English
Therefore, it is impossible to generate multiple cognitions simultaneously. If that is the case, then, the consciousness that apprehends a pot in the continuum of a single person cannot have multiple different minds with the pot as their object in a single moment. Furthermore, the prior consciousness of an unconditioned cognition is regarded as an unconditioned cognition that focuses on a single object in its own nature. It cannot be regarded as a cognition that has the object of another dharma, because that cognition is not divided into two. Similarly, here, if the object of the two prior and posterior cognitions is true in one essence, then the prior cognition will also become the posterior, and the posterior will likewise become the prior. In that case, the object of the prior consciousness, the unconditioned, exists even in the posterior time, but the prior consciousness does not exist. The object of the posterior consciousness exists in the prior time, but the posterior consciousness does not exist, which is also unreasonable. If that object has differences in prior and posterior times, then the prior and posterior cannot be the same. If there is no difference in the object, but the cognizing mind is momentary, so multiple prior and posterior moments repeatedly focus on that single object, if you think so, then, if that part that is the object of focus for each mind exists before the cognizer and after the cognizer has ceased, then why does its cognizer not exist? Because the object of focus and the cognizing mind of each object cannot be separated, it is impossible to apprehend the object. Each of their objects, neither that nor other, is the only truth. If it exists, then it would be the object of a non-momentary mind. If that is the case, know that it is impossible for that to be established as the only truth in the mind's eye. Here, it is not that just because the object is the same, the sequential cognition that apprehends it is impossible. If the object is a true one, then it is impossible for the sequential cognition that apprehends it to arise. For example, the assertion that one knows the object, such as a pot, yesterday and also knows it today, is based on the confusion that the momentary characteristics of the pot arise continuously, and it is merely labeled as one. If one thinks that it is truly one in meaning, then it is refuted by this reasoning. Therefore, many proofs such as the independent and the harmful can also be established effortlessly in this way. Therefore, whether it is unconditioned or conditioned, if one accepts it as the only truth, then it is established that the sequential cognition that focuses on it cannot arise. This reasoning refutes it. The merely labeled one
Chinese
并非完全否定一切方面，而是区分自己也认可的道理，这在一切方面都非常重要。与此类似，否定常恒真也是如此。《释量论》中说：‘稳固如金刚石等，事物也因不依赖他者，一切众生的知识，会同时产生自身。’因为同时作用而互相帮助，如果这些次第产生，则说每个刹那都是不同的。’如是，为了成立一个境是真实的，必须以心专注于此。如果专注于此，则专注的因会产生自执的知识，因为自性与境、时的部分没有差别，所以一个真实的、不依赖他者的境，不可能反复产生多个不同的有境。虽然以上所说已经很好地成立了，但由于被错觉所蒙蔽，仍然难以消除认为专注于一个真实境的多个心识有什么相违之处呢？就像专注于一个瓶子的多个心识一样。为了更详细地解释以上的内容，在先前的心识存在时，所知的事物在先前的心识正在认识的时候，后来的心识是认识还是不认识？不可能认识，因为那时后来的心识还没有产生。如果不认识，那就成了先前心识的所知，而没有成为后来心识的所知，必须存在这样的情况。如果这样，那么在后来的自时中也不可能认识，因为如果认为那个境是唯一的、无分的部分，那么最初如何存在，后来也必须如何存在。如果与此不同，就会失去无分和常恒的性质。或者，在后来的时间里，先前的心识认识或不认识，这样进行分析，是为了遮止认为先前和后来的境是相同的想法。因此，先前和后来的心识各自时间的境是不同的，因为后来的心识不认识先前的境，而先前的心识不认识后来的境，存在这样的差别。如果不区分这样的差别，后来的心识认识先前的境，先前的境认识后来的境，那么因为后来的境是所知的知识，所以先前的心识也会变成后来的心识，因为先前的境是所知的知识，所以后来的心识也会变成先前的心识，这样次第的心识，以及过去未来，境和有境等一切的分别都会毁灭。因此，
English
