides as a single truth in the nature of unconditioned phenomena. To this, it should be understood as follows: By the wisdom of yogic direct perception arising from meditation, the tenet that asserts that the knowable discrimination cessation unconditioned phenomenon is truly established, if examined with reason, the object unconditioned phenomenon is not a single truth, because the object unconditioned phenomenon is related to sequential prior and subsequent wisdom, and to the knowable and the knower. It is said thus. Moreover, not only is it unreasonable for outsiders to believe that permanent entities can produce results such as pots, but also cannot produce results.
Chinese
现在，对于那些认为自性是常存的，有部宗的观点也有不合理之处，与上述观点结合起来，无论是产生结果还是不产生结果，常、实、一、真都不可能存在，这就是这句话的力量。在对方看来，如果境本身是常存的或一真，那么境与有境的识不是本体上的关联，只是所知与能知的关联，有境的力量怎么能使境变成无常和多体呢？他们这样认为。这与自宗认为法性是常存的，以及他宗认为法——例如瓶子等——在未出现坏灭之因前是常存的等等，所有认为境是常存的观点，其意图都是一样的。例如，昨天看到的瓶子和今天看到的瓶子，虽然有境的识不同，但都认为境是同一个瓶子。因此，如果境是有境所区分的，那么境也不会真实地成为唯一的。因此，需要详细解释这一点。第二部分是详细解释这一点：如果前一识的境随顺后一识，则不合理；如果不随顺，也不合理，因此进行驳斥。首先：‘前识所识之，自性若随逐，前识亦成后，后亦如是前。’意思是说，对于那些认为无为法是常存的你们，我问你们，前一识的境所变成的无为法，是否就是后一识的境？对于这个问题，他们已经承认存在无为法，并且除了识所缘之外，不存在其他量，而识所缘必然是次第的。对于次第，前一识的境要么随顺后一识，要么不随顺，除此之外没有其他的承认。因此，如果像第一种情况那样承认，就像这样：前识所识之境的自性，就是后识所随顺的，或者说，在后识的时候也存在，并且是后识所缘的，那么，因为所缘的境没有任何差别，是唯一的，所以执持它的心识也不应该有差别。因为认识什么境，就称为什么识。否则，识的差
English
Now, regarding those who believe that essence is permanent, the Vaibhashika school's view also has its inconsistencies, which, combined with the above, means that whether it produces results or not, the permanent, real, one, and true cannot exist. This is the power of this statement. In the opponent's view, if the object itself is permanent or one and true, then the object is not essentially related to the consciousness of the subject, but merely related as the knowable and the knower. How can the power of the subject make the object impermanent and multiple? They think this way. This is the same intention as all views that consider the object to be permanent, such as our own school believing that the nature of phenomena is permanent, and other schools believing that phenomena—such as vases—are permanent until the cause of destruction arises. For example, the vase seen yesterday and the vase seen today, although the consciousness of the subject is different, are both considered to be the same vase. Therefore, if the object is distinguished by the subject, then the object will not truly become unique. Therefore, it is necessary to explain this in detail. The second section explains this in detail: if the object of the previous consciousness follows the subsequent consciousness, it is unreasonable; if it does not follow, it is also unreasonable, therefore it is refuted. First: 'The nature of what is known by the previous consciousness, if it follows, the previous consciousness also becomes the subsequent, and the subsequent also becomes the previous.' This means that for those of you who believe that unconditioned phenomena are permanent, I ask you, is the unconditioned phenomenon that has become the object of the previous consciousness the same as the object of the subsequent consciousness? Regarding this question, they have already admitted that unconditioned phenomena exist, and that there is no other valid cognition besides what is perceived by consciousness, and what is perceived by consciousness must be sequential. For the sequential, the object of the previous consciousness either follows the subsequent consciousness or does not follow, and there is no other admission besides this. Therefore, if it is admitted like the first case, like this: the nature of the object known by the previous consciousness is what the subsequent consciousness follows, or it exists at the time of the subsequent consciousness and is what the subsequent consciousness perceives, then, because the perceived object has no difference, it is unique, so the mind that holds it should also not have any difference. Because whatever object is known, it is called that consciousness. Otherwise, the difference of consciousness
Chinese
因此，不可能同时产生多种认知。既然如此，那么，一个人的相续中的认知瓶子的意识，在一刹那间不可能有多个不同的以瓶子为境的意识。并且，未造作的意识的前一个意识，就其自身而言，被认为是缘于一个境的未造作的意识。不能被认为是缘于其他法的境的意识，因为那个意识没有二分。同样，在这里，如果前后两个意识的境在一个自性中是真实的，那么，前一个意识也会变成后一个，后一个也同样会变成前一个。这样一来，前一个意识的境，未造作，在后一个时间也存在，而前一个意识却不存在。后一个意识的所知在之前的时间存在，而后一个意识却不存在，这也是不合理的。如果那个境有前后时间的差别，那么前后就不能是同一个。如果境没有差别，但缘境的意识是刹那的，所以多个前后刹那反复缘于这同一个境，如果这样认为，那么，每个意识所缘的那个部分，在没有意识之前，以及意识灭尽之后，如果存在，那么，为什么它的意识不存在呢？因为，各自的境的所缘和能缘的意识是不能分离的，所以不可能缘于境。各自的境，不是那个，也不是其他的，是唯一的真实，如果存在，那么，就成了不是刹那意识的境了。既然如此，要知道，在意识面前，也不可能成立那是唯一的真实。在这里，仅仅因为境是同一个，就认为缘于它的次第意识是不可能的，不是这样的。如果境是真实的唯一，那么，缘于它的次第意识是不可能产生的。例如，对于境，瓶子，昨天也认识，今天也认识，这种说法，是把瓶子的不同刹那的自相，不断产生，作为错乱的基础，仅仅是假立为一，如果认为在意义上是真实的唯一，那么，就被这个道理所破斥。因此，无待和有损害等等的许多理证，也能用这种方式毫不费力地成立。因此，无论是未造作的，还是造作的，如果承许是唯一的真实，那么，缘于它的次第意识不可能产生，这个道理是可以成立的。这个道理可以破斥它。仅仅是假立的唯一