English
If something is uniquely true, it cannot be considered minute in its own place. Because above that, there must be no distinction of other things. If so, all other knowables besides it must be non-existent. Even if anything is considered true within the category of knowables, it is similar to this. For something like a particle that is considered uniquely true, from the perspective of direction, among all the names of various different consciousnesses gathered by the continuum of sentient beings that can be established, if there is anything that does not apprehend that object, then on that object, the distinction of so many unapprehended dharmas can be established. From the perspective of time, among the immeasurable minds of all sentient beings' kalpas, years, months, days, hours, and moments, if there are any that do not apprehend, then the number of unapprehended dharmas equal to that number can be distinguished. Moreover, distinctions can be made equal to the number of parts of knowables that are not it, such as non-consciousness, non-pot, etc. And, from the opposite perspective, even if there are many consciousnesses of direction and time that apprehend, the atom apprehended by that and those can be established as multiple dharmas. If it is minute, small, knowable, etc., whatever parts are conceptually constructed, it can become equal to those numbers, and it can be broken down into many. So, among those, what is the uniquely true one identified as? If it is thought that among those, there is something that is not any one of them, but is separately uniquely true, then, since it cannot be an object of any consciousness of direction and time, isn't saying that it is uniquely true just a mere assertion? Those are immeasurable, so it is impossible for those to be uniquely true as the nature of one dharma. Grasping any one of those and saying "This is it," one cannot find something that cannot be further divided. If it can be divided into multiple dharmas, it cannot be said to be unique; if there is no distinction, it cannot be established as uniquely true. Then, within the category of knowables, isn't it difficult to find another reason to establish it as a unique dharma? In short, in this category of knowables, whatever the nature may be, if there is a uniquely true dharma, then all the immeasurable consciousnesses of direction and time can only apprehend that, and it is impossible to apprehend any other dharma. And, besides that, any other dharma of direction and time also
Chinese
必须没有。最后，必须没有知道“这唯一”的、具有不同于自身的所缘境，如果存在，则唯一所缘境之外的部分是可以区分的。如果作为自境的意识也不存在，那么谁会缘取唯一的真实所缘境，这是不可能的。这样一来，所有各种各样的所知显现都会像兔角一样完全消失。因此，在所知的范畴内，如果一个单独真实的法没有成立，就不会成立，也不会成立，那么方时的一切显现如此鲜明就是合理的。如果在所知的范畴内存在一个真实成立的事物，那么所有这些所知将完全不会显现。因为没有一个所知是真实成立的，所以无边所知的法性才如此鲜明。唉！诸法的法性是不可思议且奇妙的，听闻了知晓此理的如来所宣说的平等性之狮子吼，智慧的身体力量大大增长，谁能像一口吞下无边虚空那样忍受呢？手持文殊菩萨之剑，能瞬间斩断对显现世间的执着，极其深奥且难以衡量之理。因为没有一个法是真实成立的，所以一切才能显现，请对空性缘起之显现方式生起不退转的信心。这样，从经论的理路出发，这大空性的理路是用自己的智慧发挥，为有缘者宣说的。第二部分，如果不随顺就不合理，即：境非和合则成刹那，以及如果这样承认则有过的两个方面。第一，于先前与后际处，彼之体性不生者，非和合者如意识，应知生于刹那间。如是说，如果如第二种观点那样承认，在先前和后际的意识状态中，那个境的唯一体性不生起，那么先前的意识在自身时期的非和合境在后际意识的状态中不存在，后际的境在先前的时期不存在。总之，如果各自作为自境的意识的境是各自不同的，而不是一个境随顺于一个境，那么境非和
English
It must not exist. Ultimately, there must be no object that knows "this is the only one" and has an object different from itself. If it exists, then a part other than that single object can be distinguished. If the consciousness that takes it as its own object does not exist, then who would apprehend the single true object, which is impossible. In that case, all the various appearances of knowable things would completely disappear like a rabbit's horn. Therefore, within the realm of knowable things, if a single truly existent dharma is not established, it will not be established, and it will not become established. Therefore, the manifold appearances of directions and times being so vivid is reasonable. If there were one truly established thing within the realm of knowable things, then all these knowable things would never appear. Because not a single knowable thing is truly established, the nature of endless knowable things is so vivid. Alas! The nature of phenomena is inconceivable and wonderful. Having heard the lion's roar proclaiming the equality of the Tathagata who knows this, the strength of the body of wisdom greatly increases. Who can endure like swallowing the endless sky in one gulp? Holding