It is not a complete negation of all aspects, but rather distinguishing the reasons that one also accepts, which is very important in all aspects. Similarly, negating permanence and truth is also like this. The *Pramāṇavārttika* says: 'Whatever is stable, like a diamond, etc., also because the object does not depend on others, the knowledge of all beings will simultaneously generate itself.' Because of acting together and helping each other, if these arise in sequence, then it is said that each moment is different. Thus, in order to establish that one object is true, one must focus on it with the mind. If one focuses on it, then the cause of focus will generate self-grasping knowledge, because there is no difference in the nature of the object and the parts of time, so it is impossible for one true, independent object to repeatedly generate multiple different subjects. Although what was said above has been well established, it is obscured by delusion, and it is still difficult to dispel the attachment that wonders what is contradictory about having different minds focused on one true object, just like having multiple minds focused on one pot. To explain the above in more detail, when the previous knowledge exists, does the later knowledge know or not know the object of knowledge that the previous knowledge is knowing at that time? It is impossible to know, because the later knowledge has not yet arisen at that time. If it does not know, then it has become the object of knowledge of the previous knowledge, and there must be a time when it has not become the object of knowledge of the later knowledge. If so, then it is also impossible to know in the later self-time, because if it is believed that that object is the only indivisible permanent thing, then it must be the same later as it was in the beginning. If it is different from that, it will lose the nature of indivisibility and permanence. Or, in the later time, whether the previous knowledge knows or does not know, analyzing it in this way is to prevent the idea that the previous and later objects are the same. Therefore, the objects of the previous and later knowledge in their own time are different, because the later knowledge does not know the previous object, and the previous knowledge does not know the later object, there is such a difference. If such a difference is not distinguished, and the later knowledge knows the previous object, and the previous object knows the later object, then because the later object is the knowledge of what is known, the previous knowledge will also become the later knowledge, and because the previous object is the knowledge of what is known, the later knowledge will also become the previous knowledge, so the sequential knowledge, as well as the past and future, the object and the subject, etc., all distinctions will be destroyed. Therefore,
Chinese
如果次第前后相续的境成为识的对境，仅仅因为一个真实不成立，就遮止了无为法真实成立。但实际上，应考察是否成为依赖于方位的差别的一切识的对境，来区分有为法和无为法。如果不是这二者，也可以说，但实际上，凡是真实成立的所知，都要遮止。对此，无论在哪个方位、哪个时间，凡是存在的事物，都不可能有一个真实，只是在众多法上假立一个名称而已。如同截断非所知，而安立为“所知”一样；同样，截断实物的非实物，截断非实物的实物等等，总之，是对并非自性的事物进行截断的名称，虽然由分别念安立为“一”，但各个“一”中也有许多内在的差别，并且对每个差别也安立为“一”。最终，在有情、无情、微尘和刹那无分之间，虽然可以区分出许多，但却找不到唯一的一个。即使是两个无分，只要没有脱离对境，就不能成立唯一真实。因此，如果对所安立的“一”进行观察，就会发现仅仅是名言上的假立，而不能成立唯一真实。因此，像“前一刹那的识的对境也是这个，后一刹那的识的对境也是这个”之类的说法，只是在众多刹那法上假立一个名称而已。像“你所见到的这个，我所见到的也是这个”之类的，在同一时间，将不同方位的识的对境执著为唯一，也只是在对境的众多法的基础上假立一个名称而已。总之，无论是哪个方位、哪个时间的识的对境，都不可能有一个真实。那么，是否认为非实物没有可分割的部分呢？一般来说，非实物有瓶无、永无等差别。具体来说，像瓶无，也具有如金瓶无等与事物数量相同的差别。仅仅是对各自的否定对象进行截断的部分，在心中如此执著而已。因此，像在心中显现的对境，在外界丝毫也不存在。因此，凡是实物和非实物的法，只要成为不同识的对境，就应当了知该对境不成立为真实，或者不成立为唯一的自性。如果穷究考察，就像极微
English