this sword of Manjushri's hand, which instantly cuts off the clinging to appearance and existence, is extremely profound and difficult to measure. Since not a single dharma is truly established, everything appears. Please generate unwavering faith in the unique way in which emptiness arises interdependently. Thus, proceeding from the reasoning of the scriptures, this reasoning of great emptiness is explained to the fortunate ones by exerting one's own wisdom. The second section, it is unreasonable not to follow, namely: if the object is not combined, it becomes momentary, and the two aspects of showing that there is fault if one admits it. First: In the places of the previous and subsequent, if its essence does not arise, the uncombined, like consciousness, should be known to arise in an instant. It is said, if one admits as in the second view, that in the states of previous and subsequent consciousness, the single essence of that object does not arise, then the uncombined object of the previous consciousness in its own time does not exist in the state of the subsequent consciousness, and the object of the subsequent does not exist in the previous time. In short, if the objects of the consciousnesses that take them as their own objects are different from each other, and one object does not follow one object, then the object is not com
Chinese
这样做也是一样。例如，就像刚出生就停止，不会在其他时间存在的识一样。有智慧的人应该知道，它不会超出刹那的自性而生起。第二，如果这样承认，则指出过失：如果依赖于缘，则会成为有为法；如果不依赖，则会成为常有或常无。第一种情况：前前刹那的，威力所生起之时，此不会成为无为法，如心与心所。如是说。如此，各个有境的境无为法各自成立，因此成立为刹那。即使如此，那些仍然自诩有无为法的人，我问他们：像这样作为各个有境之境的无为法，是依赖于缘，还是不依赖于缘呢？如果像第一种情况一样，境无为法以其自身前前刹那依次生起的威力，使得后后刹那生起，那么，因为它是从因和缘所生的事物，所以它不会成为无为法，就像有为法的心和心所一样。第二种情况：刹那诸法于此等中，若欲自主而生者，以无依赖于他之故，将成常有或常无。如是按照第二种情况承认。像这样，无为法的刹那诸法，在各自的境，即各自的识等的各自时间等之中，如果不依赖于前刹那等缘而想要自主生起，那么，因为丝毫也不依赖于其他因，所以，只能成为恒常存在，或者恒常不存在。如果承认一个没有原因的事物，则必须成为恒常存在或不存在。如果要确定没有原因的事物必须成为恒常存在或不存在的方式，那么，如果一个没有原因的事物可能存在，为什么它不会恒常不变地存在呢？其他先前存在而后消失的事物，是因为因的改变的力量导致果的改变，所以才有可能存在和不存在的状态。而这个事物没有原因，所以它不会改变，并且它的自性一旦存在，未来也不可能改变。
English
It is also the same to do so. For example, just like the consciousness that stops immediately after being born and does not exist at other times. Those with wisdom should know that it does not arise beyond the nature of an instant. Second, if you admit it like that, then point out the fault: if you rely on conditions, you will become a conditioned phenomenon; if you do not rely on it, you will become permanent or non-existent. The first case: the previous instant, when it arises by the power, this will not become unconditioned, like mind and mental factors. As it is said. In this way, the unconditioned objects of each object are established separately, so it is established as an instant. Even so, those who still boast that there is unconditioned dharma, I ask them: like this, is the unconditioned dharma that becomes the object of each object dependent on conditions or not dependent on conditions? If, like the first case, the unconditioned object arises by the power of its own previous instants arising in sequence, so that the subsequent instants arise, then, because it is a thing born from cause and condition, it will not become unconditioned, just like the conditioned mind and mental factors. The second case: If the instants want to arise independently in these, because they do not depend on others, they will become permanent or non-existent. As admitted according to the second case. Like this, if the instants of the unconditioned dharma want to arise independently in their respective objects, that is, in the respective times of their respective consciousnesses, etc., without relying on the previous instant and other conditions, then, because they do not depend on other causes at all, they can only become either permanently existent or permanently non-existent. If you admit something without a cause, it must become either permanently existent or non-existent. If you want to determine how something without a cause must become permanently existent or non-existent, then, if something without a cause could exist, why wouldn't it exist permanently without changing? Other things that existed before and then disappeared are because the power of the change of cause leads to the change of effect, so there is a possibility of existence and non-existence. But this thing has no cause, so it will not change, and once its nature exists, it is impossible to change in the future.