If the objects of successive earlier and later cognitions become the domain, merely because one truth is not established, the truly established unconditioned is blocked. But in reality, should one examine whether or not it becomes the object of all cognitions that rely on different directions and times, to differentiate between the conditioned and the unconditioned? Even if one says it is neither of these two, in essence, whatever is a truly established object of knowledge is negated. Regarding this, in whatever direction or time, for everything that exists, one truth is impossible; it is merely a designation upon many dharmas. Just as by cutting off what is not an object of knowledge, it is established as "object of knowledge"; similarly, the non-thing that cuts off the thing, the thing that cuts off the non-thing, etc. In short, it is a term that cuts off what is not oneself, and although it is established as "one" by conceptual thought, even within each individual "one" there are many internal distinctions, and each distinction is also designated as "one." Ultimately, between sentient and insentient, particles and momentary indivisible parts, although many can be distinguished, a single one cannot be found. Even for two indivisible parts, as long as they are not separated from the object of focus, truth as a single entity cannot be established. Therefore, if one examines everything that is established as "one," one will find that it is merely a nominal designation, and a single truth cannot be established. Therefore, statements such as "This is also the object of the earlier cognition, and this is also the object of the later cognition" are merely designations upon many momentary dharmas. Statements such as "This that you see, I also see this"—the grasping of the object of cognition of different directions as a single entity at the same time—is merely a designation upon the many dharmas that are the basis of designation of that object. In short, whatever is the object of cognition of direction and time, one truth is impossible. Now, if one thinks that non-things have no parts to be divided, generally, non-things have distinctions such as the absence of a pot, complete absence, etc. Specifically, even for something like the absence of a pot, it possesses as many distinctions as there are things, such as the absence of a golden pot. It is merely that the mind grasps a part that is merely a cutoff of its respective object of negation in that way. Therefore, there is not even a little that exists independently outside of something like an object that appears in the mind. Therefore, whatever dharmas of things and non-things become the object of different cognitions, one should understand that that object is not established as true, or is not established as the nature of a single entity. If one takes the extreme of investigation, like atoms
Chinese
如果某事物是唯一真实的，那么它不可能在其自身范围内被认为是微小的。因为在那之上，必须不存在其他事物的区分。如果这样，除了它之外，所有其他的所知都必须是不存在的。即使在所知的范畴内有任何事物被认为是真实的，也与此类似。对于像微尘一样被认为是唯一真实的事物，从方位的角度来看，在所有可以安立由有情相续所摄持的各种不同意识的名称中，如果有什么没有缘取那个境，那么在那个境上，就可以安立那么多没有缘取的法之区分。从时间的角度来看，在所有有情的无数劫、年、月、日、时、刹那的意识中，如果有多少没有缘取，那么就可以安立和那些数量相同的没有缘取的法。并且，可以区分出与非意识、非瓶子等不是它自身的那部分所知相同数量的区分。而且，从相反的角度来看，即使有多少方时的意识缘取了，也可以安立被那个和那些所缘取的微尘为多种法。如果是微小的、是小小的、是所知等等，凡是分别假立的部分有多少，就可以变成和那些数量相同的数目，并且可以分解成多种。那么，在那些之中，唯一真实的是什么呢？如果认为在那些之中，有一个不是任何一个，而是单独唯一真实的事物，那么，由于它不能成为任何方时意识的所知，所以说它是唯一真实的，不也只是一个承诺吗？那些是无数的，所以那些作为一个法的自性而唯一真实也是不可能的。抓住那些之中的任何一个，说“这就是它”，也找不到一个不能再分的。如果可以区分成多种法，就不能说是唯一的；如果没有区分，就不能安立为唯一真实。那么，在所知的范畴内，要找到其他安立为唯一之法的理由，不是很难吗？总之，在所知的这个范畴内，无论是什么样的自性，只要有一个唯一真实的法，那么，所有无数的方时意识都只能缘取它，不可能缘取其他任何一个法。并且，除了它之外，方时的其他任何一个法也