Chinese
而且，没有它出现的时候也是不可能的，因为其他事物没有产生是因为因缘不具足而耽搁了。对于这个不需要因缘的事物，为什么不会永远存在呢？而且它也应该在所有方向上存在。或者说，这些存在的事物都是由各自的因缘所产生的。就像没有播种的时候，庄稼看起来很近却无法享用一样，如果播种了，庄稼就可以显现出来。同样，依赖于因缘的事物，凭借因缘的力量可以显现并能够显现。但是，对于那些没有因缘的事物，它们不随因缘而行，因此永远无法存在，也不应该存在，就像兔子的角等等一样。因此，那些因为担心非复合的刹那会变成复合的，而承认其不依赖于因缘的人，必须承认常有的刹那，或者从未有过的众多刹那，没有比这更大的矛盾了，简直是笑话。因此，仅仅将事物排除在外的他者排除的分别念的影像，就自以为是地认为境是非复合的。如果境本身在名言上都没有作用的能力，更不用说在胜义上成立了。因此，对于那些能够实现目的的事物，以及在无害的根识前显现的法，众生执着于它们是合理的。而对于那些不显现，不能通过量成立的常有事物等，将心寄托于它们是非常不合理的。第三，总结对常有事物的驳斥：不能实现目的，对此希求考察有何用？太监身材好不好，有欲望的人们考察有何益？如是说。像这样，对于常我、自在天、非复合等等，只是虚妄地假立，而境本身却没有丝毫实现目的的能力。对于这样的境，以认为它是作者等的执着，努力地考察它是否存在有什么用呢？例如，对于一个无法进行性行为的太监，以他为对象，问他身材好不好，对于那些具有性欲并追求性行为的女性来说，考察这个对象有什么好处呢？她们期望能够成立
English
Moreover, there is no time when this does not occur, because other things do not arise due to incomplete causes and conditions. For this thing that does not require causes and conditions, why would it not always exist? And it should also exist in all directions. Alternatively, these existing things are all produced by their respective causes and conditions. Just as when seeds are not sown, crops appear near but cannot be enjoyed, if seeds are sown, crops can be made to appear manifestly. Similarly, things that depend on causes and conditions can appear manifestly and be made to appear through the power of causes and conditions. However, for those things that have no causes and conditions, they do not follow causes and conditions, so they can never exist, nor should they exist, like rabbit horns and so on. Therefore, those who, fearing that non-composite moments will become composite, assert that they do not depend on causes and conditions, must admit either a constant moment or many moments that have never existed. There is no greater contradiction than this, it is simply a joke. Therefore, merely taking the image of the exclusion of others, which is the exclusion of things, as the object, they presumptuously believe that the object is non-composite. If the object itself does not have the ability to function in conventional terms, what need is there to speak of its establishment in ultimate terms? Therefore, it is appropriate for beings to cling to those things that can accomplish purposes and the phenomena that appear manifestly to the harmless sense faculties. But it is very inappropriate to place one's mind on permanent things and so on that do not appear manifestly and cannot be established by valid cognition. Third, the conclusion of the refutation of permanent things: It is not capable of accomplishing purposes, what is the use of examining it with desire? Whether a eunuch's figure is good or bad, what benefit is there for those with desire to examine? Thus it is said. Like this, for permanent self, Ishvara, non-composite, and so on, it is merely falsely posited, but the object itself does not have the slightest ability to accomplish purposes. For such an object, what is the use of diligently examining whether it exists with the clinging that it is the agent and so on? For example, for a eunuch who cannot engage in sexual activity, focusing on him, asking whether his figure is good or bad, what benefit is there for women who have sexual desire and seek sexual activity to examine this object? They hope to establish